

THE BIOGRAPHIES of the DALAI LAMAS

Ya Hanzhang



About the Author

Ya Hanzhang, a social scientist, was born in a family of Han origin in Linxia, Gansu Province, in 1916. At the age of twenty, on the recommendation of his friends, he was accepted as an unordained lamaist monk by the famed Labrang Monastery, where he studied spoken Tibetan and the Tibetan script. In May 1937 he went to the Drepung in Lhasa with Grand Living Buddha Jamyang as a secretary. His stay there made him an expert on this major lamasery with 8,800 monks. In April 1938, after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Ya went to Yan'an via India, Singapore and Hong Kong. In Yan'an he began his research into the history of China's ethnic minorities. Shortly after he became an assistant representative of the Panchen Headquarters in 1950, he returned to Tibet first as a member of the Tibet Work Committee and later as the committee's secretary-general and then director of its research department. He left Tibet in 1958 because of poor health to become the vice-chairman of the Institute of National Minorities in Beijing. Since 1983 he has been an advisor to this institute. He was also at different times the provost of the University of Inner Mongolia and director of the Institute of Religion of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Mr. Ya's other works include *The Problem of the Hui Nationality*, published in 1941, and *A New Chapter in Tibetan History*, published in 1979. He was also involved in the editing of the outline histories of China's more than fifty national minorities. Another important work that Ya authored after *The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas* (Chinese edition published in 1985) is *The Biographies of the Panchen Erdenis*, which will soon be off the press. At present Mr. Ya is collaborating with his colleagues on the eight-volume *The History of Atheism in China*.

The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas

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Preface to the English Edition

The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas writes of the history of Tibet with emphasis on its modern and contemporary periods. It is framed in the life stories of the successive Dalai Lamas and the main part of it is based on the biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, because the Tibetan people like to hear history told in this way. It begins with the first Dalai Lama, Gedun Truppa, and ends with the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, with the major portion of it, which accounts for two-thirds of the book, devoted to the life of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupden Gyatso.

The modern and contemporary history of Tibet is an integral part of the modern and contemporary history of China. It is at once similar and dissimilar to the history of the other nationalities and regions in China. Like the people of the other nationalities, the Tibetan people waged in different times heroic struggles against imperialist aggression and oppression, but these struggles were not exactly the same as those waged by other nationalities in China. Twice in recent history, the Tibetan people, ecclesiastical and secular, rose in arms against Great Britain. The first anti-British war they fought broke out in 1888. The British army seized Lengtu and annexed Drenjong. The second war came in 1904. The British army broke into Lhasa and imposed an unequal treaty on the Tibetan local government. Both wars were fought under the direct or indirect leadership of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. The historical role he played during these wars merits the attention of historians of Tibetan modern and contemporary history, thus this book devotes most of its space to detailed and systematic accounts of the wars and of the heroism the Tibetan people displayed in them. This is altogether fitting because the wars are part of the heroic history of Tibet and make up an integral part of the heroic history of the Chinese nation as a whole.

There existed something special in the modern and contemporary history of Tibet: the subordinate status of the Tibetan local government under the central governments of the motherland. The fact that such a relationship should have become a problem was due to the erroneous attitudes of a handful of Tibetans. Influenced by the imperialists who fomented national discord and by the separatist faction they fostered over a long period of time, these people, with no sense of righteousness, stood for Tibet's separation from the motherland. Their attitude was not only utterly incompatible with the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, but also was unacceptable to the Tibetan people themselves. Among those who frowned upon this attitude was the thirteenth Dalai Lama, who, during his temporal office, never challenged the fact that Tibet is Chinese territory. In his later years, he moved closer to the Kuomintang government, trying to improve relations with it, communicating with Chiang Kai-shek through his representatives and setting up a Tibetan affairs office in Nanjing, the seat of the Kuomintang government. All this showed that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama acted largely as a patriot should.

As a man, the thirteenth Dalai Lama was not above criticism. He made many mistakes of one kind or another; but as many factors contributed to the making of these mistakes he was not the only person to be blamed for them. In evaluating historical figures, it is important to examine them as they were. The thirteenth Dalai Lama, therefore, should be regarded primarily as a patriotic and anti-imperialist leader. All the materials testifying to his patriotism are included in this book. I shall be very glad to hear the opinions of my readers at home and abroad, especially those of Chinese and foreign experts and scholars of Tibetan history regarding my evaluation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.

What I would like to point out here is that when recalling the events in the recent history of Tibet, one cannot overlook the crimes the British imperialist aggressors committed in that part of China. But those who should be held responsible for them were those then in government in Britain; the British people had nothing to do with them, nor do those in government in present-day Britain. The revelations this book contains of British aggression against Tibet will not in any way harm the friendly relations

existing today between the peoples of Britain and China and their governments; on the contrary, they will promote an understanding between them.

In the process of writing *The Biographies of the Panchen Erdenis*, which I began after the publication of the Chinese edition of this book, I discovered from newly acquired materials that my accounts in a few places in *The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas* did not agree with the facts. These errors I have put right in the present English edition so the history of Tibet is presented here as it is.

My heart-felt thanks are due to the Foreign Languages Press, its editors, the translator and the printers whose efforts have made the English edition of *The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas* possible.

Y.H.Z.

Beijing, July 10, 1985

Part One

From the First to the Twelfth Dalai Lamas

Gedun Truppa, the First Dalai Lama

The first Dalai Lama was given the religious name of Gedun Truppa. According to the Tibetan *Biography of Gedun Truppa*, he was born in the Iron-Sheep year of the seventh Tibetan calendrical cycle* (1391 or the twenty-fourth year of Ming emperor Taizu's reign) at the Shabtu pasture near the Sakya monastery in Tsang. His father, Kongbu Dorje, and mother, Guomo Langje, had five children, of whom Gedun Truppa was the third. On the night of his birth, the house was ransacked by bandits, and the family since lived in poverty. As a child, Gedun Truppa helped his parents tend sheep.

At the age of fifteen (1405 or the third year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) Gedun Truppa became a lamaist monk after taking his vows as a *getsul* before Dondrub Kedrup at the Nathang monastery (located about fifteen kilometres west of where the Tashilhunpo monastery stands today). After he became a fully ordained monk at age twenty, he began to travel extensively in Ü. At the Dradruk monastery, he studied *Cause and Logic* and *The Middle Way* under the tutorship of Kunzanpa. At the time, Tsongkhapa had acquired fame as the founder of the Yellow Sect (the Ge-lug-pa Sect). In 1415 (the thirteenth year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) he was giving sermons to monks and laymen in Drashi Dokha at the invitation of Drakpa Gyaltsen, the fifth reli-

* The Tibetan calendar is based on a sixty-year cycle, with each year designated by a combination of one of the names of twelve animals and that of the five elements, i.e., Iron-Horse year, Wood-Ox year, Water-Tiger year, etc.

gious king of the Phag-dru regime. Gedun Truppa, now twenty-five years old, went to these sermons with his teacher, Dondrup Kedrup, and became acquainted with Tsongkhapa.

Tsongkhapa, also known as Lozang Drakpa, was born in the seventeenth year of Zhizheng in the reign of the Yuan emperor Shundi (1357) at Tsongkha near the city of Xining in Qinghai Province. He became a monk at the age of seven and took his *getsul* vows before Dondrub Rinchen. At seventeen (1372 or the fifth year of Ming emperor Taizu's reign) he went to Tibet to study Buddhist philosophy. In 1385, when he was twenty-nine years old, Tsongkhapa took his *gelong* vows before Tsutrim Richen at the Namgyal monastery in Yarlung.

By now many religious sects, each with its sub-sects, had come into being in Tibet. Among them were the Nying-ma-pa Sect (Red), the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White), the Sa-kya-pa Sect (Variegated) and the Bon-po (Black). Of the four the Ka-gyu-pa and Sa-kya-pa sects were the most influential and had the biggest followings. "But as the two sects tried to outnumber each other by recruiting converts, devoted and scholarly monks in the two sects diminished in number, and by the late Yuan and early Ming dynasties, the teaching of exoteric and esoteric Buddhism had been greatly weakened; except for a handful of highly principled monks, few knew anything about monastic discipline, and the monks dressed in lay attire."

Buddhism came to Tubo (as Tibet was known in the Tang dynasty) during the reign of King Songtsen Gampo (circa mid-seventh century). The Jokhang and Ramoche temples in Lhasa were constructed at this time. When Trisong Detsen ascended the throne (circa mid-eighth century), he sent a minister to India to invite the great Tantric master, Padmasambhava, to teach the Buddhist doctrine in Tubo. A monastery called Samye was built as Padmasambhava's residence, where he ordained monks and translated Buddhist texts. Thanks to his missionary efforts Buddhism began to gain ascendancy in Tubo, and by the time of King Tritsug Detsen (commonly known as Ralpachen, circa early ninth century) Buddhist monks were very much in evidence all through Tubo.

* *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

This was a time referred to in Tibetan history as the Previous Propagation Period. But when Darma (commonly known as Lang Darma) succeeded to the throne, he dealt Buddhism a crushing blow. Monks were forced to return to secular life, and "most of those who refused were slaughtered. Buddhist texts were buried, burned or thrown into rivers. The images of Sakyamuni in the Jokhang and Ramoche were destroyed. The Samye was sealed up and most of other monasteries were razed to the ground." Only a small number of monks survived the persecution by fleeing to Kham. This period is known in Tibetan history as the Destruction of Buddhism, and when King Darma was assassinated by a lama, Tubo was thrown into great chaos. More than two decades later, slaves rebelled in many parts of the kingdom. The rebellions took a heavy toll on the slave-holding aristocrats, and Pelkortsan, King Darma's grandson, was also killed. Nyimagon, Pelkortsan's son, fled to Ngari with a number of his men. There he established a small regime and became King Shangshung or King Guge, as he was known in Tibetan history. The nine-year slave uprising (869-977) led to the collapse of the Tubo dynasty, and Tibet became a scene of perpetual wars between rivaling tribes, who carved up Tibet into numerous spheres of influence. Buddhism suffered a severe setback. Only a handful of monks were able to teach the doctrine secretly at their residences. These monks later became known as *nying-ma-wa* (followers of the Old Sect) or the Red Hats, as they are referred to in Han language histories.

Chaos reigned in Tibet for about two centuries. Then in 1042 (the second year of Qingli in Song emperor Renzong's reign) Atisha, the great *pandit*, came to Ngari from India at the invitation of the king of Ngari, Lha Lama Yeshe Od, to propagate Buddhism and help Rinchen Zampo with the translation of Buddhist scriptures. Thanks to his efforts, Buddhism began to win the respect of the people in Tibet.

When he preached in Ü-Tsang, Atisha took many disciples; among them were Changchub Od, Nagtso Tsutrim Gyelwa and Tromtonpa, who was the most famous of them all. This was a time referred to in Tibetan history as the Post-Propagation Period.

* *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

In 1054 (the first year of Zhihe of Song emperor Renzong's reign) Atisha died in Nyethang, Tibet. Tromtonpa, who inherited his alms bowl and mantle (which give their recipient the status of legitimate successor), continued his effort, preaching and taking disciples. In 1057 (the second year of Jiayou in Song emperor Renzong's reign) Tromtonpa built the Radreng monastery in northern Tibet, and when he had commanded a sufficient following, he founded the Ka-tam-pa Sect (the Doctrinal Sect). Later when this sect merged with the Ge-lug-pa Sect established by Tsongkhapa, it ceased to exist.

In 1073 (the sixth year of Xining in Song emperor Shenzong's reign) a young aristocrat by the name of Konchog Gyalpo built the Sakya monastery in Tsang. The monastic studies there consisted of seventy-two secret practices and fourteen subjects, which were taught only within the walls of the monastery. They all underscored the exercise of breath and the cultivation of the mind. Celibacy was not imposed on the monks, but they were not allowed to come into physical contact with women after they had their first child. Konchog Gyalpo also had his men preaching in Ü and Kham, recruiting converts and establishing monasteries. His missionary effort resulted in the emergence of an independent sect called the Sa-kya-pa Sect (Variegated).

Meanwhile, Marpa (1012-1097 or the fifth year of Dazhong in emperor Zhenzong's reign to the fourth year of Shaosheng in emperor Zhezong's reign, both of the Song dynasty), a native of Lho Dra in Tibet, went to India to study Buddhism. When he returned to Tibet, he established the Dagpo-ka-gyu-pa Sect, which, like the Shangpa-ka-gyu-pa Sect founded by Junpo Nagyor, was a sub-sect of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White). A sect of tantric Buddhism, the Dagpo-ka-gyu-pa was devoted to the acquisition of the ability to swallow knives, belch hot air and lift oneself off the ground. Accomplished monks of this sect were said to "have acquired enough hot air in them to resist hunger and cold, to be free from being drowned or burned, and be able to walk in mid-air with perfect ease."

Marpa had many disciples. When he died, he was succeeded by

* *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

Mila, who in turn made Gampowa his successor. Gampowa founded the Gampo monastery about 1121 (the third year of Xuanhe in Song emperor Huizong's reign) in Dagpo (southeast of Lhasa). The sub-sect he founded was known as the Dagpo-ka-gyu. In 1158 (the twenty-eighth year of Shaoxing in emperor Gaozong's reign of Southern Song dynasty) Phagmo Drupa, a native of Kham, built the Thil monastery in Phag-dru in southern Tibet. This sub-sect was called Phag-dru-ka-gyu. In 1187 (the fourteenth year of Chunxi in Southern Song emperor Xiaozong's reign) Dusong Chenpa constructed the Karma monastery in Tshurphu (west of Lhasa). The sub-sect he instituted was named the Karma-ka-gyu. Later on, thanks to the effort of the missionaries it sent to Kham and Inner Mongolia to preach and build monasteries, the Ka-gyu-pa Sect became as influential as the Sa-kya-pa Sect.

Meanwhile, Drikung Rinchenpel, one of Phagmo Drupa's disciples, built the Drikhung monastery in Drikhung (northeast of Lhasa) in 1179 (the sixth year of Chunxi in Southern Song emperor Xiaozong's reign), and established the Drikhung-ka-gyu. In 1180 (the seventh year of Chunxi in Southern Song emperor Xiaozong's reign) another disciple of Phagmo Drupa, Taglungpa Trashipel, constructed the Taglung monastery in Taglung (north of Lhasa). This sub-sect was called the Taglung-ka-gyu. And there was the Yasan-ka-gyu, with its Yasan monastery built by Chomonlam, who was trained by Yeshe Sengge, still another disciple of Phagmo Drupa's. In 1175 (the second year of Chunxi in Southern Song emperor Xiaozong's reign) the Tshalpa-ka-gyu had its Tshal and Gungthang monasteries built near Lhasa by Shan Tsepa, a disciple of Gampowa's. Another disciple of Gampowa, Darma Wangchug, erected the Barom monastery in Barom in northern Tibet, and established the Barom-ka-gyu. There was also the Drophu-ka-gyu, with its Drophu monastery built by Rinchengon, the nephew of still another disciple of Phagmo Drupa by the name of Gyatsa.

At the same time, Lingre, also a disciple of Phagmo Drupa, preached and built a monastery in Drug-yul (modern Bhutan). This sub-sect, known as the Drugpa-ka-gyu, was an independent sect.

Of these numerous sub-sects of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect, the most important were the Phagmo-ka-gyu, Drikhung-ka-gyu and Karma-

ka-gyu. As recorded in *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality* and *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet*, these three sub-sects commanded mass local followings and had administrative power and their own armed forces.

According to the two books, General Dorta Nagpo, by order of Prince Godan, Yuan emperor Ogodai's son, led an army into Tibet about 1240 (the twelfth year of Ogodai's reign). Dorta Nagpo's army "reached Kongpo in the east, Nepal to the west and Mon (Tawang) in the south. It subdued the chieftains there, bringing them under submission." When Dorta Nagpo conquered Tibet, he said to Godan, "In Tibet today the Ka-tam-pa has the largest number of monasteries. The ruling lama of the Taglung-pa is very well known for his virtuous deeds; Ginnga Rimpoche of the Drikhung (Drikhung-ka-gyu-pa) is endowed with great supernatural power; and Sakya Pandita (abbot of the Sakya) is well-versed in the Five Knowledges of Buddhism. I suggest that Your Highness arrange for their invitation."** Godan acted accordingly, inviting Sakya Pandita to teach in Mongolia. In 1244, Sakya Pandita, at the advanced age of sixty-three, started for Liangzhou (now Wuwei County, Gansu Province), taking with him his nephews Phagspa and Chakna Dorji, aged eleven, and seven, respectively. In Liangzhou he met with Godan and negotiated the terms for the submission of Tibet to the Mongol khan, and the kinds and amounts of tribute to be paid. According to the Tibetan *Sakya's Lineal Descriptions*, Sakya Pandita sent a letter to all the religious sects and local chiefs in Tibet, advising them to give their allegiance to the Mongol khan and to pay tribute to the Mongol court, warning that refusal to do so would spell their doom. He also asked each of them to make a list in triplicate of their officials, troop strength and the amount of tribute to be paid, for Prince Godan, the Sakya monastery, and the reference of the local chiefs concerned.

Sakya Pandita lived in Liangzhou at a temple especially built for him by Godan for seven years. He died there in 1251, leaving Phagspa and Chakna in Liangzhou.

The following summary accounts are based on a study of *The*

* *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet.*

** Ibid.

History of the Yuan Dynasty, the New History of the Yuan Dynasty, Tibetan Painted Scrolls by Giuseppe Tucci, and other historical documents in both the Tibetan and Han languages.

After winning a military campaign in Dali (in Yunnan Province) in 1252, Kublai returned victoriously the next year. At Liupanshan (in Gansu Province), he sent for Sakya Pandita. As Sakya had died, the envoy returned with Phagspa and Chakna. Kublai took them to Kaipingfu (later known as Shangdu). Phagspa was then only nineteen years old, and Chakna fifteen. In 1255 Phagspa left Shangdu for a brief period of time. After taking his vows as a gelong before Drakpa Senge at a place bordering Han and Tibetan regions, he returned to Shangdu. In 1258 Kublai called for a debate to be conducted in his presence between two teams, each with seventeen members, representing Buddhism and Taoism respectively. Phagspa, who was on the Buddhist team, won the debate and, as a result, the respect of Kublai. In 1260 (the first year of Zhongton) when Kublai ascended the throne in Shangdu, he granted Phagspa the title of "State Tutor" and a jade seal. In the same year the khan sent to Tibet a party of officials headed by Ta-men to take a census and set up post-staging stations (called jam-mo in Tibetan).

Twenty-seven post-staging stations were established connecting the hinterland with Tibet. Seven of them were in Dotud (upper Gansu and Qinghai), nine in Domed (lower Gansu and Qinghai), four in Ü (Anterior Tibet) and another seven in Tsang (Ulterior Tibet). The stations provided government officials and messengers in transit with accommodations and a change of horses (In 1281 during the third census, four more stations were added in Ngari, bringing the total to thirty-one). Each station had several sub-stations, each of which was one day's journey by horse from the next. Serfs or slave herdsmen were assigned to them to work as details. According to *The History of the Yuan Dynasty*, each station was provided with funds in silver equivalent in worth to one hundred horses, two hundred yaks and five hundred sheep. (In 1287 military post-staging stations were set up, probably as supply depots for the Mongol army stationed in Tibet.)

The census counted each smoking chimney as one household, and each household, in addition to the payment of an annual tax,

had to make one person available for unpaid labour under a system called *ula*.

In 1264 (the first year of Zhiyuan), Kublai moved his capital from Shangdu to Dadu (modern Beijing). He established a General Council (re-named Political Council in 1288) which "exercised administrative authority over Buddhist monks and Tubo. Its pacification commissioners, with seals of authority, handled specific issues regarding Tubo."* The General Council was the highest Yuan government agency in charge of Tibetan affairs. It had two chief councillors with the second highest government rank. Sanggo, a Mongolian, was one of its first two chief councillors, and the other one was Phagspa. As one of the top ranking Yuan government officials, Phagspa shared Tibetan administrative responsibilities with Sanggo.

In 1265 (the second year of Zhiyuan) Phagspa was sent back to Tibet by Kublai on two important missions: to devise a script for the Mongolian language and to put the local administration in order. The first thing he did was to set up the Larang and instituted the post of *ponchen* (administrator). Larang, which literally means a lama's private residence, was a huge administrative body with a large staff. It handled the day-to-day religious and administrative affairs under Phagspa's supervision. Nominally Phagspa was the Sakya ruling lama, but he did not attend to these affairs personally; it was the *ponchen* who took care of the day-to-day work in accordance with his instructions. The first *ponchen* was Shakya Zampo, who was nominated by Phagspa and approved by Kublai as the "head of three Ü-Tsang *wan hu* (ten thousand households)" and was given a silver seal of authority. The head of *wan hu* was a full third rank official, the same as Darkhache, but the religious sects in Tibet had by now grown so powerful that it became highly questionable whether Phagspa was able to keep things under control. In view of this Kublai in 1268 (the fifth year of Zhiyuan) sent Akon, Milin and other officials to Tibet to assist Ponchen Shakya Zampo in a second census. On the basis of this census, thirteen *wan hu* with a head for each were installed in Ü-Tsang. The heads were nominated by the Sakya ruling lama and appoint-

* *The History of the Yuan Dynasty.*

ed by the Mongol khan. According to *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet*, Tshalpa, Drikhungpa, Phagmo Drupa and Yazangpa of the Ka-gyu-pa sect were each given a *wan hu* head. This means that of the thirteen *wan hu* heads, four belonged to the Ka-gyu-pa sect, and with two more heads for Gyama and Thangpoche, there were six *wan hu* heads in Ü. Another six were installed in Tsang for Latulo, Latu-gyang, Gumo, Chumig, Shang and Shalu, and one for the Yardrol Lake region. Of these *wan hu* heads, all of whom sect leaders or wealthy serf-holders, the biggest and most powerful were those of Tshalpa, Drikhung and Phagmo.

In 1269 (the sixth year of Zhiyuan), Phagspa went to Beijing with the Mongol script he had devised and personally presented it to Kublai Khan. "The khan was highly pleased with Phagspa's script and granted him temporal power, making him the first cleric ever to be entrusted with such authority." The khan conferred on him the title of "The Great Treasure Prince of the Dharma," and appropriated to him all the tax revenues of the thirteen *wan hu* for "his personal use." Phagspa remained in Dadu, and continued to be the chief councillor, leaving the administrative responsibilities of the Sakya regime in the hands of the Sakya *ponchen*.

To strengthen his government's rule in the Tibetan region, Kublai instituted in 1272 (the ninth year of Zhiyuan) the Pacification Commissioners General Office in the Three Regions of Ü, Tsang and Ngari, headed by five commissioners of the junior second rank. The fact that the commissioners were one rank higher than the Sakya *ponchen* is clear indication of their greater political power. Tibetan historical documents show that at least two Sakya *ponchens* served concurrently as pacification commissioners. This means that the commissioner's office was not held exclusively by the *ponchen*. It was these five commissioners who were virtually the highest authority in running Tibetan political and military affairs. They not only had jurisdiction over the thirteen *wan hu* in Ü-Tsang, but the Mongol army stationed in Tibet as well, as they had under them two commanders of the Mongol army in Ü-Tsang and two regional garrison commanders of Ngari. They also had under them one officer in charge of the civil and

* *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet.*

military post-staging stations in Ü-Tsang.

In 1276 (the thirteenth year of Zhiyuan) Phagspa returned to the Sakya under the escort of Prince Chengem sent by Kublai. In 1280 (the seventeenth year of Zhiyuan), Phagspa died suddenly at the age of forty-five. The posthumous title granted him by Kublai was "Lord Under the Divine Sky, Propagator of Literature of the Court, Great Sage of the Highest Virtue, Profound Wisdom and Accomplished Enlightenment, Imperial Protector, Great Treasure Prince of the Dharma, Prince of the Deities of Paradise, Imperial Preceptor."

Founder of the Sakya regime in Tibet, Phagspa (1235-1280) was its first ruling lama who sat at its head for only fifteen years, beginning in the year he instituted the *ponchen* (1265) to the year of his death.

Phagspa was succeeded by Dharmapala, who ruled the Sakya for seven years (1281-87). After Dharmapala died, Sharpa Jamyang Rinchen Gyaltsan reigned for nineteen years as regent (1288-1306; the Yuan government never approved his succession to Dharmapala). In 1306 (the eleventh year of Dade in the reign of Yuan emperor Chengzong), Dachen (Danyi Chenpo) became the third Sakya ruling lama after he was released from exile. He ruled for twenty years until 1326. After his death, the throne was left unoccupied for three years until 1330 (the third year of Tianli in the reign of Yuan emperor Wenzong) when Namkhah Legpa became the fourth Sakya ruling lama. Namkhah Legpa stayed in power for nineteen years (1330-1349), and was succeeded by Lama Dempa Sonam Gyaltsan, who was on the throne for three years (1350-52) as the fifth Sakya ruling lama. Tawon Lodro Gyaltsan was the last in line. He ruled for three years (1352-54). Thus, beginning with Phagspa, the Sakya was at the head of the Tibetan local regime for eighty-nine years (1265-1354) with six successive ruling lamas.

In 1290 (the twenty-seventh year of Zhiyuan), when Sharpa Jamyang Rinchen Gyaltsan was the Sakya regent, the Drikhung *wan hu* head rebelled against the authority of the Sakya. Ag-len, the Sakya *ponchen*, defeated the Drikhung troops with the help of the Mongol army in Tibet, and burned the Drikhung monastery. The incident is referred to as The Disturbance of Drikhung in

Tibetan history.

During the reign of Sonam Gyaltsan, the fifth Sakya ruling lama, a feud arose between Changchub Gyaltsen, the Phagmo Drupa *wan hu* of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect, and the Sakya *ponchen*. In 1345 (the fifth year of Zhizheng in the reign of Yuan emperor Shundi) Changchub Gyaltsen, though outnumbered in troop strength, defeated the Sakya *ponchen*. Two years later in 1347, he deposed the governor of Tshalpa, gaining control of the territory and its people. And when he occupied the territory of Drikhung in 1349 (the ninth year of Zhizheng in the reign of Yuan emperor Shundi), Changchub had the entire region of Ü under his control.

Meanwhile, the ruling Sakya family had split, and by the time of its last ruling lama, it had been divided into four Larangs: the Shithog Larang of Namkhah Legpa's son, the Rinchen-gang Larang of Sonam Gyaltsan's nephew Nima Gyaltsan, the Ducho Larang of Gongkar Legpa, Dachen's son by his fifth wife, and Lha Khang Larang of Gongkar Gyaltsen, Dachen's son by his second wife. This development marked the beginning of the end of the Sakya rule.

In 1354 (the fourteenth year of Zhizheng in the reign of Yuan emperor Shundi), Changchub Gyaltsen, taking advantage of the internal strife of the Sakya family, made war on the Sakya. His troops surrounded its monastery, routed its defenders, killing more than four hundred and capturing the *ponchen*. The troops seized and took back to their garrison an enormous amount of jade and silk, accumulated by the successive Sakya kings as imperial tutors of the Yuan court. With this the reign of the Sakya came to an end and was replaced by Changchub's regime, known as Desi or the Phag-dru. At his request, the Yuan emperor Shundi in Beijing, whose government was also on the verge of collapse, conferred on him the title of Da Situ (Grand Duke), a title that was to accompany his name thereafter, and appointed him the administrator of Tibetan local affairs.

The Desi regime had its capital city in Nedong (now Nedong county in Lhoka). "The city had three walls. Strict Buddhist discipline was maintained in its innermost section where no wine or woman was allowed. In the outer sections, ten rules for good conduct were followed without violation. The Situ himself was a highly self-disciplined man. He abstained from wine, and did not

eat after noontime. A fine example for the monastic and secular population, he was universally accepted as the ruling lama."^{*} He had a *drung chen* (secretary-general) working under him, attending to the day-to-day affairs.

Changchub's regime marked a period of economic growth in Tibet. In the early fourteenth century (late Yuan and early Ming dynasties) many manorial estates (known as *shika* in Tibetan) had appeared or enlarged in the Lhoka region. Knowing the impact they would produce on the economy, Situ Changchub spared no effort to bolster their growth. And when manorial estates came into existence in Ü-Tsang following the founding of Changchub's regime, they had become a dominating social institution in Tibet.

While promoting the growth of manorial estates, Situ Changchub, by an important decision he made, abolished the thirteen *wan hu* in Ü-Tsang (according to historical records in the Han language, Emperor Chengzu of the Ming dynasty terminated the office of *wan hu* on the grounds that the name did not correspond to the reality. The emperor's decision indicates that the abolition of *wan hu* by Changchub had the subsequent approval of the Ming government), and replaced them with districts (*dzong*), beginning with seventeen in the Lhoka region and increasing in number later. The heads of the districts, called *dzongpon*, were directly appointed by the ruling lama and were put in charge of the estates in their districts.

Another important political decision Situ Changchub made was the granting of manorial estates to his followers for their meritorious performances (a practice similar to the granting of fiefdoms that had been followed previously in the Han regions). As these estates were hereditary, a new aristocracy began to emerge.

Situ Changchub died in 1364. He was succeeded by his nephew, Shakya Gyaltsen, as the second ruling lama of the Phag-dru regime. The Yuan dynasty had been overthrown by then, and the man on the throne was Emperor Taizu of the succeeding Ming dynasty. In 1372 (the fifth year of Hongwu) Shakya Gyaltsen sent an envoy to pay homage to the emperor who granted him the title of State Tutor and a jade seal of authority.

^{*} *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet.*

According to *The History of the Ming Dynasty*, the Tibet policy of the Ming government was in the main a continuation of the policy followed by the previous Yuan government. "In the early years of his reign, Emperor Taizu, in view of the upheavals in Tubo during the Tang dynasty, contemplated ways to keep the region under control. He decided that the best approach to achieving that end was to make use of the traditional influence of the ecclesiastics among the populace, and made this policy widely known in Tibet through his envoys. He also dispatched an official from Sha'anxi Province by the name of Xu Yunde to Tibet to bring to the nation's capital and install as Ming officials Tibetans who had held official posts in the Yuan government. Therefore, an envoy bearing gifts was sent to the Ming court by Namgyal Palzangpo, the Regent Imperial Tutor in Ü-Tsang. The envoy arrived in the capital in the twelfth month of the fifth year (of Hongwu)... All sixty former Yuan officials mentioned above were given new official posts by the emperor. The title of Regent Imperial Tutor was changed to Brilliant Treasure Buddha State Tutor."

In 1369 (the second year of Hongwu) two governorships were created for Dogan (Qinghai and Xikang) and Ü-Tsang (Tibet); Sonam Odser was appointed the Dogan governor and Gonchog Odser that of Ü-Tsang, with silver seals of authority. In 1385 (the eighteenth year of Hongwu), Pegyur Zangpo was made governor-general of Ü-Tsang. These Tibetans were probably all former Yuan officials, and because they had pledged allegiance to the Ming dynasty, they were reinstalled in positions equivalent to those they had held in the Yuan government.

The Ming government spared no effort to foster Tibetan Buddhism. According to *The History of the Ming Dynasty*, the title of Prince of the Dharma went to many Tibetans with epithets such as Great Treasure, Great Vehicle, Great Compassion, Great Kindness, Great Augur, Great Virtue, etc; those given the title of prince included Propagation Prince of Persuasion, Promotion Prince of Virtue, Guardian Prince of the Doctrine, Propagation Prince of the Doctrine, Assistance Prince of the Doctrine and many others, and those with the titles of State Initiation Master and State Tutor were even more numerous. These were the manifestations of Emperor Taizu's religious policy, which was based on the belief that the best

approach was to make use of the traditional influence of the ecclesiastics among the populace. But in spite of these efforts, the Tibetan region remained under the control of the Phag-dru regime of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect.

According to Tibetan historical records, the third ruling lama of the Phagdrü was named Dragpa Jangchub. *Imperial Records of the Ming Dynasty* says that he paid tribute to the Ming court in 1374 (the seventh year of Hongwu).

Sonam Dragpa was Phag-dru's fourth ruling lama. *The History of the Ming Dynasty* records: "In the twenty-first year (of Hongwu, or 1388) Sonam Dragpa informed the emperor of his succession by his younger brother Drakpa Gyemtsen Palzangpo on account of his illness. Drakpa Gyemtsen Palzangpo was named State Initiation Master and began to pay tribute (to the Ming court) every three years."

Dragpa Gyaltsen (or Drakpa Gyemtsen Palzangpo, as he is referred to in *The History of the Ming Dynasty*), Phag-dru's fifth ruling lama, was granted by Emperor Chengzu in 1406 "the title of Prince *Chanhua* (Prince of Persuasion) and State Initiation Master along with a jade seal with a hydra-shaped top-knob, five hundred *liang* of silver, three brocade robes, fifty bolts of silk and two hundred *jin* of tea. The next year (1407) he was assigned by the emperor the task of restoring post-staging stations in conjunction with the Guardian Prince of the Doctrine, the Promotion Prince of Virtue, the State Tutor Beli Gungwa, the governors of Beli, Dogan and Longda and the tribes in Sichuan and Tibet.... From then on, the roads stretched unobstructed for thousands of *li* and government envoys in transit travelled along these roads without fear of being attacked by bandits."* Indeed, Dragpa Gyaltsen did a very important thing when he restored the stations to working order.

In addition, Dragpa Gyaltsen drew up a number of regulations that had the force of law. Known as The Sixteen Laws among Tibetans, these regulations helped in maintaining civil order.

There is no record of war or other disturbances in Dragpa's time except for two limited military operations by his troops in Gyantse. He continued the practice established by Situ Changchub of mak-

* *The History of the Ming Dynasty.*

ing inspection tours to manorial estates and carried on with the Situ's policy of giving priority to economic development. As many historical records in Tibetān show, Dragpa Gyaltsen's time was a time of stability, economic prosperity and cultural development, marking the apogee of the Phag-dru regime. According to *The History of Tibetan Kings and Ministers* by the fifth Dalai Lama, Dragpa Gyaltsen decreed that clothing should be class-distinctive. On festive days members of his family would go to banquets in expensive clothes and heavily bejeweled; on ordinary days they wore precious stone earrings as indicators of their superior social status. What is revealed by this record is that the ruling class in Tibet had by now become inclined to a life of extravagance and that a feudal hierarchy had matured.

Religiously, Dragpa Gyaltsen was a patron of the Ge-lug-pa Sect (Yellow) founded by Tsongkhapa, although the ruling lama belonged to the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White). Tsongkhapa once studied under Dragpa Jangchub, Phag-dru's third ruling lama. *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet* records: "The Great Master Tsongkhapa expressed his reverence for the ruling lama by worshipping his feet.... Dragpa Jangchub, on account of his writings, held Tsongkhapa in respect."

By the time he was thirty-four years old (1390 or the twenty-third year of Hongwu in Ming emperor Taizu's reign), Tsongkhapa had become a scholar steeped in Tantric Buddhism and initiation rituals. *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality* records: "From seventeen to thirty-six years of age, Great Master Tsongkhapa studied extensively, and meditating on the instructions of the *yidam* in solitude, gained access to all doctrinal teachings. From age thirty-eight on, he studied exoteric and esoteric Buddhism in all its aspects and was rewarded with the understanding of its true teaching." Disappointed by the unorthodox practices of the Sa-kya-pa and Ka-gyu-pa sects, which had deviated from the doctrine of Buddhism and showed no respect for religious discipline, Tsongkhapa resolved to form a new sect, which was later called the Yellow Sect or the Ge-lug-pa Sect. It stressed respect for discipline, encouraged austerity, imposed celibacy, and prohibited wine and killing. All his disciples were required to examine themselves daily for violations of discipline.

Offenders had to take immediate steps to cleanse themselves of the sins committed. The sect gave priority to the study of exoteric Buddhism, which its monks had to complete before they could advance to the study of esoteric Buddhism.

Tsongkhapa did not have many followers during the early days of his missionary effort because Tibet was then ruled by the Ka-gyu-pa Sect. In 1392 when he was thirty-six years old, he began to take disciples; the first group he took numbered thirteen. It was not until his later years that his disciples grew in number. In 1409 (the seventh year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign), with the financial help of Drung Chen Rinchen Pel, he found the Ganden monastery to provide for his disciples.

Of the disciples Tsongkhapa had, eight were very well known; they were, in order of fame, Gyaltsub Je, the first and "most eminent of the Great Master's disciples"; Khedrub Je (the first Panchen Lama), Dulzin Drakpa Gyaltsen, Jamyang Choje, Shakya Yeshe, Togdan Jampel Gyamtsho, Jetsun Sherab Sengge and Gedun Truppa, the first Dalai Lama. Gedun Truppa was the last disciple Tsongkhapa took when the great master was fifty-eight years old (1415 or the thirteenth year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) and five years after the founding of the Ganden monastery.

Tsongkhapa, at the age of forty-five (1401 or the third year of Ming emperor Huidi's reign), began to write the scriptures of the Yellow Sect: *Lamrim Chenpo* (A Complete Course of the Order of Bodhi) and *Nyagki Lamrim* (A Complete Course of the Order of Tantric Buddhism). In 1409 (the seventh year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) he instituted the Monlam festival of prayer and alms giving, a religious event also known as "the Yellow Sect's essential rite." In this effort Tsongkhapa again had the financial help of Rinchen Pel, but the most important donor to the institution of the festival and the founding of the Ganden monastery was Dragpa Gyaltsen, the fifth ruling lama of the Phag-dru regime.

In 1414 (the twelfth year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) Dragpa Gyaltsen invited Tsongkhapa to teach in Drashi Dokar *The Middle Way, Cause and Logic, the Order of Bodhi and Entry into Perfection*, tenets of the Yellow Sect. Moved to utmost admiration by Tsongkhapa's sermons, Gedun Truppa began to study the doctrine of the Yellow Sect under his tutelage. In 1416 (the

fourteenth year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign), with huge donations from Rinchen Zangpo, the *dzongpon* of Newu, Jamyang Choje, under the instructions of Tsongkhapa, founded the Drepung monastery in Lhasa's western suburb, and became the monastery's first *khenpo* (abbot).

On the twenty-fifth day of the tenth month by the Tibetan calendar in the year 1419 (the seventeenth year of Ming emperor Chengzu's reign) Tsongkhapa, *tripa* (abbot) of the Ganden died at the age of sixty-three. Gyaltsub Je, his topmost disciple, succeeded him as Ganden's second abbot. He presided over the monastery "for thirteen years, and was revered by the great master's disciples as much as was the great master himself."

In 1419, the year of Tsongkhapa's death, Shakya Yeshe, under the instructions of Tsongkhapa, began the construction of the Sera monastery in the northern suburb of Lhasa. He visited China twice. The first visit was made in the twelfth year of the Ming emperor Chengzu's reign (1414). The emperor had sent four imperial envoys to Tibet for Tsongkhapa, inviting him to preach in Beijing. Tsongkhapa declined the invitation, but sent Shakya Yeshe in his stead. In Beijing the emperor conferred on Shakya Yeshe the title of "Prince of the Western Deities and Grand State Tutor." After the completion of the Sera monastery, Shakya Yeshe visited the capital city for the second time and received the title of "The Great Compassion Prince of the Dharma" in the ninth year of the reign of the Ming emperor Xuanzong (1434). Later, he "brought the Yellow Sect to the interior,"^{*} propagating its doctrine in Mongolia and other regions.

After the death of Tsongkhapa, Gedun Truppa continued his study of exoteric and esoteric Buddhism under Gyaltsub Je, the second abbot of the Ganden, and proclaimed Gyaltsub Je to be his best tutor on exoteric Buddhism. When Khedrub Je (the first Panchen Lama) was unanimously chosen as Ganden's third abbot by its monks following the death of Gyaltsub Je, Gedun Truppa became Khedrub Je's disciple, and studied many essential theories under him. Later, when he returned to Tsang, Gedun Truppa

^{*}*The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

^{**}Ibid

"preached in Gyanchen, Tanag and Riku, and his disciples kept growing in number."

In 1447 (the twelfth year of Ming emperor Yingzong's reign) Gedun Truppa founded the Tashilhunpo monastery near Samdrubtse (modern Shigatse) with the financial help of Chungyepa Pelgyor Zangpo, Samdrubtse's *dzongpon*. When the monastery was completed, he became its first abbot. In 1450 (the first year of Ming emperor Daizong's reign) Gedun Truppa was offered the abbotship of the Ganden that had been left vacant by the death in 1438 of Khedrub Je, the monastery's third abbot. Gedun Truppa declined the offer, saying, "I cannot go there, for my monastery has not yet been established firmly enough for me to leave it." Upon his recommendation Baso Choje Gyaltsen, Khedrub Je's younger brother, was accepted as the fourth abbot of the Ganden.

Gedun Truppa died at the Tashilhunpo monastery in 1474 (the tenth year of Chenghua of Ming emperor Xianzong's reign) at the age of eighty-four. His first disciple, Panchen Zangpo Drashi, succeeded him as the monastery's second abbot.

Gedun Gyatso, the Second Dalai Lama

The second Dalai Lama, given the religious name Gedun Gyatso, was a native of Tanag in Tsang, a region under the jurisdiction of Shigatse *dzong*. According to *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality*, he was born into a peasant family in the Fire-Monkey year of the eighth calendrical cycle (1475 or eleventh year of Ming emperor Xianzong's reign) to Kunga Jichun, his father, and Kunga Bemo.

In 1478, three years after his birth, Gedun Gyatso was proclaimed the "soul boy" reincarnating Gedun Truppa by Gelong Droma, a relative of Gedun Truppa, and Khenpo Gongchen Chonjo of Tashilhunpo's Samtan Dratshang (institution for monastic study). This was the beginning of the system of reincarnate Dalai Lamas.

It is not the Ge-lug-pa Sect, however, that instituted the system

* *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

of reincarnate lamaist Living Buddhas; the honour goes to the Karma-ka-gyu-pa, a sub-sect of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White). In 1253 Karma Pakshi (1204-1283), leader of this sub-sect, met with Kublai at Rongyusedui. In 1256 he was received by the Yuan emperor Xianzong at Karaholin. The emperor gave him a black hat from which the sub-sect he led was to derive the name Black Hats. Karma Pakshi died in the Tshurphu monastery in 1283 after his return to Tibet. According to Tibetan historical records, Karma Pakshi was reincarnated in 1284 in the person of Rangyung Dorje (1284-1339) who later became the second ruling lama of the Black Hats. This event marked the inception of the system of reincarnate lamas. Later, the system was adopted by the Taglung-ka-gyu-pa, another sub-sect of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect; the Living Buddhas of the Taglung and Riboche monasteries were a succession of reincarnations. With this as a precedent, Gedun Gyatso was proclaimed the "reincarnate soul boy" upon the death of Gedun Truppa by his relatives and the *khenpo* of Samtan Dratshang.

At the age of eleven, Gedun Gyatso was taken by its monks to the Tashilhunpo, where he took his first vows of monkhood before an assembly of more than thirty Buddhist high priests.

When he was nineteen (1494 or the seventh year of Ming emperor Xiaozong's reign), Gedun Gyatso, because of the grudges he bore against Panchen Yeshe Tsemo, the fourth abbot of the Tashilhunpo, went to the Drepung at Lhasa for monastic studies at the invitation of its abbot, Jamyang Legpa Choje. At twenty-one, Gedun Gyatso became the abbot's disciple and took his vows as a *gelong*.

Gedun Gyatso studied Buddhist scriptures at a time when the Yellow Sect was extending its influence into Kham, Qinghai and Ngari. Tod Sherab Zangpo, a disciple of Tsongkhapa, had returned to his native Ngari after completing his study at the Ganden monastery to found the Tagmo monastery at Mangyul, and brought the Yellow Sect to the monasteries of the older sects of lamaism. Meanwhile, Sangphu Lhawang Lodro, Khedrub Je's disciple, established the Bargya and Liging monasteries in the Ngari. "As a result of these efforts, the Yellow Sect established itself in all parts

of Ngari.”*

A lama from Kham by the name of Jangsem Sherab Zangpo returned to Chamdo after completing his monastic studies at the Sera. In Chamdo he founded the Jampaling monastery. Following his death, the monastery was left under the charge of Phagpa Lha, who automatically became its abbot. Phagpa Lha, from whom Phagpu Lha Hutuktu of today is descended, had many disciples; they founded a large number of Yellow Sect monasteries in Kham.

The Yellow Sect, while laying great emphasis on the study of exoteric Buddhism, does not exclude esoteric Buddhism. Jetsun Sherab Sengge, Tsongkhapa's disciple and an expert in esoteric Buddhism, was the founder of Gyudmedpa Dratshang or the Lower Tantra Apartment. Later, another such institution was established by Kunga Dondrub. As it was situated in a position higher than that of its predecessor, it was called Gyudodpa Dratshang or the Higher Tantra Apartment.

After he completed his study, Gedun Gyatso travelled in Ü, Tsang, Lhoka and Dagpo, giving sermons. In 1509 (the fourth year of Ming emperor Wuzong's reign) he founded the Monastery of Chokhorgyal on Lhamo Latsho in Lhoka.

When Gedun Gyatso was in Lhasa, Panchen Yeshe Tsemo, Tashilhunpo's fourth abbot, came and asked him to return to the monastery to take charge of its monastic affairs. He complied, but lived in the Tashilhunpo for only a few years before he went back to Lhasa. Later on he divided his time of residence between the Drepung in spring and winter and the Chokhorgyal in summer and fall, as the lake on which the Chokhorgyal was situated offered beautiful scenery.

In his later years, Gedun Gyatso became the tenth abbot of the Drepung at the request of its monks, and in like manner he was at the same time made the ninth abbot of the Sera.

Gedun Gyatso's residence at the Drepung, which was built for him when he was the tenth abbot of the monastery, was called Ganden Phodrang. It was also the abode of three succeeding Dalai Lamas, and became a synonym of the local regime established by the fifth Dalai Lama.

* *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality.*

During the latter part of Gedun Gyatso's life, the political situation in Tibet was beginning to show signs of instability. With the decline of the Phag-dru regime, Rinpungpa Norzang, a big aristocrat in Tsang, proclaimed himself king in Samdrubtse in 1435 (the tenth year of Ming emperor Xuanzong's reign). His respect for the regime's rule was only nominal, for he had virtually established a separatist rule. Later on, Rinpungpa Dondrub Dorje, with his base in Samdrubtse, became exceedingly strong and his troops repeatedly invaded the territories (of the Phag-dru regime), and when Phag-dru's ninth ruling lama, Ngagi Wangchu, died, Rinpungpa Dondrub Dorje became "the regent of the Nedong court with enormous power."

Allied with the Karma-ka-gyu-pa, Dondrub Dorje was hostile to the Ge-lug-pa Sect. From 1498 until 1517, when he had military control of Lhasa, the monks of the Drepung and Sera monasteries were not allowed to attend the Monlam, an annual prayer festival instituted by Tsongkhapa that took place in January. The ban was lifted in 1518 after Phag-dru's tenth ruling lama recaptured some of his power in Lhasa and drove out Dondrub Dorje's troops from the city in 1517.

In 1537 (the sixteenth year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign) the Ge-lug-pa Sect and the Drikhung Ka-gyu of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect clashed. During an attempted military attack on the Ganden monastery, the troops of the Drikhung Ka-gyu were ambushed at Worka by the defenders of the Ganden and turned back. But the attackers succeeded in forcing eighteen monasteries of the Yellow Sect over to their camp.

All these developments indicate that Gedun Gyatso had a hard time during the last few years of his life, being attacked and persecuted by both the religious forces of the Karma-ka-gyu-pa and the Drikhung Ka-gyu-pa, and the secular forces of the serfholders in Tsang represented by the Rinpungpa family.

In 1542 (the twenty-first year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign), Gedun Gyatso, the second Dalai Lama, died in the Drepung at the age of sixty-seven.

* *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet.*

Sonam Gyatso, the third Dalai Lama

Sonam Gyatso, the third Dalai Lama, was the son of a minor aristocrat in Todlung in Ü. *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality* records the following:

"On the fifteenth day of the first month in the Water-Hare year (1543 or the twenty-second year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign) Sonam Gyatso was born in Todlung near Lhasa. His father was named Namysel Dragpa, the *dzongpon* of Jungyel, and his mother was called Padzong Buchi.... At the age of four (1546) the soul boy was brought to the Drepung. At seven (1549) he took his *getsul* vows from Sonam Dragpa, then the Drepung's abbot. At age eleven (1553), when Sonam Dragpa resigned as abbot, Sonam Gyatso was chosen by the monks as the monastery's twelfth abbot. He was ordained into full monkhood by Geleg Palzang when he was twenty-two years old (1564 or the forty-third year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign)."

Sonam Gyatso then went to preach in the Tashilhunpo monastery and travelled in the Lhoka and Dagpo regions, giving sermons and taking disciples. When he returned to Lhasa, he became Sera's thirteenth abbot at the request of its monks.

The greatest success Sonam Gyatso achieved in his life was bringing the Yellow Sect to Inner Mongolia and converting all the Inner Mongolians to that sect of Buddhist faith. In this endeavour he had the support of Altan Khan of Mongolia.

In 1559 (the thirty-eighth year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign) Altan Khan was leading the Tumed Mongols into Qinghai from the east. The Ming government, not able to check the advance of the Mongols, was compelled to adopt a policy of mollification. In 1571 (the fifth year of Ming emperor Muzong's reign) the Ming court granted Altan Khan the title of Prince Shunyi (righteousness).

By the time Altan Khan arrived in Qinghai, the Ge-lug-pa Sect (Yellow) had firmly established itself there. The prestige the sect enjoyed among the people there produced positive influence on Altan Khan. As Sonam Gyatso had by now won the great respect of Tibetan religious communities, Altan Khan sent a mission to Tibet in 1576, inviting the lama for a meeting with him in Qinghai. Sonam Gyatso accepted the invitation. In November 1577, he

started from the Drepung in Lhasa, and in May the next year he met with the Mongol Khan in Yanghua Temple (constructed in 1574) in Qinghai. The meeting was followed by an exchange of honorific titles between the two men: the one Sonam Gyatso received from Altan Khan was "All-Knowing Vajra-Holder, the Dalai Lama," and the one he conferred on Altan Khan was equally imposing: "King of the Turning Wheel and Wisdom."

"Dalai" is Mongolian for "ocean"; "lama" is Tibetan meaning "guru." Sonam Gyatso was the first lamaist monk ever to be granted the title of Dalai Lama. Gedun Truppa was named the first Dalai Lama and Gedun Gyatso the second only posthumously.

There existed among the Mongols, most of whom were believers of Shamanism, the uncivilized custom of the wife sacrificing herself to her deceased husband. There was also the practice of slaughtering a large number of camels and horses as sacrificial offerings to the dead. Sonam Gyatso talked Altan Khan into terminating such practices; for that he won the respect of the Mongolians. They gave up their old religious faith and converted themselves to the Yellow Sect, a welcome change.

The Ming government did not like Altan Khan's presence in Qinghai, but for a time it did not know what to do about it. But when it learned that the Mongol khan held Sonam Gyatso in great respect and valued his advice, it instructed in 1578 (the sixth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign) Hou Donglai, governor of Gansu Province, to extend to Sonam Gyatso an invitation for a meeting with the governor in Gansu. During the meeting the governor was to ask the Dalai Lama to persuade Altan Khan to take his men back to Inner Mongolia. According to *The History of the Ming Dynasty*, when discussing the invitation, Altan Khan told Sonam Gyatso to accept it. The Dalai Lama arrived in Gansu in winter. He was received with as much pomp as was Phagspa, and stayed in the Druple Monastery, where Phagspa had been accommodated. From the monastery he sent a letter to Zhang Juzheng, the prime minister of the Ming government. Its full text reads:

I, Sakyamuni Gelong Sonam Gyatso Pal Zangpo, am prostrating myself with joined palms before the Court and beg to speak to Your Excellency, Prime Minister Zhang. I have learned of your name, which shines like the sun and the moon and which is known throughout the

world. I wish you the best of health. I pray day and night for the well-being of His Majesty. I am now in Ertan in Ganzhou and reporting the local affairs to the Court. The horses and the other things have arrived, also the awards bestowed upon me and Prince Chanhua (propagation of virtue). I beg to be granted the special privilege that my predecessors enjoyed. I pray in the name of His Majesty and his ministers day and night for universal peace as an expression of my good faith. The gifts that come with this letter include a statue of the four-arm Avalokitesvara, two bolts of Tibetan woolen fabric and a diamond button. I will, as Your Excellency wishes, tell Prince Shunyi to return home at the earliest date.

Written in the early part of the twelfth month of the Tiger year (1578)*

According to *The History of the Ming Dynasty*, Zhang Juzheng, fearing that his acceptance of the letter and gifts might be considered inappropriate, reported the matter to the emperor, who told him to accept them and granted Sonam Gyatso the tribute-paying right.

This letter of great historic significance testifies to at least two important facts. First, Sonam Gyatso did an important thing for the Ming emperor that the emperor himself was incapable of achieving: Acting upon the emperor's wishes, he got Altan Khan back to Inner Mongolia. Second, this event brought the Dalai Lama into formal contact with the Ming government.

At this time the Ming government had not granted Sonam Gyatso any titles, but the permission it gave him to make gifts to the court amounted to acknowledging the high position he held in Tibetan religious circles, for the tribute-paying right was reserved for persons with the status of a ruling lama or state tutor.

After the meeting with Hou Donglai, the Gansu governor, Sonam Gyatso returned to Qinghai.

In 1579 (the seventh year of Ming emperor Shenzhong's reign) Altan Khan left Sonam Gyatso and took his men back to Tumed in Inner Mongolia. Hutuktu Yonten Gyatso, Sonam Gyatso's representative, went with him on missionary duties there.

Before he left Qinghai, Sonam Gyatso went to the quarters of Noyan, Altan Khan's son, to lay the foundation stone for a lamasery there. Meanwhile, Sengge Lama, who had been sent by Altan Khan

* *Complete Works of Zhang Juzheng, Memorial to the Throne Number Eight.*

to distribute alms to the three great monasteries in Tibet, brought back to Qinghai a letter in which the monks of the monasteries asked Sonam Gyatso to return to Tibet. Sonam Gyatso did not comply, but went to Kham on sermon-giving trips. In 1580 (the eighth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign) he reached Lihang, where he officiated at the initial worship ceremonies for the new Buddha statue in the Lihang Monastery. He then travelled to Mangkam and Chamdo, giving sermons and taking disciples.

In 1583 (the eleventh year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign), when he returned to Qinghai, he preached in the Monastery of Kumbum at the request of Senchong Ngangso, chief of a tribe near the monastery, and of Chongtse Gyaltzen, the monastery's abbot. They built for him a residence called Sengkam Gongma. The monastery, whose name means "the tree of origin" in Tibetan, was Tsongkhapa's birthplace. Legends say that after Tsongkhapa was born, a bodhi tree appeared near his birthplace, laden with 100,000 leaves, each bearing an image of the Buddha. A small monastery had been built there in 1560 (the thirty-ninth year of Ming emperor Shizong's reign) with the funds raised by the local Buddhists. It was Kumbum. Sonam Gyatso had it expanded with the financial help of the Tibetan and Mongolian tribal chiefs in its vicinity.

In 1583, the year Sonam Gyatso returned to Qinghai, Altan Khan died, and Sengge Dugureng Khan, successor to Altan Khan, asked Sonam Gyatso to come to Inner Mongolia to pray for Altan Khan. The Dalai Lama accepted the invitation and started from the Kumbum in 1584. He made many stops to give sermons along the way and in 1585 he reached Yikshabar on the right bank of the Silawusu in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. There he held talks with the Mongol princes and mediated an end to a war between three Mongol tribes. In 1586 Sonam Gyatso arrived in Guihua (now Hohhot), met with Sengge Dugureng Khan and performed prayer ceremonies in memory of Altan Khan. Soon after that, Sengge Dugureng Khan died and was succeeded by his son Shelik as Prince Shunyi.

While in Inner Mongolia, Sonam Gyatso spared no effort to build up the Yellow Sect there. He founded the Siradutai Monastery in the city of Guihua. In 1587 (the fifteenth year of Ming emperor

Shenzong's reign) he visited the eastern part of Inner Mongolia at the invitation of Tumen Khan, leader of the Chahar tribe. The visit gave him the opportunity to preach and take many disciples in that part of Inner Mongolia. In the same year, Teji Abadai of Khalkha came all the way from Outer Mongolia to visit the Dalai Lama, who gave him the honorific title of "Nomen Khan, Khan of Vajra-Holder." These activities are indications that the Yellow Sect had by then firmly established itself in all parts of Outer and Inner Mongolia.

In 1588, Prince Shunyi, in a letter to the Ming government, asked it to grant Sonam Gyatso the title of "Dorje Chang." The request was granted by Emperor Shenzong. "Dorje Chang" is Tibetan for "holder of the vajra", the title that Sonam Gyatso had received from Altan Khan. Emperor Shenzong, as requested by Shelik, sent officials to Inner Mongolia with an invitation to Sonam Gyatso to meet with the emperor in Beijing and give sermons there. The Dalai Lama accepted the invitation and left for the Ming capital. But death intervened; on March 26, 1588, he died at Kha'otomi in Inner Mongolia at the age of forty-six.

During the years Sonam Gyatso lived outside Tibet (1577-88), the region continued to be a scene of internal political strife. Among the major incidents that took place was the outbreak of an armed rebellion in Tsang led by Shingshapa Tsetan Dorje. He took Samdrubtse (Shigatse *zhong*) by force, deposed his superior, Rinpungpa Dondrub Dorje, Phag-dru's regent, and seized political power. Rinpungpa's son, Padma Karpo, was among those killed by the rebels. As Shingshapa was in the camp of the Karma-ka-gyu-pa, the rebellion was one of the internal struggles for power between factions of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White).

Yonten Gyatso, the Fourth Dalai Lama

The great-grandson of Altan Khan of Mongolia and son of Sumirteching Hongthaigi, Yonten Gyatso, the fourth Dalai Lama, was born in 1589 (the seventeenth year of Ming emperor Shen-

** Imperial Records of the Ming Dynasty.*

zong's reign or the Earth-Ox year of the Tibetan tenth calendrical cycle). His mother was named Tsunmo Tare Ampahan Chola. He was the only Dalai Lama who was not Tibetan by origin but Mongolian.

Yonten Gyatso was first identified by native Mongols as the soul boy reincarnating Sonam Gyatso. In the identification process Peljor Gyatsho, the third Dalai Lama's private treasurer, and Gun-song Tsepa, Yonten Gyatso's tutor, played an important role, and their claim that the boy was the true reincarnation had the support of Inner Mongolian princes, princesses and Hongthaigi.

However, as the Dalai Lama had by now virtually become the head of the Tibetan Ge-lug-pa Sect, the recognition of a soul boy by Mongolians alone had no authority; he had to be accepted by the three great monasteries (Ganden, Sera, Drepung) of the Yellow Sect. So the monasteries acted in a most prudent manner in regard to reports of the discovery of a soul boy in Inner Mongolia in the person of Yonten Gyatso. They sent a delegation there in 1592 to verify the reports. When they returned to Tibet, it is said, they went into a long discussion before they decided to recognize Yonten Gyatso as the soul boy reincarnating his predecessor.

In 1602 (the thirtieth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign), the three monasteries sent their representatives to Inner Mongolia to give their official recognition of Yonten Gyatso and bring him to Tibet. The next year he was enthroned in the Radren Monastery and was brought to the Drepung for monastic study. He took the vows of a *getsul* from Lozang Chogyel, the fourth Panchen Lama and Tashilhunpo's abbot, and Gedun Gyaltzen, the abbot of the Ganden.

In 1607 he went to the Tashilhunpo and lived there for some time, studying under Lozang Chogyel and becoming the abbot's good friend. Lozang Chogyel, as the fourth Panchen Lama, was preceded by Khedrub Je (1385-1438), the first Panchen and a disciple of Tsongkhapa; Sonam Choglang (1439-1504), the second Panchen and the Lesser Living Buddha of the Bengon Monastery in Tsang, and Lozang Dondrup (1505-66), the third Panchen and another Lesser Living Buddha of the Bengon.

Lozang Chogyel (1567-1662) was the first Panchen to become Tashilhunpo's abbot at the request of its monks. He won the

honorific title of Panchen because he was well-versed in the Five Knowledges of Buddhism. In 1614 (the forty-second year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign) he went to the Drepung at Yonten Gyatso's invitation and ordained the Dalai Lama into full monkhood. Soon after that, Yonten Gyatso became Drepung's thirteenth abbot at the request of its monks, and at the same time was chosen by the monks of the Sera Monastery to be its fifteenth abbot.

On December 15, 1616 (the forty-fourth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign), Yonten Gyatso died in the Drepung Monastery at the age of twenty-eight after living in Tibet for only fourteen years.

There is no evidence supporting the claim that Yonten Gyatso was assassinated by men sent by Tsangpa Khan. What is known for a fact is that the political picture in Tibet had by now greatly changed: The entire Tsang region had fallen into Tsangpa Khan's hands and Tsangpa Khan was hostile to the Yellow Sect.

Tsangpa Khan, whose name was Tanchong Wangpo, was Shingshapa Tsetan Dorje's great grandson and was in the camp of the Karma-ka-gyu-pa of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White). As mentioned earlier, the Karma-pa sect had become a fairly influential faction by the early years of the Yuan Dynasty. One of its ruling lamas, Karma Pakshi, was granted an audience with the Yuan emperor Xianzong at Karaholin, and received from the emperor the title of State Tutor along with a gold trimmed black hat that made him known as Kar-ma-pa's "Black Hat Ruling Lama." When another ruling lama of the sect went to Beijing, the Yuan emperor gave him a red hat, and he thus became known as Kar-ma-pa's "Red Hat Ruling Lama."

The General History of Tibet records: "During the reign of the Ming emperor Shenzong, Yang Ying, a court attendant, was sent there (Tibet) and on behalf of the emperor granted the Red Hat and Black Hat *hutuktus* of the Tshurphu and Yelong monasteries, Karmapa and Shamana, the title of 'Buddha of Great Kindness in the West, Great Treasure King of Dharma, State Initiation Master,' along with seals of authority." The Kar-ma-pa was the most powerful of religious sects in Tsang. Rinpungpa Norzang, who declared himself king in Samdrubtse in 1435, and Shingshapa Tsetan Dorje, who deposed Rinpungpa and replaced him as the king of Sam-

drubtse, were both aristocrats belonging to the camp of the Karma-pa Sect.

In 1612 (the fortieth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign) when Karma Phuntsok Namgyal's army captured all the forts in Tsang, the region came under his unified leadership; and when the forts in Ü fell before the assaulting troops of his son, Tanchong Wangpo, in 1618 (the forty-sixth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign), the Karma regime was established. Tanchong Wangpo made the Kar-ma-pa's tenth ruling lama, Choyin Dorje, the ruling lama of all Tibet, and called himself Tsangtu Gyelpo or Tsangpa Khan as he is referred to in Chinese historical records.

The following is a brief chronology of the rule of the Phag-dru regime in Tibet.

The regime was founded by Situ Changchub Gyaltsen (1302-64) after he toppled the Sakya regime in 1354 (the fourteenth year of Yuan emperor Shundi's reign). It had the recognition of the Yuan emperor who granted Changchub Gyaltsen the title of Situ. He reigned for eleven years (1354-64) as the region's first ruling lama.

Phag-dru's second ruling lama was Shakya Gyentsan (1340-1373). Granted the title of State Initiation Master by Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty in 1372, Shakya Gyentsan reigned for nine years (1365-72).

Dragpa Jangchub (1365-86), the regime's third ruling lama, stayed in power for only eight years (1374-81). Says *Imperial Records of the Ming Dynasty*: "In the eighth year of Emperor Taizu's reign, by an imperial decree... a Phagmo Drupa *wanhu* was installed."

The regime's fourth ruling lama, Sonam Dragpa (1359-1408), reigned for a very brief period of four years (1381-1385). He was the recipient of the title of "State Initiation Master" given by the Ming emperor Taizu in the twenty-first year of his reign.

Drakpa Gyeltsen (1374-1432), the fifth ruling lama of the Phag-dru regime, stayed in power for forty-seven years (1385-1432). He was granted the title of State Initiation Master and Prince Chanhua in the fourth year of the Ming emperor Chengzu's reign (1406).

Phag-dru's sixth ruling lama was Dragpa Gyungne (1414-48). He reigned for fourteen years (1432-46) and received the title of Prince Chanhua from the Ming emperor Yingzong in 1440.

Sangye Gyeltsan (1396-1468, father of the preceding ruling lama) reigned as Phag-dru's seventh ruling lama for twenty-two years (1446-68). He was granted the title of Temporary Successor to Prince Chanhua by the Ming emperor Yingzong in 1446.

The eighth ruling lama of the Phag-dru regime was Kunga Legpa (1433-95). He reigned for twenty-seven years (1468-95) and received the title of Successor to Prince Chanhua from the Ming emperor Xianzong in 1469.

Ngagi Wangchu (1438-1510) was Phag-dru's ninth ruling lama for fifteen years (1495-1510). He never received the title of Prince Chanhua the Ming emperor Xiaozong conferred on him in 1497 (the tenth year of the emperor's reign); he died before the emperor's envoy could reach Tibet for the awards ceremony.

Phag-dru's tenth ruling lama, Ngawang Drashi Dragpa (1499-1571) was granted the title State Initiation Master and Prince Chanhua by the Ming emperor Shizong in the forty-second year of his reign (1563). He reigned for fifty-three years (1518-71), but his rule was only nominal; the real power was in the hands of Rinpungpa Dondrub Dorje, who for eight years (1510-18) was the "acting regent" of the regime.

Drowa Gonpo (1568-1618) reigned as Phag-dru's eleventh, also the last, ruling lama for forty-seven years (1571-1618). He was granted the title of State Initiation Master and Prince Chanhua of Phagmo Drupa in Ü-Tsang by the Ming emperor Shenzong in the sixth year of his reign. The year he was overthrown by Tsangpa Khan was 1618, or the forty-sixth year of the reign of the Ming emperor Shenzong.

The Phag-dru regime lasted through a succession of eleven ruling lamas from Situ Changchub Gyaltsen to Drowa Gonpo. It ruled Tibet for 264 years (from the fourteenth year of the reign of Yuan emperor Shundi till the forty-sixth year of the reign of Ming emperor Shenzong).

Religiously, both the Karma regime and the Phag-dru regime it toppled belonged in the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White), but with the Phag-dru regime, it was the Phagmo Drupa faction that was in power, while in the case of the Karma regime it was the Kar-ma-pa faction that was in control. So the Karma was actually another regime established by the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White).

The Karma regime was founded two years after the death of Yonten Gyatso. After its establishment, the Ge-lug-pa Sect (Yellow) became a target of its ruthless persecution and devastation. According to *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality*, the Ka-gyu-pa Sect was "at the time hostile to the Yellow Sect and tried to exterminate it. When Karma Shadon, Karma Phuntsok Namgyal and Karma Tanchong Wangpo ruled, they all attempted to destroy the Yellow Sect." The book goes on to say: "As Tsangpa Khan was a supporter of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect, he acted repressively towards the Yellow Sect."

According to conventions of the Yellow Sect, the reincarnating soul boy had to be found upon the death of Yonten Gyatso. According to *A Brief Political and Religious History of Tibet*, "Tsangpa Khan, suspecting that his illness was caused by curses laid upon him by the Dalai Lama, banned any search for the Dalai Lama's reincarnation. It was only after repeated pleas of Lozang Chogyel, the Panchen Lama, that he lifted the ban and the search began." The biography of Lozang Chogyel says that Tsangpa Khan consented to the search because the Panchen Lama had cured him of a serious illness when his doctors had failed to do so.

Lozang Gyatso, the Fifth Dalai Lama

Lozang Gyatso, the fifth Dalai Lama, was born in 1617 (the forty-fifth year of Ming emperor Shenzong's reign or the Fire-Snake year of the tenth Tibetan calendrical circle) in the Chongye region (modern Lhoka) in Ü. His father, Dradul Rabtan, was a small serf-holder and served as a *dzongpon* during the Phag-dru regime. Lozang Gyatso's mother was named Kunga Lhaze.

When Lozang Gyatso was six years old (1622), Lozang Chogyel, the fourth Panchen Lama, had him moved to the Drepung monastery by the monks of the three great monasteries. He took his *getsul* vows from the Panchen in 1625, and in 1637 was initiated into full monkhood by him. In the same year Gushi Khan of the Oirat Mongols arrived in Tibet disguised as a pilgrim to seek religious instruction. Gushi Khan, who held the Dalai Lama and the Panchen in great respect, brought Lozang Gyatso many gifts and presented

the Panchen with two thousand *liang* of silver. The Panchen later became his religious instructor.

According to *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet*, Gushi Khan was the leader of one of the four major tribes of the Oirat Mongols, a nomadic tribe in the Urumchi region in Xinjiang and the regions north and south of the Tianshan Mountains. In 1637 (the tenth year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign) he led his tribe into Qinghai. Qinghai was then ruled by the chieftain of Chogthu Mongols. Gushi Khan, after "wiping out the forty-thousand-strong army of the Chogthu Mongols and killing their chieftain," occupied the whole of Qinghai, and brought all the Mongol and Tibetan tribes there under his rule. His newly acquired territory "reached the Qinghai Lake to the east." Two years later, in the twelfth year of the reign of the Ming emperor Sizong, he took his army to the Ganze region in Kham, and after killing Donyo Dorje, the *tusi* (local headman) of Beri, he occupied what is today Derge, Ganze, Danko, Palyul and Sershud. He then left these places to the charge of his subordinates and collected annual taxes from them.

In Tibet, Desi Tsangpa Khan was at the time the chief administrator of the Karma regime. As related earlier, he and Karmapa tried by every means to stamp out the Yellow Sect. But the Yellow Sect had become a very popular religious faith in Qinghai, Kham, Ü, Tsang, Ngari and even Mongolia, and in the nearly 180 years of development since Tsongkhapa, the sect had won the massive support of the Tibetan people. So it was only natural for the Yellow Sect to seek ways to stem the tide of persecution the Karma-pa Sect was bringing upon it. In 1641 (the fourteenth year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign), the fifth Dalai Lama, after consultation with the fourth Panchen, secretly sent for Gushi Khan in Qinghai, asking him to lead his army into Tibet. (The biography of the fourth Panchen says that the Panchen was generally believed to have been the mastermind of Gushi Khan's entry into Tibet). *Sequel to the Illuminating History of Tibet* records: "At the time the ministers of the Karma regime had usurped power and continued the regime's persecution of the Yellow Sect. The khan (Gushi Khan), upon reports of these developments, led his army westward from Qinghai and put an end to the Karma regime. By the

Water-Horse year, all the chieftains in Tibet had submitted themselves to the rule of the khan, who thus became the leader of the three regions in Tibet.... Then the khan placed all the political and religious power of running Tibet in the hands of the fifth Dalai Lama." In 1642 (the fifteenth year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign) the Ganden Phodrang regime was established by the Dalai Lama with Gushi Khan in actual control of all Tibet, thus replacing the Karma regime, which ruled Tibet for only twenty-three years (1618-41).

After Gushi Khan and the Ganden Phodrang achieved political power in Tibet, they confiscated all the land and serfs in the possession of the sects and their aristocrats that had victimized the Yellow Sect. The confiscated property was shared by the monasteries of the Yellow Sect (called *choshi* in Tibetan), the aristocrats (*gershi*) that supported or had helped the sect, and the government treasury (*shunshi*). This redistribution of wealth represented a step toward the maturity of the rule of Tibet by the three major feudal lords. According to *Records of Imperial Martial Power*, the statistics provided by the fifth Dalai Lama for *Lifan Yuan* (Board for National Minority Affairs) of the Qing government in 1733 (the eleventh year of Qing emperor Shizong's reign) showed that the Yellow Sect had by then a total of 3,477 monasteries in Tibet with 316,230 monks, of which 3,150 monasteries with 302,560 monks were under the Dalai Lama and 327 monasteries with 13,670 monks belonged to the Panchen. The total number of households of serfs that worked for these monasteries was 128,190 (6,752 of them worked for those of the Panchen faction), and with an average of five serfs to each household, there were approximately 640,000 serfs working for the monasteries.

The fifth Dalai was Tibet's ruling lama, but he did not attend to administrative affairs personally; these were left to the charge of a *depa* (customarily referred to by the common people as Tibetan chief administrator). The first *depa* was Sonam Raptan who remained in office for seventeen years (1642-58). He was succeeded by Drinle Gyatso. The *depa* who replaced Drinle Gyatso was Lozang Thuthops, Dalai's Chodpon Khenpo (official in charge of religious ceremonies). He was succeeded by Lozang Jinpa, Dalai's Yempa. After Lozang Jinpa, Sangye Gyatso was appointed *depa*.

Before the Dalai Lama assumed secular power, he lived in Ganden Phodrang in the monastery of Drepung. Lhasa was at the time not the capital city of Tibet. It was the capital in Songtsen Gampo's time, but during the Sakya regime, the monastery of Sakya served as the seat of government. When the Phag-dru regime ruled Tibet, it had its capital in Nedong, which the Karma regime moved to Shigatse. It was the fifth Dalai Lama who moved the capital back to Lhasa again. And when the reconstruction of the Potala Palace he ordered was completed, he moved his residence there from the Drepung. The Potala was first built by Songtsen Gampo, the king of Tibet. *A General History of Ü-Tsang* says: "Songtsen Gampo, of Buddhist faith, studied Buddhist scriptures on a hill in Lhasa that he called Potala (Buddha mountain).... Thus the Potala Palace fortress was constructed. It had a bridge that led to and from the palace. The palace, except for the Hall of Avalokitesvara, was destroyed by the rebellious soldiers of Mangsong. When the fifth Dalai Lama was in charge of religious and civil affairs, he had Phodrang Karpo (White Halls) built to the east and west of the Hall of Avalokitesvara. Later, Depa Sangye Gyatso had another hall, Phodrang Marpo, the Red Hall, constructed in the middle with Buddhist halls and living quarters above and below it." That is what the Potala Palace looks like today.

Since Tsongkhapa instituted it, the Monlam Festival had taken place every year in the first month of the Tibetan calendar. In its first days the festival was an occasion to collect alms for the monks of the three great monasteries. After the fifth Dalai assumed office, he made the festival a major event that lasted from the third day of the first month till the twenty-fifth day, during which period all the lamaist monks were provided for by the government. The Dalai Lama also stipulated that during the festival, the Lhasa city government was to be run by the Iron-Club Lama of the Drepung with the right to punish the city's inhabitants at will. A lantern show on the night of the fifteenth day, and horse races and archery competitions on the twenty-fourth day were added to the festivities.

Before he became the head of the new regime, the fifth Dalai Lama was the Drepung's fifteenth abbot and concurrently the seventeenth abbot of the Sera. Because of that, from the fifth Dalai Lama on, the abbotships of the two monasteries were filled exclu-

sively by the Dalai with a *khenpo* taking care of the monastic affairs on his behalf.

Now Gushi Khan had occupied Tibet after overthrowing the Karma regime, and stood squarely behind the Ganden Phodrang headed by the fifth Dalai. But the remnant forces of the previous regime were still active in various parts of Tibet, organizing armed rebellions against the new government. In October 1642 (the fifteenth year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign) the lamas of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect rose in rebellion in the region of Kongpo, southeast of Lhasa. They put the Monastery of Zingche to the torch, burning to death more than five hundred lamas of the Yellow Sect. Later on, Namling *dzong* in Tsang was seized by the troops of Katcha and Songyaling, and Rinpung *dzong* in the same region fell into the hands of Dreyul Gyaltsenwa of Tsang. It took Gushi Khan as long as two to three years to put down these uprisings.

The Ganden Phodrang regime was founded at a time when the Ming Dynasty was on its last legs. In the hinterland war was raging and corruption prevailed in political life. Meanwhile, a Qing government had come into existence in the Northeast, having wrested Tongsheng and Inner Mongolia from the Ming Dynasty. It was against this background that Sechen Chogyel, a lama of the Yellow Sect, returned to Tibet in the first year of the Ganden Phodrang after fulfilling his missionary duties in Inner Mongolia. He suggested to the Dalai and the Panchen that a goodwill mission be sent to the Qing emperor (referred to as Choskyi Gyelpo in the Tibetan chronology). After consultation with Gushi Khan, the Dalai and the Panchen decided to send Sechen Chogyel to Shenyang as their envoy. In 1642 Sechen Chogyel left Tibet. Upon his arrival in Mukden (Shenyang) the next year, he was greeted by "Emperor Taizong, his princes and court officials outside the Huaiyuan Gate. After the emperor and his retinue performed the prostration rituals to heaven, Sechen Chogyel delivered to him a letter from the Dalai Lama. The emperor showed him special respect by taking the letter in a standing position." Sechen Chogyel was the emperor's guest "for eight months and was sent back (in the fifth month of the next year). On his departure the emperor and his princes threw a sumptuous farewell banquet on the military parade ground in his

honor.”* In 1644 (the first year of Qing emperor Shizu’s reign) Sechen Chogyel returned to Lhasa with autographed letters and gifts from the Qing emperor to the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, the ruling lama of the Sa-kya-pa Sect, the Bhutan Hutuktu and the ruling lama of the Kar-ma-pa Sect. The letter to the Dalai lama read:

I, the wise, tolerant and benevolent Emperor of the Great Qing Empire, am writing to you, the Dalai Lama, Great Holder of the Vajra. With great pleasure I received your letter through your envoy and am pleased to know of your intentions of salvaging worldly beings through spreading the teaching of the Buddha among them. I take this opportunity to send you my best regards. I have asked Gelong Chahan, Gelong Palayangar, Gelong Lakapa, Gelong Nomqi, Gelong Nomkan, Gelong Samutan and Gelong Kungecholdrar to pass my messages orally to you. Accompanying this letter are my gifts for you; they include a gold bowl, two silver pans, three silver tea jars, an agate cup, two crystal cups, six jade cups, a jade pot, two suits of gilded armour, two decorative pouches, two saddles, a gold-inlaid jade belt, a gilded silver belt, two small daggers and four bolts of brocade.**

The exceptional treatment the Dalai’s envoy received from the Qing emperor had to do with the court’s Mongolia policy. Emperor Gaozong wrote in *On the Lamas*, “The two men (Dalai and Panchen), being the leaders of the Yellow Sect, have the absolute allegiance of all the Mongol tribes. Patronizing the sect means keeping the Mongols in peace, which is something of great significance. That is why (the two men) deserve our protection.”

After Emperor Shizu ascended the throne in Beijing, he sent envoys to Tibet with greetings to the Dalai and the Panchen and alms for the major monasteries in Tibet. The Dalai and the Panchen, likewise, sent their men to Beijing, paying homage to the court and bringing to the emperor Tibetan local products as gifts. In 1651, two envoys of the emperor, Choka Lama and Sherab Lama, arrived in Tibet with the emperor’s invitation to the fifth Dalai Lama for an audience with him in Beijing. The next year (1652), the Dalai Lama left for Beijing with a large entourage of 3,000 Tibetan officials and attendants. In Qinghai he was greeted by Shagu Dayal Kang, a high-ranking official of *Neiwufu* (Office of

* *Records of Qing Emperor Taizong.*

** *Ibid.*

Palace Affairs) sent by the emperor for the purpose, and was provided with food supplies from the state granary. At Genshi, the Dalai was granted the special privilege by the emperor of entering the capital city in a yellow palanquin. On the sixteenth day of the twelfth month of that year, the Dalai Lama arrived in Beijing. Before his arrival, the Manchu and Han court officials had debated on the welcoming ceremonies for the Dalai Lama. As Outer Mongolia had not "submitted" itself to the Qing, the Manchu officials asked the emperor to meet the Dalai outside the city wall of Beijing. They said that "if His Majesty greets the Dalai in person, it would help a great deal in obtaining the submission of the Kharkha Mongols (Outer Mongolians) to the Court ... without His Majesty being converted to Lamaism." The Han officials objected, arguing that "it would be inappropriate for His Majesty, the supreme ruler of the country, to meet Dalai Lama in that manner. A prince representing him might be sufficient for that purpose." Emperor Shizu struck a compromise by which he would give the impression that he had "run into" the Dalai while he was on a "hunting trip" at Nanyuan in the capital's southern suburb, and welcomed him conveniently.

When the Dalai arrived in the capital, the emperor gave a banquet in his honour at Taihe Hall in the Forbidden City, and gave him as gifts 550 *liang* of gold, 11,000 *liang* of silver, 1,000 bolts of brocade and large quantities of jewels, jade articles and horses. The Dalai Lama was accommodated at Huangsi (Yellow Palace), which had been built for him.

In 1653 (the tenth year of Emperor Shizu's reign) the Dalai Lama asked the emperor: "I beg to return home as the climate here is affecting my health and the health of those in my retinue." The emperor then provided the Dalai with an escort of Manchu soldiers led by Prince Heshu Chengtse to accompany him to Taika. On his departure, the emperor went to Nanyuan personally and gave the Dalai a farewell banquet in the Deshou Temple.

During his stop-over at Taika the Dalai Lama received a title-conferring gold-gilt album and a gold seal of authority from the emperor through Lochu Langchu, Minister of Rites, and Xi Dali, Vice-Chairman of the Board for National Minority Affairs. The gold seal bore in Manchurian, Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan the

inscription "The Seal of the Dalai Lama, Buddha of Great Compassion in the West, Leader of the Buddhist Faith Beneath the Sky, Holder of the Vajra." The fifteen-leaf album was inscribed with the following text, also in the four languages:

I hear that keeping to one's self and benefiting others are acts different only at the outset, and those of serving this world and the other one represent merely differences in approach, for these acts share the final objectives of purifying the heart, restoring men to their natural state and liberating them. The late Emperor Taizong learned with great pleasure that you were a man of moral integrity, profound virtue and wisdom, and cleansed of all mundane desires, who spread the Buddhist faith with the aim of ridding men of their ignorance, and as a result of that your influence was felt in the west and your name known in the east. That is why he extended to you an invitation for an audience. As you were aware of his intentions, you promised to come in the Year of Dragon. Now I am the sovereign, governing the country by the mandate of Heaven, and am deeply impressed not only by the fact that you kept your promise but also by the easy grace with which you carry yourself, your sense of propriety, your wisdom and compassion with which you point to the way of spiritual liberation. I, therefore, bestow upon you this gold-gilt album and a gold seal bearing the title of Buddha of Great Compassion in the West, Leader of the Buddhist Faith Beneath the Sky, Holder of the Vajra, the Dalai Lama. It is my hope that you will continue to disseminate the teaching of the Lord Buddha and preach the doctrine whenever such opportunity arises for the salvation of all mundane beings.

With this message from the Qing emperor, the title of Dalai Lama was given official recognition by the Qing court and the Dalai Lama his political status in Tibet.

The title that Emperor Shizu conferred on the Dalai Lama was exactly the same as the one Altan Khan granted the third Dalai Lama except for the addition of "Buddha of Great Compassion in the West, Leader of the Buddhist Faith Beneath the Sky." The re-use of the title was necessitated by the Mongolia policy of the Qing government at that time.

Emperor Shizu knew that Gushi Khan, with a lot of power in Tibet, was not to be ignored. At the same time he granted the title to the Dalai Lama, he conferred on the Mongol khan a title with the usual gold-gilt album and gold seal of authority, although the

khan was not in Beijing but in Tibet. The inscription of the seal read in Chinese, Manchurian, Mongolian and Tibetan "Seal of the Righteous and Wise Gushi Khan." The album was inscribed with the following:

In managing state affairs a monarch attaches great importance to the presence of peace and order at the prevalence of virtue in the country. As an expression of goodwill, the Court will commend and respect any regional leaders who, dictated by their judgement, pledge their allegiance to the Court. I have learned with great pleasure that you, Gushi Khan of the Oirat tribe, are a man of virtue, righteousness, devotion and enormous sincerity, whose good deeds are a source of happiness for the people in your region. I, therefore, bestow upon you this gold-gilt album and a gold seal bearing the title of Righteous and Wise Gushi Khan. I expect you to be even more trustworthy, to make my power and wishes known far and wide, to serve as my lieutenant on the frontier regions and bring peace to them so that national security will be strengthened and lasting happiness secured.

The album and seal were given to Gushi Khan at a ceremony conducted in Lhasa by Nangnuk Shushidai, a court official of the Qing, and other officials who had come to Tibet with the fifth Dalai Lama.

The next year (1654 or the eleventh year of Emperor Shizu's reign) the Dalai visited the Panchen Lama, now eighty-three years old, in the Tashilhunpo. As master and disciple, the two men were on very good terms. The Panchen Lama had helped in the discovery of the soul boy reincarnating the fourth Dalai and in his enthronement, and had initiated him into monkhood as well. On such important matters as the request for Gushi Khan's presence in Tibet and the subsequent founding of the Ganden Phodrang regime that replaced the Karma's rule, and the establishment of ties with the Qing Dynasty that led to the Dalai's visit to Beijing, decisions were made jointly by the two men. On account of that, the fifth Dalai held the Panchen in great respect and visited him twice in the Tashilhunpo after he became the head of the Ganden Phodrang (his first visit took place in 1642 or the fifteenth year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign).

After he returned from Beijing, the fifth Dalai had thirteen monasteries of the Yellow Sect built in Ü-Tsang with the money

in gold and silver he brought back from the hinterland. These monasteries were called *ling*, and one of the thirteen *lings* was Ganden Chokhorgyal at Namling *dzong*.

The fifth Dalai was the first to set ceilings to the number of resident monks in the monasteries of the Yellow Sect in Tibet. The Ganden monastery, for example, was allowed to keep 3,300 such monks, Sera, 5,500, the Drepung 7,700, and the Tashilhunpo 3,800. These monasteries owned estates and households of serfs given to them by the government in proportion to the number of monks allowed them, and monastic commons (called *lhade* or *choshi* in Tibetan), appointed by monastery authorities, looked after the estates and collected rents in grain from them.

The fifth Dalai also introduced rules governing monastic organization, the appointment and removal of clerical officials, monastic studies and rituals, and the behaviour of the monks. These rules have remained unchanged since.

In his later years, the fifth Dalai left most of government affairs to the care of the *depa* and devoted all his energies to writing. Among the more than thirty volumes he wrote, the best known are *New Interpretation of Being*, *The History of Tibetan Kings and Ministers*, *Lectures on the Course of the Order of Bodhi* and *The Course of Introduction to Compassion*. These books were widely read and regarded as classics by Tibetan religious communities.

When Shengzu became the Qing emperor succeeding Emperor Shizu, he continued to send men to Tibet to visit the Dalai and the Panchen with letters and gifts for them. The new emperor also decided to give the Dalai five thousand *liang* of silver each year out of the tax revenue of Tachienlu as funding for the monasteries, and provided the Panchen with an annual supply of fifty bales of tea for consumption by the monks at the Tashilhunpo.

Wu Sangui, Prince *Pingxi* (pacifying the west), was at the time commander of the Yunnan garrison. Each year he sent men to Tibet to give alms to the major monasteries and was a good friend of the Dalai's. In the thirteenth year of the reign of Emperor Shengzu (1674), when Wu rebelled against the Qing Dynasty, a Mongolian army in Qinghai was ordered by the emperor to march on Yunnan via Sichuan Province. The Dalai Lama intervened. In a letter to the Qing emperor he said, "If Wu Sangui surrenders, please

spare his life, and if he persists in what he is doing now, it might be advisable to cede territories to him and make peace with him." The emperor refused. Later, when the Qing army laid siege to Yunnan, Wu Shifan, Wu Sangui's son, wrote to the fifth Dalai, offering him the territories of Gyalthang and Balung in exchange for military aid from Tibet. The letter was intercepted by Qing soldiers, but after Emperor Shengzu read it, he took no action.

In 1679 (the eighteenth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) when Sangye Gyatso became the *depa*, a split developed between the Ganden Phodrang and Gushi Khan's descendants. The *depa* was the chief administrator of Tibet, but he did not have a strong army. After Gushi Khan subdued the Tibetan rebels, he sent most of his cavalry back to the Qinghai pastures and kept eight banners of his troops stationed in the Dam grasslands where they grazed cattle. Gushi Khan himself stayed with part of his men first in Shigatse and then in Lhasa. In 1655 (the twelfth year of Emperor Shizu's reign), the khan died in Lhasa. He was succeeded by his son, Tenzin Dorje, known as Dayan Khan, and when Dayan Khan died in 1668 (the seventh year of Emperor Shengzu's reign), his son, Tenzin Dalai, became the khan, known as Dalai Khan. But the *depa*, Sangye Gyatso, resented the continued Mongol military presence in Tibet, which he found a hindrance to whatever he did. In an attempt to drive Gushi Khan's descendants out of Tibet, he colluded with Galdan, the chieftain of Dzungar Mongols in Xinjiang, in a military invasion of Qinghai, trying to weaken the position of Gushi Khan's offspring by attacking them in their base areas. A Mongol nomadic tribe in the area of what is today Yili in Xinjiang, the Dzungars were followers of the Yellow Sect. Galdan, a younger brother of the tribe's former chief, had been a monk studying at the three great monasteries in Lhasa and had been acquainted with Sangye Gyatso. When he returned to his tribe, he usurped the khanship after he murdered his brother's son, and stayed in correspondence with the *depa*. His incursion in collusion with him inflicted great damage on the Mongol Oirat tribe in Qinghai and did great harm to the prestige Gushi Khan's descendants enjoyed in Tibet.

In 1682 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) the fifth Dalai Lama died in the Potala Palace at the age of sixty-six.

"Sangye, in an attempt to monopolize power, kept the death of the fifth Dalai a secret, saying that the Dalai was too deep in meditation to be disturbed, and forged Dalai's instructions for the decisions he made."* Meanwhile, a feud had developed between the Tushetu Khan's tribe and that of Drashakatu Khan in Outer Mongolia. The Dzungar Mongols in Xinjiang, taking advantage of the quarrel, invaded Outer Mongolia and won a sweeping victory over the Kharkha Mongols. For protection against the invaders, all the Outer Mongolian tribes capitulated to the Qing Dynasty. Then Emperor Shengzu, through his envoys, asked the fifth Dalai to send a delegate to the Dzungars, asking them to terminate the hostilities and submit themselves to the Qing. Kyirong Hutuktu was dispatched on the mission by the *depa*. But Kyirong, while pretending to try to win Galdan's submission to the Qing, plotted an invasion of Inner Mongolia by the Dzungar chieftain.

In 1690 (the twenty-ninth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign), the Qing army defeated the Dzungars at Ulanpudong. Kyirong was sent by Galdan to the Qing army to appeal for peace. He feigned good faith by taking vows before a Buddha's image with the intention of delaying further action by the Qing army, and Galdan did manage to flee to Outer Mongolia with the remnants of his troops.

In 1693 (the thirty-second year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) Sangye Gyatso went to Beijing to pay tribute, a mission that he said he had been sent on by the fifth Dalai Lama. He presented the Qing emperor with a forged letter from the Dalai that said that the Dalai "because of senility had left all his government responsibilities to the *depa*, so the *depa* needed an honorific title." The Qing emperor complied, granting Sangye Gyatso a title-bearing seal with the inscription: "Seal of Butada Ahbahdi, Mentor of the Faith of the Vajra-Holding Dalai Lama, King of the Propagation of the Doctrine of the Buddha."**

In 1696 (the thirty-fifth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) a punitive expedition led by the emperor himself routed the Dzungars on the Kalulun River in Outer Mongolia, and Galdan commit-

*A General History of Tibet.

**See Records of Qing Emperor Shengzu.

ted suicide. When the emperor learned from Tibetans taken captive by the Qing army that the Dalai Lama had been dead many years, he wrote a letter to Sangye Gyatso denouncing him in stern language. The letter read:

The enemy soldiers I interrogated have all told me that the Dalai Lama has been dead for a long time, but you have kept his death a secret from me. When the late Dalai reigned, the regions in the north and northwest enjoyed peace for more than sixty years, but time and again you instigated Galdan to make war there, defying all religious principles. The Dalai and the Panchen are religious and temporal leaders, and their succession has never been interrupted. When the Dalai died, you should have informed all the ruling lamas of his death and made the Panchen the leader of the Sect founded by Tsongkhapa. Instead, you usurped his position and prevented him from coming to Beijing. When I told you to mediate peace between the Kharkha and Dzungar tribes, you sent the wicked Kyirong on that mission. During the battle at Ulanpudong, he prayed for the enemy and watched the action from a tent on a hill. When the enemy won in an engagement, he would present them with scarves, and when they could not win, he would appeal for peace on their behalf with the intention of delaying the action of my pursuing troops. He did all that because he was trying to protect the enemy. To celebrate the crushing of the Dzungar barbarians, I am sending my envoy to Tibet with a sword captured from Galdan, an image of the Buddha that Galdan's wife possessed and a good-luck symbol she carried. You will offer these things to the Dalai, tell the Panchen to come to Beijing and send Kyirong to me. If you refuse to do so, I shall order my armies in Yunnan, Sichuan and Sha'anxi to march on you and the Oirat Mongols that you may assemble. If that happens, you must not regret.

The letter that threatened with the might of the Qing Dynasty sent Depa Sangye Gyatso into great panic. The next year (1697) he wrote a confidential letter to Emperor Shengzu saying:

To the misfortune of all his subjects, the fifth Dalai Lama passed away in the Water-Dog year. For fear of unrest among Tibetans, his death was not announced. His reincarnation is now fifteen years old and has been scheduled to be enthroned on the twenty-fifth day of the tenth month in the Ox year. I beg Your Majesty to keep that a secret. As for the Panchen, he can not go to Beijing now for fear of a smallpox attack. I will do everything I can to send Kyirong to the capital, but I

beg (Your Majesty) to spare his life.

As the Qing government had not yet secured its control over Tibet at the time, Emperor Shengzu complied with the *depa*'s requests. In the same year Depa Sangye Gyatso brought Tsangyang Gyatso to the Potala Palace, where he was enthroned as the sixth Dalai Lama.

Tsangyang Gyatso, The Sixth Dalai Lama

Tsangyang Gyatso, the sixth Dalai Lama, was born in 1683 (the twenty-second year of Emperor Shengzu's reign or the Water-Hog year of the eleventh Tibetan calendrical cycle) to a peasant father, Drashi Tantsen, and mother, Tsewang Lhamo, at Yusum in the Monyul region in southern Tibet. In 1697 (the thirty-sixth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) he was confirmed by Depa Sangye Gyatso as the soul boy of the sixth Dalai, and was taken to Lhasa in September that year. En route to Lhasa, he met with Lozang Yeshe (1663-1737) in Nankartse Dzong. Lozang Yeshe shaved his head, and gave him monkhood vows and the name Lozang Rinchen Tsangyang Gyatso. On October 25, he was enthroned in the Potala Palace.

In 1701 (the fortieth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) Dalai Khan, Gushi Khan's grandson, died. When Lhazang Khan was enthroned, succeeding his father, the relationship between the new khan and Depa Sangye Gyatso began to sour. In 1705 (the forty-fourth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign), an attendant of the khan's, hired by Sangye Gyatso, attempted to kill Lhazang Khan with poisoned food. When the attempt became known to its intended victim, the *depa* hastily assembled his militia in Ü-Tsang in a bid to drive Lhazang Khan out of Tibet. At the same time the khan secretly called in his cavalry from northern Tibet and Qinghai. In July that year, war broke out between the *depa* and the Mongol khan. It ended in the defeat of the Tibetan troops and the capture of Sangye Gyatso who then was executed by Lhazang Khan's concubine.

For all his wrong-doings as *depa*, Sangye Gyatso has been credited by Tibetan historians with a number of good things, such

as the reconstruction of the Potala Palace and the editing of literature on Tibetan medicine and the Tibetan calendar, endeavours that furthered the development of Tibetan culture.

After the war, Lhazang Khan appointed Longsu *depa*, replacing Sangye Gyatso, and sent men to Beijing to report to Emperor Shengzu on the former *depa*'s "conspiracy" and ask the emperor to "dethrone" Tsangyang Gyatso on the grounds that he indulged in sensual pleasures and had no regard for Buddhist discipline. In response, the emperor sent He Shou, a vice minister, and other officials to Tibet on a placating mission, granted Lhazang Khan the honorific title of "Supporter of the Doctrine, the Obedient Khan" and a gold seal of authority and ordered that Tsangyang Gyatso be brought to the capital in captivity.

In 1706 (the forty-fifth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) Tsangyang Gyatso started his journey to Beijing under guard and is said to have died en route on Qinghai Lake at the age of twenty-four. [*The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality* offers a different version of the fate of Tsangyang Gyatso. To wit, "The grudges that Sangye Gyatso, the Tibetan chief administrator, and the Mongol Lhazang Khan held against each other led to the murder of the former. Lhazang Khan ignored the mediating efforts of envoys sent by Emperor Shengzu but heaped abuse and slander on Sangye Gyatso. As the imperial envoys saw that they could not accomplish anything, they decided to take the Master (the Dalai Lama) to Beijing and ask the emperor for further instructions. When they reached Qinghai, a letter arrived from the emperor upbraiding them for incompetence. Seeing that the letter had put the envoys in a difficult situation, the Master decided to renounce his title and position and live in obscurity. Thus resolved, he travelled to India, Nepal, Kham, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai and Mongolia, devoting himself to the great cause of benefiting the populace through the dissemination of the doctrine of the Buddha." The Tibetan biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama says: "On a pilgrimage to Wutai Mountain in Shanxi, the Thirteenth Dalai visited the temple where the sixth Dalai had sat in deep meditation." But it is generally held in Tibet that Tsangyang Gyatso died on Qinghai Lake.]

After Tsangyang Gyatso left for Beijing, Lhazang Khan, with

Depa Longsu's consent, installed Yeshe Gyatso as the sixth Dalai in 1707 (the forty-sixth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign). But in the eleven years after his enthronement in the Potala Palace, Yeshe Gyatso was never accepted as the sixth Dalai Lama by the Tibetan people, who considered him a sham.

In 1713 (the fifty-second year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) the Qing emperor, in order to calm things down in Tibet, conferred on the fifth Panchen, Lozang Yeshe, the title of "Panchen Erdeni" with a gold album and seal of authority—an event that marked the inception of the title—and asked him to assist Lhazang Khan in the administration of Tibet.

The defeat of Sangye Gyatso did not put an end to the unrest in Tibet. Sangye Gyatso's men, who had fled to the Mongol tribe of Dzungars in Xinjiang, asked Tsewang Rabten for military assistance in their attempt to avenge the former *depa*. Tsewang Rabten, Galdan's nephew, had by now raised an army in Yili after Galdan's defeat in Outer Mongolia by the Qing army, and had proclaimed himself khan in defiance of Qing rule. Out of his animosity towards the Oirat Mongols, he complied to the request of Sangye Gyatso's faithfuls. In 1716 (the fifty-fifth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) he sent a crack army of 6,000 under the command of Teji Tsering Dondup on a surprise attack on Tibet. The army "marching at night against perils of nature, by-passed the Gobi desert and scaled the mountains in Khotan (Hetian). The next year (1717 or the fifty-sixth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign), after breaking through at Thangeri Nor and defeating Tibetan troops, the Dzungars laid siege to the Potala Palace. When they finally entered the Potala after having its gates opened from the inside, they killed Lhazang Khan and took his wife prisoner. The invaders pillaged the monasteries and sent the loot back to Yili, and locked up the new Dalai Lama in the monastery in Chakpori."

According to Tibetan historical records, soon after he took Tibet and killed Lhazang Khan, Tsering Dondup had Yeshe Gyatso, the sixth Dalai installed by Lhazang Khan, confined in Chakpori (a hill connected with the Potala called Medicine God Hill by the Han people), and placed Tibetan administrative power in the hands of

* *A General History of Tibet.*

Tagtsewa (known as Taktse in *A General History of Ü-Tsang*) by appointing him *depa*, thus terminating the seventy-five-year-old control of Tibet by Gushi Khan and his descendants (1642-1717).

The Dzungar Mongols in Tibet not only challenged the authority of the Qing government; their military presence there posed a threat to the security of the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai. So Emperor Shengzu ordered in 1718 (the fifty-seventh year of his reign) "General Erentai of Xi'an to lead an army of several thousand men into Tibet, and sent Se Leng, of the Imperial Guards, to Qinghai to put the Mongol troops there on the alert. In the seventh month, after crossing the Drichu (Tongtianhe River), Se Leng's army struck from Baitu-la, and Erentai's from Kusai-la. The enemy feigned retreat while its crack troops were waiting on the Nagchukha (Heihe River). Erentai's men advanced on the double, trying to beat the enemy to the river and capture a strategic point at Dang-la. When they joined forces with Se Leng's army on the river, the enemy, with half of its total strength of several ten thousand, blocked their advance, and attacked them from the rear with the other half, cutting off their food supply lines. The Qing armies held out for several months and were annihilated when they ran out of food." *A General History of Ü-Tsang* gives a similar account of the campaign: "The soldiers marched to the Nagchukha on empty stomachs because Tsering Dondup had cut off their food supply lines. Encircled by the enemy, they were all starved to death; and when their commander, Kang Tai, was lured to his death west of Lhari by Black Hat lamas, the enemy soldiers began to burn Buddhist scriptures in wicked glee and occupied Tibet illegally." That was the end of the first military operation of the Qing government in Tibet.

The tragic defeat of the Qing armies in Tibet gave rise to debates in Beijing. "The princes and ministers, attributing the defeat to the great distance and perils of nature involved, all agreed that no more military actions should be attempted in Tibet. But Emperor Shengzu thought otherwise. He said that as Tibet was the shield of Qinghai, Yunnan and Sichuan, its seizure by the Dzungar barbarians would mean no peace on the frontier, adding that if the

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enemies knew how to ski and lower themselves down a height on a rope, our soldiers should be able to do the same. Thus a second military expedition was decided upon.”*

In 1719 (the fifty-eighth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) the second military campaign, much more extensive in its planned operation and troop deployment than the previous one, was organized. Crown Prince Yunti, with his headquarters in Xining, was commander-in-chief of six contingents responsible for logistic support, troop replacements and operations in general. In the fourth month of the fifty-ninth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign (1720), an army of Manchu and Han officers and men from Sha'anxi and Gansu struck out from Xining under the command of Generals Yan Xin, Ma Jibo and Li Lin on its expedition to the Nagchukha along the middle route. Meanwhile, General Galbi and Deputy General Yue Zhongqi led another Manchu and Han army, formed by troops from Yunnan, Sichuan, Hubei and Zhejiang, out of Tachienlu (modern Kangding) on a march on Lhasa along the southern route. General Fu Ning'an's army was to pin down the Dzungars at Balikun and Altai (in the Urumchi area).

In the same year, Emperor Shengzu, aware of the reverence the Tibetan people had for the Dalai Lamas, conferred the title of the Seventh Dalai Lama on Kelzang Gyatso, a young Living Buddha from Kham residing in the Kumbum Monastery, and ordered him to be taken to the Potala Palace for enthronement by an escort led by Yan Xin. Also, by the orders of the emperor, “units of the armed forces of Mongol khans, princes and *tejis* in Qinghai, each numbering from several hundred to several thousand men, joined the Qing escort in accompanying the Dalai Lama to Tibet with much military pomp.” Just how many troops were used for that purpose is unknown, but judging by the size of the escort, at least ten to twenty thousand men must have been involved.

In the sixth month the southern contingent of the Qing expeditionary army captured Chamdo and organized the militia troops of Kham tribal leaders that had surrendered into advance parties. Two months later, when the army reached Medru Kongkha, the tribal chieftain in the region of Kongpo capitulated, and the

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surrender of Tagtsewa, the *depa* appointed by the Dzungars, followed. On the twenty-third *day* of the eighth month, the southern contingent marched into Lhasa, which had been left defenceless as most of the Dzungar and Tibetan troops were on the Nagchukha to block the advance of the Qing army.

Soon after he took Lhasa, Galbi arrested all of the 101 Dzungar lamaist monks who were hiding in the three great monasteries. He had five of them, leaders of the arrested lamas, executed summarily and the rest thrown into jail. He then ordered Depa Tagtsewa to stop food supplies to the troops guarding the Nagchukha, and "sent men secretly to the Tibetan soldiers in Tsering Dondup's army, telling them that the *depa* wanted them to disband." With supplies cut off and Tibetans deserting, Tsering Dondup found himself in utter isolation.

Meanwhile, Yan Xin's army, which was advancing along the middle route escorting the seventh Dalai Lama, broke the resistance of the Dzungar and Tibetan troops at the Bogchu, Chonengar and Tshomorab, and reached the Nagchukha towards the end of the eighth month. Unable to return to Lhasa, Tsering Dondup fled back to Yili by way of the grasslands in northern Tibet with what was left of his men. In the early ninth month Yan Xin arrived in Lhasa with the seventh Dalai Lama. On the fifteenth day of that month Kelzang Gyatso was enthroned in the Potala and was granted the title of "Preceptor of the Doctrine and Liberator" by Emperor Shengzu.

To consolidate the military victory, the Qing government took the following steps: having Yeshe Gyatso, the Dalai Lama, installed by Lhazang Khan, brought to Beijing for a decision to be made on him, removing Tagtsewa, the *depa* appointed by the Dzungars, from office, delegating Tibetan administrative powers to Khangchennas, who had worked under Lhazang Khan, installing Ngabopa (known as Kaloön Ngabo in Tibetan historical records), Lumpanas, Pholhanas and Jaranas as *kaloons* (Ministers of Council) to assist the Tibetan chief administrator in handling day-to-day affairs and granting them the titles of princes of various ranks. A stone slab bearing an inscription of the account of the Qing expedition entitled "The Restoration of Peace in Tibet" was erected in front of the Potala Palace. The next year (1721 or the sixtieth year of

Emperor Shengzu's reign) the expeditionary troops were pulled back, ending the second military action of the Qing government in Tibet.

Kelzang Gyatso, The Seventh Dalai Lama

Kelzang Gyatso, the seventh Dalai Lama, was born in Lithang in Kham in 1708 (the forty-seventh year of Emperor Shengzu's reign or the Earth-Mouse year of the twelfth Tibetan calendrical cycle). His father was Sonam Dargye, and his mother, Lozang Chotso. When he was brought to Tibet, his family came to Lhasa with him. With the title of *kung* granted by the Qing government and estates given by the Kashag (Tibetan local government) Sonam Dargye became an important aristocrat from whom the Samdrup Phodrang family of today is descended.

When he was eight years old, Kelzang Gyatso became a monk at the Lithang Monastery. The next year he moved to the Kumbum in Qinghai at the request of its Mongolian lamaist monks. At age twelve (1719 or the fifty-eighth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign) he was granted the title of the Seventh Dalai Lama by the Qing emperor. At age thirteen (1720) he went to Tibet under the escort of Yan Xin, and on the fifteenth day of the ninth month that year, he was enthroned in the Potala Palace, and took his *getsul* vows from Lozang Yeshe, the fifth Panchen Lama. After his enthronement, he moved to the Drepung for monastic study. In 1727 (the fifth year of Emperor Shizong's reign) when he was twenty, he was ordained into full monkhood by the fifth Panchen.

In 1723 (the first year of Emperor Shizong's reign) Lobzang Tenzin, a Mongol tribal leader in Qinghai hostile to the Qing government, seized Xining and other places. The Qing government sent a punitive army under the command of Nian Genyao and Yue Zhongqi to Qinghai, and another army of two thousand men under the command of Eqi, Bandi and Zhou Ying to Tibet in anticipation of Lobzang Tenzin's flight into that region. The next year, in a confidential report to Emperor Shizong, Eqi offered his observation of the political situation then existing in Tibet: "The leading administrators in Tibet are not on good terms with each

other. The Dalai Lama is still too young to be totally fair where his father is concerned. Khangchennas is a fairly decent man, but being too conscious of his meritorious services, acts arrogantly towards the *kaloons* and is hated by them. Ngabopa is treacherous and quite different from Khangchennas. He has formed a clique with Sonam Dargye and Lumpanas, whose two daughters are married to Sonam. Their schemes to turn the Dalai Lama and Khangchennas against each other would inevitably cause trouble. Besides, there are too many *kaloons* to be of any help. As Lumpanas is impulsive and Jaranas incompetent, they should be removed from office as *kaloons* so that Ngabopa will be left without any assistance and no one will be able to create trouble.”*

In 1727 (the fifth year of Emperor Shizong's reign) hostilities broke out between rival serf-holders in Tibet. Kaloon Ngabopa, Lord Lumpanas and Teji Jaranas, allied with each other in the armed clash, killed Beizi Khangchennas and sent Teji Pholhanas fleeing to Tsang. Emperor Shizong, upon reports of the civil strife, sent Senge, a cabinet member, and two army generals, Mala and Yan Qingru, to Tibet to investigate. The next year (1728), 15,400 Qing cavalrymen and foot soldiers were sent on a third military expedition to Tibet. The expeditionary army was composed of three contingents: one with more than 8,400 men under the command of Jalangga, an imperial co-prosecutor, and Generals Mailu and Zhou Kaijie struck out from Xining; another of over 4,000 Sichuan soldiers led by Zhou Ying, an official without portfolio, was to march into Tibet by way of Ganze in Kham while General Nan Tianxiang would lead a coordinating army of 3,000 Yunnan troops into Tibet from Yunnan Province.

Before the Qing army reached Tibet, Teji Pholhanas, with 9,000 men he collected in Tsang and Ngari, had occupied Lhasa in July 1728, and with the help of the monks of major monasteries had captured Ngabopa, Lumpanas, Jaranas, along with their families. When Jalangga arrived in Lhasa, he formed a court of justice with Mala, the general who had been sent there previously by the Qing government. The court put Ngabopa to death by slicing, and Lumpanas, Jaranas and their wives and children were beheaded.

*A Research into the History of Resident Officials in Tibet.

Altogether seventeen persons were executed, and the violent incident was brought to an end. In recognition of his contribution to the termination of the turmoil, Emperor Shizong conferred on Pholhanas the title of *Beizi* and made him the chief administrator of Tibet.

For more than eighty years beginning with Emperor Taizong, and down through the two succeeding monarchs, the Tibet policy of the Qing Dynasty was in its first phase, one of appeasing the Tibetan hierarchy. Accordingly, the emperors raised the status of the Yellow Sect to the highest level possible, granted the Dalai and the Panchen awe-inspiring titles and bestowed expensive gifts upon them. Meanwhile, the Qing managed to maintain its hold on Mongolia through the agency of the Dalai Lama and the Yellow Sect. But beginning with Emperor Shizong this policy of appeasement was applicable only where the Dalai and the Panchen were concerned; the constant outbursts of hostilities caused by bitter quarrels between Tibetan leaders had led the new emperor to contemplate measures that would trim the power of the Tibetan hierarchy and keep them divided. So in 1728 (the sixth year of Emperor Shizong's reign), the year Pholhanas defeated Ngabopa, the Qing government gave orders for Tachienlu, Lithang and Bathang in eastern Kham to come under the jurisdiction of Sichuan Province, and for Gyalthang, A'dun and Balung in southern Kham to be administered by the Yunnan provincial authorities. But when the districts west of Shigatse and Ngari were offered to the fifth Panchen Lama for his administration, he refused them. Later, he turned down another offer of six districts including Lhatse, Ngamring, Phuntsoling, Jedrung, Tsongkha and Ngari. It was only with much reluctance did the Panchen finally accept three of them: Lhatse, Ngamring and Phuntsoling. With these regions it formerly administered going under the jurisdiction of Sichuan, Yunnan and the Panchen Lama, the Kashag's power was naturally weakened.

In order to keep a close watch on the Tibetan leaders, the Qing government instituted in 1727 (the fifth year of Emperor Shizong's reign) the office of ambans (resident Qing officials in Tibet and their assistants). The first two such officials appointed were General Mala and Senge. They did not assume office until 1728. Meanwhile, "in order to maintain law and order," the Qing built a Tibet

garrison of 2,000 men from Sichuan and Sha'anxi with the ambans as its commanders, and in Chamdo it set up a "supporting" garrison with 1,000 troops from Yunnan. These steps marked the beginning of the second phase of the Qing's Tibet policy.

Meanwhile, the Dzungar Mongols in Xinjiang rose in still another rebellion against the Qing government; they seized the check-point at Balikun after breaking down the resistance of the Qing troops there. Lobzang Tenzin, the Qinghai Mongol tribal leader who fled to Xinjiang when his military adventure in Qinghai ended in defeat, had by now entered into an alliance with the Dzungar Mongols, and was once again showing his muscle. Fearing a renewal of military attack on Tibet by the Dzungars, the Qing government ordered in the winter of 1727 Jalangga to move the Dalai Lama from Lhasa to Huiyuanmiao in Garthar, northwest of Tachienlu in Kham. AT the same time, it gave orders that except in the winter when the mountains were snow-bound, the ambans were to maintain a defence line on the Thangeri Nor (Namtso in north Tibet) against military invasion by the Dzungars. The line existed for four years before the complete defeat of the Dzungar tribe by the Qing in 1732 made it unnecessary. In addition, the Qing government authorized Pholhanas to train 10,000 Tibetan cavalymen and 15,000 foot soldiers to man "check points at mountain passes leading to and from the regions of the Dzungar barbarians. These check points (later) proved to be effective deterrents against the Dzungars."* In the eleventh year of his reign (1733), Emperor Shizong told the Military Council: "The (Qing) troops stationed in Tibet were intended to keep off the Dzungar barbarian invaders. Now with these barbarians fleeing helter-skelter and approaching their doom, Pholhanas working wholeheartedly for the Court and the quality of Tibetan soldiers improved, peace once again reigns in Tibet. Such being the case, it does not seem to be necessary any longer to keep the burden of transporting supplies from the interior to a large army in Tibet on the Tibetans. Perhaps we could leave just a few hundred men there and pull back the rest." In line with this, the ambans decided to keep only 500 of the original 2,000 Sichuan soldiers stationed in

* *An Illustrated History of Tibet.*

Tibet, and send back the rest. The 500-man garrison would be rotated every three years by soldiers from Sichuan. The Chamdo garrison of 1,000 men would be reduced by half its troop strength, and was to be rotated every three years by soldiers from Yunnan. The rotation system stayed in force until the end of the Qing Dynasty.

In 1734 (the twelfth year of Emperor Shizong's reign) when "the boundaries were defined and hostilities ceased" following Dzungars' appeal for peace, thus removing the threat to Tibet, the emperor sent Prince *Guo* and Drangkya Hutuktu to visit the seventh Dalai Lama in Garthar. In April the next year, on the instructions of the emperor, the Dalai Lama started on his journey back to Tibet in the escort of 500 soldiers led by General Fushou, Qi Shan, a ranking official from the Ministry of War, and Labtan from the Board for National Minority Affairs. The party arrived in Lhasa in July, and the Dalai Lama took up his residence in the Potala Palace. In the previous year, the Dalai Lama had asked Emperor Shizong through his envoy, Drangkya Hutuktu, "to return the jurisdiction rights of Bathang and Lithang to Ü, saying that it was his birth place and that the lamaseries built there by the *tusis* were magnificent. The Court granted him the commercial tax revenue of these two places and reaffirmed its central authority there."

In 1737 (the second year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), Kelzang Gyatso, the seventh Dalai Lama, visited his teacher, the seventy-five-year-old Lozang Yeshe, in the Tashilhunpo shortly before the Panchen's death.

Tibet was now a scene of peace and economic growth. In the fourth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1739), Pholhanas was granted the title of Prince Duoluo by the emperor. Gyumey Tseten, Pholhanas's elder son, as Lord of Ngari, was put in charge of the regional administration and defence of Ngari, and Gyumey Namgyal, Pholhanas's younger son, with the title of Teji of the first rank, was put at the head of Tsoba Sogu (Thirty-Nine Ethnic Groups Tribe) in northern Tibet and the eight districts of Dam Mongols. In 1747 (the twelfth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), when Pholhanas died, Gyumey Namgyal, by the decision of the Qing government, inherited his father's title of Prince and was installed

in his father's position as the chief administrator of Tibet.

After Pholhanas's death, Emperor Gaozong wrote in a confidential communication to the new amban, Fuqing: "Tibet is a region of great importance. Pholhanas was respected by his subordinates for his wisdom and competency.... Now he is gone, and his son, Gyumey Namgyal, has inherited his title and has been put at the head of the administration of Ü-Tsang. As the region is notorious for constant unrest and disunity, a young man like Gyumey Namgyal is not likely to win the submission of all in a short time. When he was alive, Pholhanas made all the decisions, and Fuqing was consulted merely for their implementation. Now that the situation has changed, Fuqing should be told to keep a close watch on the developments in Tibet.... I want to be informed of the attitude of all those concerned, and of the prospects of Gyumey Namgyal winning the recognition of his authority in Tibet as prince and chief administrator."

Gyumey Namgyal, now as an inherited prince, became very hostile to the ambans. He attacked Amban Jishan with all the excuses he could find to vent his resentment of the Qing posting resident officials in Tibet. In this respect Emperor Gaozong warned Fuqing in his instructions to him: "If Gyumey Namgyal is trying to victimize Jishan out of his unwillingness to have resident officials in Tibet, you must act with great caution, and must never let yourself be led into his trap." In 1749 (the fourteenth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), after he left his post as resident official in Tibet, Jishan reported to the emperor: "Gyumey Namgyal, with all his perversity and distrust of the Dalai Lama, is likely to create trouble. It might be advisable to have his powers shared by his brother Gyumey Tseten, and move the Dalai Lama to Taning in case something happens." The emperor rejected Jishan's suggestions, "criticizing him for lack of subtlety in his approach." The next year (1750), in a "pre-emptive" action, Gyumey Namgyal murdered his brother in Ngari, drove out his brother's son, Gyumey Wangdrala, and took over Ngari. In addition, he "seized the property of Kaloon Depa Poluntsan of Tsang on false charges against him, and drove out all those who had formerly served under Pholhanas." When Emperor Gaozong was informed of the incident, he told the ambans in a confidential communication:

"Gyumei Namgyal is a rash young man given to trouble making. It is possible that he has been hoodwinking Jishan by feigning respect to his instructions. If the incident was provoked by his brother's invasion of Tibet, it is a case of one brother infringing upon the interests of another, and is therefore easy to handle. If his brother was innocent and fell victim to his false charges, which he created to stir up trouble, then he shall not be tolerated but must be dealt with promptly.... Fuqing shall make a thorough investigation (of the incident) on his way (to Tibet) ... and inform me of his findings."

Meanwhile, in a report to the emperor, Celeng, governor of Sichuan Province, and General Bandi said, "Gyumei Namgyal is acting in defiance of the central authority. He sent Gyaltzen Drashi and his other trusted aides on a secret mission to the Dzungars to establish illicit relations with them. He illegally granted Tsewang Dorje Namgyal (Dzungar tribal chief) the title of khan in exchange for his military support in Ladakh. Fortunately, he did that at a time when the Dzungar barbarians were being torn by internal strife, and his envoys to the Dzungars were captured together with illicit letters and gifts upon their return to Tibet." In response Emperor Gaozong gave the following secret instructions: "The perverse and treacherous Gyumei Namgyal will eventually become a danger if he is not removed. The governor of Sichuan, Celeng, shall pretend to join him in his war with his brother while waiting for an opportunity to kill him. Or the governor may take his troops into Tibet as escorts for Drangkya Hutuktu when he goes to Tibet next year to give out alms, and remove Gyumei Namgyal when the opportunity arises. When Fuqing arrives in Tibet, he will make a careful study of the situation there and decide which of the two plans is better, and inform me of his choice."

After he arrived in Lhasa, Fuqing took pre-emptive actions after consulting secretly with Labdon, the assistant amban. They sent for Gyumei Namgyal, and when he arrived at an upper room of the ambans' office, they "hit him on the head with bludgeons, killing him instantly." And when Fuqing and Labdon were killed later by Namgyal's men, chaos reigned in Tibet for a short period of time. Fu Kang'an gave a detailed account of the violent incident in a eulogy inscribed on a stone-slab at the Two Martyrs' Shrine:

My uncle, His Excellency Fu, was named Qing. In the fifteenth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign, he was appointed resident official in Tibet with the rank of an army general, and was assisted by Labdon, Imperial Co-Prosecutor. It was a time when Gyumey Namgyal, with the title of Prince inherited from his father, Pholhanas, ruled Tibet in wanton disregard to the law, and paid no heed to His Excellency's warnings. When His Excellency discovered evidence of his disloyalty, he asked the Court to grant him *carte blanche* in dealing with Gyumey Namgyal so that the danger might be removed once and for all. Considering that any premature action taken by His Excellency would leave him utterly helpless in a far-away region, His Majesty appointed General Bandi assistant resident official to replace Mr. Labdon with a view to bringing Gyumey Namgyal to justice. But before His Majesty's decision on the new appointment reached Tibet, Gyumey Namgyal had begun to hasten his conspiracy: in order to achieve regional hegemony, he had the resident officials put under close surveillance, cut off postal connections, entered into a clandestine military alliance with the Dzungars, drove away all the dissidents and was even trying to depose the Dalai Lama. Thus His Excellency was faced with two choices: if he did nothing about Namgyal's outrages, he would eventually fall victim to his intrigues; and if he manoeuvred Namgyal to his death, he would also be killed because Namgyal's gang would be too numerous for His Excellency to resist. As the outcome would be the same for him either way, His Excellency decided on the second choice, which would expose Namgyal's conspiracy sooner with fewer disastrous consequences. Thus decided, His Excellency and Mr. Labdon set up a trap for Namgyal. On the thirteenth day of the tenth month, they asked Labzang Drashi, one of Namgyal's gang, to bring Namgyal over to discuss instructions from His Majesty. Gyumey Namgyal, believing that His Excellency did not have much regional support in Tibet, did not suspect anything, nor did he take any precautions when he was sent for. When he arrived, Gyumey Namgyal walked up to the upper room where His Excellency and Mr. Labdon were waiting. He had only a few attendants with him, having left the rest downstairs. His Excellency greeted him as usual, and when he showed him into the bed-chamber, His Excellency closed the door, and with lightening speed drove a sword into Namgyal's throat. Then His Excellency's attendants rushed over, and hit him on the head with bludgeons, killing him instantly. When Labzang Drashi, who had been left outside the bed-chamber, heard the scuffling, he knew what had happened. He fled through a window and informed his son-in-law, Depa Labtan, and others of the incident. Immediately men of Namgyal's

gang were gathered and swarmed to the ambans' office, attacking it with guns from all sides. As the walls were too high to be scaled, the mobsters lit stacks of firewood below the upper room. When the room was in flames, they climbed up into it. His Excellency killed a number of them and was himself wounded in three places. When he was too exhausted to fight any more, he took his life with his own hands. Mr. Labdon also died from his wounds.

Soon after the rebellion, the seventh Dalai Lama appointed Doring Pandita acting chief administrator of Tibet, and had Labzang Drashi and the other murderers of the ambans captured. In the twelfth month, when Deputy General Bandi arrived in Tibet, he submitted a report to Emperor Gaozong, giving an account of the incident. Then the emperor sent the governor of Sichuan, Celeng, into Tibet with troops to restore order. In Tibet Celeng received instructions from Emperor Gaozong that said: "Now a golden opportunity has offered itself to settle the Tangut (Tibet) issue. If the situation is handled properly, a lasting peace may be expected, otherwise there may be more trouble. The wicked Gyumey Namgyal dared to harbour rebellious thoughts because he had a large area under his control, a strong army and the monopoly of power. Henceforth, Tangut is to have many more chiefs so that the power will not be concentrated in the hands of one man. You are to work out a detailed long-range plan for the future administration of Tangut." Accordingly, Celeng and Bandi studied all the aspects of the Tibetan issue, and in the third month of the sixteenth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1751) produced "A Program for the New Administration of Tibet" consisting of thirteen items. As it is the first document of its kind the Qing government ever produced concerning measures for better government in Tibet, the text of the program is reproduced in full as follows.

1. An additional *kaloön* should be installed. Traditionally Tibet has always had four *kaloons*. But with Polungtsan dismissed by Gyumey Namgyal as *kaloön* after he lost his eyesight, there are only three left, namely Pandita, Tsering Wangdrala and Seyul Tesebutong. In the case of Pandita, no deliberations will be needed as he has already been ordered by His Majesty to remain in office as *kaloön*. As for Tsering Wangdrala and Seyul Tesebutong, they were taken out of Tibet with

an excuse by Gyumey Namgyal before the rebellion and therefore had no part in it. Besides, they were *kaloons* appointed by His Majesty and their record as such is free of misconduct. Therefore, they shall be re-installed in their former posts. The vacancy left by Polungtsan shall be filled by a member of the Yellow Sect so that the *kaloons* will better serve the interests of the monastic and secular communities. As Pandita and the two other *kaloons* are holders of honorific titles granted by the Court, it would be inappropriate if the new lama *kaloons* is left without one. His Majesty is therefore requested to bestow on him an appropriate honorific title that will enable him to work with his colleagues.

2. The *kaloons* shall work in their office. Traditionally, the *kaloons* attended to their work jointly in their office. But since the departure of Pholhanas they have been working in their private residences, assisted by persons of their own choice instead of the officially appointed secretaries and clerks. This deviation enabled people like Labzang Drashi to usurp authority and form illegitimate cliques. Now that the new *kaloons* has been appointed to fill the vacancy, the *kaloons* office shall be where public affairs are attended to, as demanded by the legitimate practice. All the privately appointed secretaries and clerks shall be dismissed and replaced by those with official appointment. Except for unimportant matters, which will be left to the discretion of the *kaloons*, matters of importance to be reported to the Court, and those of urgency concerning post-staging stations shall be dealt with in conformity with the instructions of the Dalai Lama and the resident officials in Tibet. Such instructions shall bear the seal of authority of the Dalai Lama and the official seals of the imperial representatives. Henceforth, the *kaloons* will be encouraged to expose jointly any devious practices employed by their colleagues to serve illegitimate interests so that the parties guilty of such practices will be punished accordingly.

3. No *depas* (local chiefs) shall be appointed by private individuals. The responsibilities of the *depas* include the education of the common people in their charge as well as the management of local affairs. One of the malpractices of Gyumey Namgyal's administration was the appointment of such chiefs by private individuals. The *depas* appointed in this manner never went to the regions in their charge but had their house-servants working in their stead. As many of them harassed the people, they did more harm than good to their interests. From now on, the *kaloons* shall be impartial in choosing candidates for local chiefs, and submit them to the Dalai Lama and the imperial representatives for

their written approval bearing their seals. House-servants still holding the posts of local chiefs shall be dismissed and the vacancies they leave shall be filled. Following the execution of Gyumey Namgyal, members of his traitorous clique holding public office were replaced by persons appointed by Doring Pandita. As these replacements were chosen in haste, they are not final. If any of them is found to be the wrong person for the post he holds and therefore needs a replacement, the replacement, chosen in an impartial manner, shall have the approval of the Dalai Lama and the imperial representatives.

4. Decisions to dismiss and punish officials shall conform to the law. Traditionally, officials such as *depas* were chosen for their experience, intelligence and competency. Any of them, when found incompetent or guilty of wrong-doings, was, therefore, to be punished regardless of who he was. However, Gyumey Namgyal abused his power, and dismissed from office on false charges all the local officials who had served in the administrations prior to that of Gyumey Namgyal and had their private property confiscated. Such outrages were widely resented. Henceforth, when local officials are accused of wrong-doings, the *kaloons* and *depas* shall submit their suggestions based on impartial investigations regarding their punishment to the Dalai Lama and the imperial representatives for their decisions.

5. In selecting and appointing enthronement *khenpo* lamas (Dalai's representatives) the traditional practice shall be followed. In the past, the *khenpo* lamas were chosen by the Dalai Lama for their wisdom and competency and were sent to the lamaseries in the number compatible with their size. During Gyumel Namgyal's administration, *khenpo* lamas or their replacements were appointed arbitrarily without the approval of the Dalai Lama, a devious practice that shall not be tolerated any longer. Henceforth, the selection of persons to fill the vacancies for *khenpo* lamas or the removal of unqualified ones shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Dalai Lama, and the *kaloons* shall not be permitted to continue the illegitimate practice of usurping the authority of the Dalai Lama in handling such matters. Cases of violation of the law by *khenpo* lamas shall be reported objectively to the Dalai Lama by the *kaloons* and be dealt with in accordance with his instructions.

6. Overstaffing should end. Previously, only the Dalai Lama was assisted by a staff consisting of *dronyer*, *shangdrotenyer*, *zimpon* and *sopon*. Later, Pholhanas, with the title of prince, created for himself a staff the same in size as the Dalai Lama's. But such a staff in the employment of the *kaloons* is not only inappropriate but also illegal, and therefore shall be abolished because the *kaloons* are not holders of

the title of prince. The *kaloons* office shall be staffed with only two *drongyons* with *drungyig* and *bichige* working under them.

7. An additional *dapon* shall be installed. The administration of local affairs has always been the responsibility of the *kaloons*, and the handling of military and border security matters that of the *dapons*. This division of labour shall be maintained. But since there is only one *dapon* for the entire region of Ü (as against three for the region of Tsang, which is much smaller in size than Ü), the soldiers there will be left without a commanding officer if the *dapon* is sent away on other business or sick leave. Such was the case with Dargyal Drashi, the former *dapon* of Ü. When he was sent to Halawusu (Ngagchu) by Gyumey Namgyal, leaving no one in charge of the soldiers, Labrang Drashi and his traitorous gang were able to harass the people there with impunity. In view of that, a co-*dapon* shall be installed for Ü so that when one of them is called away for other duties, there will still be one on hand to maintain law and order and to guard the Dalai Lama. Henceforth, troop movements and the handling of border security matters shall follow the official instructions of the Dalai Lama and the resident officials in Tibet. The *dapons* shall continue to keep constant watch on the regions in their charge, and new security measures deemed necessary shall be submitted to the imperial representatives for approval, and be imposed in accordance with their instructions. Dranglojinpa, the former *dapon* of Tsang, shall be rehabilitated and reinstated in his former office as he has been proved innocent of the charges brought against him by Gyumel Namgyal, which led to his dismissal from office as Gyumel Namgyal intended.

8. Imperial mandates should be issued to *kaloons* and *dapons*. As *kaloons* and *dapons* shoulder the important task of ensuring the safety of the Dalai Lama and the military security of the regions in their charge, each of them should be given an imperial mandate as a token of trust and a sign of respect for the rites. A verified list of the incumbent and newly installed *kaloons* and *dapons* will be submitted to the Ministry in request for their mandates. In the future, the request for the Court's approval of a candidate for *kaloons* or *dapon* selected by the resident officials in consultation with the Dalai Lama, will be accompanied by a request to the Ministry for his mandate. *Kaloons* or *dapons*, dismissed from office with the approval of the Court for disobeying the Dalai Lama and for such offences as disqualifying them for the posts they hold, shall have their mandates withdrawn and returned to the Ministry.

9. The services provided by the Tibetan people shall not be used for

private purposes. The people throughout Tibet have always been put at the service of the Dalai Lama, and were assigned in accordance with the size of their regions and that of their households the amounts of corvée in the service of the religious activities of the Yellow Sect and to keep the monasteries supplied with tea. During their administrations, Pholhanas and his son, Gyumey Namgyal, usurped the right to the service of the corvée, and out of their selfish motives, rewarded many undeserving persons with such rights. To those they favoured they issued papers exempting them from unpaid labour, and those they did not favour they burdened with extra work, creating an unequal share of work and leisure among the populace. The *kaloons* and *dapons* shall look into this matter. Except for those given to deserving persons, all the rewards granted during Gyumey Namgyal's administration for no legitimate reasons shall be withdrawn with the approval of the Dalai Lama. Unauthorized corvée-exempting papers shall be withdrawn and their holders put back on the corvée originally assigned to them. Persons assigned extra corvée shall be relieved of it, with the knowledge of the Dalai Lama, to ensure an equal share of work and leisure among the populace. Persons who deserve rewards for their outstanding service shall be recommended to the Dalai Lama and the resident officials by *kaloons* and *dapons* and be rewarded in accordance with their instructions.

10. The issue of *ula* tablets (those entitling the bearers to unpaid services) shall require the approval of the Dalai Lama. Traditionally, only persons in the Dalai Lama's service were provided for by the local inhabitants. But since the time of Pholhanas and Gyumey Namgyal, this traditional practice has been neglected; *kaloons* and *dapons* have been known to give *ula* tablets to their private trade representatives in Xining, Tachienlu, Barkhama and Ngari with the result of doubling the corvée quota for the people there. Such excessive burden has plunged many of the people into untold miseries. It is time that this outrage be discontinued. Henceforth, *kaloons* and *dapons* shall be prohibited from issuing *ula* tablets to private trade representatives. When free services are needed for the execution of public duties, the Dalai Lama shall be requested to grant his official permission to use them. Persons kept on hand to perform duties nearby shall continue to receive free-service entitlement papers from the *kaloons*.

11. No private individuals shall have access to the contents of the Dalai Lama's store-house. The store-house used to be left to the charge of its *changzodpa* (keeper). The acquisition of its contents for public use must have the permission of the Dalai Lama granted by the *kaloons*

on his behalf along with new paper sealing strips bearing the Dalai Lama's official seal. In the time of Pholhanas and Gyumey Namgyal, items from the store-house were diverted to private use without the permission of the Dalai Lama while the Dalai Lama himself was not able to acquire even small items such as ceremonial scarves. This is outrageous. Henceforth, the *changzodpa* shall continue to demand paper sealing strips bearing the Dalai Lama's seal needed for acquisition. Except for the issue of articles of daily use, which will continue to be in the care of the *changzodpa*, acquisition of articles for public use shall require the permission of the Dalai Lama granted at the joint request of the *kaloons*. No acquisition for private use shall be permitted.

12. Ngari and Halawusu are regions of great importance. As Halawusu is connected with Qinghai and Ngari and borders on Dzungar, officials holding administrative posts there should be capable and trustworthy so that the interests of the people in these regions may be better served. The Dalai Lama is requested to select for the regions men equal in experience and renown to all those sent there previously. His selections will be communicated to the Ministry as usual for the granting of mandates by His Majesty as a token of trust and authority.

13. Proper arrangements shall be made for the settlement of the Dam Mongols in accordance with imperial instructions. These Mongols used to be in the charge of men appointed by Pholhanas with the approval of the Court. Since the execution of Gyumey Namgyal, the Mongols, left on their own, have smuggled themselves back to Dam. As they took no part in the rebellion, and are of a nomadic tribe, their case is quite different from that of the Tibetans. Since they have expressed their wish to remain in Dam and work there, they should be allowed by the grace of His Majesty to settle down where they are. In the past, they were under the jurisdiction of eight chiefs with the rank of *zuoling*. But the ranks that Pholhanas and Gyumey Namgyal gave them were sometimes *zaisang*, sometimes *teji*. Such irregularities are not permitted by the ranking system. To eliminate the irregularities and for better organization, it is advisable to give the current eight chiefs the rank of *gusanda*; they will be assisted by eight officials with the rank of *zuoling*, who will in turn have eight officers with the ranks of *xiaoqixiao* working under them, thus forming a system of supervision by rank. They will as usual be given hat beads (of different colours and quality to show different ranks), and be placed under the authority of the resident imperial representatives in Tibet. Each of the eight *zuolings* will send to Tibet ten men, totalling eighty of them, for duty calls and as the Dalai Lama's guards. They will receive their food rations from the

Dalai Lama's granaries, as did their predecessors. Tasks assigned to them shall have the official approval of the imperial representatives; the *kaloons* and *dapons* shall have no authority to put them on any duty. Their dismissals and replacements shall be authorized by the resident officials in consultation with the Dalai Lama. Those among the Dam Mongols who are determined by annual inspections to be obedient and hard-working, will be rewarded, and those found to have violated the law will be punished severely. The twenty-odd Mongol families still in Tibet shall be allowed to continue their residence there because they would be denied of their means of livelihood if they were returned to their native region, where they would be left without any herds of animals to live on. The implementation of this plan will place the Mongols under proper control and make the grace of His Majesty felt by them.

The aims of the thirteen-item program were obvious: to raise and consolidate the position and power of the Dalai Lama and to put the ambans on an equal footing with him.

The program was immediately approved by Emperor Gaozong. Without giving it to the Military Council for deliberation, he instructed: "Communicate the program as I have been informed of it to the Ministry."

Soon Celeng and Bandi, with the support of the program they formulated, put many of Gyumey Namgyal's followers to death, confiscated Gyumey Namgyal's property and put the Tsoba Sogu in northern Tibet and the districts of the Dam Mongols formerly in Gyumey Namgyal's charge under the authority of the ambans. This last step was aimed at weakening the position of the Tibetan ruling clique and easing the shortage of manpower for the Tibetan garrison troops. In addition, they rescinded the post of the *depa* (chief administrator of Tibet), leaving the administration of Tibetan affairs to the Kashag, the Tibetan local government. The Kashag, which functioned immediately under the Dalai Lama and the ambans, consisted of four *kaloons*, one of whom was a monk and the rest laymen. With equal shares of power, the *kaloons* acted as a check on each other to prevent a dictatorship from developing. Moreover, by the suggestion Bandi and Celeng made to the Dalai Lama, a *yigtsang* was created. It was staffed by four *drungyigs*, all monk officials, who, acting as a restraint on the power of the

Kashag, examined all the instructions and communications from the Kashag before they were delivered. In the Potala a school was set up to train monk officials as prospective *dzongpons* and *shipons* or to work in *lekhungs* (government agencies) under the Kashag. All these measures served one purpose: to give the clergy a share of power equal to that of the aristocracy, creating a counterbalance to avert future unrest. And by order of the emperor, correspondence between Tibetans, whether officials or civilians, and the Dzungar Mongols was banned. Bandi was appointed amban, and Namgyal his assistant.

In the sixteenth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1751) Kelzang Gyatso, the seventh Dalai Lama, assumed temporal power at the age of forty-four. According to *The Political and Religious History of the Tibetan Nationality*, Kelzang Gyatso "never carried himself in a haughty manner although he held such an awe-inspiring title as imperial preceptor. He was an accomplished theologian, but was always ready to learn from others. Even after he had achieved sublimity in spiritual cultivation, he remained respectful to religious discipline in whatever he did. Rich as he was, with the wealth of all Tibet in his possession, he allowed himself only one change of clothes each year." It is generally agreed among Tibetan religious circles that Kelzang Gyatso remained modest and thrifty all his life, for which he was loved and respected by monks and laymen alike. In 1757 (the twenty-second year of Emperor Gaozong's reign or the Fire-Ox year of the thirteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle), he died in the Potala at the age of fifty. As his death left this top spiritual and temporal position vacant, the emperor appointed Demo Nomihan regent to act in the Dalai's place before the soul boy was discovered or during the enthroned soul boy's minority. (Eighteen was the legal age for him to assume office.) That was the inception of regency in Tibet.

Jampal Gyatso, the Eighth Dalai Lama

Jampal Gyatso, the eighth Dalai Lama, was born in 1758 (the twenty-third year of Emperor Gaozong's reign or the Earth-Tiger year in the thirteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle) in a family of

aristocrats at Lharigang in Thobgyal in Tsang. His father, Sonam Dargye, and his mother, Phuntsok Wangmo, were related to the sixth Panchen's parents. As their son was the Dalai Lama, they enjoyed very high political status in Tibet, and with the title of *kung* conferred by the Qing government and great many estates given by the Dalai and the Kashag, Sonam Dargye became a major aristocrat in Tibet from whom the Lhalu family of today is descended.

At the age of five, Jampal Gyatso was recognized as the soul boy by Emperor Gaozong's envoy, Drangkya Hutuktu, and was enthroned in the Potala Palace in the same year. In 1765 he took his *getsul* vows from Paldan Yeshe, the sixth Panchen Lama, and by the same Panchen he was ordained into full monkhood in 1777 (the forty-second year of Emperor Gaozong's reign). Regent Demo had by now died, and had been succeeded by Gandin Shrathu Nomihan (Tsemonling) by order of Emperor Gaozong. In 1781 (the forty-sixth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), by order of the emperor, the eighth Dalai Lama assumed office, but Tsemonling, as ordered by the emperor, stayed in office to assist the Dalai Lama in handling civil affairs, and when Tsemonling died in 1791 (the fifty-sixth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign) Tatsag Nomihan (Kundeling or Kyirong Hutuktu as he is known in the historical records of the Qing Dynasty) was named successor to Tsemonling by the Qing monarch.

At this time a serious dispute arose between Tibet and Gurkha. In 1788 (the fifty-third year of Emperor Gaozong's reign) Tibet increased the duties levied on Gurkha goods in the border region of Nyanang in Tsang. The duty increase led to an armed invasion of Tibet by the Gurkha chief, Sur Bardub. The invaders occupied Kyirong, Nyanang and Dzongga. The Qing emperor, upon a request by Amban Qinglin for 1,000 troops to be sent to Tibet from Sichuan to reinforce the troops in Ü-Tsang, dispatched Bazhong, Deputy Chairman of the Board for National Minority Affairs, to Tibet to investigate. At the same time, a military expedition to Tibet, the fourth one by the Qing government, was decided upon; 3,000 Manchu and Han troops and local militia were to enter Tibet at Tachienlu under the joint command of General Ehui of Chengdu, Deputy General Fuzhi, General Cheng De, the Sichuan garrison

commander, and General Mukdannga; Li Shijie, governor of Sichuan, with his headquarters in Tachienlu, was to provide logistic support for the expedition, and Wang Tiezhu, chief of provincial civic affairs, and He Ning, provincial chief justice, were to be stationed in Chengdu to supervise the provision of army supplies, the delivery of ammunition and the assignment of tasks to quartermasters.

When the Qing army reached Lhasa in the winter, the Gurkhas pleaded for peace through Lama Shamarpa (Red Hat). General Mukdannga, sent by Bazhong, and Kaloon Tenzin Paljor, representing the Kashag, negotiated the terms with the Gurkhas on the border. It was agreed that the Gurkhas would leave the territories they had occupied, and that they were to be guaranteed with a payment of three hundred silver ingots weighing 9,600 *liang* each year for three years as compensation. The Dalai Lama and the Kashag did not give their consent to the compensation, but Bazhong "decided so in an irresponsible manner out of his eagerness for rewards." As the author of *The Illustrated History of Tibet* puts it, "Bazhong won the peace without any confrontation in the battlefield but through bribery that took millions out of the state treasury." In a report of Emperor Gaozong, Bazhong said: "Nyanang, Dzongga and Kyirong have been recovered," and proposed that the ruler of Nyanang be sent into exile in a disease-ridden region, and those of Dzongga and Kyirong be kept in heavy manacles for one month. He then asked to be allowed to "return with the victorious army."

Later, when the Gurkhas asked Tibet to honour the compensation agreement, the Dalai Lama and the Kashag refused. In July 1791 (the fifty-sixth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), the Gurkhas invaded Tibet for a second time, re-occupying Nyanang and taking Kaloon Tenzin Paljor prisoner. In August, another force of Gurkha troops took Kyirong. When Bazhong learned that Emperor Gaozong had been informed by the amban of the invasion, the bribed peace and the compensation agreement, he committed suicide.

What prompted the second invasion was not just Tibet's refusal to pay. During his stay in Beijing in the forty-fifth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1780), Paldan Yeshe, the sixth Panchen

(1738-80), received a great many gifts in gold and silver from the emperor, princes and ranking officials. When he died in Beijing in 1780, one of his two brothers, Drungpa Hutuktu, who was in charge of the Tashilhunpo during the Panchen's absence, took possession of these gifts. The other brother, Shamarpa, being a Red Hat Living Buddha of the Karma-ka-gyu-pa Sect, was not entitled to any share of the wealth. Embittered, he went to the Gurkhas secretly, and told their ruler that as Tibet had been drained of its military strength and the Tashilhunpo was defenceless, it was the best time for them to take possession of the treasures in the monastery. The temptation was too great for the Gurkha ruler to resist.

As the Gurkha invaders were advancing toward the Tashilhunpo after taking Nyanang and Kyirong, Amban Baotai, alarmed, moved Tanpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen (1781-1853), from the Tashilhunpo to Lhasa, and insisted that "the Dalai be moved to Xining, and the Panchen to Taning." On August 20, 1791 the Gurkhas reached Shigatse. The Dzaza Lama had fled with valuables on the previous night, and "the monks and lay inhabitants, frightened by an oracle," said to have been obtained by the Tashilhunpo's Jedrung Lama and the Dratsang Khenpo, "warning against any resistance to the invaders, had gone into hiding."** The only resistance came from 120 Han garrison troops under the command of a low-ranking officer, who held out for seventeen days and nights in the Shigatse fort.

After they plundered the Tashilhunpo of all its treasures and food supplies, the Gurkhas pulled back to Nyanang and Kyirong on the Tibetan-Nepalese border. They sent their loot home and stayed in the occupied territories. The invasion did great damage to the economy of the Tsang region, as it lost a huge number of sheep and cattle to the invaders, and subjected the Tibetan people to the ruthless oppression of an alien race.

Upon reports of the invasion, Emperor Gaozong ordered Ehui, governor of Sichuan, and General Cheng De of Chengdu to lead 4,000 Sichuan troops into Tibet by way of Tachienlu. But the two

* *The Illustrated History of Tibet.*

** *A General History of Ü-Tsang.*

men "acted slowly." Realizing that "they were not to be trusted," the emperor in the winter of the fifty-sixth year of his reign (1791) dispatched a crack army of 2,000 Solong soldiers into Tibet by way of Xining under the command of Generals Fu Kang'an and Hai Lancha. Another force consisting of 5,000 troops from the local militia of Jinchuan, 3,000 troops in Tibet and another 3,000 from Sichuan, was sent to the frontlines. This was the fifth military campaign the Qing government conducted in Tibet, involving a total of more than 17,000 troops.

For logistic support, Sun Shiyi, acting governor of Sichuan, was assigned the task by the emperor of collecting and transporting food supplies from Sichuan to Chamdo; from there on to Ü-Tsang the transporting was to be the responsibility of Amban Helin, and Hui Ling, governor of Sichuan, was to deliver the supplies to the frontlines. Ehui and Cheng De were sacked for inaction, but were "kept in the army."

As all the ammunition for the expeditionary army had to come all the way from the interior, and most of its food supplies were provided by Sichuan Province, and with 1,000 draught animals purchased in Sha'anxi for the transportation of military supplies, 70,000 *dan* of barley and over 20,000 head of cattle and sheep bought in Tibet, which "were enough to last more than 10,000 men one year," the expedition was to cost the Qing government a staggering sum of 10,520,000 *liang* of silver, or a quarter of the government tax revenue.

When he arrived in Tibet, Fu Kang'an decided to move the main force from Shigatse to the inland territory of Gurkha through Dzongga and Kyirong, and told Cheng De to coordinate the advance by attacking Nyanang. Also, he ordered the Tibetan army to recover Dromo by attacking it from Phari.

In the fourth month of 1792 the main force led by Fu Kang'an started from Dirilangu. On the seventh day of the fifth month, the army took Dram and recovered Kyirong. This was followed by the recovery of Rizog Zampa on the Tibetan-Gurkha border on the fifteenth day of that month. Meanwhile, the troops led by Cheng De recovered Nyanang, captured Musa Zampa and took prisoner Zama Darzunshayul, the Gurkha chieftain. By now all the territories lost to the Gurkhas had been recovered, and the Gurkha

invaders had been driven out of Tibet, and when the Gurkhas were confronted with the presence of the Qing army on their border, Rana Bahadur, the Gurkha ruler, released Wang Gang, a Han soldier, and Dzungpon Tangma from captivity. The two men brought back a letter from Rana Bahadur asking for the cessation of hostilities. Fu Kang'an refused, and ordered his victorious army to continue its advance. On the twenty-fourth day of the fifth month, it reached the check point at Shebulu in Gurkhas' territory. The Gurkhas offered resistance across the river, but ended up with five of their blockhouses destroyed by the attacking Qing troops, which had crossed the river on rafts under the cover of darkness and rain the previous night. On the eighteenth day of the sixth month, four Gurkha chieftains sent by Rana Bahadur brought back to the Qing army Kaloon Tenzin Paljor and Han and Tibetan prisoners of war, along with a letter to Fu Kang'an from the Gurkha ruler asking the Qing army to halt its advance. Again, Fu Kang'an refused.

In the seventh month, Fu Kang'an ordered his army to march on Katmandu. At Kalelatupumu, it ran into the stubborn resistance of the defending Gurkhas, and the fighting was the fiercest Fu Kang'an had ever known since the beginning of the expedition. The Qing army won the battle, but it paid a high price for its victory: it sustained heavy casualties and four of its important commanding officers were killed in action; they were Commanding General Teifeiying'ah, Deputy Commanding General Amantai, and Generals Mergenpo and Yinggui of the Imperial Guards.

It was late autumn when the Qing army was approaching Katmandu. In a report to Emperor Gaozong, Fu Kang'an said, "Snow comes early on the Tibetan border regions. Mountains like Dzungkatong-la become snow-bound as early as the eighth or ninth month. This year autumn came sooner than usual, and now it is more than ten days into this season. In view of that, the expedition has to be brought to an end and the army has to be withdrawn without delay before heavy snow sets in." In his reply, the emperor instructed: "Their (Gurkhas') appeal for peace may be granted while they are pleading for it out of fear. Their important chiefs are to be brought to the capital to pay homage to the Court along with their tribute. This is not a good arrangement, but it has

to be that way in view of the weather conditions there."

On the twenty-eighth day of the eighth month in the fifty-seventh year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1792) Fu Kang'an halted his advance as requested by the Gurkha ruler. Gurkha officials sent by the ruler arrived at the Qing camp with cattle, sheep, pigs, rice, wine and fruit as gifts to the Qing army. By the fourth day the next month the Qing troops had pulled clear out of Gurkha territory and returned to Kyirong.

When he returned to Tibet, Fu Kang'an proceeded to punish the chief culprits responsible for the invasion. He terminated the succession by reincarnation to Shamarpa as the Red Hat Living Buddha, and confiscated his property, which included silver, gold, estates, cattle, sheep and vassals; the money the property yielded each year would go to the Tibetan army. The estates in the possession of his monastery were given as rewards to Kyirong Hutuktu, the official in charge of *shangshang*. The 103 Red Hat lamaist monks of Shamarpa's monastery were forcibly converted to the Yellow Sect faith and were placed under the authority of the three great monasteries. Drungpa Hutuktu, the sixth Panchen's brother, who "instead of defending the monastery, fled with portable valuables" when the Gurkhas were approaching the Tashilhunpo, "thus committing a serious crime," was sent to Beijing by order of the emperor to be punished. The Jedrung Lama, who with the alleged oracle warning against resistance "caused the monks to flee in panic, leaving the monastery wide open to the plunderers, shall be brought to Ü, defrocked and executed."

Meanwhile, Emperor Gaozong, realizing that the victory over the Gurkhas and the gratitude the Tibetans felt for the Qing for relieving them of their sufferings offered a good opportunity to overhaul the Tibetan administrative system, instructed Fu Kang'an in an order saying "A proper ordinance should be laid down after the withdrawal of the army for Tibet to abide by all the time."

Thus ordered, Fu Kang'an said to the seventh Panchen Lama in the Tashilhunpo: "The administrators in Tibet are too short-sighted to know the importance of a comprehensive and effective system of government. The malpractices due to the lack of such a system should not be tolerated any longer. I shall discuss in detail with the resident official in Ü what is to be abolished and what is to be

established in this regard. You will be informed of our decisions by correspondence after they are approved by His Majesty, and you will instruct all the monks and lay people in Tsang to abide by them all the time." In Lhasa, Fu Kang'an said during a meeting with Jampal Gyatso, the eighth Dalai Lama: "The administration of Tibetan local affairs has never had any system to go by. All the Dalai Lama does is silent meditation and is therefore not well-informed of events taking place outside. The *kaloons* cheat with wild abandon in times of peace, and in times of war they are not able to do anything about defence. Extensive regulations are needed so that everyone knows what he is expected to do. In this regard His Majesty has instructed me in great detail what to do and has ordered me and the others to deliberate on his instructions to make sure that their execution will serve the interests of the Tibetans for a long time to come without creating any drawbacks. Since the Dalai Lama is grateful to His Majesty for what he has done for Tibet, he is expected to respect the changes to be made for better government in Tibet. If he persists in his old ways of doing things, His Majesty will call back the resident officials and evacuate the Tibetan garrison immediately after the withdrawal of the expeditionary army, and the Court will not come to the help of Tibet should any emergencies arise in the future. The Dalai Lama is asked to weigh the pros and cons and make up his mind." The Dalai Lama said in reply: "As the entire clerical and secular population and I feel deeply indebted to His Majesty for taking the trouble of instituting long-lasting rules and regulations for the administration of Tibetan affairs, violating them will be out of the question. When they become final, I shall, in conjunction with the resident officials, make sure that they are observed by the *kaloons* and the entire populace in everything they do, for their observance will benefit both Tibet and myself immensely."

Soon a twenty-nine-article "Imperial Ordinance" was produced jointly by Fu Kang'an, Kyirong Hutuktu representing the Dalai Lama, and the Dzaza Lama representing the Panchen. The original copy of the ordinance with its text in Tibetan is kept in the Jokhang temple; an English translation of the text follows:

1. The soul boys reincarnating Living Buddhas and *Hutuktus* are

customarily determined by the divination of the Four Guardians of the Doctrine. Such a practice may lead to its abuse. Henceforth, when soul boys are to be determined, their names and dates of birth will be written in the Manchu, Han and Tibetan languages on metal slips, which will then be placed in a gold urn provided by His Majesty as a symbol of his support for the Yellow Sect. This procedure, performed in the presence of the Four Guardians of the Doctrine, will be followed by a seven-day prayer session conducted by scholarly Living Buddhas. Then the reincarnations will be officially confirmed before the image of Sakyamuni in the Jokhang temple by the *Hutuktu* and the Resident Official in Tibet. When recognition is needed for only one soul boy, a blank metal slip will be put in the urn in addition to the one bearing the name of that soul boy. If the blank slip is drawn, that soul boy will not be recognized as the reincarnation, and a new one shall be sought. The reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni, who are related to each other as closely as father and son, will be confirmed in the same manner. This new procedure is intended by His Majesty to promote the interests of the Yellow Sect and to prevent cheating by the Guardians of the Doctrine. The urn will be enshrined before Tsongkhapa's image and shall be kept clean all the time.

2. For the security of Tibet, travellers and traders from neighbouring countries shall be subject to the control of the Tibetan local government. They may be allowed to do business in Tibet provided that they abide by its laws and respect its local customs. All itinerant traders must be registered, and their names reported to the Office of the Resident Official for the record. Nepalese traders are allowed to come to Tibet three times a year, and those from Kashmere once a year. These traders, whatever their destinations, must have travel permits issued to them by the Resident Official at the request of competent authorities, and showing routes they will travel by. Two check points will be set up, one at Gyantse and the other at Dingri; traders passing through them shall produce their travel permits for inspection. Foreigners who wish to travel to Lhasa shall send their requests to the *dzongpons* on the border, and the Han officials at Gyantse and Dingri, after an investigation, will report the number of persons making such requests to the Resident Official for entry permits. When the foreigners arrive in Lhasa, they shall be registered and inspected. The same procedures apply to those from Bhutan and Drenjong who wish to come to Lhasa on pilgrimages. Foreigners returning to their home countries will be subject to control and inspection by the *dzongpons*. Han officials and their clerks handling these matters will be punished if they are found

guilty of corruption. Persons sent by the Dalai Lama to Nepal to build Buddha images or pay homage to the Stupa will be issued with travel permits by the Resident Official; if they are not able to return at the prescribed time, the Resident Official will notify the Gurkha ruler of their delays. These measures will not only guarantee border security but also benefit Tibet as a whole.

3. The Tibetan *tramka* (coin) has been known to contain many impurities. Henceforth, coins minted by the Tibetan government shall be of pure Han silver containing no impurities. The new coins, like the old ones, will weigh one and a half *qian* each, and are convertible to the Han silver at the rate of six silver coins to one *liang* of Han silver. As six such coins contain only nine *qian* of silver, the one *qian* difference will pay for the cost of their manufacture. The new Tibetan coin will be stamped with the words *qianlong baozang* (Emperor Gaozong's Treasury) on the obverse side with the year of minting stamped around its rim; the reverse side will be stamped in Tibetan. To guarantee their purity, the coins will be inspected jointly by Han officials authorized by the Resident Official, and the *kaloons*. The debased coins minted by Nepal and the Tibetan government in the past may be converted into Han silver at the rate of eight such coins to one *liang* of Han silver, but from now on no coins shall be minted without official sanction. Coins minted by Nepal and the Tibetan government that contain no impurities may be converted at the exchange rate quoted above and no change shall be made in that rate. When new coins are found to contain such impurities as tin or iron, both the *tsepons* (lay officials) and the *tsezongs* (monk officials) sent by Han officials and *kaloons* to supervise their manufacture and the minters shall be punished and be fined twice as much money as the total face value of the counterfeit coins they have made.

4. There has never been a standing army in Ü-Tsang and soldiers have been conscripted at the last moment during an emergency. These soldiers, instead of being trained combatants, have been a source of harassment to the people. With the approval of His Majesty, a standing army of three thousand men will be built, of which one thousand will be stationed in Ü, one thousand in Tsang, five hundred in Gyantse, and the other five hundred in Dingri. These soldiers will be recruited in the principal regions. As each five hundred of these soldiers will be put under the command of a *dapon*, a new *dapon* will be installed in addition to the original five. The *dapons* in Ü will be put under the authority of the *youji* (army officer with the rank of lieutenant-colonel) stationed in Lhasa, and those in Shigatse, Gyantse and Dingri under the

authority of the *dusi* (army officer one rank below *youji*) stationed in Shigatse. Two muster rolls of the army will be provided, one for the Resident Official and the other for the Kashag, by which vacancies will be filled when they arise. All the soldiers will serve as the bodyguards of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni.

5. The *dapon* of the new army will have under him twelve officers with the rank of *rupon*, each in charge of 250 men; under the *rupon* there will be twenty-four officers with the rank of *gyapon*, each with 125 men in his charge, and under the *gyapon*, five officers with the rank of *dingpon* will be in charge of twenty-five men each. These officers shall be promising young men selected by the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama, and will be issued with certificates. Vacancies left by the officers will be filled by those of the next lower rank through promotion. Those in the army from aristocratic families, if promoted, shall go up only one rank at a time, starting from the rank of *dingpon*; arbitrary promotions shall be prohibited. By the old practice, *dingpon* was the highest rank accessible to soldiers recruited from the common people. From now on, these soldiers shall not be discriminated against but be promoted, one rank at a time, on the basis of knowledge, training and battle performance. Violators of army discipline shall be punished severely.

6. In the past, rank-and-file soldiers were neither paid nor provided with food rations or weapons, but had to acquire them on their own; and when they could no longer do so, they would desert. Henceforth, each of them will be issued with 2.5 *dan* of grain each year as food rations. As the grain levies from Ü-Tsang alone will not be enough to meet the need for the rations, which will come to 7,500 *dan* of grain, the 3,170 *dan* of barley from the estates of Shamarpa and Drungpa Hutuktu and from the five manors handed over by Tenzin Paljor's son, Madgye Sonam Palgyor, shall be put to that use. If that is still not enough, the difference shall be met by the proceeds from the sale of Shamarpa Lozang Jinpa's property. This way the soldiers will be kept supplied each year with the necessary 7,500 *dan* of barley. To make them understand that their interests as individuals are well looked after so that their morale will stay high, the enlisted men will be given by the Dalai Lama papers exempting them from corvée. The *dapons* will not receive any pay, as they have been given estates by the Dalai Lama. The *rupons* will each be paid thirty-six *liang* of silver each year, the *gyapons* twenty *liang*, and the *dingpons* 14.8 *liang*. The total of 2,600 *liang* of silver needed for this purpose will be provided by the Tibetan government, and the payment will be made by the Resident Official in

the spring and autumn seasons. The enlisted men will receive their pay and food rations twice a year, also in spring and autumn, from the *gyapons* and *dapons*. Short payment shall be prohibited.

7. Concerning the army's military equipment: fifty percent of it will be guns, thirty percent bows and arrows, and twenty percent swords and spears. If the monasteries in Ü-Tsang have any weapons in surplus, they may be purchased at a quoted price, and be paid for out of the 550 *liang* of silver from the sale of butter produced by the cattle farms confiscated from Shamarpa. Bows, arrows and ammunition will be made in Kongpo and Benpa by men sent there each year. Regular drills shall be maintained for the soldiers.

8. In the past, the income and expenditures of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni were not subject to audit by the Resident Official. As they are fully occupied with their religious duties, the Dalai and the Panchen are not able to attend to their private financial affairs, but have to leave them entirely in the hands of their relatives and attendants. Such an arrangement can hardly prevent embezzlement. The Resident Official has been authorized by His Majesty to make regular audits of their budgets and report his findings twice a year in spring and autumn. Cases of embezzlement will bring prompt punishment.

9. The Gurkha invasion has left many villages in Tibet in ruins and brought untold miseries to the people; the people, therefore, deserve to be relieved of their sufferings. By a recent decision the inhabitants in Kyirong, Rongshar and Nyanang will be exempted of all corvée services for two years, and one year exemption will be granted to those in Dzongga, Dingri, Khada and Tshongdu. It has also been decided that all the inhabitants in Ü-Tsang will be relieved of the tax arrears accumulated prior to the Iron-Hog year, and that monk and lay officials of the government and *dzong* and *shi* heads will have their tax arrears remitted by half. These decisions have been made to give expression to the tender care of His Majesty for the Tibetan people in Ü-Tsang, and when implemented, will greatly increase their well-being.

10. The Resident Official, being supervisor of Tibetan administration, shall have power and authority equal to that of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni, and all those working under the *kaloons*, including the Living Buddhas, shall be subordinate to him regardless of their position or rank. During the minority of the Panchen Erdeni, the *solpon khempo* will be in charge of the local affairs of Tashilhunpo, but, to guarantee fairness, he shall report important matters to the Resident Official so that the Resident Official will be able to make decisions on them when he visits Tashilhunpo on inspection tours.

11. When vacancies arise in the office of *kaloons*, candidates shall be selected from among the *dapons*, *tsepons* and *chanzods* on the basis of capabilities and performance as government officials, and two lists of the candidates prepared jointly by the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama shall be submitted to His Majesty for his selection and appointment. Candidates for vacancies left by *kaloons* lamas will be selected from among grand *khenpos*, and their names submitted to the higher authorities for appointment. Positions left vacant by *dapons* will be filled through promotion by *rupons*, or by border region *dzongpons* selected from two lists of candidates and approved by higher authorities. The positions of *tsepons* and *chanzods*, when left vacant, will be filled by those selected from *nyertsangpas*, *shipons* (law-enforcement officers), the grand secretary of the Kashag, or *tsezong* lamas (monk officials). Positions left vacant by *nyertsangpas* and *shipons* will be filled by those selected from among *shodepas*, the Lhasa *mipon* or *dapons*. In the following cases, vacancies will be filled by appointment: *shodepa*, Lhasa *mipon* and *dapon* by *dzongpons* and *dronnyers* (public relations officials) of the Kashag; monk officials of *nyertsangpa* and *shodepa* by lamaist monks from major monasteries; grand secretary by minor secretary or *dronnyer* of the Kashag; major and border region *dzongpons* by lesser *dzongpos*; minor secretaries by *gyapons* and other appropriate persons; border region *dzongpons* and minor *dzongpons* by low-ranking functionaries. In the past, all monk *dzongpons* came from the attendants of the Dalai Lama. Many of them, unable to perform their duties in the districts of their charge, had agents working on their behalf. Such a practice can hardly prevent corruption and blackmail. From now on, agents shall be nominated and appointed not by irresponsible *tsezong* lamas but by the Resident Official. The minor secretaries of the Kashag and the *dronnyers*, although low in position, can be influential persons as their work keeps them in close contact with the *kaloons*; therefore, only capable persons selected from among lay officials may hold the positions. Two *tsepons* and two *tsezongs* have been appointed as superintendants for the reorganized mint. When their positions are left vacant, the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama will be the only authorities to appoint their successors. Except *kaloons* and *dapons*, who are appointed by His Majesty, all the other officials may be appointed by the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama, and be issued with papers of authorization in the Manchu, Han and Tibetan languages. The promotion of *dzongpons* and officials below the rank of *kaloons* shall be by one rank at a time as described earlier in this document; promotion by jumping the ranks shall be prohibited. Guards

and keepers of forage grass for the Dalai Lama's stables and keepers of *tsamba* (barley flour) and tents, being minors, may be appointed by the Dalai Lama himself.

The size of the all-monk staff of the Tashilhunpo has never been prescribed, and the monks have never had any rank. From now on, the position left vacant by the *chanzod* shall be filled by the *solpon* lama (monk official in charge of food) or the *senpon* lama (dormitory superintendant), the position left vacant by the *solpon* shall be filled by the *tsezung*, and the vacancy left by the *senpon* shall be filled by the *dronnyer*, arbitrary promotion shall be prohibited. As the villages under the jurisdiction of the Tashilhunpo are not great in number and there are no important *dzongs* and *shi's* in its border region, the appointment of *chanzods*, *solpons*, *senpons* and *dzongpos*, as will be practiced in Ü, shall be the joint responsibility of the Panchen Erdeni and the Resident Official. Minors such as keepers of butter, *tsamba*, and fuel, will be appointed by the Panchen on the basis of the appointees' training. The distribution system of *ula* quotas will remain the same as before.

12. The attendants of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni have always been those related to them; the Dalai's uncle and the Panchen's father, Paldan Dondrub, have been promoted to their present positions without official sanction, and the Dalai's brother, Lozang Gedun Drupa, is notorious for his record of legal offence. In recognition of the wishes of the Tibetan people and of the monks and laymen of Tashilhunpo, it is stipulated that when the Dalai and the Panchen are alive, their relations shall be barred from holding public office, and that when they have passed away, their relations, if any left, shall be given work in the government compatible with their training.

13. Each year in spring and autumn the Resident Official will make official visits to various places in Ü-Tsang and inspect the troops there. He will investigate any complaints about the ill treatment and exploitation of the people by the Han officials and *dzongpons* in these places. Civilians shall be paid for the services they provide for the Resident Official on these inspection tours so that the tours will not become a burden on the people.

14. Disputes between Tibet and the neighbouring countries of Gurkha, Bhutan and Drenjong have been caused by, among other things, the incorrect style used for the letters of reply from the Dalai Lama to these countries regarding their payment of tribute to Tibet and the handling of affairs concerning Tibet and its neighbours. The war with the Gurkhas, for example, was the result of the indiscretion on the part of Tibet in handling their communications regarding the problem

of silver coins. Although the Gurkhas have now surrendered and shown repentance, all the future communications to them shall be executed by the Resident Official in consultation with the Dalai Lama to ensure proper wording. All replies to Gurkha representatives seeking audience with the Dalai Lama and the Resident Official shall conform to the latter's instructions in content, and the instructions of the Resident Official for the handling of important border issues shall be given even greater attention. Tributes from other countries shall be subject to the inspection by the Resident Official. When Bhutan, though of a different religious creed but ruled by those with honorific titles conferred by the previous emperors, pays its annual tribute to the Dalai Lama, and when Drenjong, Drongpa and Lo Menthang send theirs to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni, no difficulties shall be created for them, but they shall be inspected carefully. The border region *dzongpons* shall keep a record of the number of foreigners coming into Tibet and report the figures to the Resident Official; these foreigners, after being inspected by the Han officials at Gyantse and Dingri, will be allowed to proceed to Lhasa. Correspondence from foreign countries contiguous to Tibet to be forwarded to the Dalai Lama or others shall be subject to censorship by the Resident Official, who then will prepare the necessary replies to be delivered by courier. The *kaloons* shall not be allowed to maintain private correspondence with foreign countries; official communications from foreign countries to them shall be subject to censorship by the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama, and the *kaloons* shall not be permitted to give replies to them. These stipulations concerning foreign relations shall be strictly followed.

15. Kyirong, Nyanang, Rongshar, Khada, Saga and Khumbu are important communication centres adjacent to Gurkha territory; therefore, boundary markers shall be erected at the bridge at Riban in Kyirong, the iron bridge at Panzhan in Nyanang and on the border of Rongshar, to prevent Gurkha traders and Tibetans from smuggling themselves into or out of Tibet. Such markers shall also be set up without delay where they are needed to avoid disputes caused by their absence.

16. The control of the inhabitants of the border regions and the inspection of travellers passing through them are matters of vital importance. But as most of the capable *dzongpons* work in Lhasa, leaving only those of inferior capability to work in the border regions, cases of incompetence can hardly be avoided. From now on, *dzongpons* for the border regions shall be selected from among those of small *dzongs* and army officers. They shall be evaluated at the end of their

three-year term of office. If they prove to be capable and trustworthy, they shall become candidates for promotion to the position of *dapon*; those found to be incompetent shall be dismissed from office immediately.

17. In Tibet, only the aristocrats, not the common people, have been allowed to hold government positions. From now on, rank-and-file soldiers, regardless of their social status, may be promoted to the rank of *dingpon*, even *dapon*, if they merit such promotions on the basis of their training and battle performance. Other government positions shall continue to be filled by aristocrats old enough to shoulder their responsibilities. Henceforth, young men of the nobility shall not be appointed minor secretaries, Kashag *dronmyers* or minor *zhongpons* until they reach the age of eighteen.

18. As *khenpos* are heads of monasteries, they shall be men of great learning and sound moral character. Recent investigations reveal that the Living Buddhas of the major monasteries are in possession of large numbers of estates, take gifts from the people by exploiting their influence among them, engage in commercial activities, and are quite incompetent as heads of monasteries. Henceforth, the Living Buddhas of the major monasteries shall be appointed jointly by the Dalai Lama, the Resident Official and the Kyirong Hutuktu, and be issued with documents of authorization bearing the seals of the trinity. The appointment of Living Buddhas for small monasteries shall continue to be the responsibility of the Dalai Lama.

19. Taxes paid in kind shall be equal in value to the worth of the old or new coins in which the taxes would be paid. Excessive levies through cheating in the conversion are prohibited. Government purchasing agents shall be fair in business transactions and shall not be allowed to cheat the merchants.

20. The rates of import and export duties on rice, salt and other items paid at Kyirong and Nyanang shall remain the same as before; the Tibetan government shall not increase these rates without the approval of the Resident Official.

21. The poor in Tibet are over-burdened with taxes and corvée while the rich and the relatives of the Dalai Lama and the Grand Hutuktu are issued by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni with papers exempting them from corvée; holders of such papers also include many of those on the estates of the *kaloons*, *dapons* and the Grand Living Buddhas. All these papers shall be withdrawn to ensure equity in the distribution of corvée quotas. Only those who deserve the corvée-exempting privilege for their meritorious services, and recruits

in the army shall be eligible for these papers, which shall be issued to them jointly by the Dalai Lama and the Resident Official. When a soldier is no longer in active service, his papers shall be withdrawn.

22. For the purpose of control, the Office of the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama shall each be provided with a complete list of names of the Living Buddhas and lamas of the monasteries in the charge of the Dalai Lama, and another list, to be prepared by the *kaloons*, of the inhabitants in the hamlets under the *hutuktus* all through Tibet. The *khenpos* and *dzasas* shall be punished if the lamas in their charge are caught travelling without permits.

23. Some of the representatives sent by Qinghai Mongol princes with invitations to scholarly Living Buddhas to conduct prayer sessions in Qinghai have been known to enter Tibet with the knowledge of the Resident Official, while the others did so without informing the Resident Official, thus making it difficult to keep track of them. Such people shall henceforth need travel permits issued to them by the Resident Official through the Xining official after the Resident Official is notified by the official of their intended trips to Tibet. Living Buddhas on pilgrimages outside Tibet shall also need travel permits. The *khenpos* and other responsible persons shall be punished if the Living Buddhas of the monasteries in their charge are caught travelling without official approval.

24. The old practice of the Dalai Lama issuing papers entitling the holders in transit to the service of unpaid labour has caused many cases of abuse, and many relations of the *kaloons*, *dapons* and the Dalai Lama have been known to have used the unpaid labour service to transport food for private purposes. No Living Buddhas shall henceforth be allowed to use the unpaid labour service when they travel on private business. The unpaid labour service entitlement papers issued to those travelling on government duties shall bear the seals of the Resident Official and the Dalai Lama, and shall describe the kind of service to be provided them during their travels.

25. In handling cases of fights, murder and theft, the old practice may be followed, but the decisions shall be impartial and compatible with the seriousness of the offence. The rulings on such cases made by the *kaloons* and the *Ngantseha Mipon* (mayor of Lhasa) in recent years were not only unfair and the fines unwarranted, but the money, sheep or cattle thus fined went into the pockets of private individuals instead of being turned over to the government. There have been many cases involving *kaloons* who, taking advantage of their power, confiscated on false charges the property of people of low social standing after

reporting their decisions to the Dalai Lama. From now on, all fines shall be registered and handed over to the Resident Official. No penalties shall be imposed on offenders unless the penalties are approved by the Resident Official. The confiscation of an offender's property shall also need the approval of the Resident Official. All lawsuits shall be dealt with impartially no matter whether the persons involved are civilians or holders of public office. *Kaloons* found guilty of taking illegal possession of other people's property by abusing their power shall be dismissed from their posts and have their property confiscated; the property they confiscated illegally shall be returned to its original owner.

26. Ammunition needed for the annual training exercises of the army shall be produced at Kongpo by reliable persons sent by the Kashag and authorized by the Resident Official. The ammunition shall be brought to Lhasa where it will be distributed to the troops. Two of the newly made fourteen cannons shall be given to the Tibetan troops in Tsang, which have never had cannons, for target practice during training exercises. The remaining cannons shall go to the Dalai Lama.

27. *Kaloons* and *dapons* are customarily given their official residences and estates by the Dalai Lama upon their appointment, and return them when they leave office. Recent investigations reveal that some former *kaloons* and *dapons* did not return them to the government, but transferred them to their family members after they received new residences and estates from the government. All outgoing *kaloons* and *dapons* shall henceforth give their residences and estates to their successors, and shall be prohibited from taking possession of them.

28. The dates for the payment of salaries to the Living Buddhas and lamas are prescribed. However, there have been many instances in recent years of advance payment of their salaries. Henceforth no advance payment shall be allowed. The Kyirong Hutuktu is requested to investigate this matter immediately, and those responsible for advance or overdue payment of the salaries shall be disciplined.

29. Generally monk officials are sent to nearby villages to collect taxes, land rents and tributes, and lay officials are usually sent to distant villages for the purpose. Recent investigations reveal cases of embezzlement of tax money and land rents by a handful of corrupt monk and lay officials and *zhongpons*, which have led to accumulated arrears in government tax revenues. Cases of levies one year in advance have also been exposed by these investigations. In addition, taxes owned by runaway inhabitants were arbitrarily transferred to those bound to their land. All these excessive levies make life extremely miserable for

the people. From now on, tax collectors appointed by *chanzods*, monks and lay officials and *zhongpons* shall collect only the taxes and rents that fall due; collection one year in advance shall be prohibited. Runaway households shall be exempted from taxation until they return."

The twenty-nine article ordinance represented the third phase of the Qing's Tibet policy. It was a document of great importance contributing to the social stability and economic growth of Tibet, as it laid down in explicit terms, rules involving Tibet's political and religious systems in the following areas: 1. the succession by reincarnation of the Dalai Lamas, the Panchen Erdenis and the Hutuktus; 2. the relationship between the amban on the one side and the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni on the other, and the scope of their responsibilities; 3. the appointment, removal, promotion, demotion of, and material rewards for Kashag officials; 4. the building of a Tibetan local army; 5. the Tibetan local currency; 6. finance and tax revenues of the Tibetan local government and the *ula* (unpaid labour) system; 7. the exemption or reduction of various levies and the remittance of taxes and land rents in arrears; 8. the adjustment of Tibet's legal system and the establishment of procedures of litigation; 9. the management of the monasteries, the appointment and removal of *khenpos*, the sustenance of monks, and the procedures for approval of invitations by the Mongols of Tibetan Living Buddhas; and 10. foreign affairs, the control of foreign residents in Tibet, foreign trade, and border inspection.

The ordinance was an important document also because it consolidated the amban's political position in Tibet; it put him on equal footing with the Dalai Lama, gave him the power to supervise the conduct of the *kaloons* and enabled him to exercise authority as the representative of the central government over the local government of Tibet. As Emperor Gaozong said to Fu Kang'an in an instruction dated the twenty-seventh day of the eighth month in the fifty-seventh year of his reign (1792), "Usually capable, competent officials are assigned to posts in the capital; those sent to Tibet have been mostly mediocrities who did practically nothing but wait for the expiration of their tenures of office so they could return to Beijing. Because of that the Dalai Lama and the *kaloons* were able to do whatever they wished in the adminis-

tration of Tibetan affairs, ignoring the existence of these incompetent officials. That is how the Resident Official has been reduced to nothing more than a figurehead. From now on, the administration of Tibet should be effectively supervised by the Resident Official; ... the Dalai Lama and the *kaloons* shall no longer be allowed to monopolize it." In a report to the emperor in the eleventh month, Fu Kang'an made similar statements: "The Resident Official should henceforth be equal in status to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni in supervising the administration of Tibetan affairs. As a guarantee against usurpation of authority, the *kaloons*, Tibetan chiefs, responsible lamas and all their subordinates should, without exception, seek the instructions of the Resident Official in the execution of their duties. As the Panchen Erdeni is still in his minority, the *sopon khenpo* is now in charge of Tashilhunpo, but he should follow the instructions of the Resident Official in handling public affairs ... so that Ü-Tsang is administered under unified leadership." In another instruction to the amban, the emperor said, "Do not show excessive reverence to the Dalai Lama or he may monopolize power, nor any sign of slighting him, or you will lose popular support. Be watchful and make sure that everything is handled properly." All these documents were clear indications that the Qing government wanted to give the amban more power.

The amban, in implementing the ordinance, did a number of good things in conjunction with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni. It was on the advice of Amban Song Yun that Jampal Gyatso, the eighth Dalai Lama, made the following decision in the sixtieth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign (1795):

All the levies of grain and taxes in kind and in cash, with the exception of those of fodder, firewood, cattle, sheep and pigs needed by *Shangshang*, shall be remitted for one year. In addition, all the taxes in grain, cattle, sheep, pigs that fell into arrears during the period between the fifty-sixth and the fifty-ninth year of His Majesty's reign, totalling more than forty thousand *liang* of silver in worth, shall be exempted.... Many of the Tibetan people, compelled by poverty and overburdened with corvée, have fled their homes. If nothing is done about that, and the people are not relieved of their suffering, more will flee, and the houses left behind will fall into disrepair. It has now been

decided to bring back those who have fled and provide them with the money needed for the repair of their houses. Those who have become dependants of aristocrats should also be resettled in their native places. They will be given food rations and seeds for farming by *Shangshang*, and be exempted from the first three years of taxes and *ula* as a sign of government care for their well-being. The flight of the common people from their homes has been caused by the excessive levies imposed by *ula* on cattle, horses, manpower, firewood and food. In view of that, all army officers, *depas* and *dzongpons* in Tibet shall henceforth see to it that *ula* services shall be available only to those whose *ula* entitlement papers bear the seal of the Office of the Resident Official in Han and Tibetan; the only exceptions shall be pilgrims to Tibet and those sent by the Dalai Lama on his service, in which case the entitlement papers shall continue to be issued by the Dalai Lama and the Kyirong Hutuktu with the knowledge of the Resident Official. Those in the army from aristocrat families shall not refuse *ula* duties assigned to them by their officers; offenders shall be dealt with severely. Pulling *ula* stints is an obligation of both the poor and the wealthy.

As the population of Tsang is not greater than that of Ü, the amount of grain to be levied this year shall be reduced by only half after the year's payment of grain to the Panchen Erdeni.

In addition, the Dalai Lama made his own offer: "I am willing to give up the donations of thirty thousand *liang* of silver in my possession to *Shangshang* as funds with which to provide the poor with food and the grain seed they need for farming, and to enable them to restore their houses so that they may have a place to live."

When Emperor Gaozong was informed by the amban of the Dalai's offer, he instructed: "Since the Dalai has shown his understanding of our intentions and his sympathy for the people of Tangut, he does not have to give up money in his private possession. The local government shall appropriate from its public funds thirty thousand *liang* of silver for Ü and ten thousand *liang* for Tsang. Song Yun, who will supervise the expenditure of the appropriations, shall see to it that not a single Tibetan remains homeless by being left out of the relief program; this represents my concern for the well-being of the Tibetan populace." Upon these instructions, Song Yun went to Tsang with ten thousand *liang* of silver and distributed the money to the needy there, while He Ning gave out thirty thousand *liang* to the poor in the eastern, northern

and southern regions of Ü. In addition, Song Yun banned all illegal levies and taxes in Dzongka, Kyirong and other regions ravaged by the Gurkha invaders two years earlier. The ban naturally won the gratitude of the local Tibetans.

At this time a smallpox epidemic was ravaging Tibet, taking a heavy toll of human lives. The amban took effective measures to combat the killer disease. What he did was recorded on a stone slab in front of the Jokhang Temple. The inscription reads:

The people of Tangut fear smallpox more than they do ulcers. Smallpox victims end up in caves or on the wasteland; deserted by their next of kin and left utterly without help, none can ever survive. Their fate is indeed tragic. I had a number of one-storey houses built for the Tibetans struck by smallpox at Langdang'gu in northern Tibet with my own money. I fed the sick, and sent a party detail of Han and Tibetan soldiers to look after them. After a period of treatment, nine out of every ten victims recovered. When the monks and lay people were convinced that smallpox was not an incurable disease, I persuaded the Dalai Lama and the Panchen to donate food to smallpox victims.

The amban also tried to put an end to sky burial in Tibet. He opened burial grounds for the poor in Lhasa and Shigatse and put up public notices warning against sky burials. The notices said:

To re-affirm the respect for the relationship between family members and to improve social customs, the carving up of the remains of the dead shall be strictly forbidden. Every human being is as much indebted to his parents for their nurture as he is to the sky and earth.... It is a long established custom in Tangut that after a person has died, his remains are carved up and fed to vultures or dogs, or are thrown into rivers, practices called sky burial, earth burial and river burial. Sometimes the remains are even chopped up and mixed with barley flour as food for vultures or dogs. These are bestial practices! ... Carving up remains and feeding them to vultures and dogs shall be prohibited. The dead shall be buried properly on private estates; the poor who do not own land shall report their dead to the authorities and bury the remains in public burial grounds to be opened by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni in Ü-Tsang. This Office, upon violations of the ban on the old burial practices by ignorant Tibetans, will order the officials and army officers stationed in Tibet to put to death the offspring of the dead involved by slicing their bodies into small pieces; those who watch the banned burials and encourage the offenders, shall also be

punishable by death.

But judging by the fact that the custom persisted despite the intended reform, it seems the ban was entirely ignored by the Tibetans.

The twenty-nine article ordinance formulated by Fu Kang'an began a period that in general marked the height of the Qing's rule over Tibet. The eighth Dalai Lama was the leader of Tibet only nominally, for everything he did was dictated by the amban. In 1804 (the ninth year of Emperor Renzong's reign) Jampal Gyatso died in the Potala at the age of forty-seven. Following his death, the Kyirong Hutuktu was appointed regent by Emperor Renzong, and the search for the reincarnate soul boy was begun.

Lungtok Gyatso, the Ninth Dalai Lama

Lungtok Gyatso, the ninth Dalai Lama, was born in 1805 (the tenth year of Emperor Renzong's reign, or the Wood-Ox year in the thirteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle) at Chunko in Danko in Kham to Tenzin Choskyong, the local headman, and Dondrup Drolma. After his son was confirmed as the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Choskyong was granted by the Qing court the rank of *Kung*. Following the death of the Dalai Lama at age eleven, he returned to Kham to his former position as a headman, having found it difficult for his family to remain in Tibet.

When Lungtok Gyatso was recognized as the reincarnate soul boy at the age of three (1807), he was brought to Lhasa from Kham and took up his temporary residence at the Gungthan Monastery. In a joint request to the amban, Tanpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen, the regent and the representatives of the three major monasteries said that as the soul boy was the genuine "re-embodiment of the fifth Dalai Lama, we seek the permission of His Majesty to dispense with the drawing of lots from the golden urn." The granting of the request was announced by the emperor's envoy, General Teching'e, who also delivered to the Dalai the emperor's gifts including a ceremonial scarf, a sculpture of the God of Longevity, a precious stone rosary and a golden bell on a staff. The emperor then sent Prince Tuleng, Galedansila Hutuktu, vice min-

isters and officers of the Imperial Guards to Tibet to attend the enthronement ceremony. He granted the Dalai the privilege to use the yellow palanquin and the seals of the preceding Dalai, and gave him ten thousand *liang* of silver. The coronation took place on September 22, 1808 (the thirteenth year of Emperor Renzong's reign), during which Tanpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen, shaved the Dalai's hair, ordained him into monkhood, and gave him the religious name Lungtok Gyatso.

In 1811 (the sixteenth year of Emperor Renzong's reign) the emperor installed the Demo Hutuktu as regent to succeed the Kyirong Hutuktu, who had died that year. Britain had by now annexed India, and was sending men into Tibet to collect information in preparation for its invasion of Tibet.

With its power beginning to wane following Emperor Renzong's ascension to the throne, the Qing Dynasty was barely able to maintain its rule over Tibet. It adopted a passive, "none-of-my-business" attitude towards disputes between the countries adjacent to Tibet, or their internal strife, and shut its eyes before the acts of aggression that Britain was perpetrating against these countries. As a result, these countries gradually drifted away from the Qing, and the British imperialists were emboldened in their aggressive attempts.

At the time Gurkha was convulsing with internal disorder. Narching, a Gurkha *khache* (minister), had been feuding with King Rana Bahadur. In a rebellion he led, the minister drove the king out of Yambu (Katmandu). Later, when the king raised an army and recaptured Katmandu, Narching sought asylum in Tibet, but was refused entry by Amban Ying Shan. Later, when the king was slaughtered by the rebels, the amban reported to the emperor that Rana Bahadur, the Gurkha king, had been killed, and suggested that since the killing was not reported through official channels, no one should be sent to Gurkha, and that the Gurkha rebel, Dana Picholong (Narching's brother), should be expelled from Tibet. To this Emperor Renzong gave his consent.*

Meanwhile, the king of Drenjong, in an attempt to exploit the civil strife in Gurkha for the recovery of the territories he had lost

* *Research into the History of Resident Officials in Tibet.*

to it, asked the amban to "issue a statement denouncing" the Gurkhas. The request was "repudiated" by Amban Ying Shan. In a comment on a memorial from Ying Shan reporting the matter, Emperor Renzong said, "The Drenjong chief believed that since Ying Shan was new to his post, he might be able to hoodwink him by providing him with false information, as he did, about the territories that Drenjong lost to the Gurkhas a long time ago, so Ying Shan might arbitrate in his favour. Ying Shan studied the background of the dispute, and persuaded him to give up his demand. The Resident Official handled the matter properly."

Having been snubbed by the amban, the king of Drenjong turned to the British for help. As the British were looking for an excuse to bring under their control the countries bordering on Tibet, they promptly complied. In 1814 (the nineteenth year of Emperor Renzong's reign) the British, upon the request of the king of Drenjong, sent their troops to Drenjong. They captured from the Gurkhas Teila and Molan in the Himalayas and gave the two places to Drenjong; and when Drenjong accepted the position by which "Britain is henceforth committed to the protection of Sikkim (Drenjong) in case of a crisis," it was reduced to the status of a British "protectorate."

Not reconciled to the loss of territory, the Gurkhas mounted an offensive and drove the British out. In 1815 (the twentieth year of Emperor Renzong's reign) Britain launched a large-scale attack on the Gurkhas. The Gurkhas offered resistance, and at the same time appealed to Amban Xi Ming for logistic aid. The amban not only refused to help, but reproved them for having provoked the British, saying that they were "looking for trouble." When the British broke down the resistance of the Gurkhas, the Gurkha ruler asked the amban to send troops to their aid, warning that "if (we) surrender to Phyingling (Britain), we shall no longer be able to pay tribute to the Qing Court." Again, the amban refused, and "criticized him sharply." Being left without any help, the Gurkhas were forced to negotiate peace with Britain. In 1816 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Renzong's reign) they signed the Treaty of Segolie with Britain, under which they ceded three places to Britain and had to have a resident British envoy in Katmandu.

During the British-Gurkha war, the ninth Dalai Lama died

suddenly on February 11, 1815 (the twentieth year of Emperor Renzong's reign) in the Potala, aged only eleven. Emperor Renzong then ordered a search for the reincarnate soul boy and appointed the Demo Hutuktu, then in charge of *Shangshang*, regent. When the Demo died in 1818 (the twenty-third year of Emperor Renzong's reign), the Qing emperor ordered Gandin Shrathu Nomihan (later known as the Tsemonling Hutuktu) to succeed the Demo as regent.

Tsutrim Gyatso, the Tenth Dalai Lama

The tenth Dalai Lama was born in 1816 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Renzong's reign or the Fire-Mouse year of the fourteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle) in Nabu village at Nedu in Lithang, Kham, to the village headman Lozan Niyanta and his wife, Namgyal Butri. Following his son's recognition as the tenth Dalai Lama, Lozan Niyanta was granted the rank of *Kung* by the Qing court. After he moved to Tibet, the Kashag gave him a large number of estates and vassals, establishing him as a major Tibetan aristocrat from whom the present-day Yuthog family is descended.

There had been three claimants to the Dalai's throne. In 1822 (the second year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) they were brought to Lhasa as ordered by Emperor Xuanzong, and the drawing of lots from the golden urn that took place in the Potala established the Lithang boy as the tenth Dalai Lama. In the Nythang Monastery near Lhasa, where the Dalai Lama was staying as arranged by Regent Tsemonling, Tanpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen, shaved the soul boy's hair, administered the *getsul* vows for him and named him Tsutrim Gyatso. On the eighth day of the eighth month, Tsutrim Gyatso was enthroned in the Potala.

At the age of thirteen (1828) Tsutrim Gyatso began his monastic study at the Drepung, and when he was eighteen (1833), he took his *gelong* vows from the seventh Panchen. On the first day of the ninth month in 1837 (the seventeenth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign or the Fire-Cock year of the fourteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle), when he was only twenty-two years old, Tsutrim Gyatso died suddenly in the Potala without ever assuming temporal power.

During the time of the tenth Dalai Lama, not much happened in Tibet or outside of it, but its neighbours distanced themselves even further from the Qing Dynasty. In the first year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign, "the Drenjong ruler came to Tibet to give out alms. He asked the regent to make him the *dzongpon* of Phari, or put him in charge of the Dromo tribe and Dromo Yanadrosong under the jurisdiction of Phari." Amban Wen Gan "repudiated the request," and suggested to Emperor Xuanzong that "the Drenjong king be allowed into Tibet only every five or eight years." In reply, the emperor said, "Make it eight years." The next year (1822) when the king asked for an exception to be made so that he might be able to attend the enthronement ceremony of the tenth Dalai Lama, the emperor instructed: "The request may be granted ... but get him out of Tibet as soon as the ceremony is over." This meant reducing the contact between Drenjong and Tibet to the minimum.

In 1827 (the seventh year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign), the Ladakhi ruler tried to present to the emperor a memorial along with a ceremonial scarf and a bolt of silk cloth. The amban called the intended presentation a "breach of formality." In reply to his request for instruction, the emperor said, "Presentation of memorials to the throne by small tribes on the Tibetan border is unheard of. As Ladakh is not on a par with border states like Gurkha, the Resident Official is right to regard the presentation as a breach of formality."

In 1835 (the fifteenth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) when another border dispute arose between Gurkha and Drenjong, the Gurkha king reported to Amban Eshuan'an: "Drenjong has encroached upon our border. Your instructions are requested." To the succeeding amban, Guan Shengbao, the emperor gave the order: "Proceed to the border immediately and investigate the situation there. Keep constant surveillance on that area. If hostilities break out between them, the Resident Official shall order all Chinese and Tibetan officials to tighten security measures at check points. No one shall be allowed to go beyond the border and cause

* *Research into the History of Resident Officials in Tibet.*

trouble. This is a matter of importance.”* As the order amounted to a refusal to intervene in the dispute, Gurkha and Drenjong turned to Britain for mediation. “The British government sent Grant to mediate. When the dispute was settled, Grant asked for the lease of Drenjong’s Darjeeling as a British ‘summer resort.’ In 1835 Drenjong ceded to Britain Darjeeling and the mountainous areas connecting the plains of India, and Britain promised to pay the king of Drenjong an annual stipend three hundred pounds.”**

Khedrup Gyatso, the Eleventh Dalai Lama

The eleventh Dalai Lama was born in 1838 (the eighteenth year of Emperor Xuanzong’s reign or the Earth-Dog year of the fourteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle) in a wealthy family near the Taning Monastery in Tachienlu (Kangding) in Kham. His mother was named Yungdrung Butri. His father, Tsewang Dondrub, was granted the rank of *Kung* by the Qing Dynasty after his son was chosen as the eleventh Dalai Lama. The large number of estates and vassals Tsewang Dondrub received from the Kashag after he settled in Tibet made him a major Tibetan aristocrat from whom the Phunkhang (Phuntsog Khangsa) family is descended.

There had been three candidates claiming to be the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, and the final choice had to be made by lottery. As there was a war going on in Ngari at the time, Khedrup Gyatso was brought to stay temporarily in the Taning Monastery.

The Ngari war was fought in 1841 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Xuanzong’s reign). Ladakh, a tribal state west of Ngari, was a dependency of Tibet under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama. “When Ladakh was invaded by the Senpas, savages living beyond the Tibetan border, it appealed to Tibet for help. The appeal was rejected by the amban. Embittered, Ladakh joined the invaders and persuaded them to attack Tangut (Tibet) in the hope of recovering the land west of the Mangchuna Mountain.”*** In a large-scale attack, the Senpas captured Ruthog, Gatok, Dapa, Pu-

* Ibid.

** *A General History of Tibet.*

*** *Illustrated History of Tibet.*

reng and Tsarang, occupying the whole of Ngari.

The Qing government, now fighting the Opium War, could not spare any troops for Tibet. So the amban sent Kaloon Tsetan Dorji and Dapon Pelshi to Ngari with 1,300 Tibetan troops to mount an offensive. The Qing government, which set great store by the campaign, instructed the amban to equip the Tibetan army with heavy guns from the armoury "for the purpose of the campaign." As the Senpas were good soldiers, the Tibetans did not score any victories in the beginning. So a five-hundred-strong militia from Ü-Tsang was sent by the Kashag as reinforcement. In the winter of 1841 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) heavy snow of several feet fell in Ngari, to the distress of the Senpas, who were not accustomed to cold weather. With the help of the snow falls, the Tibetans mounted an attack with chain-reaction guns, and routed the Senpas, killing more than two hundred, including their chieftain, Wazir, and taking over eight hundred prisoners; and by the time the Tibetan army had pursued the fleeing Senpas all the way to the Tibetan-Ladakhi border, it had recovered all the lost territories in Ngari.

The defeated Senpas then negotiated peace with Tibet. They withdrew from all the territories they had seized from Ladakh, and returned them to the jurisdiction of the Ladakhi ruler.

On the twenty-fifth day of the fifth month in the twenty-first year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign (1841), the amban had the three candidates for the reincarnate Dalai Lama brought to the Potala for the lottery, and when Khedrup Gyatso was chosen, he had his hair shaven by the seventh Panchen, Tanpai Nyima, and was given the religious name Khedrup Gyatso by him. Then the sixteenth day of the fourth month of the next year (1842 or the twenty-second year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) was set for the enthronement to take place in the Potala. Emperor Xuanzong appropriated ten thousand *liang* of silver from the imperial treasury for the enthronement ceremony, and sent a delegation composed of the Drangkya Hutuktu, Meng Bao and the deputy commander of the Chengdu garrison, Shimeng'e, to attend.

In 1844 (the twenty-fourth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) Amban Qi Shan, in a feud with Regent Tsemonling, impeached the regent before the emperor on charges of "greed and graft. The

emperor ordered Tsemonling's removal from office and exiled him to Huanglongjiang. His property was confiscated and the proceeds from its sale went to the monasteries to pay for the renovation of their buildings." Then the amban proposed to the emperor that Tanpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen, be put in charge of *Shangshang*. But when "the emperor endorsed the proposal that the Panchen Erdeni be put concurrently in interim charge of *Shangshang*," the Panchen, now at the advanced age of sixty-three, said that he was not interested in the regency. It was only after persistent urging by the amban that he agreed to take over. Soon after that, Amban Qi Shan, in an effort to put an end to the various malpractices prevalent in government at the time, made amendments with the emperor's approval to the twenty-nine article Imperial Ordinance, defining in detail the status and scope of authority of the amban and stipulating rules for the regency.

In 1846 (the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) the nine-year-old eleventh Dalai Lama took his *getsul* vows from the seventh Panchen before the Sakyamuni's image in the Jokhang Temple. Soon after that, Emperor Xuanzong appointed Ngachithu Nomihan (Radreng Hutuktu) regent to replace the Panchen, who insisted on resigning and retiring to his monastery.

In 1852 (the second year of Emperor Wenzong's reign) Khedrup Gyatso, the eleventh Dalai Lama, accompanied by Amban Eleheng (later by the garrison commander, Tong Xingkui, when the amban fell ill), left Lhasa for the Sera, Drepung and Ganden monasteries to preach, give out sweet-butter tea and alms. After the Ganden, he journeyed to the Chokhorgyal Monastery on Lhamo Latsho, and from there on to the Samye in Lhoka before returning to Lhasa. In 1855 (the fifth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign) the Dalai Lama assumed temporal power by order of the emperor, and the Radreng Hutuktu remained as head of *Shangshang*. On the fifteenth day of the twelfth month of the same year, when he was hardly one year in office, the Dalai Lama died suddenly in the Potala, aged only eighteen. Following the Dalai Lama's death, the Radreng Hutuktu was re-appointed regent by Emperor Wenzong.

The eighteen years of the life of the eleventh Dalai Lama coincided with the time when the Qing's rule in Tibet and the rest of China was weakened first by the Opium War and then by the

Taiping Rebellion that was sweeping the country. In the second year of Emperor Wenzong's reign (1852) a riot broke out in the lamasery in Draya, south of Chamdo in Kham. "The minor lamas took out their personal grievances on the chiefs under the Nomihan, killing seventeen of them. They burned the Nomihan's documents, looted the monastery and robbed the post-staging stations of their horses," cutting off Tibet's communication and postal connections with the interior. Similar outbursts of violence were reported in Middle Nyagrong in eastern Kham at the same time. The amban and the Kashag ordered Kaloon Tsetan, the *chang-zodpa* in Chamdo and the garrison commander of Draya to "suppress" the rioters in Draya, and troops were sent from Sichuan to "put down the riots resolutely" in Middle Nyagrong. It took more than one year to calm things down in these places, but the situation in Tibet as a whole was beginning to get out of control.

Immediately after the suppression of the local riots, an armed conflict instigated by the British imperialists broke out on the Tibetan border. Back in 1842 the Gurkha ruler had said to the amban that "as his country was repeatedly bullied by Phyiling (Britain), he needed help in money and troops, and asked that he be given another piece of Tibetan territory." As the request was tantamount to a territorial demand on Tibet on the pretext of British aggression, Amban Meng Bao "repudiated it forcefully and rejected the letters from Phyiling that were brought to his attention." But the Gurkha ruler, instead of giving up his claims, made still another unjustifiable demand that "Nyanong and Kyirong be administered alternately by Tibet for ten years and by Nepal for three years." Again the amban refused with "sharp reproof." In the fifth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign (1855) Ganpo Tangsong-wangtu was sent by the Gurkhas to Kyirong. There he announced to an assembly of the local villagers that he was going to take over as the new *dzongpon* of Kyirong. Then Kaloon Wangchuk Gyalpo and the grain officer, Zhang Qi, sent respectively by the Kashag and the amban, "arrived in the Dingri area. On the pretext of investigating legal cases they readied the area for an emergency."

Soon after that, the Gurkhas, in violation of their pledge of "non-aggression toward Tibet," sent an invading army of several thousand men into Tibet, alleging that Tibetan border officials had

levied excessive rice taxes on Gurkha traders, blocked their entry, and that there had been cases of murder and robbery involving Gurkhas. Kyirong and Nyanong fell to the invading Gurkhas, and then Dzongga. This led to the meeting between Amban Hetehe and a Gurkha *khache* (minister) at Shekhar in Tsang. The amban studied the complaints of the Gurkhas and told the Gurkha minister that he would order Tibet to pay them fifteen thousand *liang* of Han silver for the damages done in exchange for cessation of hostilities. The Gurkhas, refusing the terms, sent in more troops and occupied Pureng Dzong in Ngari and Rongshar in Tsang, "attempting to destroy the Qing camps with increased military strength." At the same time the Tibetan army under the command of Kaloön Tsetan mounted an offensive on the Gurkhas in Rongshar, killing several hundred of the invaders and razing to the ground the Gurkha camps at Phajia-la. Next the Tibetan army recovered Nyanong and laid siege to Dzongga, and when Kaloön Tsetan led his troops in an attack on Rongshar, the war situation began to turn in favour of the Tibetans. However, the Gurkhas, not disheartened by their initial setbacks, raised a crack army of seven to eight thousand men. They descended on Nyanong from the cliffs at Yumukha, capturing the place again. As the Qing government could not spare any troops for Tibet on account of the Taiping Rebellion, the amban had to move two thousand Han and Tibetan soldiers from Ü to Tsang as reinforcements, and at the same time asked the governor of Sichuan through the court to provide him with military support by sending local troops into Tibet from Kham. But when all these efforts failed to bring military victory, Tibet was forced to succumb to the Gurkhas and sign an unequal treaty with them. The gist of the treaty is as follows:

The monk and lay officials of the Gurkha and Tibetan Governments mentioned below held a conference and agreed upon and concluded a treaty of ten articles:

1. The Tibetan Government shall pay the sum of ten thousand rupees annually to the Gurkha Government.
2. Both Gurkha and Tibet regard the Great Emperor with respect. Tibet being the Holy Land of Buddhism, the Gurkha Government shall afford help to it if any foreign country attacks it.
3. Henceforth Tibet shall not levy taxes on trade or taxes on roads

or taxes of any other kind on Gurkha merchants.

4. The Tibetan Government agrees to return to the Gurkha Government the Gurkha soldiers, weapons and women captured in the war. The Gurkha Government agrees to return to the Tibetan Government the Tibetan troops, weapons, yaks, and articles left behind by the Tibetan residents at Kyirong, Dzongga, Nyanong, Pureng and Rongshar. On the conclusion of the treaty the Gurkha troops will withdraw from Kyirong, Dzongga, Nyanong, Pureng and Rongshar.

5. Henceforth the Gurkha Government will have a resident envoy in Lhasa.

6. Gurkha merchants will open shops in Lhasa and engage in free trade.

7. The Tibetan Government is not allowed to try any case arising among Gurkha merchants residing in Lhasa. In the event of quarrels between Tibetan and Gurkha subjects, officials of the two governments will jointly try the cases; the fines imposed on the Tibetan subjects will be taken by the Tibetan official, and the fines imposed upon Gurkha subjects will be taken by the Gurkha representative.

8. Should any Gurkha criminal go to Tibet, he shall be surrendered by Tibet to Gurkha; and should any Tibetan criminal go to Gurkha, he shall be surrendered by Gurkha to Tibet.

9. If the property of the Gurkha merchant or other subject is plundered by a Tibetan subject, the Tibetan officials, after inquiry, will compel the restoration of such property to the owner, or compel the plunderer to restore the property within a certain period of time. If the property of a Tibetan merchant or other subject is plundered by a Gurkha subject, the Gurkha official, after inquiry, will compel the restoration of such property to the owner, or compel the plunderer to restore the property within a certain period of time.

10. After the conclusion of the treaty neither government shall take vengeance on the persons or property of Tibetan subjects who helped the Gurkha Government during the war, or on the persons or property of Gurkha subjects who so helped the Tibetan Government.

Apparently, the Gurkhas had the backstage support and encouragement of the British imperialists in their invasion of Tibet, for Britain had by then gained the control of the Gurkha government.

Trinley Gyatso, the Twelfth Dalai Lama

Trinley Gyatso, the twelfth Dalai Lama, was born in 1856 (the sixth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign or the Fire-Dragon year of the fourteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle) to Phuntsog Tsewang, the father, and Tsering Yudreng. After the twelfth Dalai died at the young age of twenty, the family merged with that of the Lhalus.

There had also been three children who claimed to be the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. They were brought to Lhasa, and on the thirteenth day of the first month in 1858 (the eighth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign) Phuntsog Tsewang's son, one of the three claimants, was chosen as the twelfth Dalai Lama by lottery conducted by Amban Man Qing in the Potala. He then had his hair shaven and was given the religious name Trinley Gyatso by Regent Radreng. (The seventh Panchen had died, and the eighth Panchen was only four years old, too young to perform the ceremonies.) After that Trinley Gyatso was brought to the Norpulingkha where he took up temporary residence in Kelzang Phodrang.

In 1864 (the third year of Emperor Muzong's reign), when he was eight years old, the twelfth Dalai Lama took his *getsul* vows from Lozang Chenrab Wangyug, the retired abbot of the Ganden, as the eighth Panchen was still in his minority.

As the Qing Dynasty was by now no longer able to keep a tight rein on Tibet, disputes were arising one after another among Tibet's neighbours; the British imperialists were becoming insatiable in their imperialistic conquests, and the situation in Tibet itself was threatening to get out of hand. In 1862 (the first year of Emperor Muzong's reign) a conflict flared up between Regent Radreng and the monks of the Drepung. The regent had sacked a *khenpo* of the Drepung for "pocketing part of the donations" to the monastery. This angered the monks who gathered in front of the regent's residence to protest the decision. Han soldiers led by Grain Commissioner Li Yupu and Lt. Col. Tang Huaiwu were dispatched by Amban Man Qing to "suppress" the protesters. But with Li Yupu siding with the Drepung monks, the crisis worsened. The monks, now united with the lamas of the Ganden, started to shell the regent's residence with guns they had seized from the armoury in the Potala. The incident, believed to have been engineered by

Kaloon Chanpon (Pelshi), his son and the four grand *drungyigs* with the participation of one third of the monk and lay officials of the Kashag, was in fact a revolt of the government officials against the regent, a struggle between the regency and the aristocracy triggered by the dismissal of the *khenpo*.

Regent Radreng reported the incident to the amban and ordered his men to counterattack by opening fire on the demonstrators. The fighting lasted one day, and when the regent found that the attackers were too numerous for him to win, he fled in the night with his official seals. Then Emperor Muzong, upon the amban's impeachment, stripped Radreng of his title and "declared invalid the seals of authority granted him." Nomihan Shatrava Wangchuk Gyalpo was then chosen by the emperor to be in charge of *Shangshang*, and when Wangchuk Gyalpo died in 1864 (the third year of Emperor Muzong's reign) Lozang Chenrab Wangyug was appointed his successor by the emperor.

When Radreng arrived in Beijing by way of Qinghai, he filed his charges to the Qing government. The Qing government authorized Fu Ji to investigate his charges in Tibet and ordered a court confrontation to take place in Beijing between Radreng and Li Yupu. Fu Ji never went to Tibet; the roads had been closed by a dispute among the tribes in Nyagrong in Kham, and Li Yupu, protected by the amban, "was never sent to Beijing," and when Radreng died in the capital, the case fizzled out.

What had begun as a dispute among the tribes in Nyagrong later developed into a tribal war with the Tibet involved in it. Consisting of an upper, lower and middle region, Nyagrong (now Xinlong County in Sichuan Province) had seen tribal quarrels in the time of the eleventh Dalai Lama. In 1863 (the second year of Emperor Muzong's reign), Gompo Namgyal, the *tusi* (local headman) of Nyagrong, allied with the *tusi* of Derge, invaded the territory of the Hordrago *tusi* and carried the war to the regions under the jurisdiction of the *tusi* of Mingcheng (Kangding reign). Thubten Gonpo, Gompo Namgyal's son, leading a mob, destroyed the residence of Lithang's *tusi* and tore down the bridges on the main roads. He "opened government mail, trussed up the interpreters with rope and closed the roads to Tibet." In the fourth year of Emperor Muzong's reign (1865), Tibetan troops under the com-

mand of Li Yupu were dispatched to the troubled area, and as support, Sonam Wanggyel, the *tusi* of Mazur in Kham, and Gyaltsen Lingchen, the *tusi* of Mingcheng, were ordered by the Qing government to send their troops on a two-pronged attack. It was not until the first month of the next year when the new fort and the old one in Nyagrang fell to the attackers and Gampo Namgyal perished in a fire along with his two sons, were the whole of Nyagrang "pacified" and the communications between Tibet and the interior restored.

The Tibetan army, after overrunning Nyagrang, asked the governor of Sichuan to pay its expenditure of two hundred thousand *liang* of silver. When the demand was rejected by the governor, the Tibetan army declared its occupation of Nyagrang, refusing to pull out of it. Thus the Qing government decreed that "the three regions of Nyagrang be administered by the Dalai Lama through the agency of a *khenpo* and temples be built there for worship."

Around this time, Tibet itself was rocked by outbursts of violence in many places within its boundaries. In the eighth month of the second year of Emperor Muzong's reign (1863) the lamas of the Sera Monastery "robbed Lobzang Trinley Namgyal, the chief *khenpo* who had been removed from office and was awaiting court trials. The rabble was put down by troops sent by Amban Man Qing." Eight years later in 1871, "Chief Khenpo Palden Dondrub and the lamas of the Ganden started a riot, offering resistance from a strategically advantageous position. Amban En Lin ordered military suppression of the riot and at the same time urged jointly with the Dalai Lama the Han and Tibetan government officials and army commanders to help with the suppression by both peaceful and military means. The riot ended with Palden Dondrub shot to death, and twenty-five rioters taken prisoner, including Lama Ngadan and the deposed Kaloon Tsering Wangchuk."*

Meanwhile the British imperialists were intensifying their encroachments on the Tibetan borders. After they seized Darjeeling from Drenjong, they turned the district into a county and posted a county magistrate there. In 1849 Drenjong jailed the British magistrate for six weeks before they put him to death along with

* *Research into the History of Resident Officials in Tibet.*

a British tourist. Because of that, Britain stopped the payment of the annual salary of three hundred pounds to the Drenjong king. In 1860 (the tenth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign), Ashley Eden, leading an expeditionary army sent by the British imperialists, stormed into the king's palace in Toomlong. "When Britain defeated Drenjong, it dictated the following terms of peace: 1. free trade by British subjects in Sikkim (Drenjong); 2. protection of foreign travellers (in Drenjong); 3. construction of roads; 4. Sikkim to act as British agent in handling communication affairs with Tibet, and to receive from Britain an increased annual stipend of £1,200."

These incidents were indicative of the decline of the Qing's rule in Tibet. The ambans had become too feeble to do anything to halt the aggressive advances of the British imperialists, and within Tibet, as the people turned their backs on the Qing, violent incidents broke out one after another. As admitted by the Qing government in one of its instructions to Amban Chong Shi, "the situation in Tibet is indeed deplorable."*

In 1873 (the twelfth year of Emperor Muzong's reign), when Lozang Chenrab Wangyuk, the acting regent, died of illness, the emperor instructed the Dalai Lama to assume temporal power. As demanded by custom, Trinley Gyatso, after coming into office, went on pilgrimages to the Sera, Drepung and Ganden monasteries. Then he journeyed on to the Chokhorgyal in Lhamo Latsho, and after the Chokhorgyal he travelled to the Samye in Lhoka, where he preached. He returned in 1874. On the twentieth day of the third month in 1875 (the first year of Emperor Dezong's reign or the Wood-Hog year by the Tibetan calendar), the twelfth Dalai Lama died suddenly in the Potala at the young age of twenty, only one year after assuming temporal responsibilities. Following the Dalai's death the Qing emperor appointed the Kyirong Tungshan Hutuktu (Kundeling Tatsag Nomihan Hutuktu) regent and ordered a search for the future thirteenth Dalai Lama.

All the four Dalai Lamas from the ninth to the twelfth died in their teens or early twenties; the ninth at eleven, the tenth at twenty-two, the eleventh lived for only eighteen years and the

* *A General History of Tibet.*

** *Research into the History of Resident Officials in Tibet.*

twelfth had just turned twenty when death overtook him; and these were all sudden deaths. Murder was suspected, but just who the murderers were never became known. What is certain is that these four Dalai Lamas were victims of the power struggles between the big clerical and lay serf-owners of Tibet.

The premature deaths of the Dalais could not but arouse the suspicion of the Qing government. In each case, the ambans would order the remains to be kept in the same position and all the objects in the Dalai's bed chamber in the same place as when the death occurred. They would also have all the Dalais' attendants locked up and order autopsies in the hope of pinning the murder charge on someone. But these investigations never led to anything but fat purses for the ambans and increased boldness of the murderers.

Part Two

Tupden Gyatso, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama

Searching for the Soul Boy

In Dagpo, a district southeast of Lhasa, there is a place nestled in picturesque mountains and endowed with mirror-like lakes. In this enclave, so goes the Tibetan biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, there is a village that the local people call Langdun, meaning "before Elephant Mountain," as the mountain that rises behind it resembles the trunk of an elephant. The place is blessed with a mild climate and fertile land, and is known for the honey of the bees raised there.

There lived in the village of Langdun a peasant family not of aristocratic lineage, nor one, to borrow the Tibetan phrase, "cursed for the taking of lives." The master of the household was Kunga Rinchen, who was married to Lozang Droma. On the fifth day of the fifth month in 1876 (the Fire-Mouse year of the fifteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle or the second year of Qing emperor Dezong's reign) Lozang Droma gave birth to a boy at sunrise. The baby boy had a broad forehead and a few white hairs that grew in a mass of black hair at the crown.

Trinley Gyatso, the twelfth Dalai Lama, had been dead for more than a year by then. The Kashag, seeking information on the direction in which the incarnate Dalai could be found, consulted the eighth Panchen, Tanpai Wangchug, of the Tashilhunpo for oracles. The oracle the Panchen invoked said that the Dalai's re-embodiment had been born somewhere to the southeast of Lhasa. The answer was confirmed first by the Chosgyong of the Samye in Lhoka, and then by the Nechung Chosgyong, a profes-

sional divine oracle invoker. Thus, the Kashag decided to search for the soul boy in the direction the oracles pointed.

Customarily, after the direction was determined, an inquiry would be made about a number of things that would help locate the soul boy's birth place and family. This was done by consulting an oracle priest and by examining the reflections in the Lhamo Latsho at Chokhorgyal. Accordingly, divine revelations of such information on this soul boy were asked by the Nechung Chosgyong in the Potala's Grand Prayer Hall in the presence of the regent, the Living Buddhas of the three great monasteries and all the *kaloons*. The oracle invoked said, according to the medium, "The soul boy has been born in a village east of Lhasa to Kunga and Droma. Highly revered priests should be sent to look for him in the area west of Tachienlu."

Accordingly, large teams of Living Buddhas, *khenpos* and government officials were dispatched by the Kashag to various places in Ü and Kham to look for the locality and the parents that fitted the description given by the oracles. In the ninth month of 1876 Lozang Dargye, a retired *khenpo* of the Upper Tantric House in Lhasa, was sent by the Kashag to look at the reflections in the Lhamo Latsho. The *khenpo*, following the usual practice, threw *hatas* (ceremonial scarves), vases and medicine into the lake, and, after a series of prayer sessions, looked into the lake at what was supposed to be the reflection of the village where the Dalai had been reborn.

After the examination of the images in the lake, the *khenpo* met with the *nyertod* (local official) of Chokhorgyal. The *nyertod* told him that he had heard that a boy had been born on the fifth day of the fifth month in the Fire-Mouse year to a peasant named Kunga Rinchen and his wife Lozang Droma in the village of Langdun in the district of Dagpo. The local official's information took the *khenpo* to Langdun where he conducted a secret investigation. He claimed that when he arrived at Langdun, he found that the village resembled in every detail the images he had seen in the Lhamo Latso, and that the names of the boy's parents were those revealed by the deity invoked by the Nechung Chosgyong.

The *khenpo* paid a visit to the peasant couple and their baby boy. When he returned to Lhasa, he submitted a detailed report of his

investigations to the Kashag and the regent. Immediately the Kashag sent Gyangchub Namdrol, the Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoche and Lhawang Norbu, a Kashag *dronyer*, to Langdun to check every detail and ask Kunga and his wife to submit to the Kashag a truthful written report on the unusual circumstances surrounding the conception and birth of their son.

In Langdun, the two envoys on behalf of the Kashag presented to the infant boy a long *hata*, a statue of the Buddha, seven large parcels of dried fruit and two packets of pills called *tandui* and *mani rilpo*.

The gifts having been presented, the Khenchen Phurchok placed in front of the boy some of the objects that the twelfth Dalai Lama had used. The Yellow Sect believes that the boy who picks up articles used by the deceased Dalai is his reincarnation. Casually, this boy picked up from the array of objects a small bottle. The Khenchen Phurchok then told the boy's parents to take extremely good care of their son with emphasis on cleanliness, and that no one outside the family should be allowed to come in contact with the boy.

The Khenchen Phurchok stayed in Langdun for four days, during which time he inquired further into the birth of the child and observed carefully his movements; when he found everything to his satisfaction, he returned to Lhasa and reported his observations to the Kashag. Again, the Nechung Chosgyong was consulted by the regent, the four leading *kaloons* and representatives of the three great monasteries. The oracle offered in prostration a *hata* in the direction of southeast, a gesture that meant the boy found in that direction was the true reincarnation of the Dalai. Meanwhile, the Kashag reported in detail the discovery of the soul boy to the eighth Panchen, and the Panchen in his reply confirmed its belief.

As there were no rival claimants, the Kashag, supported by the confirmations, established the identity of the boy from Langdun as the prospective Dalai Lama. A joint request was then made by the eighth Panchen, the regent, and the entire lay and clerical staffs of the three great monasteries and the Tashilhunpo, asking the emperor through Amban Song Gui for the permission to omit the lot-drawing process on the ground that the boy was the sole candidate whose identity as the Dalai's reincarnation had been

confirmed by all those involved in his selection. In the third month of 1877, Emperor Dezong wrote at the end of the petition, "Lozang Thabtan Gyatso, the son of Kunga Rinchen, may be proclaimed the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama without resorting to the drawing of lots from the urn."

The Hair-Shaving and Name-Giving Ceremony

On the twentieth day of the tenth month in 1877 (the third year of Emperor Dezong's reign) a large team of monk and lay officials arrived at Langdun with the things that the twelfth Dalai had used. They were to take the soul boy to Lhasa where he would live as the head of Lamaism. The team was composed of over thirty monk and lay officials from the Potala including the Senpon, Solpon, Chodpon (the three leading *khenpos* serving as the Dalai's closest attendants) and *khanchungs* in addition to more than twenty *dapons* and the Yuthog Teji from the Kashag, plus a *larang chanzod*, *isepons*, *namdras*, *zimgyogs*, a groom, a palanquin officer, canopy carriers, tent attendants, a guard of honour and a musical band.

On the first day of the eleventh month, the soul boy, in a monk's robe, left Langdun for Lhasa in a palanquin in a procession led by the guard of honour and the musical band. At each stop on the way he was greeted by and presented in ceremonial tents with *hatas* from such dignitaries as the *gyigyab khenpo*, Phünkhang Gong, *kaloons*, Ta Lamas, the Gurkha Dzasa, Chanlochen Gong, the Tangyeling Hutuktu, the Horkhang Dzasa, Teji Phunda, *phogpons* and *dapons*.

On the fourteenth day, when the soul boy arrived at the Tsel Gungthang Monastery on the southern bank of the Lhasa River, he was carried by the *senpon khenpo* in his arms to the Nyiod Khang where, like all his predecessors, the soul boy in a prostrate position facing east listened to an imperial edict read out to him by the amban. In the edict Emperor Dezong gave his approval for the boy's succession as the thirteenth Dalai Lama and granted the request for the omission of the lot-drawing ceremony. After he repeated the prostration ritual three times to the east following the

reading of the edict in acknowledgment of the imperial grace, the boy received *hatas* from the two *ambans* and in return gave them his *hatas* and other presents including images of the Buddha, joss sticks and Tibetan woolen cloth. The gift exchange was followed by a celebration ceremony called *gadro*. At this ceremony the regent representing the Kashag presented the soul boy with a *hata*, mandral, religious ritual objects, the wheel of the doctrine, conches, gold, shoe-shaped silver ingots, silk cloth, tea, butter, dried fruit and white barley; next, the *dronyer* from the Tashilhunpo gave the soul boy expensive presents in addition to the usual *hata*, and the *dronyer* in his turn was followed by the *hutuktus*, Preceptor Phurchog, *kaloons*, *kungs*, *dzasas*, *tejis*, representatives from the three great monasteries and the monk officials of the Lower and Upper Tantric Houses in their presentation of *hatas* to the prospective Dalai Lama. In the Tsel Gungthang Monastery the soul boy took up his temporary residence, waiting for the eighth Panchen from the Tashilhunpo to shave off his hair and give him his religious name.

Tanpai Wangchug came to Lhasa on the fourth day of the first month of 1878 (the fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) at the invitation of the Kashag. On the eleventh day of that month, the Panchen, accompanied by the regent and the preceptor, met with the soul boy in the Tsel Gungthang Monastery. At the *hata*-exchanging ceremony the soul boy presented Tanpai Wangchug with a mandral. The Panchen then cut his hair with a pair of scissors, clothed him in a monk's robe and gave him the name Jetsun Ngawang Lozang Tupden Gyatso Jigrab Wangchug Chogle Nampar Gyelpa Pel Zangpo or Tupden Gyatso for short. The ceremony ended with the two Tibetan high priests exchanging presents that included *hatas* of extra length and statues of the God of Longevity.

The occasion was then celebrated joyously by the Kashag in the Shodukhang Chenmo Grand Prayer Hall; the celebration was repeated at the Tashilhunpo the next day.

The Panchen stayed with the soul boy at the Tsel Gungthang for more than two months before returning to the Tashilhunpo. During his temporary residence at the Tsel Gungthang, the soul boy had all his expenses covered by the Kashag. Later he moved

to the Rikyasamtanling Monastery, where he awaited the enthronement ceremony.

The Enthronement

Shortly after the soul boy was brought to the Tsel Gungthang, the Kashag had reported to the ambans, "We are planning to enthrone the Dalai Lama in the Earth-Hare year. We ask Your Excellencies to submit our request to His Majesty that he give his approval for the ceremony as in all the preceding cases, and grant the Dalai Lama the privilege to use the yellow palanquin and the yellow saddle during the ceremony."

In the fifth month of 1879 an imperial edict was brought to Lhasa in which Emperor Dezong said: "I have learned with great pleasure that the re-embodiment of the Dalai Lama has been confirmed and that the thirteenth day of the sixth month this year has been chosen as the auspicious day for his enthronement. I am sending the Dalai Lama a yellow *hata*, a statue of the Buddha, a rosary and a *vajra* with the matching bell. The Dalai Lama, after being enthroned, shall be entitled to the use of his predecessor's gold seal of authority and I shall be informed of the date on which he begins using it. The request for the use of the yellow palanquin and the yellow saddle is granted. Kunga Rinchen, the Buddha's father, shall be given the rank of *kung* and, the privilege to wear the precious stone bead and peacock feathers on his hat." The rank of *kung* and the large number of manorial estates with serfs that he later received from the Kashag established the father of the thirteenth Dalai as a major aristocrat from whom the Langdun family is descended.

On the tenth day of the sixth month, the regent, *kungs*, *kaloons* and *khanmangs* arrived at the Rikyasamtanling to prepare the soul boy for the enthronement in the Potala. On the twelfth day, the prospective Dalai left the Rikyasamtanling for Lhasa in the company of the regent. The party spent the night in a tent that the Kashag had set up at Dodguthang about ten *li* east of downtown Lhasa. There the Dalai was greeted by the amban and the two exchanged *hatas*.

Prior to the enthronement day, orders were issued by the Sho Depa and the Lhasa Mipon (mayor of Lhasa) to all the inhabitants of the city and those in the nearby villages that all the streets in Lhasa be cleaned, the road between the Jokhang and the Potala be marked with a lime line on either side, canopies, religious banners and coloured flags be displayed atop all the buildings in the city, and the Dalai's entry into downtown Lhasa be greeted with the music of *suona* (a wind instrument), giant horns, drums and cymbals played from the rooftops, and with the burning of aromatic pine and cedar branches in front of every house.

On the morning of the thirteenth day, the Dalai, wearing a yellow, scented monk's robe, started for Lhasa in the yellow palanquin. The procession was a long one; travelling in front of and behind the Dalai's palanquin were a guard of honour, a band of musicians, the regent, preceptor, abbot of the Ganden, *hutuktus*, *kungs*, *kaloons*, *dzasas*, attendant *khenpos*, Kashmirs (Muslims), Bolpos (Nepalese), Atsarayas and the Zumligyalpo.

Welcoming crowds of monks and lay people lined the ten-odd-li-long road leading from Dodguthang to the Potala. On the right side of the road were lamaist monks from the three great monasteries, the Upper and Lower Tantric Houses, the Meru Gumpa of Lhasa, the Shide Dratsang and Chakpori; they were holding in their hands canopies, religious banners, fresh flowers, sacrificial offerings, and cymbals, or playing giant horns and beating drums. On the left side were the residents of Lhasa and nearby villages, all dressed in colourful costumes, singing auspicious songs, doing auspicious dances; there were also Tibetan waist-drum teams, spinning and swirling to the roll of their drums; the music reached its climax when the Dalai's palanquin passed by.

The Dalai, as custom demanded, stopped at the Jokhang. There he draped a *hata* over a plaque on a pillar inscribed with "A long, long life to the reigning emperor." Then he proceeded to the Main Hall where he presented a *hata* to the image of Sakyamuni. On that day one thousand lamps and offerings made out of one thousand pieces of *tsampa* (barley flour cakes), all provided by the Kashag, were placed before the images of the deities enshrined in the Jokhang.

After going through the worship rituals in the Main Hall, the

Dalai went upstairs to the second floor. There he offered *hatas* to the statues of King Songtsen Gampo, Princess Wencheng of the Tang Dynasty, the Great Master Padmasambhava, and Palhamo (a female deity), and when he finished chanting the Buddhist scripture "The Four Achievements," the Dalai came downstairs and went straight to the Potala.

In the Zimchung Nyiod Khyil (Sunlight Hall) of the Potala the Dalai met with the amban for a second time. After the usual exchange of *hatas* between the two men, the Dalai gave the amban another *hata*, one of extra length, and a statue of the Buddha. Then the enthronement ceremony began.

On the public square in front of the Potala the occasion was celebrated with performances by theatrical companies and waist-drum teams from all parts of Tibet. Crowds of young Tibetans in their holiday best sang auspicious songs and danced auspicious dances while seventy-five top-notch Tibetan horsemen swept down the approximately 15-*li*-long road from New Dungkar (in front of the Drepung) to the Potala in a long distance race.

After the enthronement, the Dalai took over the gold seal of his predecessor, for which he, like his predecessors, "expressed his gratitude in a memorial to the Emperor." The memorial was prepared in advance by the *drungyig chenpo* and was submitted by the *gyigyab khenpo* and the four *drungyis* (secretaries) to the Dalai who affixed the seal to the document. The memorial followed a writing style that had remained unchanged since the time of Lozang Gyatso, the fifth Dalai Lama. It contained a verse in Tibetan singing the praises of the emperor: "We live in a land of poverty and misery, but you give us peace and tranquility. In Your Majesty we trust, for in who else could we do so except you?"

The celebrations lasted from the fifteenth day of the sixth month till the twenty-second day. They began with a ceremony of great pomp in the Tashilhunpo, attended by the Dalai, the regent, and the ambans. At the ceremony Nubawa, the Dzasa Lama of the Tashilhunpo, presented gifts to the Dalai and read out eulogies on behalf of the Panchen. The Tashilhunpo ceremony was followed by a succession of celebrations that included those at the Tangye-ling on the sixteenth day, those on the seventeenth day attended by more than five hundred people including those from the

Nechung Dratsang, the Gyantse Khangsar and the headman of Ngari, and those on the eighteenth day with over two hundred Drenjong officials and merchants residing in Lhasa taking part. These celebrations were then in their turn followed by a festive gathering of the headmen of the Tsoba Sogu (the Thirty-Nine Tribes) and of Ü-Tsang, which in its turn was followed by a celebration by all the Han officials and soldiers stationed in Drashi, and finally the celebration by the Kashmirs in Lhasa.

Throughout Tsang and Ngari and in all the monasteries and temples in Kham, the festive occasion was observed in the form of Chengbu Assemblies and prayer sessions.

Following the enthronement ceremony, the *balyar khen-po* (courier) sent by the regent left for Beijing with a memorial to the Manchu monarch reporting the proceedings of the Dalai's ascension ceremony.

Taking the Getsul Vows

After being installed on the throne, the Dalai Lama was to begin his study of Buddhist scriptures. In the fourth month of 1882 (the eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), with the approval of the emperor, Regent Kyirong Dongshan Hutuktu Ngawang Paldan Choskyi Gyaltsen was made the Dalai's preceptor and Phurjog Shapdrung Lozang Tsultrim Jampa Gyatso assistant preceptor.

With his teachers appointed, the Dalai was initiated into scriptural studies on an auspicious day. He was to begin with a series of Buddhist sutras and daily calligraphy practice. On the day of initiation all the members of the Kashag, as required by Buddhist custom, presented the Dalai Lama with *hata*s.

Amban Song Gui, whose three-year term of office had by now expired, was leaving for Beijing, and the new amban, Seleng'e, had arrived in Lhasa. The new amban, upon assuming office, paid a courtesy call on the Dalai in the Potala and received from him an *ashe hata* and a statue of the Buddha as first-meeting presents. Likewise, the departing amban paid the Dalai a farewell visit; the latter made him the usual local Tibetan gifts and sent a monk official to escort him to Markham.

In 1881 (the seventh year of Emperor Dezong's reign) the Dalai was six years old, and by Buddhist custom he was to take his *getsul* vows the following year. This ceremony was generally administered by the Panchen himself, but as the eighth Panchen was too ill at the time to make the trip to Lhasa, the Kashag thought of asking the Dalai's teacher to give the vows instead. For this the Kashag sent a request to the emperor for approval through the ambans. In the ninth month of that year, the emperor granted the Kashag's request and sent Yeshe Sogpa of Kharkha Mongolia to Lhasa to witness the *getsul* vow administration ceremony. Then the thirteenth day of the first month in the Water-Horse year (1882 or the eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) was chosen by the Kashag for the Dalai to be initiated into monkhood by the regent in front of Sakyamuni's image in the Jokhang.

On the sixth day of the first month the Dalai left the Potala Palace for the Jokhang Temple.

The ordination ceremony took place in the Main Hall of the Jokhang on the day as scheduled. The regent had *The Book of Exoteric Buddhism*, which was kept in the Jokhang, placed in front of the Dalai who then performed the prostration ritual before the scripture and draped it with a large coloured *hata*. The regent then opened the book and lectured the Dalai on its thirty-six *getsul* commandments against such sins as theft, the taking of lives, telling of lies and immoral sex. Next, the Dalai took the following oath: "I shall abide by all the commandments in the book and put them into practice in my work for the welfare of worldly beings." The scripture was then wrapped in a bolt of quality brocade and taken back to where it was kept. Finally, the Dalai presented to the regent on a plate of pure gold twelve packets of gold each weighing one *qian*, a conch with whorls going up from left to right, and a revolving wheel; they were the regent's rewards for administering the Dalai's ordination.

On the nineteenth day of the first month, the Dalai Lama, following the practice of the Dalai Lamas before him, submitted to the Qing emperor a written account of the ceremony. The document was then taken to Beijing by the *balyar khenpo*.

In the fourth month the Dalai's initiation into monkhood was celebrated by order of Emperor Dezong.

On the sixteenth day of the seventh month Tanpai Wangchug, the eighth Panchen, passed away in the Tashilhunpo. On the twenty-second the Dalai Lama was informed of his death by messengers from the Tashilhunpo and was asked to arrange immediately for the search of the Panchen's reincarnation. Promptly the Kashag and the regent went into consultation, which produced a prayer in the name of the Dalai Lama to be said in all the *dzongs* and *shikas* in Ü-Tsang, Ngari and Kham for the early reincarnation of the Panchen. Meanwhile, all the monks of the three great monasteries and the Namgyal Dratsang of the Potala were required by the Kashag to pray for the same purpose. Large-scale memorial services were conducted in the Jokhang and the Ramoche.

In the sixth month the next year (1883), Lozan Dondrub, the Dzasa Lama, sent by the Tashilhunpo, reported to the Dalai on the funeral of the deceased Panchen and the construction of the *serdung* (stupa) for the Panchen's remains, and, as a representative of the Tashilhunpo, gave out alms and sweet butter tea to the monks of the three great monasteries.

The Routine of the Dalai Lama

The pattern of activity of the Dalai Lamas had remained unchanged since the fifth Dalai became the local temporal ruler of Tibet; barring the interference of extraordinary events such as the thirteenth Dalai's flights to Outer Mongolia in 1904 and to India in 1910, this pattern was never altered. Thus, a description of it will give one a general idea of the political and religious activities of the Tibetan lamaist hierarchy.

Tibetan Spring Festival falls in the first month of the Tibetan calendar; it is also the month when the Monlam prayer festival with the participation of twenty to thirty thousand monks takes place. On the first day of the month, the Dalai would host a grand celebration party in the Potala. At the party the amban and the Dalai exchanged New Year greetings. This was followed by the presentation to the Dalai of *hatas* and New Year gifts by the regent, *kaloons*, monk officials of the three great monasteries, the Dalai's teachers, lay and monk government officials and the representa-

tives of the Tashilhunpo and the Sakya. Each of the dignitaries was blessed by the Dalai by having his head touched by the leader of Lamaism. Then hatchet dances were performed by a group of children. Dressed in colourful costumes and wearing hats ringed with white cloth bands and tiny bells on their boots that jingled with every movement they made, these young performers, each holding a small hatchet in his hand, danced to the music provided by drums and giant cymbals. It was an exotic Nepalese dance of gentle, graceful movements. The performance was followed by a debate between two monks selected by the three great monasteries for their quick wit and knowledge of Buddhist scriptures. The party wound up with the throwing of *kase* (Tibetan-style doughnuts) and a noisy scrambling for them. All the celebration parties in Tibet on this occasion went like that.

On the second day of the first month a small celebration party was thrown in the Potala by the new monk and lay officials who were appointed each year. Called *samkha*, the occasion was not graced by the presence of the ambans, the regent and the *kaloons*. As a rule, the appointments of new government officials were announced by the Kashag at the end of each year, and the appointees took office immediately after they presented *hatas* to the Dalai at the New Year party.

On the night of the third day of the month, the Dalai would ask for divine prophecies before the image of Auspicious Deva in the Potala about first the well-being of the emperor in the coming year, second the well-being of the Panchen, third the operation of the Kashag, and lastly the well-being of the lay and clerical populace of Tibet.

On the fourth day of the month, the monks of the three great monasteries began to converge on Lhasa for the Monlam prayer festival. As stipulated by the fifth Dalai, during the festival from the third day of the first month through the twenty-fifth day, the *ngantsesha* (Lhasa municipal government) was run by the Tshogchen Shango of the Drepung with the power to punish any resident of Lhasa at will. He took over the municipal government after he reported for duty to the Dalai Lama on the night of the third day of the first month.

The Monlam festival took place in the Jokhang with six gather-

ings each day. The first morning meeting was called *shogthog* and the next *sogyang*. The noon assembly, known as *gamthog*, took place on the Sungchos Public Square on the right side of the Jokhang. After *gamthog* came first *kungthe*, then *monlam* and lastly *kungga*. The Dalai Lama was barred from the Monlam festival during his minority; after he assumed temporal power, he could attend the festival on invitation; in that case he would give a sermon to the monks from the three great monasteries on the Sungchos Square during the day of the fifteenth day of the month.

The Monlam was also an occasion for the aristocrats and wealthy merchants of Qinghai, Kham and Tibet to give out alms to the monks and to the Dalai Lama as well; the share that went to the Dalai was many times greater than what ordinary monks received.

The Lamp Festival with the exhibition of *marme* (butter lamps) fell on the night of the fifteenth day of the first month when Barkor Street around the Jokhang was lit with butter lamps. The lamps had wooden racks behind them that were decorated with figurines, mountains, rivers, dragons, snakes, birds and animals, all made of coloured butter with exquisite craftsmanship. In front of the butter sculptures burned a huge array of lamps fueled by melted butter. The Dalai Lama was not supposed to look at the lamps before he assumed temporal office, but if he was invited to the Monlam in the first year of his coming to power, he would have the privilege of enjoying the spectacle of the burning lamps before the regent, *kaloons*, aristocrats, monks and the common people were allowed to view the exhibition. It was a night of noisy merry-making throughout the city and often went on until day-break.

On the twenty-third day the Monlam festival closed with the send-off of the God Without Function. An effigy of the deity was carried to the outskirts by lay and monk bearers; there it was burned amidst rifle reports fired by Tibetan soldiers in the belief that with the deity gone the people would come to no harm for the rest of the year. On the next day the streets of Lhasa became scenes of wrestling and weight-lifting competitions; in the suburbs archers competed on galloping horses. On the twenty-fifth day, the monks from the three great monasteries began to return.

If the Dalai was to join in the Monlam festival, he would leave

the Potala on the fifth or sixth day of the first month and stay in the Jokhang; on the twenty-fifth day he would as a rule pay obeisance first to the Buddha image in the Jokhang and then to that in the Ramoche before returning to the Potala on the same day.

The Lesser Monlam, called *tsogchod*, was observed in the Jokhang from the nineteenth to the thirtieth day of the second month by three thousand monks from the three great monasteries. During this festival the Dalai would sometimes leave the Potala once for a scripture reading session in the Jokhang and return to the Potala on the same day. The festival closed on the thirtieth day with a special event called *gokusham* (Sunning the Buddha) during which a giant painting of the Buddha, approximately thirty *zhang* in length, was displayed from the roof of the Potala all the way down to the foot of the hill.

The seventh day of the third month was the day when the Dalai would gather all the lamaist monks of the Namgyal Dratsang of the Potala for the chanting of Buddhist texts and the filling of *bumpa zangpo* (treasure-holding jars) with cereals, bits of brocade, cotton cloth, metal and coral. The filled jars would be buried in the fields in *dzongs* and *shilkas* throughout Tibet in the belief that they would "preserve the vitality of the land" and bring in good harvests. The burial took place once a year and was repeated by the Panchen in the Tashilhunpo.

The eighth day of the third month was *gyargo jeba* (apparel changing day) when the Dalai Lama, aristocrats and high-ranking lamaist monks changed to their summer clothing. To celebrate the occasion, members of the Kashag and the three great monasteries would present the Dalai Lama with *hatas*.

On the eighteenth day, the Dalai moved to Norpulingkha (Summer Palace) from the Potala. He was seen off ceremoniously by the monk and lay officials of the Kashag and the *kusun dapons* (Dalai's guards) along the route between the Potala and Norpulingkha. After he arrived at the Summer Palace, he was presented with *hatas*. The next day, the ambans would pay him a visit and exchange *hatas* with him.

As prescribed by the Yellow Sect, the one and a half months from the fifteenth day of the sixth month through the thirtieth day

of the seventh month were observed as Confinement Days (*gyarnas*). During this period, Yellow Sect lamaist monks throughout Tibet kept themselves within the compounds of their monasteries for fear that they would trample to death insects in the newly grown grass in violation of the belief that "Heaven has tender love for all living beings." During these days a roving discipline officer called a *yada* was appointed by the Dalai with the authority to punish violators of the confinement. The ban on outdoor activities would be lifted by the Dalai on the thirtieth day of the seventh month.

During his stay in Norpulingkha, the Dalai would go through a seven-day *karma rishi* (bathing ritual) beginning on the first day of the eighth month. *Hatas* were presented to the Dalai on this occasion by the three great monasteries and officials of the Kashag, and bathing gifts from the Panchen and the ruling lama of Sakya were brought to him by special envoys. At the end of the rituals, the ambans would pay him a formal visit.

Late in the ninth or early in the tenth month, when the Dalai left Norpulingkha for the Potala, he would be welcomed back by all the members of the Kashag, representatives from the three great monasteries and the *kusun dapons* in the same manner as they saw him off. The next day the ambans would again exchange *hata*s with him in the Potala.

The twenty-fifth day of the tenth month was *ngachod chenmo* (festival of lights) in memory of the death of Tsongkhapa. On the night of this day the roofs of monasteries and other buildings throughout Tibet blazed with burning lamps. It was also the day to change to winter apparel. From this day on, the Dalai and all the aristocrats and monks would dress in their winter clothing. This occasion was also marked with the presentation of *hata*s to the Dalai Lama by the three great monasteries and all the monk and lay officials of the Kashag.

Each year the Dalai would spend one month's time from the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month till the twenty-eighth day of the next month in deep meditation. He would receive no one, and all the documents and requests for instructions submitted to him by the Kashag were handled by the *Ta Dronyer*.

The Dance of Gods (*chamgyag*) was performed on the twenty-

ninth day of the twelfth month in front of the Rinnekongsa Hall in the Potala by the monks from the Namgyal Dratsang. The dancers wore colourful costumes and masks of human skulls, demon faces, cow and deer heads and danced to the music of giant horns, drums and cymbals.

Once a month representatives from the Sera and the Drepung would present the Dalai with *hatas*, wish him well and report to him on the work of their monasteries. Although he did not reside in either of the two monasteries, the Dalai, being their honorary pontiff, was the highest authority of their administration; it was he who appointed the *lobpons* (officiating monks for scripture readings) and *dratsang khenpos*. The Ganden Monastery was different from the other two: it had its own abbot—the Ganden *tripa*, who in the eyes of the Tibetans, was the third most powerful priest after the Dalai and the Panchen, and was above all other lamaist monks. The *tripa* was changed every seven years; the appointment of each new *tripa* was the responsibility of the Dalai, but it was a mere formality, for the *tripa* was in fact selected by the monastery in accordance with prescribed procedures. The Ganden pontiff usually had two candidates under him; the *shartse chosje* and the *gyangtse chosje*. If the outgoing *tripa* had been a former *shartse chosje*, the position would be filled by the *gyangtse chosje* through promotion. When the *shartse chosje* was promoted to that position, the vacancy he left would be filled by the *khenpo* of Lhasa's Upper Tantric House; and the position left vacant by the *gyangtse chosje* as a result of his promotion to pontificate would be filled by the *khenpo* of the Lower Tantric House. But all these promotions needed the approval of the Dalai Lama.

The Dalai had a very special entitlement: once every twelve years, during the Monkey year, he had the privilege to collect rents and taxes in the district of Lokyu.

Tibet During the Minority of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama

The political situation in Tibet showed ominous signs during the minority of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. Ding Baozhen, governor of

Sichuan Province, described the situation in a memorial to Emperor Guangxu entitled "Measures to Be Adopted for the Administration of Tibet." The memorial, dated the seventh day of the third leap month in the fifth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign, read:

By the system established by the ancestors of this dynasty, troops under the command of officers with the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and major have been stationed in Chamdo, Draya and throughout Ü-Tsang, and at the passes in Gyantse and Dingri to maintain law and order in Tibet, with the ambans supervising the general administration of the region. Unimportant and simple issues were left to the care of the Tibetan officials with the decision-making power for them left to the regent while important and complicated ones were communicated to the ambans by the regent for their instructions; decisions on the selection, appointment, promotion and dismissal of Tibetan officials were made under the supervision of the ambans. With this system in force, there can be no transgression of powers, and those in authority over Tibet are able to administer the region in accordance with comprehensive laws and regulations. In the past two hundred years when the Tibetan officials were submitted to the control of the Han officials and no arrogance or defiance on their part was tolerated, there was good cooperation between the Hans and Tibetans and all orders were carried out to the letter with no impediments whatsoever. However, since the last few years of the reign of Emperor Xuanzong, with control relaxed, Han and Tibetan officials have drifted apart. As a result, what began as isolated cases of defiance on the part of the local officials has become part of their conduct, and has led to the end of their submission to the Han officials. To make matters worse, cooperation between Han officials themselves has deteriorated. The only system that remains effective is the one for the office of the ambans, but even that is in danger of losing its authority....

Two things in regard to Tibet that need to be done immediately involve measures to put an end to the unrestricted travels of foreigners in Tibet and to the unjustified claims of Drenjong.... From now on, my subordinates will have my orders to halt any foreigners trying to enter Tibet by way of Sichuan Province pending decisions by higher authorities. In recent years foreigners have come to Tibet by way of Xinjiang or through countries other than their own. It is proposed that the ambans, upon being informed of foreigners intending to travel in Tibet, should send officials to the border areas concerned to persuade the foreigners to turn back. That is the first important measure recom-

mended for adoption. The other measure of importance concerns Drenjong, which lies between India and Tibet. Recent reports about Drenjong indicate that the Drenjongians, taking the Phyiling (British) occupation of their territory as an excuse, have caused trouble for Tibet. If no preventive measures are taken in time, Drenjong could enter into alliance with the foreign occupiers to our detriment, and if that happens, conflict between foreigners and Tibet will hardly be avoidable.

Recently there have been reports of local disturbances in Chamdo and Draya. These incidents, as revealed by investigations, were actually manifestations of internal rivalries. All that needs to be done about them is for the ambans to prove that they mean well by their control and that they can be trusted. If that is done and justice is meted out to the few unruly elements who insist on creating disturbances, submission and stability can be expected.*

Ding's memorial made no secret of the enormous dangers then facing Tibet: the intensified effort of the imperialists to invade Tibet and the fast deterioration of the Qing's rule in that region.

Tibet's Resistance to Westerners' "Exploration" Attempts

As early as the seventeenth century, the British imperialists began to send their men into Tibet to collect information about the region. In 1774 (the thirty-ninth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign), George Bogle of the East India Company came to Tibet. He had an interview with the sixth Panchen, but he never managed to reach Lhasa because the Kashag did not want him there and the Qing government refused to give him permission to go there. For the same reason, Samuel Turner, also of the East India Company, was prevented from going on to Lhasa after he arrived at Tashilhunpo in 1783 (the forty-eighth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign). The man who made it to Lhasa was Thomas Manning. Sent in 1811 by Lord Minto, Viceroy of India, he was received by the ninth Dalai Lama, but not much came of it. In 1876 (the second year of

* *Dispatches and Memorials to the Throne Concerning Tibet in the Qing Period*, Vol. I.

Emperor Dezong's reign) A.R. Margary, an English interpreter, was killed by the inhabitants of Tengyue of Yunnan Province. The British imperialists, using this incident as a pretext, intimidated the Qing government into concluding the Chefoo Convention in Yantai (Chefoo), Shandong Province. Signed by Li Hongzhang, representing the Qing, and Thomas Wade, British minister to China, the convention contained a separate article that was included under British pressure. It provided that if a British "mission of exploration" travelled the following year to Tibet from Beijing by way of Gansu, Qinghai or Sichuan, the Zongli Yamen (Administrative Council), "having due regard to the circumstances," would issue the necessary passports and address letters to the high provincial authorities and to the Chinese Resident in Tibet. If it came from a point on the Indian-Tibetan border the Yamen, upon notification from the British authorities, would also issue passports and write to the officers to take care of the mission. This article represented the British attempt to enter Tibet by way of Qinghai or Sichuan since they were barred from getting into Tibet from India.

In 1879 (the fifth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), the British imperialists, invoking this separate article, informed the Qing government that they were sending "their men" to Tibet by way of Qinghai for the purpose of "travel," and Amban Song Gui, upon instructions from Beijing, told the Kashag to provide the party with an escort of Han and Tibetan soldiers. At a meeting called by the Kashag to discuss the matter, all the secular and ecclesiastical headmen from Ü-Tsang objected to the Westerners' "exploration" in Tibet. Thus, a petition, signed by the Dalai, the Panchen and others, was sent to the amban to be forwarded to the emperor. The petition read:

By order of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni, the Dongshan Kyirong Hutuktu in charge of *Shangshang* (Tibetan administrative authority), is joined by all the *hutuktus* of Tibet, the *khenpos* of the three great monasteries, all the previous and current *kungs*, *tejis*, Tibetan secular and ecclesiastical officials, all those in the military service and the entire populace, in requesting the Imperial Resident Official in Tibet that our joint petition be forwarded to His Majesty.

We have received from the Imperial Resident Official in Tibet several communications in Tibetan with regard to travels by Westerners in

Tibet. The communications say that as their entry into Tibet has been provided for by the Convention and they have been granted the permission by the Court, the decision in this regard is final, and that when they are in Tibet, they will be entitled to the protection of all the Hans and Tibetans, and their security shall be guaranteed. We have also been exhorted to that effect several times.

In view of the fact that there has never been the presence of Westerners in Tibet and that their alien customs and religion may bring harm to this land of Buddhism, we request the Imperial Resident Official to tell the Court how the entire lay and monastic populace of Tibet feel about this matter. The two regions of Tibet (meaning Ü-Tsang) owe so much to the Great Emperors for their efforts to foster the Yellow Sect and protect this land of Buddhist doctrine that it has never occurred to us to disobey, still less dispute, the wishes of Your Majesty. But the Westerners, as we have learned, are by nature wicked people who defame Buddhism with wanton lies in order to destroy this religion; peaceful co-existence with such people (in Tibet) is, therefore, out of the question. The entire secular and ecclesiastical populace of Tibet have now taken the oath that no Westerners shall be allowed entry into Tibet, and have vowed to stand by our oath from this generation on. If any Westerners attempt to enter Tibet, troops will be sent to halt their advance and turn them back by peaceful means; should they resort to force, all the Tibetan people will fight them with all our might. We are convinced that Tibet will not be overrun by them as the land is blessed by the Lord of Buddhism and the religion protected by the grace of Your Majesty. We are now submitting to the Court through the Imperial Resident Official this petition, appealing to the infinite benevolence of Your Majesty for your protection of the lives of the entire Tibetan populace.

Signed and sealed by the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Erdeni, and *kaloons* on behalf of the entire populace in upper, lower, southern and northern Kham and Tibet.

The petition was a document of great historic significance as it was in fact a declaration of the Tibetan people to resist imperialist aggression. The resolute stand taken by the Tibetan hierarch and the common people, however, left Amban Song Gui in a difficult position as evidenced by his report to Emperor Dezong, which said,

The foolish, intransigent stand of the *Shangshang* and the biased views run counter to the wishes of Your Majesty.... (I am) submitting

this account of the *Shangshang*'s disobedience to the highest authority in the hope that Your Majesty will order severe punishment of the Dongshan Kyirong Hutuktu in charge of the *Shangshang*, the *kaloons* and chief *khenpos*. As I have failed in my duties and rendered my authority ineffective, I also deserve to be heavily punished. It is requested that a more competent official be appointed for this office in Tibet so that things may be handled properly and the *Shangshang* may act as instructed and not defy the authorities at will; thus the interest of the frontier areas will be better served.

The petition and the amban's memorial created a difficult situation for the Qing government, which secretly ordered the governor of Sichuan to try to stop the British, but the British would not listen. In a memorial to the throne, Ding Baozhen wrote:

This Westerner asks to be allowed immediate entry into Tibet. I am still trying to stop him by explaining to him the situation in Tibet and by showing him the facsimiles of the communication from Imperial Resident Official Song Gui and the petition of the entire Tibetan populace.... As his entry into Tibet will surely cause disturbances, ways and means must be found to stop him and persuade him to proceed to India instead.... But as a man not to give up his demand easily, he is not expected to comply soon.

In 1880 (the sixth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), some British risked their entry into Batang in Kham. "Before their arrival, the Tibetans, upon information of their attempt, were agitated, and soldiers were alerted to block their entry. To prevent hostilities from breaking out, the amban sent Kai Tai, head of the Tibetan Affairs Section, to Batang along with ranking monk and lay officials to calm things down there.... As Kai Tai reported in a letter, the Tibetans, determined to oust the Westerners, were dispatching a large body of troops to Batang, and Kai Tai was doing his best to stop them. The Tibetans threatened in a communication to him that unless the civil and military *tusis* (local headmen) drive out all the Westerners in their regions and guarantee that their regions are permanently closed to all Westerners seeking entry into Tibet, their troops will advance to Batang and raze to the ground the churches and the mansions of the *tusis* there. It has been reported that the Tibetans have also notified the *tusis* in Batang, Lithang, Hor, Dramku, Tehku, and the monasteries in Adunzi, Gyalthang and

Balung, regions under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province, that no Westerners shall be allowed to pass through their domains and no escort parties shall be provided for them.”*

The British imperialists, now aware of the enormous danger their attempt would involve, were compelled to drop the idea of entering Tibet for the time being, and those they had sent for that purpose left Batang for India to look for other routes into Tibet.

The Murder of the Couriers

In September, 1880 (the sixth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), following the murder of the couriers of the amban's office by the Tibetans of the Zhalu tribe in Kham, an armed conflict flared up between the three-to-four-thousand-strong tribesmen and the government troops stationed there. Zhalu was a small tribe with approximately 1,800 households and was under the jurisdiction of the *tusi* of Lithang. In a memorial Ding Baozhen gave the following account of the incident:

The Zhalu barbarians, supported by Nyagrong, openly defied the authorities. On the twentieth day of the eighth month, in collusion with Jokhang Sahse Kongsal and other Tibetan officials, they collected three to four thousand Nyagrong barbarians and advanced to Dadrukha and Chokki Sanguan Guanpa, east and west of Lithang. There they encamped and displayed much arrogance and hostility. From the twenty-fourth day to the early part of the ninth month, they looted and plundered wherever they went.... Near Rashuithang the barbarians murdered three couriers who had come from Batang with a box of memorials to the throne from the ambans, and closed the highway. Upon reports (of the murder) Yang Fucui ... started immediately from Tachienlu with five hundred troops including those he had sent previously. On the sixteenth day of the ninth month, when they reached Guro, 120 *li* west of Lithang, they ran into about two hundred of the barbarians. Disguised as bandits and shouting war cries, these barbarians blocked their advance from a hill. At the command of Yang Fucui, the soldiers opened fire in battle formation, killing more than ten of the barbarians and dispersing them.

On the first day of the tenth month, an extremely arrogant local

* Memorial by Ding Baozhen.

official from Nyagrong by the name of Zur Khang Se (sent by the Kashag) came to Lithang to meet with Yang. He was cunningly evasive when Yang demanded the evacuation of their troops and the discontinuation of their alliance (with the Zhalu tribesmen). After three days of delay, their troops were withdrawn, but to no farther than the other side of Taiyuan Mountain, and harassment continued as the one thousand-odd Zhalu tribesmen led by traitors Kungchog Dedan and Darma Kunde still had the secret support of Nyagrong's Zur Khang Se.... Therefore, Yang sent more than one thousand troops from Maoya, Gongshi and Chodung under the command of two majors, Yang Fuheng and Zhang Hongde, on an attack on the upper and lower forts of the rebels while he himself led his men in an assault on the middle fort. On the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth days, when they joined forces, the command urged the rebels to surrender with the promise of leniency. Darma Kunde refused, and when he led his followers in an attempt to resist, Yang Fuheng shot him to death. Then our men began to bombard the forts from all sides. With their ringleaders gone, the barbarians, kneeling in semi-circles in front of the forts, said tearfully that they were tribesmen who had been duped by the instigators, and that they would surrender and repent. Convinced of their sincerity, Yang Fucui promised that he would spare their lives, but told them to lead his men into the forts and ferret out the remaining culprits hiding there as a sign of repentance. Soon Zhang Hongde and others reported that they had captured more than ten chief culprits including Solong Gyantche, Dzalu Ahtsung and Dantse Wangshu, and that decisions would be made on them after interrogation at headquarters. Meanwhile, all the walls in the forts and the ten-odd watch-towers were ordered to be torn down and the forts to be razed to the ground.

Zur Khang Se's support of the Zhalu tribesmen was a clear indication that the rebels had the behind-the-scenes support of some members of the Kashag.

After Zhalu came another military action. In 1882 (the eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) Ji Zhiwen, a grain supply officer, led an attack on the Tibetans in Sangan, a region under the jurisdiction of Chamdo. Of the incident Ding Baozhen wrote in the memorial quoted earlier in this chapter:

"The barbarians of Sangan have been robbing merchants for many years. Last year, Assistant Amban Ji Qing was held up by them at Dashibao on his way to Tibet from Sichuan Province; they killed his horse and his attendants."

When Ji's men surrounded Zida,

The Dongdaya barbarians, with a mob of over nine hundred men they had gathered from the tribes of Nawa, Weijia and Musi, attempted to break the encirclement at Langlongla Hill in front of the Zida fort. Our men intercepted them and sent them fleeing in panic. In pursuit our men killed more than twenty of them, and a large number of them who managed to escape were wounded; and when the bandit chief Shadu of Zida was killed, all the men and women of the fort begged tearfully for mercy, saying that they would surrender and give up banditry. In response to the repeated appeal for mercy by Wanggan, a monk of the Chana Monastery, on behalf of the tribesmen ... only the lawless elements in the village of Zida were punished by having their houses burnt down and their land given to law-abiding tribesmen; the tribesmen in Dongda, Nawa, Weijia, Mosi, Musi and Dzongba were allowed to surrender.

With peace restored in Zhalu and Sangan, the postal routes and post staging stations in Tibet once again functioned normally.

The Robbing of a Nepalese Merchant in Lhasa by Lamaist Monks

In 1883 (the ninth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) relations between Tibet and Nepal became strained following the robbing of a Nepalese shop in Lhasa by lamaist monks during the Monlam festival. Amban Seleng'e recorded the incident in a memorial to the throne as follows:

From the first till the third month every year, ranking Tibetan lay and monk officials of the *Shangshang* in Ü give out alms and sweet butter tea (called *jakol* in Tibetan) in the Jokhang and the Ramoche, and pray for happiness. During this period thousands of monks from all the monasteries and lay people will converge on Ü. As there are always unruly characters among them, the *Shangshang*, following a long-established practice, puts a *tshogchen shango* (the Iron-Club Lama) and an assistant *tshogchen shango* in charge of maintaining public order; throughout the festival the two officers run the local government to the exclusion of the Tibetan officials. On the first day of the third month this year when the festival was coming to a close, some monks

had a quarrel with a Nepalese shopkeeper over business transactions. It was night, and the *tshogchen shangos* were trying to settle the dispute when a large crowd of belligerent monks, having learnt of the quarrel, suddenly arrived at the scene. They wrecked the doors and windows of the house of the Nepalese and violated his property. As soon as I was informed of the violence, I instructed the Dongshan Kyirong Hutuktu in charge of the *Shangshang* to disperse the mob immediately before things got out hand. The mobsters were thus driven away. When examined, the Nepalese was found to have suffered no injury, but much of his property was lost.

Nepalese merchants in Tibet, being subjects of Gurkha, have been the charges of a Gurkha resident official in Tibet appointed by the king.... When the Gurkhas invaded Tibet during the reign of Emperor Wenzong, Amban Hetehe intervened with an army. Soon hostilities ceased and a treaty of ten articles was concluded. The treaty stipulates that if Gurkha merchants or other subjects are plundered by Tibetans, the Tibetan officials, after inquiry, will compel the restoration of such property to its owners, and that if the plunderers are not able to return such property, they shall be compelled by Tibetan officials to make good such property within an extended period of time.... The Dongshan Kyirong Hutuktu and the *kaloons* now have my instructions to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion by referring to the treaty so that friendly relations with our neighbour may be preserved.

During the negotiations, Tibet said it would pay for the damage, which they said was estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 *liang* of silver, but Nepal insisted that the loss amounted to more than 300,000 *liang*. Because of the huge discrepancy, the talks got nowhere and tension developed on the Tibetan-Nepalese border. Ding Baozhen wrote in a memorial to the Court:

Some of my colleagues, subordinates and the officials back from Tibet on government business have told me in my interviews with them that the Gurkhas are firm in their refusal of the sum offered by Tibet on the ground that it can hardly cover the damage done. They say that with tens of thousands of their troops massed on the border, the Gurkhas may go into war any moment while the Tibetan monks out of conceit and insensitivity to reason are talking about repulsing the Gurkhas in case of a war.

In the tenth month of that year the Nepalese resident official in Lhasa was recalled to report on the Lhasa looting to his govern-

ment. Before his departure he paid the thirteenth Dalai Lama a farewell visit in the Potala. The Dalai showed him much hospitality, treating him to tea and preserved fruit, and giving him a *hata*, a packet of gold weighing five *liang*, two silver ingots and a bolt of brocade. He told the Nepalese official that he would like the Nepalese king to know that Tibet desired to maintain friendly relations with Nepal and live in peace with its neighbours.

Tension continued between Tibet and Nepal until May 1885 (the eleventh year of Emperor Dezong's reign) when the Nepalese king reduced the compensation to 183,400 *liang* of silver. But all Tibet was able to raise amounted to only about 104,000 *liang*; the difference was "utterly beyond Tibet's power to make up." So the amban asked the governor of Sichuan in a communication "to raise 80,000 *liang* for Tibet." Of this request the governor said in his memorial to the throne:

What the Tibetans did with the property of the Nepalese merchant was a despicable act of robbery.... No objections would be raised if Your Majesty out of your kindness wanted us to lend them the money; our misgivings are that the Tibetans may henceforth become unbridled in their acts of provocation, thinking that someone will always pay for whatever damage they cause. If that should turn out to be case, the financial drain would be far too great for us in Sichuan to bear.... We are transmitting to them, as requested, the sum of money that we raised to the best of our ability. It seems proper that the amban sees to it that the Tibetans will pay back the money in three yearly instalments without deferment.

According to the Tibetan biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Qing government, in view of Tibet's financial plight, exempted it from the payment in 1886 (the twelfth year of Emperor Dezong's reign).

Britain Frustrated In Its Second Attempt to Enter Tibet

In 1885 (the eleventh year of Emperor Dezong's reign) Britain sent Colman Macaulay, secretary of the government of British

India, to Tibet from India with Lhasa as his destination. Of this Francis Younghusband wrote in his *India and Tibet*:

... In 1885 a renewed effort was made to come to an understanding with the Tibetans. The brilliant Secretary of the Bengal Government, Colman Macaulay, visited the frontier to see if any useful relationship could be established with the Shigatse people by the route up the head of the Sikkim Valley. The Tashi Lama (the Panchen), who resides at Shigatse, had always been more friendly than the Lhasa people, and this seemed more promising.... He threw his whole soul and energy into the matter. He secured the support of the Government of India. And, more important still, he fired the Secretary of State for India with ardour.... There seemed now a real prospect of success.

A General History of Tibet recorded this attempt as follows:

In 1885 Colman Macaulay, an official of the Indian Civil Service, applied to the Qing government for a visa after he was granted the permission by his government to tour Lhasa.... After much negotiation with London and Beijing, Macaulay obtained the visa and various privileges from the Zongli Yamen of the Qing government. To make his trip an impressive affair, he recruited a large number of scientists for the purpose of surveying mineral deposits in Tibet.... The Qing government believed that that was the only way to satisfy Macaulay, but the Tibetans raised strong objections to the entry of Macaulay's mission into Tibet, saying that they would go into war rather than comply. The Qing government was thus faced with a difficult choice: to silence the Tibetans with military force or to withdraw the visa granted by the Zongli Yamen, as requested by Tibet.

In 1886 when Macaulay reached Khamba Dzong (a district under the Panchen's jurisdiction) in Tibet from Drenjong, he was halted by the *dzongpon*. Macaulay threatened to send in three thousand troops to attack him if the *dzongpon* would not let him through, but the *dzongpon* persisted in stopping Macaulay's party and kept them in Khamba Dzong for several months.

This happened at a time when the British imperialists were bent on military aggression in Burma. After the British army overran that country in November 1885, Britain and the Qing signed "The Sino-British Convention Relating to Burma" in Beijing. On the question of Tibet, Article IV of the convention read: "Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese Government has

shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Tibet provided for in a separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission." As for frontier trade between India and Tibet, the article said, "If insurmountable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly."

Following the conclusion of the convention, the Indian government ordered the withdrawal of Macaulay's mission from Khamba Dzong, suspending its "exploration" in Tibet.

The Demo Hutuktu Succeeds as Regent

On the eighth day of the fourth month in the twelfth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1886) the Dongshan Kyirong Hutuktu passed away. By the Tibetan custom, after a Dalai Lama or a regent died, his remains were not encoffined but were kept in the same position as when he died, and everything in the chamber and the clothes in which he died had to remain unchanged until an examination by the amban showed that no damage was done to his remains and that the skin bore no suspicious marks. So on the ninth day of that month, Amban Seleng'e examined the body of the deceased regent, as required of him, and ordered the suspension of the use of the regent's official seal pending the selection of his successor. The amban then went to the Potala to convey his condolences to the Dalai Lama.

To pick a new regent, the Kashag called a meeting of important monks and lay officials and representatives of the three great monasteries and of the Upper and Lower Tantric Houses. The selection fell unanimously on the Demo Hutuktu. Then the Kashag sent *kaloons* Tahdo and Yuthog to report on the decision of the meeting to the amban's office and the Potala, asking the amban to inform the emperor of their selection. Meanwhile the Demo Hutuktu, by precedent, was installed as acting regent pending the emperor's decision.

In the ninth month of that year, Emperor Dezong approved of the Kashag's selection in an edict that read, "I appoint the Demo Hutuktu to be the official in charge of the secular and ecclesiastical

affairs in Tibet with a term of office of five years." On the thirteenth day of that month the new regent was inaugurated in Lhasa. To celebrate the occasion, joss-sticks were burned, colour flags hoisted, giant horns sounded to the crash of cymbals and the roll of drums atop all buildings in downtown Lhasa, as decreed by the Kashag. In the Zimchung Nyiod Khyil (Sunlight Hall) of the Potala, the new regent was received by the Dalai Lama and was given the regent's official seal of silver by the amban. After that celebrations began.

The Ninth Panchen Established by the Drawing of Lots

Following the death of Tanpai Wangchug, the eighth Panchen, the Tashilhunpo began the search for his reincarnation. In the third month of the thirteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1887) Sopon Khenpo Wangyal and Ta Dronyer Dawa, sent by the Tashilhunpo, arrived in Lhasa. They "presented the Dalai Lama with *hatas* and mandrals and asked for his instructions on the direction in which the soul boy of the ninth Panchen could be found. On the tenth day of the fourth month, the Dalai asked for divine prophecies in front of the image of the Auspicious Deva in the Potala, and the answers he obtained were said to claim that the soul boy had been born and that he was most likely to be found in the direction of southeast. Thereupon, search parties were sent to Ü-Tsang by the Tashilhunpo. They returned with reports that three boys had been discovered, one at Dagpo in Ü, the other at Lamo, also in Ü, and the third one at Thobgyal in Tsang. As required by the Qing, lots would have to be drawn from the golden urn to determine which of the three candidates was to be established as the ninth Panchen.

On the sixteenth day of the sixth month, Yechen Zur Khangpa and Dronyer Sugang were dispatched to Lhasa by the Tashilhunpo to arrange for the lot-drawing ceremony. They were joined by Khanchung Tsutrim Dondan, sent by the Dalai Lama to help with the preparations.

In the eleventh month, with the approval of Emperor Dezong, the date for the lot-drawing was fixed for the fourteenth day of the first month in the next year (1888).

On the fourth day of the first month in the fourteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1888), Dzasa Lama Nomihan Lozan Don-drub arrived in Lhasa from the Tashilhunpo with a party of over five hundred monk and lay officials of the monastery and the soul boy from the Rinengpa family in Thobgyal. The next day the Dzasa Lama called on the Dalai Lama in the Potala. After presenting him with a *hata*, mandral and a picture of pine trees, he asked the Dalai to perform the head-shaving and name-giving ceremony for the future Panchen and requested him to compose a eulogy on the new Panchen and a prayer to keep him from harm.

On the fourteenth day of the first month, the lot-drawing ceremony took place as scheduled in the Sasum Namgyal Hall in the Potala. First to arrive at the palace for the ceremony were the new amban, Wen Shuo; all the monk and lay officials from the Tashilhunpo, and a large team of monks who were to chant the Golden Urn Sutra. They were followed by the Dalai Lama, the regent, the Dalai's assistant preceptor, Phurjog; the three soul boys and their families. The lot-drawing began, as prescribed, with the writing of the names of the three candidates in Manchurian, Chinese and Tibetan languages on three ivory tablets. After examination by the Dalai Lama, the regent, the Dalai's preceptor, the amban and the monks from the Tashilhunpo, the inscribed tablets were wrapped in paper and placed in the golden urn by the Manchu secretary. Then sutras were chanted by the Dalai, the regent, the Dalai's teacher and the Golden Urn Sutra chanting monks. When they finished, the amban rose from his seat, and, facing east, performed the prostration rituals. He then took up a pair of gold sticks, and after making three circles with the sticks inside the urn, he picked out one of the three ivory tablets. When the wrapper was removed, the name inscribed on the ivory strip was revealed. It was the name of the soul boy from Dagpo.

The next day when he was to have his head shaven by the Dalai Lama and to receive his religious name from him, the selected soul boy left Degyilingkha where he was staying for the Potala. In the Ganden Yartse Hall he kowtowed to the Dalai, and presented him

with a *hata*, mandral and a picture of pine trees. After placing a *hata* on the statue of Sakyamuni in the hall, he sat down on a special seat before the Dalai. When the Dalai finished praying for the happiness of the new Panchen, he shaved his head and named him Jetsun Lozang Choskyi Nyima Geleg Namgyal or Choskyi Nyima for short. After that the Dalai gave the ninth Panchen a book of eulogy he wrote on the Panchen and a *jakhata* in addition to an extra-long *hata* and a statue of Sakyamuni. After expressing his thanks to the Dalai, the ninth Panchen went to the Nyiod Khang with the Dalai to attend a party given by the Kashag in celebration of the conclusion of the head-shaving and name-giving ceremony.

On the fifth day of the second month the Panchen left for the Tashilhunpo in the company of two officials sent by the Dalai: Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoche Ngawang Nyima and Dronyer Tshultrim Chosphe.

Tibet's First War Against the British Invaders

After being frustrated in its second attempt to enter Tibet, Britain lost no time in turning Drenjong (called Sikkim by the British) into an outpost for its invasion of Tibet. What it did may be seen from a memorial to the throne by Ding Baozhen. "According to the secret reports that I received from Zhao Xianzhong, a magistrate in candidacy for Tibet," Ding wrote,

More and more Tibetans and Hans have been associating with the foreigners in Darjeeling. The foreigners there are said to be quite pleased with the association. They show much hospitality to the Tibetans and Hans, especially Tibetans, in order to win their friendship. They lend money to the Tibetans and sell goods to them on credit, making Darjeeling a very attractive place to them. It has also been learned that the railroad across Darjeeling has been built, and that it will go all the way to Phari. Phari borders on Tsang, and is only twelve staging post stations from Ü, a distance that can be covered in eight to nine days posthaste. Zhao says that as he does not believe the foreigners mean well by what they are doing, he felt it necessary to file these

secret reports.

The acts of aggression that Britain was perpetrating in Drenjong only served to put Tibetans of all walks of life on the alert and prompt them to adopt measures for defence. In order to win Drenjong over from Britain, the Kashag decided to get its king to move into Tibet. Because of the close bond between Tibet and Drenjong formed by their common language and religious faith, the Kashag did not have much difficulty in talking the king into moving his residence to Tibet. "Having been persuaded, the king left his native land and lived in Tibet for over two years. During this period, Britain made several attempts to force him back to his country ... threatening that if he did not return soon enough ... Britain would punish him by suspending his yearly stipend. But the king stood firm and humiliated the British in his letters to them."

In 1886 (the twelfth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) the Kashag built a blockhouse at Lengtu, a former Tibetan territory now ceded to Drenjong. Manned by Tibetan soldiers, the blockhouse was intended to prevent Tibetans from trading with the British and the intrusion of British "tourists" into Tibet.

To apply diplomatic pressure on the Qing government, Britain "protested" to it the setting up of the Lengtu check-post. In a note to the Zongli Yamen dated the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month in the twelfth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1886), the British minister to China said that the British could easily destroy the blockhouse, but had decided instead to ask the amban to warn the Tibetans against "committing rash acts." The next year, to apply further pressure on the Qing, the British minister in another note threatened to "expel" the Tibetans from Drenjong with armed forces.

As a result of its defeat in the Opium War and the War Against the Allied Anglo-French Expeditionary Forces, the foreign policy of the Qing was now one of submission to foreign powers. Predictably, Britain's threats worked. The Qing government hastily ordered the amban to force the evacuation of Tibetan troops from Lengtu without making the necessary inquiry into the circum-

* *A General History of Tibet.*

stances. In a letter to Amban Wen Shuo in the ninth month of the thirteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1887), the Zongli Yamen said:

For a long time the British have been trying to get into Tibet for travel and trade. During the treaty negotiations with them last summer, our representatives barely managed to stop them from entering into Tibet, but that does not mean that they have given up their attempt to force their entry under the pretext of being provoked. The fortified check-post manned by Tibetans beyond the Tibetan border will give them just such pretext. If an armed conflict breaks out, it will be impossible for us to delay their entry; what is worse, any loss of Tibetan territory would lead to endless border disputes, complicating the security problem of the western frontier. The present situation, being fraught with imminent danger, is indeed a matter of grave concern.... It is of paramount importance to show to all the Tibetans, secular and religious alike, where their true interests lie, and to order the immediate evacuation of all Tibetan troops garrisoned beyond the border.

In a letter to the amban dated the thirteenth day of the ninth month, Liu Bingzhang, governor of Sichuan Province, wrote:

The Tibetan blockhouse can never survive the assault of the modern guns of the British, so why must they provoke the enemy by keeping such a thing there? The proper thing to do now is, of course, to evacuate [the Tibetan troops] to this side of the border so that the British will have no excuse to start a war. As the happiness of the Tibetan lay and monastic population rests in your hands, you will surely do your best to straighten them out on this point and calm things down there.

In another letter to the amban the governor said:

What the British have been trying to do is nothing more than opening trade with Tibet. To say as the Tibetans do that their aim is to destroy Buddhism is groundless. Refusing to trade with the British and, on top of that, denying them their long-attempted entry into Tibet for the purpose of travel may lead to hostilities; if war breaks out, there would be no guarantee of victory but senseless bloodshed for our soldiers and civilians. And when the Tibetans find that their swords and clubs are useless against the attack of modern guns, it would be too late. They say in their petitions that they would rather fight to the last man than open trade (with the British), but any sensible person would prefer peace to extermination in a situation like this. It is painful to

know that they are so muddle-headed as to fail to recognize the plain truth.

What Liu said in this letter was representative of the prevailing mentality of a group of Qing officials who would give anything for an ephemeral peace. But the Kashag refused to act as instructed.

In the second month of the thirteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign, when tension was building in Tibet and war was imminent, the Qing government panicked and gave the amban the following instructions:

In an emergency like this the argument about whether Lengtu is Tibetan or Drenjong territory is beside the point—the issue can be easily settled in the future. What needs to be done now is to evacuate the check-post. Before Sheng Tai arrives, it remains the duty of Wen Shuo to effect an immediate evacuation by means of persuasion, as he has been instructed to do several times. If Indian troops are already there, the Tibetan soldiers must be told to restrain from engaging them in battle, in view of the great disparity in strength. It is especially important that the garrison troops in Tibet, being small in number, be ordered to maintain strict neutrality so the issue will not become too complicated to make future reconciliation difficult.

The Kashag ignored the repeated orders of the Qing government to evacuate. This was not only because these orders went against the interests of the Tibetans of various social strata but also because the Qing's rule over Tibet was no longer as effective as it had been in the time of Emperor Gaozong. In a petition to the amban signed in the second month of the thirteenth year of Dezong's reign (1887) by representatives from the three great monasteries, the Tashilhunpo and other lamaseries, and all the officials of the Kashag above the seventh rank, the reason for setting up the check-post at Lengtu was given as follows:

It is the British who have started all this as they want to travel and open trade in Tibet, the sacred land of Buddhism.... These foreigners, who are different from us in temperament and religious faith, can never live in peace with us.... The entire secular and clerical populace of Tibet is resolved to resist their intrusion even if it means the extermination of every one of us....

Darjeeling is a territory under the jurisdiction of Drenjong. The British have not only occupied it by force, but are acting as if they were

its masters, opening one shop after another beyond the border and building roads and bridges there. Last year to counter their repeated acts of provocation, we decided to block their entry by putting up check-posts at strategically important passes manned by officers and men of local troops and inhabitants.... Here is the background to the setting up of this particular check-post: Last year two officers of the Phari garrison, relaying the repeated requests of the king of Drenjong and its chiefs, reported that the British had decided to go on a pilgrimage to Tibet and had requested free passage, saying that nothing would happen if we complied, otherwise troops would be sent to Tibet. As they kept pressing for an answer, an emergency arose. Renock, which lies more than two-hundred *li* from Darjeeling, is Tibetan territory, and was once left to the administration of Drenjong with the permission of the Tibetan secular and ecclesiastical authorities.... To make the border secure we have built a walled guard-house and put a small number of soldiers there at a convenient place in Mount Lengtu within the Tibetan territory of Renock. Renock is not Indian territory, and is a great distance from Darjeeling.

The British have now occupied Drenjong's territory of Darjeeling. They open shops and keep their occupation forces there. The British are not unaware that the two tribes of Drenjong and Brugpa (Bhutan) are in the Han and Tibetan territory, and that their people are our brothers and sisters. The British could have asked His Majesty to grant the land to them or told the Tibetan secular and ecclesiastical authorities of their intentions regarding it. Instead of doing either, they seized the territory with force and are now saying they were perfectly justified in doing so. It is to safeguard our territory that we have built the house within the Tibetan border, and the British should never be allowed to turn what we have done into an excuse and try to influence His Majesty with falsehoods for the purpose of sowing discord.

What the petition said pointed to a rift that was developing between the Qing central government and the local authorities of Tibet, a rift caused by the former's shrinking from supporting the Tibetans in their struggle against British aggression for fear of "complicating the security problem of the western frontier."

In the eighth month of the thirteenth year of Dezong's reign (1887) Regent Demo Hutuktu said to Amban Wen Shuo: "It is true that a walled building was constructed in Mount Lengtu last year to accommodate the border patrols. It was done in anticipation of possible attacks as there had been reports of British troops prepar-

ing an invasion of Tibet. Later when the tension relaxed, we reduced the number of guards there to prevent the ignorant border inhabitants from trading beyond the border as such trading could be used by the British as an excuse to stir up trouble. As the guard-house is located in Tibetan territory, the British have no reason to object to its existence. They call it a border violation, but Tibet does not border on any British territory but on Gurkha to the southwest, Drenjong to the south and Brugpa to the east. The guard-house is not in British territory; it is even separated from Drenjong by a grazing ground and is a great distance from Darjeeling. Even Darjeeling is Drenjong's territory that is only leased to the British, but the British have seized it by force. With a pack of lies the British are now trying in an underhanded way to annex Tibet's Mount Lengtu to Darjeeling. This is clear proof of their dark designs: it is land and its people that they are out to grab; they are not to be appeased through trade with them.... It is the British invaders who started all this trouble, not we."

In another petition to the amban in the eleventh month, representatives of the three great monasteries together with lay and monk officials and officers declared that they would not obey the orders of the Qing government for an immediate evacuation of the blockhouse at Lengtu. The petition read:

Lengtu is a door on the Tibetan border, not a passage between Gyakar (India) and Gurkha. We are guarding our own land, not creating disturbances on the other side of the border. Since we are in the right, it is wrong for the British to complain,... to say nothing of accusing our people with false charges of creating trouble beyond the border, as they are shamelessly doing now.... We will stand by the oath we took a long time ago that we will do our best and leave the outcome to Heaven.... It is absolutely impossible to withdraw from the Lengtu blockhouse. We will stop the British and resist their invasion with all we have. There will be no retreating from our stand, no wavering in our resolution even if it means the death of every man and woman in Tibet.

In the twelfth month the three great monasteries and the entire monk and lay officials submitted to the amban still another petition that openly criticized the Qing's foreign policy. The petition read:

If we gave up Lengtu, our frontier would be left wide open to the invaders. Has there been anything like that in history? His Majesty, being open-minded, always turns to his ministers for advice, but those not posted in the capital but charged with foreign affairs may not know what happens in remote regions. For instance, those devilish foreigners have recently been threatening us with force. Mount Lengtu, being a tiny piece of land, may not count for much, not even Tibet, compared with regions adjacent to the capital. But they are what limbs are to the body; when something goes wrong with the limbs, the body can not relax. Perhaps the ministers do not realize that ceding land is not a move in the right direction. In short, trading will cause much trouble in the future, and giving up territory is preposterous.

By now Britain had made January of the next year (1888) the deadline for the evacuation of the Tibetan troops, and the Qing government had ordered the Tibetans to observe the deadline. Once again the three great monasteries and all the Tibetan monk and lay officials petitioned to the amban, protesting the orders of the Qing emperor. They declared, "The deadline set by the British for the first month next year in regard to the check-post at Lengtu does not mean anything to us. We are not going to give up this part of the frontier to anyone even if that will mean total extermination for us. The orders are strict, but we request Your Excellency to inform the throne that we refuse to yield to Britain's pressure."

By now the Tibetans had not only become critical of the Qing's foreign policy, but had also begun to suspect that Han officials posted in Tibet "sided with the foreigners," as evidenced by what Amban Wen Shou said in a letter to a vice minister:

It has led to the belief that all Han officials are corrupt, and that they are partial towards foreigners wherever they are concerned; so the Tibetans do not trust them. All this accounts for their defiance. They even say that the British will never be able to come to Tibet if they don't turn to Han officials for help, and that when they do, Tibet will suffer.

In a memorial to the throne Assistant Amban Seleng'e made similar comments:

Since the British began to ask for entry into Tibet, there has been the suspicion that the ambans and the garrison troops side with the foreigners. That is why the Tibetans are disobedient in regard to issues

involving foreigners. The sooner we want to open the border for trade, the more suspicious and defiant they will become. If they are pressed too hard, trouble may be expected and that would mean internal strife even before there is the threat of foreign invasion.

These documents bear witness to the resolution of the Tibetans in their struggle against British aggression and their opposition to the Qing's policy of submission to foreign powers. The conflict was virtually a struggle between two political lines with the Tibetan people (and the peoples of other nationalities in China as well) on one side, who stood firm in their opposition to the aggression of the British imperialists, and the Qing government on the other, which was too demoralized to face up to the British threats.

One of the sad episodes in this struggle was the dismissal of Wen Shuo as amban. Although a Manchu, Wen Shuo did not think much of the Qing's foreign policy but sympathized with the Tibetan people in their struggle. In a memorial dated the ninth day of the seventh month of the twelfth year of Emperor Dezong's reign, he said:

Trade with Tibet would not bring the British much profit, and they know it wouldn't. First, it was the British who turned their attention to Tibet, and then the Russians did the same. With two countries coveting a piece of land at the same time it is not difficult to see that it is not just trade they want. Being suspicious of their intentions, the Tibetans are naturally dead against trading with them. As they are not totally wrong in their effort to protect the orthodox Yellow Sect and keep the spirit of their land out of harm's way; criticisms of what the Tibetans are doing do not seem to be altogether justified.

In the ninth month of the thirteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1887) Wen Shuo, in another letter to Liu Bingzhang, governor of Sichuan Province, denied the charges that Tibet had expanded its army to man forts beyond its borders. Said the letter:

In the six months since I took office, I have made investigations whenever the need arose, and I have never discovered any instance of the expansion of the army occasioned by the setting up of a fort. The total strength of the Tibetan armed forces is fixed at three thousand. One thousand are stationed in Ü, whose actual strength is 914, the rest being in Nyagrong on garrison duty or on sick leave. This number was verified during the autumn inspection this year. The other one thou-

sand are in Tsang, with five hundred of them stationed in Dingri and the other five hundred in Gyantse. According to reports from Acting Inspector Yu Gang of the Board for National Minority Affairs, this part of the Tibetan army is in full strength with no one on sick leave.... Therefore, the Tibetans seem credible when they disclaim any responsibility for the recent unrest.

On the seventh day of the tenth month that year, Wen Shuo in a communication to the Zongli Yamen cited examples of the aggression of China by the imperialists to show that Britain had designs on the territory of Tibet. Said Wen Shuo:

The Tibetans believe that the foreigners are treacherous and deceptive and that behind their sweet words are the sinister intentions of spreading their erosive influence to other lands. They fear that if they comply, the spirit of their land and the doctrine of Buddhism might be endangered, making Tibet still another victim of the foreigners. It is out of this fear that the Tibetans are resisting. Their fear may be ill-founded, but no one knows where these avaricious foreigners will stop. Take the opening of the trade marts for an example. Five such marts were opened in South China in the twenty-second year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign, then three more in North China were added in the tenth year of Emperor Wenzong's reign, which in their turn were followed by still more on the Yangtse River. With all these prosperous port cities in the control of foreigners, their merchants have been able to rake in profits from them at the expense of our own people. If the foreigners are well-intentioned, why do they choose Tibet, of all places, to show that they are? The British know that Tibet is not rich in farm produce, still less so in valuables; what is it then that they are after, trying so hard, even with threats of force, to open trade with it? Not only the Tibetans but also I myself doubt that trade is the only thing they want.... We have in recent years been accommodating with the British and trying to get the Tibetans to act as we wished because we wanted to maintain peace and security in this frontier region. True, the Tibetans are foolish, but since they persist in their stand, the harder we try to make them sensible and do what we think they should the more suspicious of our intentions they will grow and thus the stronger they will resist. Consequently, the defence of the frontier will be weakened before we can deal with foreign threats, and this frontier region with a history of three hundred years of submission will drift apart from and turn its back on us, making the issue even more complicated. Can that be called a wise policy?

In another letter to the Zongli Yamen dated the nineteenth day of the tenth month, Wen Shuo wrote:

Nothing has come of the effort to persuade the Tibetans to open trade. They insist that if they do, they would end up being victims of the schemes of the treacherous foreign heathens; when they are asked what their fears are, they will cite many such victims, among them Drenjong, which they say is the most unfortunate of them all. These fears were once dismissed as mere excuses, but the false charges of the British of border violations in regard to the check-post at Lengtu and their unveiled intentions of making inroads into another country's territory by annexing Mount Lengtu to Darjeeling by foul means show that the Tibetans are not totally wrong to regard the British as forces of evil.

The next month Wen Shuo received a letter from Liu Bingzhang, governor of Sichuan Province, urging him to "end this stalemate as soon as possible by means of authoritative persuasion," which meant coercing the Tibetans into evacuating Lengtu. In his reply, Wen Shuo argued convincingly that Mount Lengtu was part of Tibet and the Tibetans should not be forced to leave the place. He wrote:

I have recently chanced upon the place named Phari in the footnotes to *Ode to Tibet* by Mr. He Tai'an, the former vice-minister of rites. According to the notes, Phari is popularly known as Pali. The region inside the line that extends from Phari to Tsangmeng Valley and Renock Dzong Fort alongside Chimu Mountain is Tibetan territory; Drenjong is located on the other side of the line, with Brugpa, popularly known as Drupayon, lying to the east. This geographical position bears out the fact that Renock may also be called Rina, as *re* and *ri* are almost homonyms; and the fact that the name Renock is followed by the word *dzong* is even more revealing because in Tibetan *dzong* means a triangle formed by rivers and mountains. The map shows that Rina lies to the south of Mount Lengtu, sitting right on the border where Drenjong and Brugpa converge in a triangle. This is clear proof that Tibet has never violated the border. Such being the case, how can the Tibetans accept the entirely irrelevant argument about the roads the British secretly built in the Nina Mountain; how can they be expected to cede this part of their border to others? If restraining the Tibetans can not be justified, it is even less justifiable to force them to evacuate the check-post.

It was not difficult to predict what misfortune awaited a resident official who sympathized with and supported the Tibetan people in their struggle against foreign aggression while the government he served knuckled under the threats of foreign powers. In the second month of the fourteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1888) Wen Shuo was reprimanded by the Qing government. "Wen Shuo," the reprimand said, "has been repeatedly instructed to effect an immediate evacuation of the Lengtu check-post by means of persuasion so that Tibet might be kept out of harm's way. It was after carefully weighing the pros and cons that the Court decided on the evacuation ... but Wen Shuo, out of stupidity, has been preparing armed resistance in disregard of the interests of the country." The next month Wen Shuo was dismissed as amban. The decision to remove him from that post said: "Since his arrival in Tibet Wen Shuo has done little to enlighten the Tibetans as instructed but has persisted in his preposterous views in disregard of the greater interests of the nation. Thus he was relieved of his duties and ordered to return to Beijing. Now he has gone so far as to communicate to the Council of Legal Supervision unauthorized memorials to the throne and classified telegrams. As such outrages can never be tolerated, Wen Shuo is hereby dismissed from his post."

Wen Shuo's dismissal produced some repercussions in Tibet. As the compiler said in the postscript to *Dispatches and Memorials to the Throne Concerning Tibet in the Qing Period*,

Wen Shuo's policy was to win the loyalty of the Tibetans through pacification for joint resistance to foreign invaders. That is why when the British, taking the Tibetan check-post at Lengtu as an excuse, threatened war, and the Court instructed him to effect an evacuation, he spoke out in defence of the Tibetans, saying that the check-post was intended for self-defence, and stood for a just settlement of the matter with the British. He expressed these views in scores of memorials to the throne, and refused to change them even when he was severely reprimanded by the government. Eventually he was dismissed and replaced by Sheng Tai.... Wen Shuo might have been ill-informed of what was happening outside China ... but he should be credited with what he did for the defence of Tibet, ... and for that he was highly respected by the Tibetans. His removal as amban led the Dalai Lama to say that the Court was no longer worthy of his trust because it showed

poor judgement in the selection of officials, and to contemplate establishing relations with Russia. This showed that Wen Shuo would have played a decisive role in shaping the destiny of Tibet; he was not reckless and headstrong as those incompetent cowards who succeeded him would have us believe. This collection of memorials is a verdict on who was right and who was wrong.

The war broke out on the twentieth day of the third month (seventh day of the second month by the Tibetan calendar) in the fourteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1888) just before Wen Shuo's dismissal, when about four to five hundred British troops launched an attack on the Lengtu defence line held by Tibetan forces. The attack was described in a Kashag's report to Wen Shuo as follows:

The British made a surprise attack on the fort from the Dranglam Pass at the foot of Mount Lengtu at noon time on the seventh day of the second month. Immediately the *tsepon* led his men in a counter-attack. When our soldiers killed an Englishman in yellow uniform in the exchange of fire, the attackers retreated. It seems the man killed was an officer. Not a single casualty was sustained by our troops, thanks to the blessings of Manjusri and our Great Emperor. On the early morning of the next day the British renewed their attack from the same direction. The militiamen, their morale raised by the *tsepon*, offered stubborn resistance. It was a long battle during which about one hundred British troops were killed or wounded. When we counted our casualties, one *gyapon* and over twenty militiamen were found missing. The *tsepon* will continue to keep his men on the alert, but in view of insufficient strength, reinforcements sent by the secular and monastic authorities are needed so there will be enough troops to man the positions.

Four days later, the British army launched a large-scale offensive and inflicted heavy casualties on the Tibetan forces; and when they could no longer hold out, the Tibetans pulled out of Lengtu and withdrew to Dromoi Sane. Of this battle Shu Ichiro Kurozawa wrote in *A General History of Tibet*:

Linthong (Lengtu) is an important place to the trade between Tibet and Britain. It rises more than 600 feet above flat ground with an elevation of 12,617 feet. The roads there are so perilous, the air so thin that men and their horses climbing it have to stop for breath after every few steps. The reason that the Tibetan troops guarding a terrain like

this should have been beaten by the British was because their weapons were primitive. They had a bamboo wall built as the first line of defence on a height of 9,600 feet, with a fort of stone on top of the height. It was well fortified, but the British troops under the command of General Graham put the Tibetans to rout without suffering many casualties. The Tibetans would have been able to hold out if they had had just a few weapons of the ordinary type. The Tibetan word for commander is *dapon*, which means leading archer, and the word for small fire-arm is *mida*, which refers to flaming arrows. All they had for weapons were flame ropes, bows and arrows, small fire-arms and stones. But they had enormous faith in the lamaist incantations and oracular prophecies, believing that by reciting the incantations they could not only invoke all the gods for help, but survive the attack of bullets. They attributed the heavy casualties they suffered to the incorrect ways of reciting these incantations, and believed that they would work next time when they were better read. So on they repeated those magic words, refusing to acknowledge their defeat. When the British soldiers looked at the windmills left by the Tibetans in their positions, they found inscribed on them incantations prophesying the complete defeat of their enemies.

After the fall of Lengtu militia reinforcements from Ü-Tsang and Kham were sent by the Kashag. The first such contingent, consisting of nine hundred men from Kongpo under the command of Thon-mi Lhading Se and Tse Dronyer Sonam Gyaltsen, set out for the front on the sixteenth day of the second month (Tibetan calendar). It was followed by over one thousand from Kham led by Phunkhang Se and Tse Dronyer Jampa Tenzin. Then several thousand more were sent from Pomi, Shopendu and Kuchu. Altogether more than ten thousand militia reinforcement troops were rushed to the front. These soldiers, when passing through Lhasa on their way to the battlefield, were blessed by the thirteenth Dalai Lama by having their heads touched by him, and were given for protection specially made white umbrella wheels which had had incantations recited over by lamaist monks.

The Lengtu garrison had been under the command of *tsepon* Dorje Rigzin appointed by the Kashag. After the fall of Lengtu, Kaloön Lhalu was installed as Drenjong *magar jichob* (commander-in-chief) by the Dalai Lama in charge of frontline operations, and Tsepon Tsarong was made Phari *magar jichob* with the responsi-

bility of transporting supplies to the front. Later Kaloon Rampa, as another Phari *magar jichob*, was sent to the front along with the chief lamas of the *dratshangs* of the three great monasteries to help with the planning of operations on the Phari front. The monks of the three big monasteries were ordered by the Dalai Lama to stand by for frontline duties.

Meanwhile, by order of the Dalai Lama, Dodrag Khanpo, Lhari Zimphug, Ger Lha Paljan, Tsampo Kalzang and fifteen incantation-reciting lamas chanted The Martial Sutra in secrecy in the Potala to bring curses down upon the British army, and the oracular answer invoked by the Nechung Chosgyong in the Potala that "It was wrong to have started it; now it has been started, don't drop it" further strengthened the Tibetans' resolve to resist the British invaders.

In the sixth month of that year, three thousand Tibetan troops mounted a counteroffensive on Lengtu in an attempt to recapture it, but the attack was repulsed. Of this battle Younghusband wrote in *India and Tibet*: "Two months later, however, the Tibetans again showed truculence, and with three thousand men attacked our camp at Gnatong (Lengtu). They were repulsed, and once more withdrew."

In the tenth month the Tibetan army made a third attempt, but were again beaten back and retreated to Rinchen Gang in Dromo. *India and Tibet* described this counteroffensive by the Tibetans as follows:

But in September they, for the third time, advanced across our border, and in a single night, with that skill in building for which they are so remarkable, threw up a wall three miles long and from three to four feet high in a position just above Gnatong, and some miles within our border.

This position General Graham attacked on the following day, and drove the Tibetans from it over the Jelap-la Pass, and in the ensuing days pursued them into the Chumbi Valley. But here again, in accordance with our principle of respecting Chinese susceptibilities, our troops did not remain in Chumbi a single day, but returned at once to Gnatong.

A General History of Tibet gave a similar account of this battle:

Thiao Khana Gang rises 13,550 feet above sea level. The scouts of

the British army did not find a single Tibetan there on the night before the battle. All through that night, the British camping near Nagthang about one and a half miles from the ridge did not hear a sound. The next morning they found to their great surprise that a rampart standing chest-high and running about four to five *li* had been built by the Tibetans. Dashing about and shouting behind it were several thousand Tibetan soldiers. But when the British troops advanced on it and bombarded it with artillery, the Tibetans suffered a total defeat.... What the Tibetans feared most was artillery. When the shells fired by the British army exploded in their midst, they were sent fleeing in great panic, and when they retreated to a height in an attempt to hold off the British for some time, they were again defeated. The British army swept across Dzaleb Gang and reached the Chumbi Valley. If the British had decided to fight on, the entire Tibetan army would have been annihilated. But at the sight of Chinese government office flags flying in Pipi Thang, the British, to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of China, ceased fighting and moved to Nagthang.... The place is close to Dzaleb, ... there were not many trees there except for pines and junipers which might be used for fire-wood, and for drinking water there were brooks and pools of clear water. In the distance the mountains sat silently in the cold, rivers frozen hard no longer flowed, the sky looked bleak, the winds blew sad and chilly.... Passing through here An Hui saw graves on numerous boulder terraces. They were where the war dead of the British were buried.... An Hui said, "When I was passing through there, my attendants told me that it was where the war the year before had been fought, and that so many were killed that the ground was soaked with blood and strewn with piles of bones. What horrors! It is not hard to imagine the huge number of Tibetans slaughtered there."

The battle was also described by Sheng Tai, the new amban, in a memorial to the throne:

On the seventeenth day of the eighth month (Tibetan calendar) the Indian troops struck and overran the Drenjong territory. As the Indian troops at Nyedu-la often came dangerously close to the Tibetan camp at the top of the mountain and fired their guns there, the Tibetans moved their camp to two mountains at Nyedu-la on the night of the eighteenth day and built a rampart overnight. The next morning when the British saw the camps which they said blocked their way, they attacked them. Overwhelmed, the Tibetan soldiers retreated to their first camp at Gupo Dungchu. The British went after them, took the two camps and continued their hot pursuit up north. As the Tibetans had

fled the previous night, the passes at Dzaleb, Dromo and Langra fell to the enemy in a single day, and when the Indian troops closed in, the entire Tibetan army of over ten thousand men was routed, leaving behind weapons such as spears and swords, cooking utensils, tents and other things of daily use which lay strewn along the route of their flight. On the twentieth day, when the defeated Kaloon Kung Yeshe Norbu Wangchuk fled to Rinchen Gang, the acting Gyantse garrison commander, Major Xiao Zhanxian, had arrived with my instructions to block the advancing enemy. The panic-stricken Yeshe Norbu Wangchuk warned Xiao that the enemy with its deadly guns was too powerful to be resisted, and that he should join him in his flight or he would be killed. As they talked, incessant gunfire could be heard, and soon, as the enemy approached, Xiao told him, "I've been instructed by the amban to block their advance. Your folly has led to your defeat. If the British do not relent in their pursuit, the whole army will be annihilated, and Phari will be lost. I'm different from you because I'm a Han official and have to do my best to stop them.... You may not listen to me, but I've done what I ought to do." Then at the sight of approaching enemy soldiers, Yeshe Norbu Wangchuk fled. Immediately Xiao Zhanxian hoisted the flag of the Gyantse garrison which had Chinese characters on it. When the Indian troops saw the flag at a distance, they stopped firing. Xiao sent men to tell them why he was there, and the Indian commander, Palio Seyiu or Sahib, said that they would cease fighting in respect to the presence of Han officials. At a meeting with Xiao that the British commander had requested, Xiao explained to him his presence there, and told him to stop the pursuit. The British commander consented, saying he would wait for a settlement, but asked me to bring the matter to a close as soon as possible because cold weather was setting in and they could not wait very long.

After the defeat of the Tibetan army the British tricked Thuthop Namse, the Drenjong king, into returning home and imprisoned him at Kalimpong. Meanwhile, they sent their political officer in Drenjong to Gangtok. "By now Britain had won complete control of both the internal and external affairs of Drenjong. Nominally Drenjong was Britain's protectorate; in reality it had been reduced to a British territory with the king being a mere puppet." *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recorded these developments as follows:

* *A General History of Tibet.*

The British not only seized Drenjong, but threw its king into prison at Kalimpong as well. They stationed massive armed forces in Drenjong, and recruited jobless Indians and Gurkhas to reclaim wasteland there. Deciding that any attempt it made to save the situation in Drenjong might complicate the Tibetan issue, the Court instructed Sheng Tai to maintain neutrality.

Biographies of Resident Officials in Tibet gives a brief account of some of the events related to the imprisonment of the Drenjong king:

Previously the Queen Mother of Drenjong had requested in a petition that Drenjong remain a part of Tibet. When the king was imprisoned, she and her grandsons were still in Chumbi. The British tried through a forged letter from the king to get her grandchildren to Kalimpong, but she refused to let them go. She took them to Sheng Tai and begged tearfully for the help of the Qing government. Sheng Tai did nothing. In the eighth month, the Drenjong king said in a letter that he wanted to return to Chumbi, and that in order to end his torment at the hands of the British, he was willing to cede land to them. Sheng Tai turned him down, fearing that his re-entry into Tibet might give the British a handle against the Qing.

The First Treaty Between China and Britain on Tibet

Sheng Tai, the new amban, was faithful to the Qing's policy of non-resistance to foreign powers. In a memorial to the throne dated the eighteenth day of the eighth month in the fourteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign he wrote:

The war was caused by the belligerence of the Tibetans. All the regions north and south of Mount Lengtu are Drenjong's territory and are regarded by the British as land under their protection.... The Tibetans, who treat their neighbours badly, have never acted in defence of Drenjong when it was bullied.... Then (they) seized its territory, and threatened it with war, accusing it of conspiring with the British. But their threats backfired as they frightened Drenjong into colluding with the otherwise reluctant British and led to the hostilities between Tibet and India.

On the day he wrote the above memorial Sheng Tai sent the following message to the Kashag's monk and lay officials:

If in the future you obey instructions from the authorities and honour your word, I guarantee full cooperation. But if you continue to be truculent and resort to force, and are repulsed for that, it will be impossible to maintain even the status quo of the boundaries. Perhaps you will win a victory by sheer luck, but if a weaker Tibet will not resign itself to the loss of the Lengtu check-post, how can the much stronger India be expected to give up fighting because of a slight setback? Deepened enmity will lead to endless wars, and Tibet, being protected by the Central Government, may not be put out of existence immediately, but the cost would be too great for Tibet to sustain. You had better give that serious thought.

The Kashag disagreed with the amban; it insisted on its claim of sovereignty over Renock Dzong. Of this Sheng Tai wrote in his memorial to the throne: "Although the Tibetans have qualms (about what they have done), they argue unconvincingly that Renock Dzong is Tibetan territory that they gave to Drenjong, and that since Drenjong now maintains illicit relations with the British, they must regain their sovereignty over the place." On the eighteenth day of the eighth month, all the monk and lay officials in Tibet petitioned Sheng Tai, saying, "If the British withdraw their troops, things will return to normal and we shall abide by the instructions forbidding us to create disturbances beyond the border. But if the British refuse to give up their occupation of Drenjong, it will be difficult for us to tolerate their tyrannical rule there." In his memorial to the throne dated the tenth day of the ninth month, Sheng Tai attacked the Tibetans vehemently. Said he:

The Tibetans, as I have discovered, are the most treacherous, stupid and obstinate kind of people the world has ever known. Since I took office, I have been doing my utmost to bring them to reason, but to no avail, no matter how hard I try. They are defiantly uncooperative, absurdly arrogant and know nothing better than going to oracles for advice.... They blame their defeat at Lengtu on their adherence to the instructions of the Court. What indecent, ungrateful talk!

In another memorial dated the same day, the amban said:

The Tibetans, out of stupidity and malice, regard Han officials as collaborators with the British and refuse to listen to their advice. They

know they can not be forced into subordination because the garrison troops in Tibet are small in number. That is why all the preceding Resident Officials connived at their wrongdoings and covered them up for them.

In its instructions to Sheng Tai dated the twenty-third day of the tenth month in the fourteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1888), the Qing government said:

The Tibetans stand condemned for their stupidity and ignorance, which led to their total defeat in their reckless attempt to attack the enemy camp.... Sheng Tai has performed his duty satisfactorily since his arrival in Tibet. The situation in regard to the relations between India and Tibet has now reached a stage where a final settlement can no longer be delayed, but such a settlement will be impossible unless Sheng Tai goes to the border and negotiates with Britain. The British minister in Beijing informed the Zongli Yamen that Sheng Tai would leave for the border on the twelfth day of the tenth month. Sheng Tai is hereby authorized to negotiate a satisfactory settlement by the guidelines contained in all the previous instructions regarding the issue. He is expected to do his best to straighten things out and restore peace to that border region.

Thus authorized, the amban consulted the Dalai Lama and the Kashag on the matter. Tibet, now greatly weakened by the three military defeats it suffered, needed time to recover its strength. So the Tsongdu (Tibetan Assembly) agreed to Sheng Tai's appointment as mediator, and the Dalai Lama provided him with an entourage made up of Kaloon Rampa, Acting Kaloon Ta Lama Yeshe Phuntsok, the Bumthang Ta Lama, also an acting *kaloons*; and representatives of the three great monasteries.

Sheng Tai arrived at Rinchen Gang on the Tibetan-Indian border on the tenth day of the eleventh month. When he ordered the ten thousand-odd Tibetan troops stationed there to evacuate, "the Tibetan commander told him that he could not do so on the grounds that the amban had not yet met with the foreign officials, and that no one knew what would happen, but said that he would order his men to pull back approximately ten *li* to Lingmathang and watch how things would develop." On the nineteenth day Sheng Tai met with Charles Bell, the British representative, at Nathang in Drenjong while the *kaloons* and the other monk and

lay officials remained at Rinchen Gang waiting for the news of the meeting.

Bell said to Sheng Tai that "the treaty between Drenjong and Britain signed twenty-seven years earlier had given Britain a protectorate over Drenjong"; then the British representative demanded war reparations from Tibet. To this Sheng Tai replied, "Drenjong has always been a vassal territory of the local government of Tibet. The note from the Viceroy of India regarding the treaty between Drenjong and India has never been accepted by my government, and the Tibetans have never created disturbances in Indian territory. The demand for war reparations is therefore not justified." After much haggling, the negotiations ended with a proposal for the conclusion of a treaty between India and Tibet. About the suggested treaty Sheng Tai wrote to the Qing government:

Tibet has no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Drenjong. What Drenjong is obliged to do for the *Shangshang* and the Resident Officials is to send presents to the former and greetings to the latter on festive occasions. If this traditional expression of respect continues, the British protectorate will continue.... On the question of trade, the British said they wanted to carry it as far as Lhasa. This our representatives repudiated sternly. After much argument the British backed down, saying that they would go no farther than Gyantse. Again they were told that trading in Gyantse was out of the question. Now they insist on Phari.... I have firmly refused to consider even that, and the British official is quite displeased.... However, the interest the British take in Tibet, ... which is often expressed in their talk, is so keen that excessive resistance on our part may mean endless trouble for us.*

In its reply to Sheng Tai that reached him on the eleventh day of the second month in the fifteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1889) the Qing government approved of the position the amban recommended in regard to the suggested treaty. Said the reply:

The lease of Drenjong to Britain by a treaty is now an established fact, and nothing can be done to change it. Drenjong, after all, is not a part of our territory. It is because the country has become too weak to look after itself that it is willing to submit itself to our authority, but

* Sheng Tai's memorials to the emperor dated respectively the twenty-third day of the eleventh month and the tenth day of the twelfth month.

Britain, which coveted Drenjong for a long time, would never allow that to become a fact, and Britain's opposition in that case could only mean problems for Tibet. It is therefore altogether proper for the Resident Official to insist that Drenjong's expression of respect continue in exchange for our recognition of Britain's protectorate over it.

What the Qing insisted on was merely that it not lose face.

In the first month of the sixteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1890) Sheng Tai, acting on the Qing government's instructions contained in its reply to him, put before the Dalai Lama and the Kashag the three issues of evacuating Tibetan troops from the disputed region, delimiting the boundary with Drenjong and opening trade with Britain, and asked for their answers to them. In the early part of the third month Tibet's reply came in the form of a joint petition signed by the Demo Hutuktu, the three great monasteries and all the Tibetan monk and lay officials. Said the reply:

...We have been ordered repeatedly to evacuate the troops, delimit the boundary and open trade without delay. As ordered, we have pulled back our troops. As for the delimitation of the boundary, there used to be a line of demarcation until we gave Renock Dzong to Drenjong. The pasture lands in Geyachintsang at Mount Lengtu, where we Tibetans graze our cattle, are where the boundary lies between Tibet and Drenjong.... We Tibetans are in an extremely difficult position on the question of trade. If there must be trade as the orders say, then Dzaleb must be made off limits for foreigners. We shall be very grateful if that condition is met.

Clearly Tibet was still opposed to trade with Britain.

It took Sheng Tai one year to repress the opposition of Tibet to fawn on Britain, as dictated by the Qing's policy of capitulation to foreign powers. For that he was commended by the emperor as a man "keenly aware of where the ultimate interest lies." On the ninth day of the first month in the sixteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1890) the Qing government sent him a telegram that said, "Sheng Tai, Assistant Resident Official in Tibet, is deputed with full powers to conclude and sign a treaty with his counterpart of Great Britain." On the twentieth day the next month the amban left Darjeeling for Calcutta. There he met with Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India. After a brief bargaining period, the Anglo-Chinese Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet was

signed on the twenty-seventh day of the second month in the sixteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (March 17, 1890). An abridged version of the eight-article treaty follows.

Article I: The boundary of Sikkim (Drenjong) and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal (Gurkha) territory.

Article II: It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the ruler of the state nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

Article III: The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

Article IV: The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

Article V: The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

Article VI: The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

Article VII: Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.

Article VIII: The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

The convention represented a major diplomatic setback the Qing government suffered at the hands of Britain on the question

of Tibet, because Britain had its occupation of Drenjong recognized by the treaty without even conceding to Sheng Tai's insistence on the mere "continuation" of contact between Drenjong and Tibet. Consequently the door to Tibet was thrown open for the British.

On the first day of the sixth month Sheng Tai returned to Lhasa from Calcutta. The next day he went to see the Dalai Lama in the Potala. He informed the Dalai of the content of the treaty and briefed him on the negotiations that led to its conclusion. Then the Dalai Lama sent the treaty to the Tsongdu for deliberation.

Sheng Tai claimed "credit" for the conclusion of the treaty, and asked the Qing emperor to "reward" those officials who had assisted him during the negotiations. Said he in a memorial to the throne:

During the war between Tibet and India two years ago, things in Tibet were almost unmanageable, a situation that kept me in constant anxiety. For two years following my arrival here the Tibetans resorted to stalling tactics in dealing with the issue. Such tactics would have upset everything, had it not been for the repeated instructions and directions of the Court.... The Tibetans were finally brought under control. Now with the boundary defined and trade opened — measures that have won us a friendly neighbour and defused a crisis, stability in Tibet may be expected.

But the Tibetan people thought otherwise; they denounced Sheng Tai for betraying the nation by currying favour with a foreign power. Of the denunciation the amban wrote in a letter to James H. Hart:

The dispute between India and Tibet was settled through my efforts and the efforts of the commissioners from the Kashag. When I returned to Tibet in the sixth month, I heard the rumours spread by the attendants of Official Chang Geng and the ignorant Tibetans and Hans in Tibet that the emperor was unwilling to cede Sikkim (Drenjong) to Britain and that it was I who gave it up in my eagerness to curry favour with Britain.... In his clandestine correspondence with the Tibetans, the brother of the Sikkimese ruler at Chumbi said that he, his brother and their tribe wanted their territory to remain a part of Tibet, but that I refused to support them in their request.... This smear campaign against me has now subsided but only after I rebuked the Hutuktu for the circulation of such slander and ordered him to arrest those responsible

for it.

The Anglo-Chinese Convention put Britain's increasing demands on Tibet on a legal basis. In the ninth month of the sixteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1890) A.W. Paul, Governor of Bengal, in a letter to the amban urged him to begin negotiations for a final settlement of the questions left open in Articles four, five and six of the Anglo-Chinese Convention. The amban sent Huang Shaoxun, an official in charge of grain supplies in Tibet, and Zhang Fang, a government secretary, to Darjeeling for the purpose, but their talks with Charles Bell came to nothing. In the eleventh month the next year (1891) the Qing government in a cabled instruction to the amban told him to go to Darjeeling himself and continue the talks with Bell. Prior to that, the third day of the first month the next year (1892) had been fixed for the ninth Panchen, Choskyi Nyima (1883-1937), to be enthroned in the Tashilhunpo and to take his *getsul* vows from the Demo Hutuktu. (The vows are usually administered by a Dalai Lama, but the thirteenth Dalai Lama was not qualified to give them as he himself had yet to take them, so the Demo Hutuktu acted on his behalf.) Sheng Tai, as ordered by Emperor Dezong, was to stop at the Tashilhunpo on his way to Darjeeling to officiate at the enthronement ceremony.

On the twelfth day of the first month in the eighteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1892) Sheng Tai left Shigatse for Rinchen Gang after the ceremonies in the Tashilhunpo. He wrote to Bell asking him to continue the talks at Rinchen Gang. The British put forward in written form the articles to be negotiated on trade, pasturage and communication; of these articles Tibet said many were unacceptable. On the twentieth day of the second month, the Demo Hutuktu forwarded to the amban a petition from the three great monasteries and all the monk and lay officials in Tibet. Said the petition:

Article two about the construction of houses on purchased land at Yadong is unacceptable. Housing will be provided by the Tibetan lay and monastic authorities for British merchants, and the rents shall be paid in full on a daily basis. Article three provides for a duty-free period of five years for commodities leaving or coming into Tibet. Duties will have to be imposed on these commodities by the Tibetan lay and

monastic authorities; the five-year duty-free period is unacceptable. As for Article four about prohibited goods, salt and tea produced in Gyakar (India) have never been allowed to enter Tibet, and their import will have to continue to be prohibited. The import and export of arms, ammunition and intoxicating drugs shall be strictly prohibited. Appended Article two says that if both countries agree that the trade-mart at Yadong is no longer useful, it will be moved to another locality in Tibet, or one or several trade-marts will be added in accordance with the provisions for trade. This article we shall never agree to. The trade-mart at Yadong was opened only because we had to obey the orders of His Majesty. There can be no reason whatever to move it to another place in Tibet or open additional trade-marts.

These objections were communicated to the British representative by the amban. On the eighteenth day of the sixth month James Hart, an Englishman acting as a mediator, told Sheng Tai in a letter that the British insisted on the acceptance of these articles as they were. Then the amban wrote to the Kashag saying that he wished to "instruct in person" representatives of the three great monasteries at Rinchen Gang. To Hart he said: "The Tibetans are obstinate and ignorant beyond description. When I received the draft version of the convention from India, I sent it to the Tibetans for their approval, but they responded with a series of petitions, harassing me with all sorts of objections, some of which were too offensive to be made known to your country. But you must be aware of these objections since I have given you a summary of them. I have issued a large number of orders to the Tibetans in regard to this matter and rejected their petitions four times, and the commissioners involved have been stripped of their official status and wait for decisions to be made by the Court on their punishment. Still, nothing has come of all that yet. I have now ordered the *khenpos* of the three great monasteries to come to me soon and I shall talk to them. After that I shall decide what to do next, and inform you of their attitude."

In the ninth month Sheng Tai died of illness at Rinchen Gang. His successor, Kui Huan, and the new assistant amban, Yan Mao, continued the negotiations with the British along the lines set by Sheng Tai. On the twenty-eighth day of the tenth month in the nineteenth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1893) the Regulations

Regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage to be Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, a slightly modified version of a text drawn by Britain consisting of nine articles and three general articles, were signed by General He Changrong of the Sichuan Garrison Command and James Hart of the Tax Bureau representing China, and Charles Bell, British Political Representative in Drenjong, representing Britain. The following are the main points of the regulations, omitting the general articles:

TRADE

I. A trade-mart shall be established at Yatung (Yadong) on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the first day of May 1894 (the twenty-sixth day of the third month of the twentieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign). The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to observe the conditions of British trade at that mart.

II. British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent houses and godowns for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertakes that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation I to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

III. Import and export trade in the following articles—arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IV. Goods, other than goods of the description enumerated in Regulation III, entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim (Drenjong)-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years commencing from the date

of the opening of Yatung to trade; but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced.

Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

V. All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Customs Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.

VI. In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

COMMUNICATION

VII. Dispatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer, who will forward them by special courier. Dispatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese Frontier Officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

VIII. Dispatches between the Chinese and India officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.

PASTURAGE

IX. After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such Regulations.

For the Qing government the regulations meant the loss of another important diplomatic battle to Britain on the Tibetan issue, because these regulations secured for Britain a foothold in Tibet, making it easier for the country to intensify its aggression in Tibet.

The conclusion of the 1890 convention and of the subsequent regulations was negotiated exclusively by the ambans and other Qing officials posted in Tibet; the Kashag and the Tibetan people

did not give their full consent to the conclusion of these agreements, and they would not have done so at the time when they felt so strongly against Britain. Such being the case, Tibet did not recognize the agreements, still less honour them. Observed Young-husband in *India and Tibet*: "This Convention proved in practice to be of not the slightest use, for the Tibetans never recognized it, and the Chinese were totally unable to impress them." In another place Younghusband wrote:

May 1, 1894, had been fixed as the date upon which the trade-mart at Yatung was to be opened, and at the appointed time Mr. Claude White, the Political Officer in Sikkim, was sent to visit Yatung, to attend the opening of the mart, and to report on the general situation as regards trade.... Mr. White, writing on June 9 from Yatung, reported that ... he found the Tibetans most discourteous and obstructive, and he believed that the Lhasa authorities had issued orders that the free-trade clauses of the treaty were not to be carried out. The local official at Phari, at the head of the Chumbi Valley, charged ten per cent on all goods passing through Phari, both imports and exports ... Mr. White also reported that the Chinese, though friendly to him, and apparently willing to help, had "no authority whatever." They admitted that the treaty was not being carried out in the proper spirit, and Mr. White gathered that the Tibetans actually repudiated it, and asserted that it was signed by the British Government and the Chinese, and therefore they had nothing to do with it. In any case, they maintained that they had a right to impose what taxes they chose at Phari so long as goods were allowed to pass Yatung free.

Tibet's non-recognition of the 1890 Convention was also recorded in a memorial to the Court by Amban An Cheng. He wrote: "By the agreement negotiated by the former Resident Official Sheng Tai, the boundary runs along the north-south water-parting at Mount Gipmochi. But as the Tibetans refuse to recognize it, actual surveying still remains to be done."

The Gelong Ordination

The thirteenth Dalai Lama, who took his *getsul* vows at the age of seven, began to study *Cause and Logic* when he turned eleven. The first five Dalai Lamas all took their lessons in debate by joining

the monks' assemblies at Drepung. This practice was stopped in the time of the sixth Dalai Lama. Beginning with him, the Dalais took their lessons in debate and Buddhist texts from two learned lamaist monks called *tsan shepa*, who visited their pupils every day at the Potala. The two such lamaist tutors for the thirteenth Dalai Lama were Lozang Sonam from the Sera and Lozang Phuntsok from the Ganden, who became the young Dalai's tutors on debate at the request of the Kashag.

When the Dalai reached eighteen, he was initiated into the study of exoteric Buddhism; two years later when he was twenty, he was old enough to be ordained a *gelong*. There are 253 commandments for a *gelong*, including four called *pampa*, thirteen known as *lhagma*, thirty-five under the name *pangtung*, four grouped under *sorshag* and eighty called *nyiki*. According to these commandments, a *gelong* should refrain from killing living beings, theft, adultery and telling lies. He should also dress, eat, speak, act, live, worship and chant Buddhist scriptures in strict conformity to the rules the commandments prescribe.

In the Wood-Ox year (1895 or the twenty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign) the thirteenth Dalai Lama was due to take his *gelong* vows, as required by custom. The vows were usually administered by a Panchen, but as the ninth Panchen was still a minor and himself only a *getsul*, they were to be given instead by Phurchok Lozang Tsultrim¹ Jampa Gyatso, Tutor of the Doctrine. The ordination, which followed roughly the same procedures as the one for a *getsul*, was scheduled to take place on the eleventh day of the first month that year before the image of Sakyamuni in the Jokhang. On the fifth day of that month, the Dalai moved from the Potala to the Jokhang where butter lamps burned amid sacrificial offerings in front of the Sakyamuni image and the four volumes of exoteric scriptures. Beginning on the sixth day, scripture-chanting monks from the Namgyal Dratsang of the Potala prayed in preparation for the ordination. On the eleventh day the Dalai was initiated into full monkhood before the image of Sakyamuni. The Tutor of the Doctrine, acting as the ordination *khenpo*, was assisted by the Dalai's assistant tutor, Dorje Chang Ling Drul Lozang Lungtok Tenzin Trinley Pal Zangpo, who performed the duty of *Lelob* (assistant ordination lecturer); by Drub Khang Chog

Drul Lozang Ngawang Tenzin Gyatso who acted as *Sangton* (ordination tutor who saw to it that the Dalai Lama understood the commandments); by the Abbot of the Ganden, Lozang Tsultrim, who served as *Dugowa* (time keeper and manager of the ordination procedures); and by the Shartse Chosje and the Gyantse Chosje of the Ganden who worked as *Pabo* (who presented the Dalai with containers of food at the prescribed times). Prayers were said by eleven chanting monks throughout the ceremony.

After he took the vows, the Dalai Lama, accompanied by the Tutor of the Doctrine and the Ganden Abbot, went to the Richenmho Hall; there he received *hatas*, mandrals and pictures of pines in celebration of the occasion from the Tutor of the Doctrine, the Ganden Abbot, the Demo Hutuktu, *kungs*, *kaloons*, *tejies*, *dza-sas*, *lobpons* of the three great monasteries and all the lay and monk officials. Then the celebration party began.

When the Dalai returned to the Potala, he prepared a report on his ordination for the Qing emperor as was required of him. Then the *balyar khenpo*, with the report tied on his back, set off for Beijing.

Assuming Temporal Power

Ordinarily, a Dalai Lama took charge of Tibet's religious and administrative affairs at the age of eighteen. But for four successive Dalai Lamas beginning with the ninth, the power remained in the hands of the regents (the Tibetan ecclesiastical and secular authority) because all these Dalais died in their minority. When the thirteenth Dalai turned nineteen in the twentieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1894), the emperor ordered him to assume temporal power. The Dalai declined on the grounds that he was too young for that, and that he was too busy with the study of Buddhist scriptures to handle the secular and monastic affairs. He only took over the three seals of authority of the Dalai Lama and placed them in the custody of the Ganden. (The first of the three seals, called *sidshi deji*, meaning religious and administrative harmony, was used on important occasions or for important proclamations. The second one, called *tagdam*, was stamped on docu-

ments signed by the Dalai, and the third one, known as *seldam*, was reserved for financial statements.)

The *gelong* ordination the thirteenth Dalai Lama received marked the end of a major stage in his study of Buddhist classical texts. It took place at a time when the British imperialists were stepping up their schemes to nibble up the territory of Tibet, causing political upheavals in the region. Such a situation gave the Tibetan ruling clique the idea that with the Dalai Lama in full political power, it would not only be able to win greater support of the Tibetan people, but would be in a better position to challenge the authority of the ambans as well. So after the Dalai took his *gelong* vows the three great monasteries and the Kashag declared that it was "the divine wishes" that the Demo Hutuktu resign as regent and the Dalai Lama assume power.

In the eighth month of the twenty-first year of Emperor De-zong's reign (1895) the Demo Hutuktu tendered his resignation to the Dalai Lama. After the three great monasteries and the Tsongdu deliberated on the matter, as ordered by the Dalai, they submitted a report to him. Said the report:

All the participants of the conference recalled that as early as the Water-Dragon and the Wood-Horse year, we asked the Dalai Lama to assume temporal power, but the Dalai Lama declined on account of his minority. Now that he has completed his study of exoteric and esoteric Buddhism, he should no longer evade his secular responsibilities by offering excuses. He is now twenty years old, two years overdue for secular office, compared with all the Dalai Lamas before him. This fact makes it all the more necessary for him to assume his secular responsibilities as all the Tibetans wish. Therefore, we request in the name of all the Tibetan people and their well-being, that the Dalai Lama accept the regent's resignation and take temporal office.

On the eighth day of the eighth month that year the Dalai was inaugurated as the head of the Tibetan local government at a ceremony in the Sesi Phungtsok Hall in the Potala. To mark this happy occasion colourful flags were displayed atop all the buildings in the Potala and the buildings all through Lhasa while pine branches smouldered in joss-stick burners, and from morning till night teams of young Tibetans in multi-coloured costumes performed songs and dances of good luck to the accompaniment of

drums and horns in Lhasa's Barkor Street and the open space in front of the Potala. The Dalai, after leaving the celebration party, went to the Dadampa Side Hall where he took in the bird's-eye view of Lhasa and watched the dancers and Tibetan opera actors performing in front of the Potala.

Lhasa was not the only city where the holiday mood prevailed on this inauguration day. All through Tibet colourful banners fluttered atop monasteries and village buildings over scented smoke, and monks prayed to the music of drums, horns and cymbals.

At a series of parties beginning on the eleventh day of that month the Dalai Lama accepted presents from well-wishers from first the Kashag, then the Tashilhunpo, and then the three great monasteries; coming after them were the larangs of grand *hutuktus*, lay and monk representatives from all over Tibet, and special envoys from the kings of Bhutan, Gurkha and Drenjong. Among the well-wishers were also men sent from the distant Outer Mongolia by its ruling lama, Jebtun Dampa.

Following the Dalai's assumption of office, the Demo Hutuktu, now relieved of his office as regent, called on the Dalai, as required by formality, to say good-bye to him and told him that he was "returning to his monastery to meditate." The Dalai sent a *dronyer* to escort him on his return journey. With the regent gone, the Dalai was both the ruling lama and king of Tibet in charge of government and religious affairs in Tibet.

The New Year of 1896 (the twenty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign), being the first year since the Dalai's assumption of office, was celebrated with the *Tsog Pheb* ceremony. On the eighth day of that month a celebration party took place in the Aewam Hall of the Jokhang, attended by the Dalai and more than one thousand dignitaries. At the party, the Dalai received *hatas* from the high- and low-ranking officials of the Kashag, the representatives of the three great monasteries and the *hutuktus* of the four famous Buddhist temples. The occasion was highlighted by the deity-invoking rituals performed by a dharmapala from the Meru Monastery.

On the fifteenth day, the Dalai gave his first sermon in the Sungcho Rakar preaching ground west of the Jokhang on the

discipline of exoteric Buddhism and the life of Sakyamuni to an assembly of ten-thousand-odd monks from the three great monasteries, who had come for the Monlam Festival. That night, walking westward from Jangchub Gyunlam, the Dalai toured Barkor Street, visiting the butter lamp exhibition there. The lamps decorated with butter figurines, birds and animals were extremely attractive. The Dalai blessed each of the lamps he saw by sprinkling a few grains of barley wheat on it, an act called *chagna zad* in Tibetan. All through his tour, the Dalai had the entire street to himself; no one was allowed there except a handful of attendant *khenpos* and important officials; nor was anyone allowed to pop up his head over the house-tops. The lamp exhibition remained thus closed until the Dalai returned to the Jokhang.

With the Dalai in power differences grew between the Tibetan local government and the Qing central authorities in regard to Britain; and to make things even worse, the Dalai, being equal in status to the amban, became unmanageable to the Qing Resident. Such relations were well described by He Changrong, Persuasion Commissioner for the Frontier Regions, in a report he sent to the governor of Sichuan Province. Said the report:

... Before the twentieth year of the reign of His Majesty (Emperor Dezong), it was the Demo Hutuktu who ran Tibet without the interference of the Dalai. That is why the residents were listened to; they could even reprimand the Tibetans. The former resident Sheng Tai was able to stop the war and establish the trade-mart at Yadong because he still had the power to do so. Now the Dalai has taken over the command. As a man given to solitary meditation, but now suddenly charged with the responsibilities of public office, he is bound to be ignorant where these responsibilities are concerned. And being equal in status to the resident, he is predetermined to be independent of him in what he does. Worse yet, most of the *kaloons* he selected are his favourites and are men in want of vision; and as he lives in a monastery way up in the hill, he is not easily accessible to the resident. When he does receive him, he is haughtily reticent. As a result, contact between the two men on government business has been reduced to mere exchanges of documents in translation, and if any of such official communications incurs his displeasure, however slight, the resident gets no response from him.

The Dispute Over Nyagrong

Nyagrong, the Tibetan name for Zhandui, is located in eastern Kham to the north of Lithang. The dispute over the region, which arose when the Dalai Lama assumed secular office, deepened the antagonism between the Dalai Lama on one side and the amban and the governor of Sichuan on the other. Lu Chuanlin, Governor of Sichuan, recorded the events that culminated in hostilities in Nyagrong in a report he sent to the Qing government in the fourth month of the twenty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1896). Lu wrote:

Nyagrong was in the past administered by its Upper, Middle and Lower *tusis*. In the fourth year of Emperor Muzong's reign, a joint military action by the Sichuan and Tibetan armies was ordered by the Court to put down the armed rebellion of tribal chief Gonpo Namgyal and his son, which had survived many attempts to suppress it. When the forces under the command of Shi Zhikang, Deputy Governor of Sichuan, reached Tachienlu Prefecture, they halted their advance. This gave the Tibetan army the time to beat the rebels before Shi's troops could do it. After the Tibetans overran Nyagrong and occupied it, they demanded a payment of 300,000 *liang* of silver to cover the expenses they said were incurred by the military action they took, and declared that unless it was paid in full they would not give up the territory they had taken. As Sichuan was at that time being ravaged by roaming bandits, and the local government was not able to pay the money, Shi Zhikang proposed that Nyagrong be put under Tibetan jurisdiction. Shi's proposal was brought to the attention of the Court by Luo Bingzhang, the former governor of Sichuan. In those days Sichuan and Tibet were regarded as joined to each other, and the Court was of the opinion that the Tibetans deserved to be rewarded for their military victory over the rebels. So it decided to leave Upper, Middle and Lower Nyagrong in the charge of the Dalai Lama, to be administered by Tibetan officials. Since the take-over, however, the Tibetan officials have subjected the people of Nyagrong to a reign of terror and over-taxation, causing them untold sufferings and giving rise to a series of internal disturbances that broke out between short intervals of only a few years each. Last year hostilities broke out between the troops of Nyagrong and the *tusi* of Tsagla. In the middle of the war, the Nyagrong forces were suddenly pulled back when Assistant Resident Na Qing was passing through the area. At first it was believed that the Tibetan

commander did so in deference to the resident, but later it was learned that they were moved back because the natives of Nyagrong had once again rebelled. Later when he was impeached by Resident Kui Huan to the Court, the Tibetan commander even dared to defy the orders for his removal and showed much contempt for the law.

Gong Shou, reporting on the war between Nyagrong and Tsagla to the throne, wrote:

The three villages in Nadren west of Tachienlu used to be the pasturage of the *tusi* of Gechu Tsa. In Emperor Muzong's time, Gonpo Namgyal, the Nyagrong tribal chief, invaded the region and took possession of the pasturage. In the past few years the inhabitants of Nadren, finding life impossible under the Tibetans, have been fleeing to Tsagla. In retaliation for Tsagla's acceptance of these refugees, the Tibetan officials have been sending men to loot and burn in the domains of the *tusi* on the Tsagla-Nyagrong border. And when the *tusi* of Tre Drag clashed with his son-in-law and Tre Hor went over to Nyagrong, Tibet interfered by making frequent raids on Tre Drag's territory.

These accounts show that the trouble in Nyagrong was caused by disputes among the tribes.

However, as Lu Chuanlin, Governor of Sichuan, viewed these disputes as "disturbances created with immunity in the neighbouring *tusi* domains" by Tibetan officials in Nyagrong (appointed by the Kashag), he and the amban asked the Qing government in a joint "impeachment" to remove from office Duddul Dorje and Yeshe Thubtan, a lay and a monk official in Nyagrong. Assistant Amban Na Qing told Lu in a letter what happened after the dismissal of the two officials was announced by the Qing court: "When I transmitted the orders to the *Shangshang* for their execution, it ignored them, and told me arrogantly that it was not going to dismiss these Tibetan officials." That was the beginning of hostility between the Kashag on one side and the amban and the provincial governor on the other. The governor had this to say: "(The Tibetans') wilful disobedience of authority as shown first by their rejection of the orders and then by their creation of disturbances, amounts to treason. If no punitive military action is taken against them now, not only will these two officials be emboldened in their defiance and become uncontrollable, but the *tusis* in my

province, no longer counting on Han officials for protection against the bullying Tibetans, will follow each other in seeking vassalage under Tibet. If that happens, things on the frontier will get out of hand."

In the fifth month of the twenty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1896) an army composed of Anding troops, put under the command of Zhou Wanshun, Distinguished Sichuan Garrison Commander, by the governor, struck out from Tachienlu, supported by several hundred militiamen provided by the *tusi* of Tsagla. On the twenty-sixth day of the month, when Zhou's mixed army of Han and Tibetan soldiers attacked the fortified village of the *tusi* of Tre Drag, they ran into the stiff resistance of the defending Tibetans. Several scores of mounted herdsman and a few hundred lamaist monks from the Tre Drag Monastery, recruited by Tibetan officials, "charged from the ridge of Mount Ramago, firing their way down in support of the Nyagrong soldiers." On the thirtieth day the Sichuan army took the base of Tre Hor, and the Tibetans pulled all their forces back to Nyagrong for its defence. "Once they got back, they had all the ten-odd wooden forts with watch towers in Middle Nyagrong manned by their soldiers, and posted an all-Tibetan guard around their headquarters to keep off the local inhabitants. Meanwhile they threw several important local chiefs of Nyagrong into prison to forestall any attempt at betrayal, put the passes leading to Nyagrong under heavy guard, and destroyed the bridge over the Yalong River. To make sure that Khoyukha and Aenjokho would be defended to the last man, they were left to the charge of *tsepons* and their ferocious faithful." What began as tribal conflicts had by now developed into a war between the Qing army from Sichuan and the Tibetan forces sent by the Kashag to garrison Nyagrong.

On the tenth day of the eighth month, when the Sichuan army and the supporting militia invaded Middle Nyagrong, they met with stubborn resistance of the Tibetan troops, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. But the better equipped Sichuan army managed to lay siege to the principal fortress of Nyagrong. On the seventeenth day the next month, when the fortress still stood in spite of the encirclement, the attackers began to dig tunnels for explosives to blow it up from underneath. Now Duddul Dorje and

Tsezong Tsedrung Drakpa had fled back to Tibet, and Yeshe Thubtan was the only Tibetan left in charge of the fortress. He sent men to the Sichuan army to negotiate terms of surrender. "After he gave up the fortress, the remorseful Yeshe Thubtan begged to be provided with a party of soldiers to escort him back to Tibet. Zhou Wanshun informed him of his pardon by the Emperor, and granted his request without reservation, saying he would order a breach in the encirclement.... On the twenty-sixth day, Yeshe Thubtan left the fortress with some three hundred monks, women and children after turning over five artillery pieces to the Sichuan army and releasing from prison seventy-six men captured from the tribes of Tsagla, Gechu Tsa, Derge and Hor. These tribesmen, after being processed, were immediately sent back home with money, and when the Sichuan troops set up camp in the fortress, peace was restored all through Upper, Middle and Lower Nyagrong."

During the war, when the Dalai Lama learned of the presence of the Sichuan army in Nyagrong, he offered as a concession to dismiss the two Kashag-appointed Tibetan officials in Nyagrong and sought the emperor's approval through the amban of two new supervisors for Nyagrong he appointed. When the governor of Sichuan learned of that, he urged the emperor to order the repossession of Nyagrong, its administration by Han officials and an end to the appointment by the Kashag of Tibetan supervisors for that region. But the hesitant Qing government did not act as suggested by the governor, fearing the repossession would "alienate" the Dalai Lama. In a cabled reply to the governor dated the twelfth day of the tenth month, the Qing government said:

The governor insists that no Tibetan officials be allowed in Nyagrong any longer. But since Lithang, where the disturbances took place, is located on the strategically important route to Tibet, the Dalai Lama would certainly resist any action taken as suggested by the governor; such resistance should be foreseen even if the Tibetan army were not aiding Nyagrong. The security of Sichuan is of course important, but the security of Tibet is even more so. Re-installation of Han officials for the administration (of Nyagrong) would strengthen the security of Sichuan, but not of Tibet. The policy that will make both Sichuan and Tibet secure shall be one by which rebellion will be repressed relentlessly and submission encouraged; territories already granted to them

will remain in their hands, and officials they have installed will stay; and at the same time the Dalai Lama will be made to feel the presence of a military deterrent so that he will refrain from starting any dispute.

In the eleventh month Lu Chuanlin raised the issue again in a memorial to the throne, suggesting in detail a new administrative system for the Nyagrong region. Said the memorial:

Nyagrong borders on Lithang to the south, an important town on the route to Tibet; to the north it touches the territory of Derge through which tea traders from the north enter Tibet. With easy access to the *tusi* domains around it, Nyagrong is a region of strategic importance. The following measures in regard to Nyagrong after its repossession are recommended for adoption: install a prefect as Nyagrong's chief administrator, re-name the place Dingzhan Ting (Prefecture) and put it under the direct jurisdiction of the Jianchang Dao (Provincial Region); move the Jianchang Dao government to Tachienlu, but add no deputy governor in order to avoid redundancy; put the Tachienlu Ting also under the direct jurisdiction of the *dao*, and keep the Fuhe garrison there. Establish a new administrative system to be modelled on the five-*tun* system of Jinchuan for the *tusi* domains of Tre Drag and Tre Hor by putting them in the charge of government-appointed *tun* officers (those in charge of districts growing food grain for the army). These two *tun* officers, subordinate to the Nyagrong Prefect, will also be the chief administrators of the *tusi* domains of Mazur, Khangsar and Beri. An officer with the rank of major will be appointed and be posted in the same town as the prefect. The *tusi* of Derge ... will be brought under the authority of a *tun* officer and a major who will be subordinate to the Nyagrong Prefect. I have ordered Tang Chengli and Zhang Ji to make inquiries into the size of the territories, tax revenues and census registrations of Nyagrong, Tre Drag and Tre Hor; and submit their findings for verification.

The new administrative system was aimed at replacing *tusis* with Han officials. The Qing's control of the Tibetan region was effected through Tibet's traditional government system and Tibetan *tusis*; the new system would put them out of function, stripping the *tusis* of their privileges and bringing the Tibetan people under the direct control of Han officials. It is not surprising that it met with the opposition of all Tibetan local headmen. Of this Yi Shou gave a rough idea in his memorial to Qing emperor when he said, "the suggested new administrative system has caused widespread anx-

iety among the people west of Tachienlu."

In the first month of the twenty-third year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1897) the Dalai Lama, through Tsezung Lozang Phelgye, the envoy he sent to Beijing, lodged a complaint with the emperor against the governor of Sichuan, and requested that Nyagrong remain under the jurisdiction of Tibet. The Qing government, in view of the larger interests of the nation, transferred the governor to another post, recalled all the Han officials and army from Nyagrong, and returned the administrative powers over it to Kashag-appointed officials. At the same time, it gave Amban Wen Hai the following instructions:

With a view to achieving enduring harmony, it is necessary to reach an immediate agreement with the Dalai Lama on rules of conduct to be strictly observed by all concerned, and obtain a signed statement that Tibetan officials will no longer abuse their powers or create disturbances. The Dalai Lama shall be told that he will henceforth be held responsible for any acts of provocation by Tibetan officials.

In the seventh month the next year Amban Wen Hai said in a report to the Qing government:

During a meeting in my office, the *kaloons* told me that the Dalai Lama, grateful to His Majesty for returning Nyagrong to Tibet, would exercise prudence in selecting officials for the place, but a signed statement, they said, might give the Nyagrong inhabitants a handle against Tibetan officials. I rebuked them on that point and told them that the undertaking was intended by the Court merely as a precaution and a means to pacify the people there, and that if the Dalai Lama refused to undertake that obligation, I could hardly speak for him to the Court and close the matter. Finally the reluctant Dalai sent in the signed statement.

With that the Nyagrong dispute came to an end.

The Murder of the Demo Hutuktu

In the seventh month of the twenty-fifth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1899), when things in Nyagrong had just quieted down, "an attempt was made on the Dalai's life." The case is recorded in the Tibetan biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama as

follows:

After resigning from his office the former regent, Demo Hutuktu Ngawang Lozang Trinley Rabgyas, lived in seclusion in the Tengyeling Monastery over which his young brother, Norbu Tsering, and a monk official by the name of Dondan had supreme power. Treacherous and avaricious by nature and resentful of the Dalai's secular power, they plotted against his life in the hope of reinstalling the Demo Hutuktu as regent so that they would become powerful enough to have everything their way. In a conspiracy with Rimpoche Palri and Rimpoche Nyagdrul they wrote the date of the Dalai's birth on slips of paper that contained curse-laden incantations, and buried them around the Potala, in the Hapori Hill where the Samye Monastery is situated, and other sacred places. In addition, they gave the Dalai Lama a pair of boots with the fatal incantations sewn in the soles. When the Dalai wore the boots he would become distraught and too sick to eat anything. So the Nechung Chosgyong was consulted, and the revelation made by the deity Marlum Yesheki the oracle invoked traced Dalai's sickness to the boots. When the boots were torn apart, the incantations were discovered. The exposure led to the arrest of Norbu Tsering and Dondan. Confronted with iron-clad evidence, they made no attempt to defend themselves but confessed everything. When the conspiracy was exposed, all the monk and lay officials including those of the three monasteries were involved in the investigation by the Kashag. The Demo Hutuktu, who had been meditating in the Tengyeling, died suddenly on the night of the day he learned of the frustration of the murder attempt. He was forty-five.

Liu Jiaju offered his version of the case in *A Brief Political and Religious History of Tibet*: The Tibetan government, Liu wrote,

Taking the revelations by the Defender of the Doctrine as an excuse, threw the Demo Hutuktu into prison where he eventually died, and confiscated the property of the Tengyeling Monastery on trumped-up charges of plotting to kill the Dalai Lama by witchcraft; and when the Demo's steward, Norbu Thondrup, and others at the Tinggyeling (Tengyeling) were put to death by the same frame-up, the Dalai Lama succeeded in making himself feared throughout Tibet and establishing for himself an authority that was not to be challenged.

Following the Demo's death, the Dalai ordered the confiscation of his estates, monasteries and property in Nedong, Lhungtse, Tsegang, Gyantse, Tsaltod De, Lhorong Dzong, Dagpo, Tshal,

Ngamring and Medru Kongkha. Eight monk and lay officials, seven *tsezhongs* and three *tsongkhors* were appointed by the Kashag to make inventories of them and were put in charge of their management. The title Demo Hutuktu was abolished and his reincarnation terminated. All this was reported to the court by Amban Yu Gang on behalf of the Tibetan local government.

Charles Bell believed that the Demo Hutuktu was terribly wronged. Said he in his book *Tibet: Past and Present*:

Among these [who criticized the Dalai Lama "for taking part in secular matters"] were the two late Rulers of Sikkim, Maharaja To-tup Nam-gyal and Maharaja Sid-keong Nam-gyal, themselves of the Tibetan race.... "His treatment of the Ten-gye-ling Regent, which resulted in the latter's death," said Maharaja Sid-keong, "is considered by many Tibetans to be the cause of Tibet's present troubles. The Regent of Ten-gye-ling was a man highly respected. But Tibetans will of course express such sentiments only to true friends." These views I too found to be widely held. And this was not only on account of the great respect in which the Regent of Ten-gye-ling was held and the widespread, though not universal, belief that he personally was innocent of the charge of witchcraft.

In the absence of facts it is hard to say with any finality just what led to the death of the Demo, but one thing is certain: he was the victim of internal strife in the Tibetan hierarchy.

With the Demo gone, the Dalai Lama was able to consolidate his position as the head of the Tibetan ruling clique with such power and influence as to make him "feared all through Tibet and his authority unchallenged," as observed by the author of *A Brief Political and Religious History of Tibet*.

How the Dalai and the Panchen Come to Dislike Each Other

In 1902 when Choskyi Nyima was twenty years old, he had reached the age to take his *gelong* vows from the thirteenth Dalai Lama, who had been ordained into full monkhood eight years earlier.

The fifteenth day of the fourth month in the Water-Tiger year (1902 or the twenty-eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) was fixed for the Panchen's ordination. According to the Tibetan biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Panchen and his party arrived in Lhasa on the fourth day of that month. He was greeted and presented with *hatas* by the monk officials from the Lhaje of the Drepung, the Nechung Chosgyong of the Nechung and others in a ceremonial tent at Tsannyid Lingkha in front of the Drepung.

Ceremonial tents were also erected by the Kashag at Kyidtsal Luding, a place halfway between the Drepung and Lhasa. There all the monk and lay officials from the *kaloon* down stood in line in order of rank to welcome the Panchen, while the amban and Han officials of all ranks awaited his arrival in a building called Bugyab (popularly known as the Hall for Greeting Arriving Officials) that stood next to the tents.

The Panchen was given arousing welcome in Lhasa by several ten thousand inhabitants of the city and lamaist monks from the major monasteries. On the left side of the street he passed through stood monks blowing giant horns, beating drums or crashing cymbals or carrying all kinds of ceremonial and Buddhist ritual objects and pictures of the Buddha; on the right side crowds of lay people danced to the beat of waist-drums while the young ones among them dressed in brightly coloured costumes greeted the Panchen with auspicious songs and dances.

The first place the Panchen was taken was the Potala Palace. There in the Tsanzim Khang Hall he met with the Dalai Lama. After they exchanged *hatas*, the Panchen retired to the Jokhang where he was to stay in the quarters reserved for him by the Kashag.

On the thirteenth day the Dalai Lama moved to the Jokhang in preparation for the forthcoming ordination.

The ceremony on that "auspicious day," the fifteenth day of the fourth month, began with the Dalai and the Panchen walking abreast to the Main Hall of the Jokhang. After they both presented *hatas* to the image of Sakyamuni in the Hall, the Panchen prostrated himself before the Dalai and offered him a *hata*, mandral and other important presents in recognition of the Dalai as his teacher. Then he was ushered into a room in the Odpag Lhakhang Hall by an attendant *khenpo* for a short rest while the Dalai, the monk

officials and scripture-chanting lamas began to pray. When they finished and the Panchen returned to the Main Hall, the actual ordination began. Standing in front of the Sakyamuni image, the Dalai Lama, acting both as a *khenpo* and a *lobpon*, administered to the Panchen first the vows of a lay Buddhist and a *getsul*, which the Dalai had not been able to do earlier, and then those of a *gelong*. Assisting the Dalai in the ceremony were the abbot and the retired abbot of the Ganden, a Shartse Chosje (*khenpo* from the Shartse Dratsang) from the monastery, a Gyantse Chosje (*khenpo* from the Gyantse Dratsang), and a master of ceremonies who also helped with saying the prayers.

Having taken the vows, the Panchen presented to the Dalai a *nangsod hata*, a plateful of gold mandrals, a revolving wheel inlaid with jewels, a white conch with silver inlays, silver, gold, brocade and three silk *gutsan*—tokens of gratitude for the teacher. In return, the Dalai gave him a statuette of the Buddha cut from precious stone. Then, in celebration of the occasion, the Kashag and the Tashilhunpo presented the Dalai and the Panchen with many expensive gifts, draped the Sakyamuni statue with a new robe and placed before it sacrificial offerings that included butter lamps and food. Finally the Dalai and the Panchen joined an assembly of monks at the Namgyal Dratsang to say prayers of thanks to Paldan Lhamo, a female deity.

The next day a celebration party was given by the Kashag in the Aewam Hall in the Jokhang. On this occasion the Dalai received *hatas*, mandrals and other expensive presents as tokens of thanks from Teji Kushang (the Panchen's uncle on the maternal side) and all the Panchen's attendant monk officials at the Tashilhunpo including the *sopon*, *sepon*, *chodpon khenpo*, *ta dromyer*, the four *shenkhas* and the *gonkhangpu*.

The Dalai said good-bye to the Panchen on the twenty-third day of the fourth month. He then went to the Ramoche to light joss-sticks before returning to Norpulingkha. For the next few days the Dalai and the Panchen were visited separately by Tibetan dignitaries who offered them their gifts and congratulations. The visitors included representatives from the three great monasteries, the Ogminling Monastery of the Lhatse Dzong, the Phanpo Gadan Chokhor Monastery, the Salkhang Monastery, the Nyemo Gyalche

Monastery, the Shoggurmon Monastery, the Gongkar Chode Monastery, the Tsemonling Larang, the Phurjog Larang, the Tsechogling Larang, the Lelung Larang and the Dordrag Dzodpa Monastery; the visitors also included such aristocrats as Depon Thonpa, said to have descended from the Thonmi family, and the revered Dokharwa.

On the second day of the fifth month, the Panchen called on the Dalai Lama at the Norpulingkha before leaving for the Tashilhunpo. A send-off party was given by the Kashag in honour of the Panchen at the Zimchung Nyiod Khyil in Norpulingkha.

The Panchen and his entourage returned to Tsang on the fourth day of the fifth month. By order of the Dalai Lama they were escorted all the way from Lhasa to the Tashilhunpo by Dapon Lhadingse of Tsang, Shodrung Khashepa, Tsezung Tanpa Robgye and Samkar Drakpa Kaldan. They also had the honour of being accompanied as far as Todlung Gang, about fifteen kilometres from Lhasa, by the four chief *kaloons* and the Dalai's *gyigyab khenpo*.

According to *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*, the relations between the Dalai and the Panchen began to sour following an incident that occurred during the latter's stay in Lhasa for ordination. "One day in the spring of the twenty-eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign," said the book, "the Panchen's guards did not stop beating the ceremonial drums when the Panchen was passing by the Potala on his way to pay his respects to the Dalai. The latter, considering the drum-beating in front of his residence by his pupil as an act of disrespect for his teacher, took offence, and imposed on the Panchen a fine of 1,500 *liang* of silver. Since then bad feelings developed between the two men and were kept alive by their aides who fed their respective masters with slander against the other."

Whether the book is right or wrong in pinpointing the cause of the alienation is yet to be proved. In a memorial to the Qing court dated the twenty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1896) which reported "the recovery of Nyagrong with the suggestion for the abolition of Tibetan administration of that region and an analysis of the unlikelihood of Dalai's sudden alienation from the Court and of the threat to Tibet from Britain and Russia," the governor of Sichuan, Lu Chuanlin, said, "Discord has always existed

between the Panchen of Tsang and the Dalai Lama." This would indicate that the "discord" between them began long before the Panchen's ordination.

Britain Becomes Insatiable in Its Demands

After annexing Drenjong and setting up a trade-mart at Yadong in the Tibetan territory as provided for by the Anglo-Chinese Convention and its subsequent regulations, thus establishing a base for an attack on Tibet, Britain lost no time in getting things ready for a push into the heartland of Tibet. In 1896 (the twenty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign), alleging that "certain places in the north-east of Sikkim, and within the boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890, had recently been occupied by Tibetan soldiers," Britain suggested "that it would probably be convenient to arrange that frontier officers should meet before long on the border and travel together along the boundary fixed by the Convention." The following is said to have happened next:

The Amban replied, in October, that the Tibetan Council raised objections to our officers "travelling along" the frontier, and were unable to agree that British officers should travel on the Tibetan side of the frontier, but that they considered the proposal to send officers to define the frontier one with which it was proper to comply. The amban had, accordingly, deputed a Chinese major commanding the frontier troops, and the Tibetan Council had deputed a general and a chief steward, to proceed to the frontier to meet the officer appointed by the viceroy, "there to inspect the border between Sikkim and Tibet as defined by the Convention, and to make a careful examination in order that boundary pillars might be erected, which shall be forever respected by either side." In conclusion, the amban asked to be informed what officer had been deputed by the viceroy for this duty, and the date on which he would arrive on the frontier, in order that he might instruct the Chinese and Tibetan deputies "to proceed at the appointed time for the work of demarcation." ... The Viceroy replied, in December, that he thought a start should be made any time between May 1 and July 1; that Mr. White had been deputed for the purpose, and would meet the other deputies at whatever point on the frontier

might be convenient.*

When the issue of "delimiting the boundary" was raised to the Kashag by the amban, the Kashag objected and closed the border to the officials that the amban might send there. Reported the Sichuan governor in a memorial to the throne:

With the date approaching for the work of delimitation to begin, the British are pressing hard for a definite answer. But the Tibetans still insist on their objections, not only refusing to send their officials for the joint inspection of the frontier and to supply porters and horses, but also forbidding the employment of manpower for transport purposes. Kui Huan talked to them many times, but to no avail, and Na Qing, being new to Tibet and a mere assistant, can hardly do anything about it.

Claude White arrived on the Indian-Tibetan border at the appointed time of May, 1897. There he waited for the Han and Tibetan commissioners to start the joint inspection. By the time the work was to begin, only one officer authorized by the amban had arrived; there were no Tibetan officials. The officer "asked for more delay, but Mr. White refused ... and Mr. White and he fixed the site of the pillar on the Jelap-la (pass), which is a spot where the side of the watershed forming the boundary, according to treaty, is quite unmistakable, as it runs along a very sharply-defined ridge. Mr. White erected a pillar there, and arranged with the Chinese deputy to meet him at another pass, the Dokala, on June 1, while Mr. White should in the interval erect a pillar at the Donchukla, to be afterwards inspected by the Chinese."

What should be noted here is that these boundary markers were set up in the absence of the entire party of Han and Tibetan deputies, and in the process of delimitation the British stole many pieces of land from Tibet. Such act of aggression infuriated the Tibetan people.

A few days later came the news that the pillar which Mr. White had erected on the Jelap-la had been demolished by the Tibetans, and the stoneware slab on which the number of the pillar had been inscribed had been removed by them. And on June 11 Mr. White telegraphed that the pillar he had erected on the Donchuk-la had been wilfully damaged, ... that the numbered slab there had also been taken away, and

* *India and Tibet.*

** *Ibid.*

that the destruction of the pillar was most probably the work of three Lamas sent from Lhasa.... This was brought to the notice of the Chinese Resident by the Viceroy, and a reply was received that the State Council had sent no orders for the destruction of the pillar, and that he had given orders that a strict examination should be made into the affair, and the people who stole the slab from the pillar be severely punished.*

In August 1898 (twenty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) Li Yulin, Commissioner for Frontier Affairs, and Dapon Phuntsok Wangdu were sent to Gamba Dzong (Khamba Dzong) by the new amban Wen Hai and the Kashag respectively; they were to define the boundary with White Tibet said that the borderline between India and Tibet should basically be the same as the one that had traditionally separated Drenjong from Tibet—a line marked by piles of rock called *epo*. The British said that they would recognize that line as the borderline on the condition that Phari be made a trade-mart; otherwise Britain would take possession of the Chumbi Valley (where Yadong is located) with military force. Said Younghusband in *India and Tibet*:

The wisest policy would be to give them warning that unless they at once made arrangements ... in the work of delimitation it would be done without them, and that unless they appointed a ruler on their side who could protect the pillars set up, the British Government would march in and hold the Chumbi Valley in pawn, either temporarily or permanently. Such a brusque and high-handed line of conduct ... was the only one that frontier tribes who have reached the stage of civilization of the Tibetans could understand.

Faced with the imminent danger of British aggression and its blatant threat of military invasion of the Chumbi Valley, the gate to southern Tibet, the Tibetan people of all social strata necessarily took steps to prepare themselves for a war of resistance. On the twenty-sixth day of the third month in the twenty-fifth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1899) the Dalai Lama sent a memorial to the Qing emperor through Jebtsun Dampa, the ruling lama of Outer Mongolia—not through the amban because the Kashag was at odds with the Qing Resident who always stood for making

* *India and Tibet*.

humiliating concessions when dealing with foreign powers. The highlights of the document are as follows:

1. It is not a wise policy to make peace with a bully. During the British India's military invasion in the fourteenth year of His Majesty's reign, the ten-thousand-odd troops dispatched by the Dalai Lama in response to a joint request engaged the enemies in two major battles, and with superior strength our men won these battles. But when our troops were resolved to win still greater victories, the Resident ordered us repeatedly to cease fire, thus hurting the men's morale. When the enemies learned of these orders, they resumed fighting, pushing back our defence line. When we were waiting for troop reinforcements and the replenishment of supplies, the Resident again ordered us to offer no resistance because he was going to the border to negotiate peace. From then on the British advanced unchecked.

2. The former Resident, Wen Shuo, provided the Board for National Minority Affairs with a map showing the boundary of Balaijong (Drenjong). The tribe was formerly a dependency of the Dynasty; its rulers were the recipients of honorary titles and official ranks granted by Their Majesties. Its present ruler is now imprisoned by the British and is subjected to torture. But he stands his ground in spite of the physical pains inflicted on him, and is asking in earnest that his territory remain under Tibetan jurisdiction.

3. The fund earmarked for Tibet by the Court during the dispute with British India is said to have totalled 400,000 *liang* of silver. What we actually received was 4,000 *liang* for the renovation of the Jokhang and 2,000 *liang* for the repair of the city wall of Yadong. When Kui Huan was Resident, we received 5,000 *liang* to pay for repair work, and then another 12,000 *liang*. There are signed receipts for the money, which show that the total sum we received never reached 400,000 *liang*.

4. When the Regulations about Yadong were concluded, Resident Kui Huan said that if any changes were to be made in them five years after their conclusion, intentions for these changes should be made known six months in advance. It is true that this arrangement has been mutually agreed upon, but the British are not to be trusted by what they say.

5. The Brugpa Tribe (Bhutan) borders on Tibet and Britain. A bond of friendship exists between us and the tribe, but the crafty British may turn it into their dependency. Your Majesty is hereby requested to confer a title of nobility on its ruler as an expression of goodwill towards him. Gurkha (Nepal) is another friendly neighbour of Tibet. A

feud between its king and his brother has led to a division of the territory between them. The king's brother is now contemplating allegiance to Britain, but the king is worried about the consequences of such a decision. As they are not yet able to make up their minds, Your Majesty might do well to bestow favour on them in order to win their trust.

6. The local taxes collected in Yadong after it became a trade-mart go to the Tibetan government, but the British traders there do not pay any taxes. Since officials were put in charge of collecting and expending trade taxes by order of the Resident, an Englishman with a group of others, passing themselves off as frontier officers, have been collecting taxes there.

7. According to a public notice signed by Resident Sheng Tai, the British are permitted to sell in Yadong only such goods as are useful to Tibet; trade shall be stopped if it involves goods of other descriptions. What the British merchants are selling now are mostly guns, knives, explosives, tobacco and alcoholic beverages for which Tibetans have no use. Also, they are trying to import Indian tea into Tibet. Sichuan merchants make a good profit out of the tea they sell in Tibet, and they pay a tea and a Tibetan local tax. Sichuan tea is the Tibetans' favourite drink. If the British are permitted to sell tea here, they would undoubtedly make it easily affordable, and many tax problems would ensue. Therefore, trade in tea by the British should be banned.

8. Your Majesty is requested to grant to the Dalai Lama the right to collect land sales and purchase taxes in Yadong beginning five years from now. The income will help to pay for army supplies. It has been very difficult for Tibet, which has been in deep financial trouble for many years, to maintain an army of more than ten thousand men in active service for as long as seven years. Your Majesty is also requested to place the Tsoba Sogu and the Eight Banners of Kalawusu, now governed by the Resident, under Tibetan jurisdiction.

9. The Tibetan army is in full strength but in short supply of weapons. We could manufacture them ourselves, but we can not find skilled workers for that. Your Majesty is requested to supply us with guns of all sizes, explosives and lead shot, or send us workers for their manufacture.

10. In view of the fact that the Resident takes no notice of the above-mentioned matters, it is requested that the Dalai Lama be permitted to address his reports to Your Majesty through the Board for National Minority Affairs in case of an emergency, and for that purpose he will need another seal of authority granted by Your Majesty. Also,

the Resident did not act in the interest of the country when delimiting the boundary; if that is to be investigated, we would like to confer with authorized persons from the capital.

This historical document is a record of Tibet's rejection of the Anglo-Chinese Convention and its non-recognition of Britain's annexation of Drenjong; the measures it suggested to consolidate the southern frontier by strengthening friendly ties with Nepal and Bhutan, and the requests for military and financial help of the Qing government bore out Tibet's resolve to resist British aggression. The memorial also shows that although the Dalai Lama was quite disappointed with the way the Qing ran things, he still looked to the central government for help.

But the Dalai's requests and suggestions met with the total rejection of the central government. "Refuting" them one by one, it said in its reply on the first point, "The war with India was one between a weak Tibet and a powerful enemy. As the Tibetan soldiers were poorly equipped and badly disciplined, they could never have held out for long. As Tibet is traditionally under the protection of the Court, the Court, after carefully weighing the pros and cons, went to all the trouble to negotiate a cessation of hostilities to rescue it from the impending danger and win it the time it needed to become strong. Instead of showing his appreciation of the great effort the Court made to protect the entire Tibetan population from harm, the Dalai Lama is now alleging that Tibet would have won the war had it not been for the peace negotiations. This is not true, and such an allegation shows that the Dalai does not seem to understand the importance of adapting oneself to the changes of circumstances." On the second point the reply said, "There is not such a tribe called Balaijong on the map and in the documents provided by Wen Shuo. Judging by his description he must have meant Drenjong. The tribe shares its religious faith in the Yellow Sect with Tibet and was once its dependency. During the reign of Emperor Wenzong it became a British dependency by the agreements it reached with Britain. Since then Britain has set up government offices there and has for many years built roads and bridges in Drenjong and had the land reclaimed. For the protection of its dependency, Tibet should have done everything it could at the outset to prevent Drenjong from being taken by

Britain. Now that Britain has established itself there, it is too late for Tibet to demand, as it is now doing, its re-possession of the tribe, and it is useless to ban travels to and from there." The third point was denied in the reply that said, "When Sheng Tai and Kui Huan were Residents, a total of 120,000 *liang* of silver was appropriated for Tibet, of which some 58,000 *liang* was for the construction of the walls of the check-points in the west and of government office buildings. The appropriations have been officially recorded. The alleged sum of 400,000 *liang* earmarked for the Tibet never existed." On the question of achieving closer ties with Bhutan and Nepal, the reply said, "As the two tribes border on Tibet, what they do means a great deal to the latter. In view of what has happened to Drenjong, it is entirely necessary to make sure that their rulers remain friendly so that Tibet may enjoy better security along its frontier. The Resident should be ordered to work out measures for that purpose on the basis of an investigation to be made of the situation there." The request for financial assistance was flatly refused. Said the reply: "It is true that the increases in the past few years in the number of troops on garrison duty have caused financial strain (to Tibet), but the Dalai Lama, who has all of Tibet in his possession, is not interested in making Tibet strong by promoting the growth of such basic economic sectors as agriculture, commerce and industry. This lack of enthusiasm has led to the impoverishment of Tibet. The request that the Tsoba Sogu and the Eight Banners of Kalawusu, regions under the authority of the Resident, be placed under Tibetan jurisdiction for financial reasons shows that the Dalai is short-sighted. It is for the stability of the frontier that the two regions have been put under the charge of the Resident. The attempt to change this farsighted arrangement is transgression of power." On the request for supplies of weapons, the reply commented, "Good weapons are indispensable to a strong army. It is altogether proper for Tibet to set great store by their manufacture. But the actual work should not be undertaken without the Court's approval and therefore should wait until the Resident has studied the situation, which he is expected to be able to do after the delimitation of the boundary and the trade negotiations get under way. Any premature action in regard to this matter would cause inconvenience to the man-

agement of frontier affairs." On the last point, the reply had this to say: "The Dalai Lama is wrong in thinking that His Majesty is ill-informed of the situation in Tibet mainly because his authority is not respected by the officials there. Since Tibet became a trouble spot in the fourteenth year of His Majesty's reign, no Residents have ever failed to keep His Majesty abreast of events that happened there, and what they have done was sanctioned by His Majesty. As there has not been any case of withholding information or of disrespect of authority, the Dalai's request should not be considered."

The reply dashed the Dalai's last hopes of support from the Qing government, and faced with the threat of British military invasion, he began to look for a foreign ally, and in so doing Russia claimed his attention.

Imperial Russia Steps In

When the Dalai Lama thought that he had found an ally in imperial Russia to help Tibet repel British invaders when the Qing was too cowardly to stand firm behind Tibet, he did not know that he had fallen into a trap set for him by that country.

Russia's interest in Tibet began long before the thirteenth Dalai Lama sought alliance with that country. Back in the years between 1870 and 1879 Colonel N.M. Prejevalski and Roborovski, "explorers" sent by Russia, reached the Nagchukha in the northern Tibetan grasslands by way of Xinjiang. When they were prevented by the Kashag from traveling any farther in Tibet, they diverted their itinerary and proceeded to Qinghai. On three occasions when they clashed with the native Tibetans there, they killed thirty to forty of them. Between 1889 and 1890 Russia sent its missions to northern Tibet. The Russians' activities in Tibet were reported to the throne in 1896 by Lu Chuanlin, Governor of Sichuan, in a memorial. Said Lu:

Tibet's contact with Russia began during the war with India (1888). Taking advantage of the war, Russians, posing as tourists, entered Tibet by way of Tsang. They wooed the Tibetans with flattery and money. Because of the language barrier, they gave the Tibetans three confiden-

tial letters and told them that if Tibet was in need of immediate help, they could send the letters to Russia, which would then dispatch its troops to the aid of Tibet as soon as the letters reached them in telegraphic form. Delighted, the Tibetans said they would do as arranged, and kept the whole thing a tight secret. Later on, when the Panchen of Tsang turned to Britain in his feud with the Dalai, the clandestine arrangement was exposed. The investigation by the former Resident Sheng Tai that followed led to the discovery of the letters. But as they were not destroyed after they were found, a secretary, bribed by the Tibetans, stole them and returned them to the Tibetans.

The Dalai's effort to seek alliance with Russia was also mentioned by Lu's predecessor, Liu Bingzhang, in a memorial to the Qing emperor dated the sixth month of the twentieth year of the emperor's reign (1894). Said the memorial: "It was only expected that the Tibetans out of their stupidity tried to turn to Russia for help in its war with India to avoid defeat, and that the Russians tried to lure them into doing so. But as the Tibetans' persistent denial shows their fears, full exposure of these attempts might give India an excuse."

Russia's secret contact with the Dalai was maintained through a Siberian Buriat Mongol named Dorjjeff. Himself a lamaist monk from a tribe which was also of the Yellow Sect in religion, Dorjjeff, disguised as a student studying Buddhism at the three great monasteries, was sent to Tibet by the Tsar on the secret mission around 1880, not long after Emperor Dezong ascended the throne. Said *A General History of Tibet*:

At first Russia contacted the Dalai Lama through Jebtsun Dampa; its direct contact with him was achieved later on by a man with the official title of *tsannyid khenpo* granted him by Tibet. The man was Dorjjeff, a Russian Buriat. With strong financial support rewarded him by the Russian government for his advice on matters regarding Tibet, he studied in Tibet as a lama. He spent over ten years studying the Tibetan language in Lhasa. Benefited by a modern education, clear in thinking and well-versed in Tibetan literature, Dorjjeff was a man of superior intellect, and for that he was selected as a Reader to the Dalai Lama. (That is how he earned the title *tsannyid khenpo*, which means in Tibetan the Dalai's instructor on lamaist catechism.) In this capacity he was able to put his learning to the best use. He described to the Dalai the major trends in the world, saying that the Qing government was

unreliable, and that the threatened invasion by Britain from the south posed grave danger for Tibet, but that lamaism should not be left to the mercies of a foreign religion. With the help of a map he showed the Dalai the size of Russia's territory, trying to convince him that Russia with its growth in national strength and territorial expansion would eventually achieve supremacy in both Europe and Asia, and that as Russia would certainly in the future become strong enough to unify the world, the country could surely be relied upon as the patron of lamaism. Then, quoting the prophecies in the canon of the Yellow Sect, he tried to prove to the Dalai that the king of the Buddhist doctrine mentioned in these religious writings was none other than the Russian emperor. Therefore, he suggested, the Dalai should make secret preparations to break free from the Qing and turn to Russia for assistance to ward off British aggression and achieve independence. Wise as he was, the Dalai seemed unable to resist the temptation in such talk.

In 1900 (the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), after his requests for financial assistance and supplies of arms and ammunition were rejected by the Qing emperor, the Dalai Lama sent a *ta dronyer* along with Dorjieff on a secret mission to Russia. They brought with them signed letter from the Dalai Lama to the Tsar. In the letter the Dalai addressed the Russian sovereign as His Majesty, the Defender of the Buddhist Doctrine. Of the mission Francis Younghusband wrote in *India and Tibet*:

... An announcement in the official column of the *Journal de Petersbourg* of October 2 (15), 1900, announcing the reception by His Majesty the Emperor of a certain Dorjieff, who was described as first Tsanit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet ... the *Odessa Novosti* of June 12 (25), 1901, stating that Odessa would welcome that day an Extraordinary Mission from the Dalai Lama of Tibet, which was proceeding to St. Petersburg with diplomatic instructions of importance. At the head of the mission was the Lama, Dorzhiev (Dorjieff), and its chief object was a rapprochement and the strengthening of good relations with Russia. It was said to have been equipped by the Dalai Lama, and dispatched with autograph letters and presents from him to His Imperial Majesty. And, among other things, it was to raise the question of the establishment in St. Petersburg of a permanent Tibetan Mission for the maintenance of good relations with Russia.... "This reappearance of the Tibet Mission in Russia proved," said *Novoe Vremya*, "that the favourable impressions carried back by Dorjieff to his home from his previous mission have confirmed the Dalai Lama in his intention of contracting

the friendliest relations with Russia.... A rapprochement with Russia must seem to him (the Dalai Lama) the most natural step, as Russia is the only Power able to frustrate the intrigues of Great Britain." ... The *Messenger Officiel* of June 25 (July 8, 1901) had the announcement that His Majesty the Emperor had received on June 23, in the Grand Palace at Peterhof, the Envoy Extraordinary from the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

"Among the goods brought by the Mission to Lhasa on their return from Russia was a consignment of Russian arms and ammunition. There came also a magnificent set of Russia Episcopal robes, a present from the Tsar of all the Russias to the God-King of Tibet (the Dalai Lama)."

When Britain learned that the Dalai Lama had sent a mission to Russia with the objective of forming an alliance with that country its Secretary of State for India on July 25, 1901 "pointed out to the Foreign Office that the Dalai Lama had recently refused to receive the communications addressed to him by the Viceroy, and that while the Viceroy was thus treated with discourtesy a mission was publicly sent to Russia, and the publicity given to the Tibetan mission which had recently arrived in St. Petersburg could not fail to engender some disquietude in the minds of the Indian Government as to the object and result of any negotiations which might ensue. (He added) that His Majesty's Government would naturally not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status in Tibet."** In 1902 (the twenty-eighth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), for reconnaissance purposes in preparation for a full-dress military aggression of Tibet, British troops intruded into Gamba Dzong (Khamba Dzong, an area under the Panchen's authority) in southern Tibet under the pretext of inspecting the boundary.

As soon as it learned of the British intrusion, Russia lodged a protest with the British Foreign Office, saying, "According to the information which the Russian Government had received from an authoritative source, a British military expedition had reached Komba-Ovaleko, on its way north by the Chumbi Valley, and that the Russian Government would consider such an expedition to Tibet as likely to produce a situation of considerable gravity, which

* Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present*.

** *India and Tibet*. .

might oblige them to take measures to protect their interests in those regions.”* To the protest Britain replied in even stronger language. It said, “The Indian Government (was) seriously perturbed by the communication made (by Russia) to the Foreign Office ... (because) any ... Russian ... activity in the regions immediately adjoining the possessions of Great Britain can scarcely fail to have a disturbing effect upon the population, or to create the impression that the British influence is receding, and that of Russia making rapid advances into regions which had hitherto been regarded as altogether outside her sphere of influence.... As we are much more closely interested than Russia in Tibet, it follows that, should there be any display of Russian activity in (Tibet), we should be obliged to reply by a display of activity, not only equivalent to, but exceeding that made by Russia.”**

As Russia was at the time too preoccupied with problems caused by its worsening relations with Japan to make any effective counter-moves to Britain's invasion, it had to back down. In a note sent to the Foreign Office on April 8 the Russian ambassador to Great Britain said,

The Russian Government has no designs whatever about Tibet, but we cannot remain indifferent to any serious disturbance of the status quo in Tibet. Such a disturbance might render it necessary for us to safeguard our interests in Asia; not that even in that case we would desire to interfere in the affairs of Tibet, as our policy “ne viserait le Tibetan en aucun cas”, but we might be obliged to take measures elsewhere. Russia regards Tibet as forming part of the Chinese Empire, in the integrity of which we take an interest.

The note showed that Russia would not dare to intervene militarily even when Britain invaded Tibet. So Britain said in its reply:

We have no idea of annexing (Tibet), but (the Russian ambassador) is well aware that (Tibet) immediately adjoins our frontier, that we have treaties with the Tibetans, and a right to trade facilities. If these are denied us, and if the Tibetans do not fulfill their treaty obligations, it will be absolutely necessary that we should insist upon our rights.

Thus an excuse was invented by Britain for its aggression of Tibet:

**India and Tibet.*

***Ibid.*

the Tibetans' failure to "fulfill their treaty obligations" would make its military invasion of that part of China's territory "absolutely necessary."

Tibetans Rise Again In Arms Against British Invaders

The two hundred British troops led by Claude White that invaded Giagong in Khamba Dzong in southern Tibet in June 1902 collected information about the military strength of Tibet on the frontier. As a result of Russia's intervention they soon returned to India—with some five thousand sheep and six hundred head of cattle they looted from the local Tibetan herdsmen.

On May 26 of the same year, Parr, an Englishman employed by the Qing government to assist in the Sino-British negotiations, had written to Amban An Cheng informing him of the British views in regard to Tibet. These views were:

1. In view of the inability of the Residents to run Tibet because they have no power, the Indian government is planning to conclude new treaties with authorized Tibetan officials and will not recognize the authority of the Residents.

2. If the Tibetan government refuses to send its representatives to the negotiations, Britain will have an excuse to enter Tibet and run it on behalf of the Residents.

3. There is the danger of a military invasion by Russia from the north. If attacked from both the north by Russia and the south by India, a defeated Tibet would be forced to become independent like Korea.

4. The Resident should consult with the Dalai Lama immediately so that capable officials accredited with full power might be appointed to work with the Resident. Tibetan officials should be prevented from communicating with foreigners so that they will not be able to conclude secret treaties with them.*

These views were the most candid expression of Britain's sinister design to annex Tibet.

In July 1903 (the twenty-ninth year of Emperor Dezong's reign)

* *Dispatches and Memorials to the Throne Concerning Tibet in the Qing Period*, V.

British military forces led by Commander Francis Younghusband and Deputy Commander Claude White invaded Khamba Dzong for the second time. The three hundred invading troops along with another three hundred supply and transport soldiers under the command of Colonel Brander had assembled in Drenjong on July 1. On July 7, three days after they reached Giagong, the British entered Khamba Dzong without encountering any resistance of the Tibetan army; the local officials had attempted to halt their advance, but the British paid no attention to them.

Younghusband himself arrived at Khamba Dzong on July 18. He recorded what happened following his arrival in *India and Tibet*.

On July 20 I made a formal call upon Mr. Ho (He Guangxie) and the Tibetan delegates.... Two days later they all came to return my visit, and after the usual polite conversation I said I would now redeem my promise, and I told the interpreter to commence reading a speech which I had prepared beforehand, and which Captain O'Connor had carefully translated into Tibetan. But before he could commence the Tibetans raised objections to holding negotiations at Khamba Jong at all. The proper place, they said, was Giagong.... The Tibetans then raised objections to the size of my escort.... When I asked the Tibetan delegates to communicate my speech to the Kashag, they replied that they could not even do that much, that they could make no report at all unless we went back to Giagong.... These so-called delegates never came near us again at Khamba Jong, but shut themselves up in the fort and sulked.... A deputation came to see me on behalf of the Tashi Lama (the Panchen), who is of equal spiritual importance with the Dalai Lama, though of less political authority. They said that they had been sent to represent to us that the Tashi Lama was put to great trouble with the Lhasa authorities by our presence at Khamba Jong; that the Lhasa authorities held him responsible for permitting us to cross the frontier, and he begged me to be so kind as to save him from the trouble by withdrawing across the frontier or to Yatung.... On August 21, the head Abbot of the Tashi Lumpo monastery ... came to make another representation.... The Abbot said that a Council had been held by the Tashi Lama, and it had been decided to make another representation to me.... He was especially insistent about Giagong.... He explained that the Tibetans thought we had come with no friendly intent.... He then asked me what we wanted in the coming negotiations ... and asked me what was meant exactly by opening a trade-mart.... On August 31 I was informed by a trustworthy person, who had exceptional sources of

information, that ... some 2,600 Tibetan soldiers were occupying the heights and passes on a line between Phari and Shigatse. My informant did not think, however, that they would attack us for the present.... Their immediate policy was one of passive obstruction. They had made up their minds to have no negotiations with us inside Tibet, and they would simply leave us at Khamba Jong, while if we tried to advance farther, they would oppose us by force. They were afraid that if they gave us an inch we would take a mile, and if they allowed us at Khamba Jong one year we should go to Shigatse the next, and Lhasa the year after. So they were determined to stop us at the start.... Another month passed, and there was still no improvement in the situation. On the contrary, continued rumours arrived that the Tibetans were massing troops, and that at Lhasa they were quite prepared to go to war.

The Qing government had ordered Amban Yu Gang to present himself at Khamba Dzong for talks with the British with a view to preventing them from advancing any farther, but the Kashag and the three great monasteries objected to the arrangement. Said the amban in a memorial to the throne:

A few days ago when the Tibetans learned that I was trying to hire horses and porters from the Eight Banners of Dam for the journey to the frontier on my own, they came to my office with several score civilians and told me that they knew what to do if British troops entered Tibet, and that they would do all they could to prevent me from making the journey to the frontier because they considered my going there an act of yielding to the British and a disgrace to the Court. They talked in such a defiant manner and argued with such heat as they had never done before.... Under the circumstances I am afraid that if I rebuke them for their fallacies and insist on going, not only would I be incapacitated from shielding the Tibetans against foreign aggression, but something worse than that might happen: the Tibetans might have an excuse to stir up trouble which would eventually develop into internal disorder. Under these circumstances it is not possible for me to proceed to the frontier.... The Tibetans are not going to drop the idea of meeting aggression with military force. Every time I tried to talk them out of that idea, they would say that they could have recovered from their defeat at Lengtu and would not have lost the territory if Resident Sheng Tai had not stopped them from fighting, and that if the Resident tried to do the same this time, he should be held responsible for any loss Tibet might suffer. Earlier, I refused their requests for troop movement and logistic support. Since then they have been collecting

troops and procuring horses and manpower in many places without my knowledge.... In view of that, war seems inevitable, and peace may not be negotiated until the conclusion of hostilities.

As the storm of war was gathering, both ambans tendered their resignations. The Qing government appointed You Tai Resident and Na Qing Assistant Resident, and ordered "a decision to be made by the Ministry on the out-going ambans."

Simultaneously with the British invasion of Khamba Dzong, the Viceroy of India had proposed a meeting at the *dzong* between representatives of the amban and their British counterparts. "The Viceroy proposed that our representative, with an escort of two hundred men, should proceed to that place, while reinforcements were held in reserve in Sikkim, and that, should the Chinese and Tibetan representatives fail to appear, or should the former come without the latter, our representative should move forward to Shigatse or Gyantse."* The proposed talks were no longer to be limited to the question of trade but were intended as a means to achieve British domination over Tibet. Younghusband made the purposes quite clear in *India and Tibet*. He wrote:

The question at issue ... was no longer one of details as to trade and boundaries—though on these it was necessary that an agreement should be reached—but the whole question of the future political relations of India and Tibet. They agreed with the Indian Government that, having regard to the geographical position of Tibet on the frontiers of India, and its relations with Nepal, it was "indispensable that British influence should be recognized at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other power to exercise pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India."

In October 1903 the British troops pulled out of Khamba Dzong, and when Younghusband returned to India, he immediately went into discussion with the authorities of British India on plans for a large-scale military attack on Tibet. "On October 1 Lord George Hamilton telegraphed to the government of India that the government had again considered the position, and was now prepared, if complete rupture of negotiations proved inevitable, to authorize, not only the occupation of the Chumbi Valley, but also the advance

* *India and Tibet*.

of the Mission to Gyantse, if it could be made with safety.”*

The frantic preparations by the British imperialists for a war of aggression against Tibet necessarily pulled all Tibetans together in their determination to fight them. In 1903 (the twenty-ninth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) in a public announcement by the Sholekung (Tibetan local government department in charge of inhabitants in the jurisdiction of the Potala) the Tibetan local government urged Tibetans of all classes to wage a resolute armed struggle against British invaders by arming themselves and joining the military forces. Part of the announcement, which was in fact a mobilization order, read as follows:

On the issue of the Tibetan frontier ... China and Britain are now discussing it on the border, but neither side should be expected to listen to the other in a friendly manner. If the British insist on their unjustifiable demands, we shall not hesitate to lay down our lives in defence of the foundation of earthly happiness—Buddhism; inaction on our part will be out of the question. We should act in accordance with what we have said in our various petitions, and rise in arms to make the invaders pay for their follies. Therefore, while the reductions of the *corvée* for the aristocrats, the army and the impoverished decreed in the Earth-Mouse year as well as those made after the investigations in the Iron-Rabbit year remain valid, each manorial and monastic estate and each pastoral area where *corvée* for the government is mandatory, with land in excess of six *gang*, shall have one man conscripted into the army. Also, each region shall prepare, in accordance with the procedures or rules and regulations regarding military conscription, a new register of its inhabitants who are eligible for conscription; those on the new registers shall be brought here. Conscripts must be chosen on a household basis. Households whose members are too young or too old for military service may offer substitutes, and as the substitutes must be physically capable of the strenuous work in the army, they must not be chosen in a perfunctory manner. The provision of weapons, gunpowder, cartridges, fuses and the monthly army pay shall follow the regulations promulgated by the Shopa of Gyantse in the Earth-Mouse year.

Tibetans of all classes were well prepared for the war.

* *India and Tibet.*

On December 10, 1903 Lengtu again saw the assembling of British invading troops.

The force then assembled consisted of two guns, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; a Maxim gun detachment of the Norfolk Regiment; two guns, 7-pounders, 8th Gurkhas; half-company 2nd Sappers; eight companies 23rd Sikh Pioneers; six companies 8th Gurkhas; with field hospitals, engineer field park, ammunition column, telegraph, postal, and survey department detachments.... General Macdonald (commanding officer of the British invading troops) was able to make a short march on the 11th to the foot of the Jelap-la with the first column, consisting of 1,150 fighting men, four guns, and four Maxims.*

This time the British army was to force its way into Tibet along the route between Yadong and Gyantse via Phari.

On December 12, 1903 the British army crossed the boundary dividing ridge of the Jelap-la and invaded Yadong. On the way the invaders did not run into any opposition of the Tibetan army except that a Han and a Tibetan official tried to halt their advance. Younghusband gave the following account of the intrusion in *India and Tibet*:

The local official seized my bridle and made one last ineffectual protest.... General Macdonald, with a flying column of 795 fighting men, started on the 18th for Phari.... The (Phari) Jong (fort) he found unoccupied. It was a strong, lofty, masonry-castellated structure, at the junction of the road to the Tang-la (pass).... In this Jong General Macdonald stationed two companies of the 8th Gurkhas and one 7-pounder gun, while the remainder of the column camped on the plain outside.

When Younghusband arrived in Phari on January 6, 1904,

We found that representatives of the three great monasteries ... and a General ... had arrived.... Captain O'Connor saw these monks, whom he found to be exceedingly surly, saying they would discuss nothing whatever until we went back to Yatung. A Major Li (Major Li Fulin), who had been deputed by the Resident to take Colonel Chao's place, visited me, and told me it was impossible to get the Tibetans to do anything. He said they were a most obstinate people, and at present would pay no respect to the Chinese, as they were so fully relying on Russian support.

* *India and Tibet*.

On December 20, 1903, the winter when the British army was assembling for the invasion, the Qing government had instructed the new amban, You Tai, as follows:

Stop the Tibetans immediately by way of persuasion from causing any hostilities on the border. It is extremely important that they are stopped. Find ways to reach the frontier as soon as possible and settle the matter properly with the British. We believe that with all the grace bestowed upon you by the monarchy, you will accomplish the mission.

After the British army entered Tibet, the Board of Foreign Affairs of the Qing government cabled the following instructions to You Tai on February 23, 1904:

Why is there such a long delay in arranging for contact with the British after you took office? We hope you will begin the discussion with the British immediately as instructed by the imperial edicts, and at the same time make the Tibetans understand by persuasion that they must wait for the opening of the discussion, and that any obstacles they create may lead to large-scale conflicts.

In the winter of 1903 the three great monasteries and all the monk and lay officials of the Kashag signed a petition to the ambans. It denounced the crimes Claude White and his troops perpetrated in Giagong in the previous year. The petition read:

Last year when the troops led by Claude White crossed the *ebo* (rock piles marking boundaries) erected in the reign of Emperor Gaozong on the Khamba-Drenjong border, they pulled down the defence walls of the blockhouses there, and claiming that they were defending their rights, they set up flags wherever they pleased within the Tibetan border in contemptuous disregard of the Han and Tibetan commissioners. They paid only a token price for the cattle and butter they bought from the inhabitants of Gamba (Khamba Dzong). We request that His Majesty, after being informed of our wishes by Your Excellencies, ask the Viceroy of India to punish the British perpetrators, and to respect without any reservation the original *ebos*.

On the Han officials posted in Tibet, the petition made the following critical comment:

The present dispute with the British finds the Han and Tibetans in the same boat, but it is saddening to know that the prefect deputed to handle it not only performs his duties perfunctorily, but is inconsistent

in his attitude toward his own people; he is thoroughly oppressive with Tibetans but complies to every wish of the British.

In conclusion, the petition voiced the determination of the Tibetan people to fight the British imperialist aggressors:

We request that Your Excellencies inform Prefect He, Commissioner for Frontier Affairs, and notify the Viceroy of India that we insist on the retreat of the British army to the other side of the border if they expect the negotiations to take place. We also insist on the recall of the *drungyigs* and *dapons*; we should not be expected to give up this land of Buddhism without a struggle. We are determined to retaliate with all we have as we have decided to do regardless of the consequences. We have ordered the troops under the command of six *dapons*, the militia under the command of *dzongpons* and the men and officers of the Gyantse Tibetan garrison in Tsang to join the Tibetan troops stationed at the strategically important places of Dromo (Yadong) and Gamba (Khamba Dzong). Your Excellencies are requested to inform, as in previous cases, the Han troops stationed at Tachienlu (Kangding) to provide them with reinforcements or logistic support. We shall humbly seek the approval of His Majesty for this undertaking.

The petition came at a time when Amban You Tai still hoped that the Dalai Lama would listen to him and give up the idea of fighting the British, but the Dalai "cited ill health as the reason refused to see him," as Yu Gang reported in his memorial to the throne, because the Kashag was collecting the Tibetan militia forces to block the advance of the British army.

On the fifth day of the second month in the year 1904, after the British army invaded Phari, Younghusband wrote You Tai a letter informing the amban that he was about to move to Gyantse to "commence negotiations," and asking You Tai to meet with him there in "the attendance of fully empowered Tibetan representatives." In the letter he asked the amban to "warn the Tibetans that the consequences of resistance to the passage of my Mission will be very serious." In his letter of reply dated the tenth day of the second month You Tai said:

I understand that it is your concern about the long delay in accomplishing the objectives of your military expedition that has prompted you to advance to Gyantse. In my effort to save the situation, I have somewhat managed to bring the Tibetans to reason, but they are a

crafty lot and unpredictable; any hastiness on your part to penetrate into Tibet will, I am afraid, result in the return of the hostility in the Tibetans and endanger future trade relations. I have been informed by the Dalai Lama in a communication that if you retreat to Yadong, I shall be asked to proceed to the border with selected Tibetan officials to discuss matters. For ten years this frontier matter has been hanging fire because it was perfunctorily drawn up in the beginning and was subsequently shirked by the commissioners, who did not make any real effort to adjust the difficulties. As you have already done a good thing for all the Tibetans by halting the advance of your army, I should feel ashamed to ask you to retreat to Yadong. It is true that establishing trade relations is your policy, but war is a costly business. You ought to be wise enough to choose between displaying military strength in a remote land without the hope of accomplishing anything, and insuring the smooth working of a settlement.

In total disregard of You Tai's pleas, Younghusband began his advance to Gyantse, and when his army opened fire on the defending Tibetan troops at Tuna, the second armed struggle of the Tibetan people against Britain began. This is what Younghusband wrote of the battle in *India and Tibet*:

The first event of importance after our arrival at Tuna was the receipt ... of a message from the Lhasa officials, saying that they wished for an interview. At noon, the time I had appointed, several hundreds of men appeared on the plain below the village. They halted there.... A few days later the Lhasa General, known as the Lhi-ding Depon, in company with a high Shigatse official (Sopon Khenpo Surkhang Norbu, representative of the Panchen faction) and the General who had met me at Yatung (Major Li Fulin of the Tibetan garrison), paid me a visit at Tuna. The Lhasa General announced that, like me, he was most anxious to come to a friendly settlement, and therefore he would ask me to withdraw to Yatung, where discussions could then take place in the most amicable manner. I told him ... I would ask him to let his Government know that the time was past for talk of this kind, and to warn them that ... far from going back, or even staying here, we were going to advance still farther into Tibet.... I heard from him later that he had communicated to the Lhasa monks the substance of this interview, but they had stated they could make no report of my views to the Lhasa Government until we had retired to Yatung.... Two more messengers arrived on the 10th, asking me to fix a date for withdrawal, and threatening trouble if I remained. These threats and rumours of

attacks, and reports of the monks having set apart five days to curse us solemnly, continued for the following weeks.... On March 24 General Macdonald left Chumbi, and arrived at Tuna on the 28th, with two 10-pounder guns, one 7-pounder, four companies 32nd Pioneers, three and a half companies 8th Gurkhas, field-hospital, and engineer park.... On March 31, after we had given fair warning to the Tibetans, the advance was made.... As we advanced across an almost level gravelly plain, we came in sight of the Tibetan position in a series of sangars on a ridge. At one thousand yards' distance we halted.... The Tibetans on their side showed great indecision. They also had apparently received orders not to fire first.... The Tibetans first ran into their sangars and then ran out again. Gradually our troops crept up and round the flanks. They arrived eventually face to face with the Tibetans.... At this point the two Lhasa Majors who had met me previously in the day rode out again, and told me that the Tibetans had been ordered not to fire, and begged me to stop the troops from advancing. I replied that we must continue the advance, and could not allow any troops to remain on the road.... General Macdonald and I had a consultation together, and agreed that in these circumstances the only thing to do was to disarm them and let them go. We rode together to the spot, and found the Tibetans huddled together like a flock of sheep behind the wall. Our infantry were in position on the hillside only twenty yards above them on the one side; on the other our Maxims and guns were trained upon them at not two hundred yards' distance. Our mounted infantry were in readiness in the plain only a quarter of a mile away. Our sepoy were actually standing up to the wall, with their rifles pointing over at the Tibetans within a few feet of them. And the Lhasa General himself with his staff was on *our* side of the wall, in among our sepoy. He had, of course, completely lost his head.... I sent Captain O'Connor to announce to him that General Macdonald and I had decided that his men must be disarmed, but he remained sullen and did nothing; and when, after a pause, the disarmament was actually commenced, he threw himself upon a sepoy, drew a revolver, and shot the sepoy in the jaw.... The signal had now been given. Other Tibetan shots immediately followed. Simultaneously volleys from our own troops rang out; the guns and Maxims commenced to fire. Tibetan swordsmen made a rush upon any within reach, and the plucky and enterprising Edmund Candler, the very able correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, received more than a dozen wounds, while Major Wallace Dunlop, one of the best officers in the force, was severely handled. For just one single instant the Tibetans, by a concerted and concentrated rush, might have broken our thin line,

and have carried the Mission and the military staff. But that instant passed in a flash. Before a few seconds were over, rifles and guns were dealing the deadliest destruction on them in their huddled masses. The Lhasa General himself was killed at the start, and in a few minutes the whole affair was over. The plain was strewn with dead Tibetans....

After routing the Tibetan army at Guru, Younghusband wrote to You Tai a letter on the nineteenth day of the third month (March 31, 1903), declaring that it was out of the question for the British troops to retreat to Yadong. In the letter he informed the amban "of the circumstances of the Guru fight," and told "him that I (Younghusband) was advancing on Gyantse, which I expected to reach in about a week, and I hoped that I should then have the pleasure of meeting him and a high Tibetan official with the power to make a settlement which would prevent any further useless bloodshed."

In a dispatch to Younghusband on the third day of the fourth month, the amban said:

It was the *dapon* who in disregard of discipline caused the hostilities at Guru. The defeat he and his men sustained was what they deserved, but it was also due to my failure to restrain them from challenging the might of a great power, and it was with sadness and the awareness of this failure of mine that I wrote in reply to you on the last three occasions. I appreciate your compassion in magnanimously releasing the foolish and ignorant prisoners, giving medical care to the wounded and showing to all the Tibetans both your sternness and mercy. All I can do to express my gratitude to you is to pray for you on behalf of all Tibetans. Major Ma Quanji, the commissioner for frontier affairs, told me that you had arrived in Gyantse and had set a time for me to meet you there, and that if I failed to do that, you would go straight to Ü (Lhasa). Immediately after I was informed of that, I told the Dalai Lama to select without delay a capable Tibetan official to go to Gyantse with me. I shall be in Gyantse before this month expires and shall not break my word as my predecessor did.

Meanwhile, the amban reported to the Foreign Affairs Board on the situation arising out of the British invasion. Said the report:

To the Grand Secretary. Your Excellency: I have received the telegram asking why I did not begin negotiation with the British as soon

* *India and Tibet.*

as I assumed office. Aware of the fact that for many years no progress had been made on this frontier issue, I discussed the matter with the Dalai Lama and tried the best I could to make him understand the importance of treating it properly. But he would not listen to me and refused to provide me with transport, being, as I gathered from what he said, deeply suspicious of the motives of Han officials. As pressing him would not yield any positive results, I could not but be patient with him, informing him of what the imperial edicts said in regard to this matter, and trying to make him understand where his true interests lay. In a recent reply to my communication, he informed me of the defeat of Tibetan troops by the British at Guru, which left them with four officers and several hundred men killed and wounded, but declared that the defence of Tibet was a matter that the Tibetans had to take into their own hands, adding that he had ordered the militia in Ü to move to the front and was asking for the aid of His Majesty in troop reinforcements and military supplies. Such a reply left me thoroughly disgusted. Now that war has broken out, the break is complete; if such is not entirely the case where the British are concerned, it is because they showed compassion after their victory and are still desirous of good relations with us as shown in their flawlessly worded communications. But the Tibetans are so obstinate and reckless that no persuasion, however eloquent, can bring them to reason; the only thing that can be done to convince them of their follies is to let them fight on and be defeated in the war. If their refusal to provide me with transport and to listen to my advice is not an outrage, their disrespect for the instructions of His Majesty certainly is. Expressions of such disrespect are carefully kept out of their official documents, but examples of it abound in their talk. The best thing to do now is to keep our composure and wait for the right occasion to arise. Fortunately, as the British fully understand what really caused the present situation, our relations with them will not be jeopardized except for the mere increase in difficulty in future bargaining with them. If the Tibetans suffer another defeat, the situation will improve, for defeat will make them reverse their stand and obey our orders. That is how the situation stands now and Your Excellency is requested to inform the Court of it.

In another cable to the Board dated the nineteenth day of the third month, the amban *said*: "As the communications from the British still show their strong desire to maintain good relations with us, their presence here will help us recover our authority, and the difficulty in future bargaining caused by this situation will, by

comparison, be negligible." As the defeat of the Tibetans in their struggle against the British was what You Tai wanted to see happen, he had no intention of going to Gyantse to halt the advance of the British army; he was merely stalling under the pretext of "inadequate transport."

The British army occupied Gyantse without meeting much opposition because the Tibetans, not yet recovered from their defeat at Guru, were too weak to hold up against the British there. Wrote Younghusband of the fall of Gyantse:

On the way to Gyantse, at the Tsamdang Gorge, the Tibetans again opposed our progress by building a wall across the narrow passage. But General Macdonald dislodged them and inflicted heavy loss, and on April 11 we arrived at Gyantse. We found the valley covered with well-built hamlets and numerous trees and plenty of cultivation. Most of the inhabitants had fled, but the *jong*, or fort, which stands on an eminence in the middle of the valley, was still partially occupied. The Commandant was informed that General Macdonald proposed to occupy the *jong* on the following morning, and would expect to find it vacated by 9 a.m. On the morning of the 12th we found that the troops had been withdrawn, and the *jong* was occupied without opposition.*a

But it was not long before the local militia forces were once again mobilized. They surrounded Gyantse and made a surprise attack on the British invaders there, inflicting heavy losses on them. Of the assault Younghusband wrote in *India and Tibet*:

Rumours soon began to reach me that Tibetan forces were collecting again. On the 24th came news that they were building walls across the road at the Karo-la (pass) on the way to Lhasa, that camps holding 700 or 800 Tibetans had been established there, that the Dalai Lama was endeavouring to gain time to enlist Tibetans from far and wide to resist a British advance on Lhasa.... On May 4 Captain Walton's patients warned him that some kind of attack on us at Gyantse was likely, and Major Murray, 8th Gurkhas, who was in command during Colonel Brander's absence, sent out a mounted patrol some miles down the Shigatse road; but they returned, reporting everything quiet. At dawn the next morning the storm burst. I was suddenly awaked by shots and loud booing close by my tent. I dashed out, and there were Tibetans firing through our own loopholes only a few yards off. From the

* *India and Tibet*.

Shigatse direction a force of 800 men had marched all night, and many, under cover of darkness, had crept up under the walls of our post. Then at dawn these suddenly jumped up, and, supported by the remainder, made an attempt to rush our post, a substantial house with a garden at one side, the wall of which we had loopholed. In the first critical moment they almost succeeded. They as nearly as possible forced an entrance, but were stoutly held at bay by two gallant little Gurkha sentries till our men turned out.... The attack began at about 4:30, and did not cease till nearly 6:30, but in that time they had left about 250 dead and wounded round our post.... Major Murray, as soon as he had repelled the attack, pursued the enemy for about two miles down the Shigatse road. But it now became evident that this attacking party was not the only force of Tibetans in the neighbourhood, and that another of similar strength had occupied the *jong*, for these latter began firing into our post, and we gradually came to realize that we were now besieged. It turned out from information received from prisoners that these troops had been collected by a General recently appointed by the Lhasa Government, and that it was accompanied by a representative of the Great Ganden monastery at Lhasa, by two clerks of the Dalai Lama, and by other Lhasa officials. It was, therefore, no mere local rising, but an attack deliberately planned by the Central Tibetan Government. For a few days, till Colonel Brander returned, we were in a critical position.... The worst that, in making our calculations at Darjiling in November, we had deemed likely to happen had happened, and we were now at the straining point.

The heavy losses inflicted on them by the Tibetan army left the British stunned. On June 5 Younghusband, breaking through the encirclement with an escort of forty mounted infantry, left for Chumbi to discuss new plans for the aggression with Macdonald. Younghusband wrote in *India and Tibet*:

I reached Chumbi on June 10, and spent the next few days in discussing details of the advance with General Macdonald. The change from the monotony of the investment at Gyantse ... was refreshing in the extreme.... Strong reinforcements had now come up from India; the remainder of the mountain battery, under Major Fuller, a wing of the Royal Fusiliers, the 40th Pathans, and the 29th Punjabis; and on June 13 I set out to return to Gyantse with General Macdonald to relieve the Mission escort at Gyantse and, if need be, to advance to Lhasa.... We reached Kangma without incident on June 22, and halted a day while Colonel Hogge was sent to disperse a body of 1,000 Tibetans who were

holding a sangared position on the road which runs down here from the Karo-la.... On June 26 we reached Gyantse, after encountering considerable opposition at the village and monastery of Niani, which was held by 800 Tibetans. The fight lasted from 10 a.m. till 2 p.m., Colonel Brander from Gyantse assisting by occupying the hills above the village. Major Lye, 23rd Pioneers, was here severely wounded in the hand and slightly in the head. On its arrival our force was ineffectually bombarded from the *jong*.

By now a *kagoon* lama, a *ta drungyig* and the representatives of the three great monasteries had arrived in Gyantse from Lhasa. Coming with them was the Tongsa Penlop who was acting as a mediator. You Tai did not come. A *Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* offered its explanation of the amban's absence:

After they occupied Gyantse the British continued to write to You Tai, giving him two weeks time to present himself in Gyantse for the negotiations. The *Shangshang*, now regretful of what Tibet had done, begged You Tai in a joint request to proceed to Gyantse to begin the talks. But You Tai would not go, believing that having advanced this far, the British army would certainly not stop until they reached Lhasa and negotiations would therefore be useless.

In *India and Tibet* Younghusband wrote of what happened during the negotiations:

At eleven (on July 1) I received the Ta Lama and the Tongsa Penlop in Durbar. There were also present the Tung-yig-Chembo (the Grand Secretary, who was one of the delegates at Khamba Jong last year), and six representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries.... All except the Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before.

The meeting began with Younghusband trying to justify the British invasion, claiming that it was Tibet's violation of the treaty and the Indian border that had compelled Britain to send its troops to Tibet. He blamed the Tibetans for the hostilities at Guru, alleging that the first shot was fired by the Tibetans. He then asked if Tibet would honour any treaty produced by the negotiations. Younghusband continued,

I then informed them, as I had been attacked at Gyantse without any warning, and after I had written repeatedly to the amban saying I was waiting there to negotiate, and as I had been fired on from the *jong* continually for two months since the attack, I must press for its

evacuation. General Macdonald was prepared to give them till noon of the 5th ... in which to effect the evacuation; but if after that time the *jong* was occupied, he would commence military operations against it.... The Grand Secretary then said that if the Tibetan troops withdrew from the *jong*, they would expect that we also would withdraw our troops; otherwise the Tibetans would be suspicious. I replied that the Tibetans did not at all seem to realize that they would have to pay a penalty for the attack they had made on the Mission, and that I could not discuss the matter further. They must either leave the *jong* peaceably before noon on the 5th, or expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving, the Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his regrets for having kept me waiting, and begged that I would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary went away without a word of apology. He was the evil genius of the Tibetans throughout this affair.

On July 5 the British began their attack on the fort when the Tibetans refused their demand that they leave the place. The inhabitants and soldiers of the *dzong* offered heroic and stubborn resistance, but as they were up against an enemy too strong for them, the *dzong* fell.

The battle of Gyantse was the biggest the Tibetan people had ever fought against the British aggressors. Although Tibetan records of this battle are yet to be found, the accounts given by the British alone are enough to testify to the heroism of the defenders. They were vanquished, but they remained heroes.

Soon after it occupied Gyantse, the British army began to prepare for the advance to Lhasa. Just before he set out for the city Younghusband wrote to Amban You Tai saying that since the Resident had repeatedly failed to come first to Khamba Dzong and then to Gyantse with empowered Tibetan officials, he was left with the only alternative of meeting him in Lhasa.

When the Qing government learned of the British army's advance, it telegraphed its instructions to You Tai. Said the telegram:

Reports from the General Tax Bureau say that the British general Younghusband has decided to lead his army to Lhasa. The reports state that peace may still be negotiated if the Dalai Lama and the Resident open such talks with the British soon after their arrival, but, the reports say, if they have already left Lhasa, leaving no one for the British to negotiate with, the British will have to stay there for some time until the Dalai Lama changes his mind and begs for peace; in that event,

according to the reports, a settlement may not be easy. In another telegram sent to you from Tachienlu, you are asked about the reaction of the Tibetans and whether the Dalai Lama is willing to reverse his stand. You are also urged to do your best to make the Dalai Lama understand that the important thing to do now is not to avoid the British and miss the opportunity but to open negotiations with them as soon as they reach Lhasa. In case that telegram does not reach you in time, we have asked Mr. Satow of Britain to send this telegram to you through His Excellency Francis Younghusband. You are expected to do as you have been instructed and cable your reply as soon as you can.

The fact that this telegram that contained government confidential instructions was forwarded and delivered to its recipient by the two most unlikely persons showed that the Qing government did not even bother to draw a line between friend and foe.

On the British advance to Lhasa *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recorded this development:

According to an English source, after the British army reached Gyantse, Younghusband asked the British government to sanction his advance to Lhasa. The British government then in a telegram instructed its ambassador in Beijing to contact the Board of Foreign Affairs on this matter. In his reply, the ambassador reported that he had met with the Grand Secretary, and that when he informed the Secretary of the presence of the British army in Gyantse and warned that if China did not mediate, the British army would go to Lhasa, the latter, to the ambassador's surprise, remained undisturbed and said nothing to warn the British army against its advance. Then the British government gave Curzon and Younghusband the go-ahead signal.

On July 17 the British army, enroute from Gyantse to Lhasa, was held up on the Karo-la by more than one thousand Tibetan troops, but the battle ended in the defeat of the defenders by the 8th Gurkhas of the invading army. On the 19th when the resistance offered by a small number of Tibetan troops manning the block-houses at Nankartse Dzong was broken down, the *dzong* fell to the British.

After the British army reached Nankartse, another delegation sent by the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in a renewed effort to halt the British arrived there. Younghusband gave the following account of his meeting with the delegates:

The deputation ... consisted of the Yutok Sha-pé (*kaloön*), the Ta Lama, the Chief Secretary, and some monks.... The Yutok Sha-pé took the chief place.... This latter official (Chief Secretary), acting as spokesman, said they had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that we wished to negotiate at Gyantse, and they had set out to meet us when they heard that we were advancing. They were quite willing to negotiate if we returned to Gyantse, and in that case they would accompany us and make a proper settlement with us there.... After listening for an hour to their protests, I asked them if they would now care to hear the terms we intended to ask of them. They replied that they could not discuss any terms till we returned to Gyantse. I said I had no wish now to discuss the terms, but merely desired to know if they wanted to be acquainted with them. They continued to protest that they would discuss nothing here.... I then said that ... we had no intention of remaining in Lhasa any longer than was required to make a settlement, and as soon as a settlement was made we would leave. But I had the Viceroy's orders to go to Lhasa, and go there I must.... The delegates listened attentively while I made this exhortation to them, but, after consulting together, replied that even if we did make a settlement at Lhasa, it would be of no use, for in Tibet everything depended on religion, and by the mere fact of our going to Lhasa we should spoil their religion, as no men of other religions were allowed in Lhasa.... The Yutok Sha-pé throughout was calm and polite, and at his departure was cordial in his manner. The Ta Lama, though more excited, was not ill-mannered. The Chief Secretary was very much excited throughout, and argumentative and querulous.... The following day the Tibetan delegates held another prolonged interview with me, lasting three and a half hours.... [The Tibetans] were very insistent that we should not advance to Lhasa.... They said that in Lhasa there were a great number of monks and many unruly characters, and disturbances might easily arise; to which I replied that I should much regret any such disturbances, ... for the result (of such disturbances) could only be the same as the result of the disturbances at Gyantse.... Another argument the delegates used was that, if we went to Lhasa, we should probably find no one there. To this I replied that this would necessitate our waiting until people returned.... They then remarked that if we now went to Lhasa all the other nations would want to go there, and see the sights, and establish agents there. I told them ... that, though we had no intention of establishing a political agent at Lhasa, we desired to open a trade-mart at Gyantse on the same conditions as the trade-mart at Yatung had been opened—that is, with the right to send a British

officer there to superintend the trade. The delegates would not, however, be led into a discussion of the terms. They said they could only discuss the terms at Gyantse.

On the night of the 21st the delegates left for home without taking leave of the British. As soon as the negotiations broke down, the British army began its march on Lhasa. It invaded Pete Dzong on July 22, and on the 25th it reached the Chaksam Ferry on the Yarlung Zampo River and seized two ferry-boats there.

After crossing the Zampo, the British army reached Chisul Dzong, only 120 *li* (60 km) from Lhasa. Said *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*: "Alarmed by the presence of the British army in Chisul, the Dalai Lama personally asked You Tai to go there to negotiate a halt. You Tai turned him down." Instead, the amban sent men to Chisul to welcome the British and deliver a letter from him to Younghusband. In the letter the amban said:

Please accept my sympathy for all the hardships Your Excellency suffered during the long journey. I am ashamed that the Tibetans acted so foolishly and were so obstinately adverse to receiving advice. As your army has now reached Chisul and Your Excellency will soon discuss matters with me in Lhasa, I am sending to you my envoys, Major Liu Wentong, Chief of the Military Secretariate, and Assistant Secretary Wu Zu'nai, a magistrate in candidacy. They will deliver this letter to you, honour your arrival and acquaint you with the latest developments in the situation. I have communicated with the Dalai Lama, warning him that the Tibetans must on no account treat you uncereemoniously again. But as the Tibetans are cunning and insincere, it is necessary to obtain guarantees from them before a settlement of anything can be made. I am looking forward to the day when I shall have the pleasure of meeting you.

At the same time the Dalai Lama, in still another effort to stop the advancing British army, sent to Chisul a new deputation consisting of the Gyigyab Khenpo, the Ta Lama and the Drungyi of the Kashag. They brought with them a letter to Younghusband from the Dalai Lama. Said the letter:

I have sent two representatives on ahead to negotiate regarding friendship, and also the Chikyab Kenpo (Gyigyab Khenpo), who lives always near me. It will be well if matters are discussed with my delegates there for the sake of peace. But it is not well for the

establishment of an agreement between the two countries if you come to Lhasa contrary to my wishes. Please consider this well.*

Of the talks between the Dalai's delegates and the British Younghusband wrote:

They brought with them a letter from the Dalai Lama, and repeated the old request that we should not go to Lhasa. The only new argument they used was that our going to Lhasa would so spoil their religion that the Dalai Lama might die.... In reply I expressed my inability to accede to the Dalai Lama's wishes, but trusted they would ask His Holiness (the Dalai Lama) to excuse my insistence.... After the interview had lasted three and a half hours, I asked them to report my words to the Dalai Lama.... The Dalai Lama's Chamberlain returned to Lhasa immediately, but on the 29th the Ta Lama, accompanied by the same Secretary of Council who was present at the interview of July 27, again came to visit me. He explained that the Chamberlain had returned to Lhasa to report personally to the Dalai Lama the result of his interview with me, and he hoped that I would wait here till the reply of the Dalai Lama should reach me. I informed him that I could not wait here longer than the 31st.... On the same day as I was having this interview I also received from the Chinese Resident a letter, in which he expressed sympathy with me in the trials of my long journey.... On July 31 all the troops, except a small garrison to guard the ferry, having crossed the river, set out again towards Lhasa. As I was passing Chisul the Ta Lama asked me to stay for a short time to talk to him. He said he was much surprised at our advancing.... The Ta Lama then tried to persuade me to advance with only a small following; he said that my entering Lhasa with a large army would alarm the Tibetans, and make the Dalai Lama think that our intentions were not really friendly.... The Ta Lama, as a final effort, begged me to stay here for a day; and, last of all, as he was shaking hands with me ... entreated me not to enter Lhasa.

But Younghusband turned a deaf ear to their entreaties, and continued with his push to Lhasa.

For the next two days we marched steadily on towards Lhasa.... On August 2, at our last camp, only a dozen miles from Lhasa, which now really could be seen in the distance, I received the final deputation, which had come to make the last great effort to induce us to stop. It consisted of the old Ta Lama, the General who had met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong (the Tsarong Kaloon), and had since been pro-

* *India and Tibet.*

moted to the post of Councillor, ... the Chinese official deputed by the Resident, the Abbot in private attendance on the Dalai Lama, a Secretary of Council, and the Abbots of the three great Lhasa monasteries. They repeated the usual requests that we should not go to Lhasa. I reiterated my usual statements that we must go there.... The final effort to stop us had failed, and on August 3 we set out on our last march.... We passed numbers of little hamlets and groves of poplars and willows. And then we saw, rising steeply on a rocky prominence in the midst of the valley, a fort-like dominating structure, with gilded roofs, which we knew could be none other than the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lama of Lhasa.

In a report he sent to the Board of Foreign Affairs after the British occupied Lhasa, Amban You Tai said: "Younghusband arrived in Lhasa with his army on the twenty-second day (lunar calendar). The Dalai Lama has not received him yet.... There is not much public disturbance here." The amban did not know that the Dalai Lama was by then four days gone on his flight to Outer Mongolia via Qinghai.

Peace Terms Dictated by the Aggressors

The day the British invaders reached Lhasa, Amban You Tai "called on" Younghusband. Said the amban in his memorial to the Qing emperor: "As soon as Younghusband arrived in Lhasa, I called on him. I brought cattle, sheep, rice and flour to his troops and gifts to his staff. The Englishman understands the importance of maintaining good relations with us. We met in a most pleasant atmosphere."

Younghusband had wanted to turn Tibet into a British colony, but the British government thought otherwise. Said *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*: "Younghusband proposed turning Tibet into a British vassal state with a resident agent posted in Lhasa, as Britain had done with Drenjong, but the British government did not approve his proposal." Younghusband himself put it this way:

Military considerations were allowed to preponderate. I could only stay in Lhasa a month and a half or two months. We must be back

before the winter. And thus tied, I had to set to work with all speed ... to negotiate the treaty.... I was told by General Macdonald that September 15 was the latest date to which he could remain at Lhasa.... The medical authorities considered September 1 the latest safe date. The officers commanding units thought the 12th might be risked.... General Macdonald concluded that September 13 was the latest safe date for our stay in Lhasa.*

The British did not put Tibet under their military occupation not merely because they feared that heavy snow in the winter would cut off their supply lines; the stubborn resistance put up by the Tibetan people had compelled them to back down from their initial goals and be content with a treaty that would lead step by step to their final conquest of Tibet. So Younghusband lost no time in getting the negotiations for such a treaty started as soon as he arrived in Lhasa.

The terms of the treaty that Younghusband communicated to You Tai included:

The placing of a Resident at Lhasa, or, failing that, an agent at Gyantse, with the right to proceed to Lhasa; the formal recognition of exclusive political influence, the demand of an indemnity; the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security; the establishment of trade-marts at Gyantse, Yatung, shigatse, and Gartok; the settlement of the Sikkim and Garhwal boundaries, customs duties, and trade regulations.

These terms Tibet refused. Said Younghusband:

The Tibetans' so-called reply to our terms was the next day communicated by the Resident's secretary to Mr. Wilton. The Tibetans refused each single point, and said that an indemnity was due from us to them rather than from them to us. The only trade-mart they would concede was Rinchengong, which was scarcely two miles beyond Yatung. I had the document returned to the Resident with a message that I could not officially receive so preposterous a reply.**

With the Tibetans refusing to budge, the British thought of getting You Tai to coerce their adversaries into accepting their terms, and as a result of the coercion, the British believed, relations would become even more strained between the Qing government

* *India and Tibet.*

** *Ibid.*

and the local authorities of Tibet. Said Younghusband:

I called upon the Chinese Resident on the 10th and impressed upon him the responsibility which lay on the Chinese Government to induce the Tibetans to make a settlement. He said he was most anxious to work with me ... [and] I was fully prepared to act. At the same time, it would be much more satisfactory if the needful pressure could be put on by the resident, as I had no wish to take more action unless absolutely compelled to.

Immediately after his meeting with Younghusband, You Tai rapped the Kashag, calling its refusal to agree to the British demands inappropriate, and asked it to re-examine its stand on the issue. And believing that the time had come to recover the Qing's authority in Tibet by getting rid of the Dalai Lama and installing the Panchen Lama in his position, the amban said to the Board of Foreign Affairs in a telegram:

The Dalai Lama escaped on the night of the fifteenth day last month. No one in the *Shangshang* could provide me with any information about his destination when I inquired. The Dalai Lama is believed to be chiefly responsible for the war this year. He began by acting contrary to imperial instructions and giving no heed to advice, and when his army was defeated and a grave situation threatening, he did nothing to avert it but took flight to some remote region, deserting his homeland and giving the foreigners a handle against us.... Please inform the Court of my request that the Dalai Lama be removed of his titles temporarily as a warning for potential imitators in the border dependencies and as an apology to our neighbours. The Court is also requested to order the Panchen Erdeni to head the Yellow Sect in Ü for the time being, and to handle matters related to the negotiations.

On the twentieth day of the seventh month, You Tai denounced the Dalai Lama again in a memorial to the throne. Said he:

Since he assumed secular office, the Dalai Lama has shown no respect for His Majesty, and paid no heed to advice, but has acted like a disgustingly conceited despot. He provoked neighbouring countries as he pleased, and when the situation got out of hand, he took flight. The outrages he committed are the source of seething discontent among the populace. Indeed, Tibet has never seen a worse ruler in all its history.... The Dalai Lama is required to inform the Resident of his departure from the Potala Palace and his return from a journey so that

the Resident may report them to the Court. The current Dalai Lama took liberties with this regulation; he went on a long journey without informing the Resident. Nothing indicates that his departure is part of any conspiracy, but if he is not denounced for his insubordination, for the loss of the war and his outrageous acts, potential imitators may be encouraged and neighbouring states disappointed.

Previously, You Tai had discussed with Younghusband the matter of denouncing the Dalai Lama to the Qing emperor and had obtained his support. Said Younghusband:

He (You Tai) said he would denounce the Dalai Lama to the Emperor ... and would summon the Tashi Lama, with a view to making him the head of the whole Buddhist Church in Tibet.... He had now definitely decided to denounce him to the Emperor, and would today or tomorrow send me a telegram which he would ask me to have dispatched to Peking as quickly as possible. I said I would do this service for him, and I considered he was acting with great wisdom in denouncing the Dalai Lama, for it was he who had brought all this trouble upon his country, and he deserved to suffer for it.

On the twenty-fifth day of the seventh month, the Qing government telegraphed the following reply to You Tai: "This is an imperial edict: You Tai's telegram has been received. The Dalai Lama is to be removed of his titles temporarily, and the Panchen Erdeni is to act in his capacity for the time being. The other proposals shall be acted upon."

When this decision was announced to the public, the Tibetan people, both lay and clerical, raised their objections. In a joint petition to You Tai, the monks of the three great monasteries and the entire lay and clerical staff of the Kashag asked to have the decision revoked. Said the petition:

Several days ago Mr. Li, the interpreter sent by Your Excellency to the Ganden Trippa and the Acting Kaloon told them that as the foreigners insisted on discussing matters with no one but the Dalai Lama, saying repeatedly that they would wait for his return, it had become necessary to remove the Dalai of his official titles temporarily and announce the decision to the public so that the foreigners would have no excuse to delay the conclusion of a peace treaty, and that as soon as the foreigners left Tibet, the titles would be restored to the Dalai. Mr. Li then urged them to do their best to make the secular and

monastic population understand that there was no cause for them to become alarmed as the arrangement was aimed at facilitating the settlement of the issue. We do not question the truth of all that. But as things did not turn out the way Your Excellency, the Imperial Representative, said they would, misunderstanding arose between the government and the people; and as the discrepancies were the product of uncalled-for ingenuity, we deemed it necessary to present on the third day of the ninth month a petition in which we described the case in detail. Since His Holiness the Dalai Lama graciously condescended to take charge of the secular and ecclesiastical affairs at the request of the entire Tibetan population, he has been upholding justice and has been impartial in his treatment of the monasteries and the people regardless of their status or position, thus bringing peace and happiness to Tibet. For that he commands the respect and enjoys the trust of all Tibetans, lay and monastic alike.... It is important that the people be convinced of the necessity of removing his titles; until then it will be difficult for us not to feel dismayed at the decision.

The popular opposition to the decision prevented the Panchen from taking over the Dalai's office as ordered by the Qing Court. With an excuse he stayed where he was. In a letter to You Tai he explained:

I have received the orders from His Majesty, and it is out of the question for me to disobey them. But Tsang is a vitally important region, and the local public affairs need my attendance. Besides, with the British lurking in Gyantse, which is only a two-day journey away, Tsang must be closely guarded. If I were in Ü, I am afraid I would not be able to look after things in Tsang.

Having failed to lure the Panchen to Ü, You Tai, in order to get everything over with, tried to pressure Regent Lozang Gyaltsan and the other *kaloons* into accepting the British terms. But the regent and the Kashag balked. They declared that the terms were totally unacceptable, especially the one about indemnity, saying it would be beyond the ability of Tibet to pay it. Said *India and Tibet*:

They (representatives of the Kashag) ... announced that they were ready to agree to all our terms but one. The indemnity they could not pay. Tibet was a poor country, and the Tibetans had already suffered heavily during the war; many had been killed, their houses had been burnt, *jongs* and monasteries had been destroyed.... The little money they had was spent on religious services in support of the monasteries,

on buying vessels for the temples and butter to burn before the gods. The peasants had to supply transport for officials ... and there were no means whatever for paying the heavy indemnity we were demanding... The sentence regarding the opening of more trade-marts in future they very strongly objected to.

With the Tibetans refusing to yield to pressure and with the date approaching for troop withdrawal, Younghusband resorted to political hooliganism, trying to intimidate Tibet into submission. Said he:

I told the Chinese Resident that I would call on him on September 1 ... and that I would like the Tibetan Council and the members of the National Assembly to be present when I met him. In the presence of the Chinese representative, I meant to inform the whole of the leading men of Lhasa, monk, lay, and official, that they must sign the Treaty, or take the consequences of refusal.

He threatened that any delay in the conclusion of the treaty would mean increased indemnity and said, "as long as they did not mind paying Rs. 50,000 a day, they might consider it [allowing the Tibetan representatives to take away the final draft of the treaty and consider it]."

Left without alternative, the regent and the Kashag announced with much reluctance their acceptance of the peace terms. On September 4, when the regent, accompanied by *kaloons*, a secretary, the Tongsa Penlop and a Nepalese representative, met with Younghusband, he told the Englishman that "the Tibetan Government was prepared to conclude the Treaty ... if the term for the payment of the indemnity would be extended, and the payment made in seventy-five annual instalments of one *lakh* of rupees each." Then September 7, 1904 (the twenty-eighth day of the seventh month in the reign of Emperor Dezong) was fixed by Younghusband as the date for the signing of the treaty, and the Potala was chosen by him as the place for the signing ceremony.

The treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of Lhasa, consisted of ten articles. They were:

1. The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

2. The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade-marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.... The Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing new trade-marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

3. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

4. The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

5. The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade-marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or the Chinese authorities....

6. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs—to the British Government ... (to be paid) in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on January 1 each year....

7. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfillment of the provisions relative to trade-marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

8. The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

9. The Government of Tibet ensures that, without the previous consent of the British Government,

(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

(c) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

(d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.


10. ... Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood-Dragon year.

The representatives of the three great monasteries and the *kaloons* were the first to affix their seals to the treaty. Then the regent, as the Dalai's representative, put his seal on the document as requested by Younghusband. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* said:

When You Tai was asked to affix his seal to the ten-article treaty concluded in the Potala, he dared not raise any objections; but before he could sign it, He Guangxie, a secretary, stopped him, saying that he could not do it without the instructions of the Board of Foreign Affairs. To this the British replied that the Board could declare the treaty invalid if it did not like it. But He Guangxie warned the amban, who was still inclined to sign the treaty, that it was better to wait for instructions now than to have it annulled later, for in case the Board refused it and the British insisted on its validity, the treaty bearing his seal would cause him trouble. You Tai then telegraphed the text of the treaty to the Board.

On the fourth day of the eighth month the Qing government cabled to You Tai its reply. It pointed out that Tibet was Chinese territory, and said

As the two treaties of the sixteenth and nineteenth year of the reign of His Majesty were negotiated and concluded by Chinese and British officials deputed by their respective governments, it follows that the



The Potala Palace in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama's permanent residence.



The Jokhang Monastery built in 648. The trees were planted by King Songtsen Gambo who built the monastery, and his wife, Princess Wen Cheng.

The Samye Monastery built during the Pre-Propagation period of Tibetan Buddhism.





A fresco showing Phagspa received by Kublai Khan.

The northern section of the Sakya, known as the White Palace, whose construction began in 1073.





The edict from Emperor Taizu of the Ming conferring on Olis the title Commander of *Wan Hu*.

The edict from Ming emperor Shizong granting Chospa Choshe Gyaltzen the title Inherited Prince *Chan Hua*.



Gushi Khan, leader of the Oirat Mongols, whose endorsement of the Gelug-pa Sect helped it to establish a local regime in Tibet. (Fresco)



The Drepung Monastery, the official residence of the early Dalai Lamas.





A fresco showing the fifth Dalai Lama received by the Qing emperor Shizu.



Huang Si (The Yellow Palace) built for the fifth Dalai Lama by the Qing emperor Shizu.



The gold seal and its inscription issued to the Dalai Lama by the Qing emperor Shizu.



The gold seal and its inscription issued to the Panchen Erdeni by the Qing emperor Shengzu.



The stone slabs in these two buildings bear the accounts of military expeditions led by the Qing emperors Shengzu and Gaozong which quelled harassing Dzungars in Tibet and expelled invading Gurkhas from that region.



The gold-leaf album from Qing emperor Xuanzong conferring on its recipient the title Dalai Lama.



The system of confirming the incarnate Dalai Lama by drawing lots from a gold urn was established by the Qing Dynasty in 1792. Picture shows the gold urn from Emperor Gaozong of the Qing.



A fresco showing the Empress Dowager receiving the thirteenth Dalai Lama.



The fortress at Gyantse Dzong where the defending Tibetans fought British invaders in 1904.


A request for instructions submitted to the Nationalist Government by the Dalai's representatives in Nanjing in 1924.

中華民國十三年 十一月 二十七日謹呈

蒙藏院鑒

西藏特派駐京堪布等為呈請事竊 堪布等奉
達賴喇嘛之命來京當差凡民國與西藏之關係自應注意
近聞政府將大清皇帝之優待條件書已取銷查此條件
與蒙回藏待遇條件同時宣布今以何理由而取銷至其同
時宣布之條件是否一律取銷 堪布等連日探詢未得真
相為此呈請
鈞院轉請政府明示如約法所載之條件一律取銷 堪布等即
應回藏銷差如尚未取銷亦請明白批示以便報告
達賴喇嘛免致遠道傳聞失實轉生誤會為此呈請
蒙藏院俯予轉呈 堪布等敬候辦理謹呈

西藏堪布雅和宮住持札薩克額穆仲尼
西藏特派駐京教習堪布却旺旺結
西藏特派駐京卓尼爾丹巴旺
西藏特派駐京洛藏堪布格丹增
西藏堪布五臺山札薩克羅布桑
西藏堪布達賴喇嘛羅桑仁增



Leaves of a jade album from the Nationalist Government announcing the posthumous conferment of the title thirteenth Dalai Lama.

A special envoy of the Nationalist Government visits the boy thought to be the reincarnation of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. The boy was to become the fourteenth Dalai Lama.





Representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the region of Tibet signing the agreement on the ways for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

present one should be concluded in the same manner, with the Tibetans signing it only as a secondary party; Britain should not be allowed to conclude it with the Tibetans directly.

In another telegram to You Tai on the twenty-sixth day the Qing government said:

The ten articles need to be studied closely, especially Article 9, which is hardly acceptable because it infringes upon China's rights. The treaty should honour what has been guaranteed in the previous communications, that is, it must not violate China's sovereignty or permit the seizure of Tibetan territory.... We find those parts forbidding undertakings by foreign powers in Tibet especially unacceptable because all the trade treaties between China and other countries have been concluded on the principle of equal shares of interests for all, and Tibet, which is a part of China, can not be made an exception.

Defending himself against the criticism, You Tai said in his cabled reply:

The telegram has been received. The treaty was not signed by Britain and Tibet directly. As the Tibetans did not honour the treaties concluded in the sixteenth and the nineteenth year of His Majesty's reign, Mr. Younghusband feared that if the conclusion of this treaty was delayed, the deceitful Tibetans might change their minds to the detriment of a settlement. After thorough discussions with me, he decided that the treaty was to be signed on the twenty-eighth day of the seventh month in the Potala, and that if Tibet failed to sign it on that date, it would have to pay to the British army a reparation of Rs. 50,000 for each day lost. The Tibetans, with all their financial difficulties, also wanted an early settlement. Such being the case, I could not but tell the Tibetans to sign the treaty first while I myself, as I reported in my previous telegram, withheld my signature in the absence of instructions from the Court. When negotiating on the ten terms, I did my best to make sure that they contained nothing that violated China's sovereignty.... On the third day of the eighth month Mr. Younghusband told me in a communication that China was not referred to by the term "any foreign power" mentioned in Article 9 of the treaty.... I gave careful thought to the matter, and it does not seem to me that our sovereignty is violated.

On the nineteenth day of the twelfth month the Foreign Affairs Board informed You Tai in another telegram that "by an agreement with the British envoy, Tang Shaoyi will go to India to discuss matters relating to the treaty. Tang is waiting for authorization and

will leave by sea on the twenty-first day of the eleventh month."

It is true that the Tibetan government signed the Treaty of Lhasa, but they did it not out of their free will but under the pressure of both the British invaders and the amban. Their unwillingness is evidenced by the ban imposed by the Kashag on selling food to the British troops in order to starve them out, and by the assassination attempts on the lives of the British in Lhasa and cases of physical attacks on them. Said Macdonald in his book *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

An unfortunate incident, in which a lama was concerned, marred the tranquillity of our camp soon after our arrival in Lhasa, just when we thought that all trouble was past. A fanatical priest made a futile attempt to assassinate General Macdonald, in the course of which he badly wounded two I.M.S. officers with a sword. He was apprehended, and tried by court martial, being sentenced to be hanged.... The Sera Monastery was fined five thousand rupees over this matter.

This incident and others indicated that the anti-imperialist sentiment of the Tibetan people was running unabated.

Younghusband and his army pulled out of Lhasa on September 22, 1904, seven days behind the scheduled time. They took away large quantities of priceless cultural relics. An Englishman said that in one instance he transported from Lhasa a total of over four hundred loads of such relics by pack animal.

When he reached Gyantse, Younghusband left Capt. O'Connor there as trade agent with a party of armed guards, and after he arrived in Yadong, he sent troops to occupy the Chumbi Valley (called Dromo in Tibetan), for the British held that the Treaty of Lhasa gave them the right to occupy the valley for seventy-five years until Tibet paid all the indemnity. Charles Bell, writing of Chumbi under British rule in *Tibet: Past and Present*, said:

For the time being the valley (the Chumbi Valley), with an area of seven hundred square miles but a small population, was in British occupation. It was necessary to organize its administration.... A yearly sum ... was fixed as the taxation for each of the five divisions of the valley, and the headmen took the responsibility for realising this. They also received powers in petty matters of justice and police. The two officials of the Central Government of Tibet were necessarily barred from sharing in our administration, but were permitted to remain in

their official residences in the Phari Dzong.... The four companies of Indian infantry, left behind by the Expedition, were amply sufficient as a garrison. Only a dozen or so policemen were employed, the rest of the policing being done by the villagers themselves.... These arrangements were accepted by the Indian Government, and I think I may say that they worked well.

This means that Britain was running Tibet's Chumbi as its colony.

The Panchen in India: A British Conspiracy

After the British troops left Lhasa, a new plot against Tibet was hatched by the British imperialists. They were to get the ninth Panchen to India, bribe him into their service, and send him back to Tibet to run the region to the exclusion of the Dalai Lama. The conspiracy was detected by Zhang Yintang, the Qing's delegate to the treaty talks in India. In a telegram to the Foreign Affairs Board dated October 1, 1905, Zhang reported:

I have learned that the Indian government, taking advantage of the Dalai Lama's absence, has sent men to Tibet to induce the Panchen Lama to India. This is a conspiracy against the Dalai Lama and Tibet carried out under the pretext of inviting the Panchen to honour the arrival of the Prince of Wales in India. As it is a matter of grave consequence, the Board of Foreign Affairs is urgently requested to alert Resident You Tai to it and to instruct him to do all he can to frustrate this sinister attempt.

Meanwhile, in a communication to You Tai, the Panchen said:

Mr. O'Connor, the British agent in Gyantse, will soon return to Gyakar (India). By the instructions of the Indian Viceroy, he will come to Tsang on the twenty-fourth day of this month to pay me a farewell visit. He will be accompanied by an escort of over fifty soldiers. I can not possibly refuse to see him.

Then an official posted in Shigatse reported to the amban that the British were trying to force the Panchen to go to India. Said he in the report:

During an audience with O'Connor on the twenty-ninth day of the ninth month, the Panchen was told that the British Prince of Wales would come to India for an important gathering, and that the prince

would like to meet with him while he was there. O'Connor asked the Panchen to start in the tenth month. The Panchen replied that personally he did not object to going to India, but he said he could not do so without the signed approval of His Majesty given through Your Excellency. But the Englishman insisted on his going, saying that Britain was doing that in good faith and asking him to give serious thought to the invitation. Under these circumstances, the Panchen humbly asks Your Excellency to decide for him.

On the sixth day of the ninth (leap) month, the Panchen told You Tai in another communication that under the pressure of the British he could not but agree to go to India. The letter said:

But the British threatened with their military might. If I decided contrary to their wishes, I would cause His Majesty anxiety and do a disservice to the religion of Tibet. Still, I can not help being deeply concerned about the safety of the Tashilhunpo, its monks, the sacred scriptures kept there, and the entire Tibetan populace.... I can not but risk my life and meet with the Prince of Wales in Calcutta as they insist. Your Excellency is requested to explain to His Majesty as soon as possible that as my decision to go was made under great pressure, it should not be taken as an intended offence.

All through the crisis You Tai never knew what to do except to tell the Panchen to persist in his refusal.

The Panchen left Shigatse on October 12, 1905; on October 27 he reached India. All through the journey an escort of British soldiers kept him in isolation.

Britain was expecting a great deal from this scheme of theirs. Reported Zhang Yintang in a memorial to the throne dated October 26:

The Panchen is now on his way to India. The Indian government will receive him with the highest honour. A magnificent guest house opposite where I am staying is ready for him, and the Prince of Wales will return his courtesy call. Indian press reports say that his visit to India is intended for something more important than meeting with the prince.

When it learned that the Panchen had gone to India, the Qing government telegraphed its instructions to Zhang Yintang on the sixteenth day of the eleventh month. Said the telegram:

The Panchen, with religious titles granted him by the Court, should

concern himself solely with religion, not the political affairs of Tibet. He is now in India to honour the arrival of the British Prince of Wales there. The Chinese government will not recognize any unauthorized agreement he may reach with anyone. The Resident was told in a telegram yesterday to notify the Indian government of this.

In a letter to You Tai, the Panchen reported on his activities:

Because of the intense heat, the journey was quite exhausting. The day I reached Darjeeling with a small party including the Dzasa Lama and others, I was told by an official there that he had received a telegram from the British informing him that the Prince of Rawal Pindi was coming to pay homage to an ancient Buddhist temple at Dacashiya. He asked me to meet the prince in that temple. He was so insistent that I could not possibly refuse.... So I paid a courtesy call on the prince, and after that I was invited by him to see the British soldiers stationed there. We did not talk about anything important. Since my arrival in Calcutta I have met with the Viceroy of India and the Prince of Wales once so far.... After my second visit to them, I shall send the Dzasa Lama with a report on my journey to His Excellency Zhang. The others I saw on various occasions included a number of British officials, those from Dredrug Gyakar and four local officials and monks. My conversations with them were limited to polite inquiries into each other's health, and never touched upon official business or other matters of consequence.

But, of course, the British did not get the Panchen to India just for that. Said Zhang Yintang in a memorial to the throne dated the fifth day of the twelfth month:

Since his arrival in India the Panchen has been given the treatment reserved for a sovereign. According to intelligence reports, the government of India is planning to manoeuvre the Panchen into asking Britain to help Tibet become independent and putting Tibet under British protection, and, when he returns, declaring such independence to all Tibetans on the ground of China's inability to administer Tibet. The British predict that the Panchen will sooner or later expel Han officials from Tibet, or even kill them; they believe that being an ambitious type of man, he will turn to Britain for help. If that happens, it would be much worse than any secret treaties he may sign.

In another memorial dated the twenty-second day of the same month, Zhang reported: "Indian press reports say that the government of India is sending the Panchen first back to Tsang and then to Lhasa, and that he will force the Tibetans to install him on the

throne of the Dalai Lama so when the latter returns to Tibet, he will find himself a nobody."

The Panchen left Calcutta for home on the seventeenth day of the twelfth month in the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezhong's reign, and returned to the Tashilhunpo on the sixteenth day of the first month of the next year. In September 1906, Charles Bell, sent by the British imperialists, visited the Panchen in the Tashilhunpo. Bell wrote of the visit in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

In September 1906 ... the Tashi Lama sent me a warm invitation to visit him at his seat at Tashilhunpo, and the Indian Government permitted me to accept this.... My welcome at Shigatse was hearty in the extreme.... My visit lasted for a week.... On the day following our arrival I called on His Holiness.... My two private calls showed this [friendliness] still more clearly. These took place in a beautiful, secluded pavilion, surrounded with water, and standing in the part of the Lama's country seat on the outskirts of town. Here no curious ear could listen to what passed between us, and the conversation ranged over many subjects.... His [the Panchen's] interest centred chiefly on the political situation. He had accepted the Indian Government's invitation to visit India, depending on their support if his acceptance should subsequently lead him into trouble. The Chinese were regaining power in Tibet, and he feared their reprisals. Would our Government come to his aid if necessary? I gave him such comfort as my instructions allowed, and it is probable that my visit to Shigatse helped in some degree to preserve him from untoward consequences. He feared also the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. Our Government had fought with Lhasa, but showed friendliness to Tashilhunpo, and the enmity of his own Central [Tibetan] Government was, therefore, inevitable. The latter suspected that Tashilhunpo aimed at soliciting the help of Britain to obtain independence from their rule, and thus to divide and weaken Tibet as a whole.... On the 6th November 1906 I paid my farewell call on the Tashi Lama, and at his request went round to see him privately afterwards. He gave me a photograph of himself, coloured by Tibetan artist.

The Second Sino-British Treaty on Tibet

Having instructed You Tai not to sign the Treaty of Lhasa, a treaty that the British forced upon the Kashag but which the Qing government considered impairing China's sovereignty, the Qing

government proposed to Britain negotiations in Calcutta between India and a Chinese plenipotentiary, Tang Shaoyi, to revise the treaty. Britain accepted the proposal, and in the first month of the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1905) Tang arrived in Calcutta. The talks dragged on for more than a year without producing any results, due to the intransigency of the British and their refusal to make any changes in the treaty. In August 1905 Tang returned to Beijing because of ill-health; he was replaced by Zhang Yintang, and again, the talks got nowhere. Early the next year, the site of the negotiations was moved to Beijing; Tang continued to represent China as its plenipotentiary, but his British counterpart was now Ernest Satow, British ambassador in Beijing.

The negotiators bargained the hardest on the question of the indemnity. By the Treaty of Lhasa Tibet was to pay Britain a reparation of Rs. 7,500,000 in seventy-five annual instalments. In a bid to win the favour of the Tibetans, Britain offered to reduce the sum by Rs. 5,000,000 to Rs. 2,500,000. The Tibetans, incapable of paying even the reduced amount, asked the Qing government to pay it for them. Said the Kashag in a report to You Tai dated the thirteenth day of the twelfth month in the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign: "As we reported earlier that Tibet is unable to pay the indemnity, we are appealing, through Your Excellency, to our Sovereign Ruler, the Great Qing Emperor, to provide the money and pay it to Britain." The Qing government granted the request immediately. The next day the Foreign Affairs Board said in a communication to You Tai, "The Court, aware of the financial difficulties of the Tibetans, has decided that the Government will pay for them the total sum of the indemnity of over 1,200,000 *liang* of silver. You Tai is to announce this decision to Tibet." But the British negotiators did not like the idea. Said *India and Tibet*:

Sir Ernest Satow suggested that we should inform the Chinese Government that we could not receive payment from them.... It seemed to him reasonable to conclude that this declaration of their intention to pay the indemnity was intended to force the hand of the Indian Government and induce them to accept an arrangement that the Chinese Government could afterwards quote as a precedent in other matters.... Lord Lansdowne ... felt difficulty in advising the India Office

as to how to deal with the matter.... Lord Lansdowne felt no doubt that the proposal had been made by the Chinese Government with the object of re-establishing their theoretical rights to supremacy over the Tibetan Government, and probably also with the object of insuring ... the retirement of the British forces.

But eventually several factors including international pressure compelled Britain to agree to the payment by the Chinese government.

The other question the negotiators argued over was the length of the indemnity payment period. Said Younghusband in *India and Tibet*:

The principle that the Chinese should pay instead of the Tibetans was ... practically conceded. But another point arose. The Chinese had said they wished to pay the amount of 25 lakhs of rupees (Rs. 2,500,000) in three annual instalments, but by the Treaty the payment was to be paid in annual instalments of 1 lakh each. The suggestion that the whole indemnity should be paid in three instalments the Government of India thought a Chinese device, having for its object the weakening of our position in Tibet. The Treaty obligation was clear. And the Indian Government preferred, as requested by the Tibetans themselves at the time of signing the Treaty, to receive annual payments of 1 lakh each at Gyantse, both for political effect and because money was required for recurring rent expenditure there. Mr. Morley felt much hesitation in accepting the views of the Government of India on this point. While recognizing that certain advantages had been supposed by some to arise from the political point of view in maintaining our hold over the Tibetans for the full period of twenty-five years, he was of the opinion that such advantages would be altogether outweighed by our relief from the necessity of enforcing a direct annual tribute for so long a period.

The true reason the British insisted on the original arrangement of payment was this: "Connected with this question of the payment of the indemnity was the question of the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley, to effect which was the most important object of Chinese policy. By the original Treaty we had the right to occupy it till seventy-five annual instalments of the indemnity had been paid...." That is, if the Qing government paid everything in three years, the

* *India and Tibet.*

British troops would have to leave the Chumbi Valley; as they did not have the intention to do so, they balked when the Qing government offered to pay for Tibet, and then insisted on the annual payment of Rs. 100,000. Finally the British made concessions on this issue in exchange for China's recognition of the Treaty of Lhasa; thus a second treaty relating to Tibet was concluded between China and Britain and was signed on April 27, 1906 with the Treaty of Lhasa attached to it as an annex.

The treaty, called the Convention between Great Britain and China, consisted of six articles, the gist of which is as follows:

Article I: The Convention concluded on 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed ... and both of the high contracting parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfillment of the terms specified therein.

Article II: The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

Article III: The concessions mentioned in Article 9 (d) of the Convention concluded on September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade-marts specified in Article 2 of the aforementioned Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

Article IV: The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annex thereto, remain in full force.

Article V: The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared ... but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article VI: This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

By January 27, 1908, three years after the signing of the convention, the Qing government had paid the total sum of the indemnity

of Rs. 2,500,000 (or 1,200,000 *liang* of silver), and the British troops had to evacuate the Chumbi Valley twenty-two years earlier than originally planned.

The Qing's New Tibet Policy

The idea of a new policy for Tibet was offered by Zhang Yintang, the Qing's treaty negotiator with Britain, in a telegram he sent to the Foreign Affairs Board on January 23, 1906 (the thirty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign). Said the telegram:

For many years, Britain spent huge sums of money and resorted to all kinds of intrigue, including the wildest ever thought up by men, to achieve its goals in Tibet. Two years ago, knowing that Russia was too busy fighting the Japanese in the east to look after things in the west, and taking advantage of China's preoccupation with its many problems, it sent its armed forces to invade Tibet. Last year, it induced the Panchen to India and received him as a sovereign. Indian press reports said that the British, exploiting the friction between the Panchen and the Dalai, offered their protection if the Panchen would agree to depose the Dalai and declare independence. The Panchen is not a man of intrigue, but, being inexperienced and naive, he may have found the British offer attractive; and as the Panchen can hardly stand on his own, the British offer reminds one of the trick that Japan played on Korea in the name of protection.... Tibet, with its territory of over 7,000 *li* across and more than 5,000 *li* from north to south, is a natural barrier protecting the four provinces of Sichuan, Yun'nan, Sha'anxi and Gansu. Should anything go wrong in Tibet, not only would the defence of these provinces become a problem, but the effect on the nation as a whole would be disastrous. In the management of their frontier affairs, the provinces all have the military support they need. Tibet is very close to India; special care is needed to handle border incidents there, and the risk involved is greater today after what happened last year. Such a situation compels, as pointed out by leaders of the country, immediate action to put things in order in Tibet. This means the recovery of our political power in Tibet, and to achieve that goal military support is essential.... It is proposed to the throne that aristocrats be selected by His Majesty to fill the official positions in Tibet in order to achieve the complete control of the entire region, and that, to relieve the present tension there, an army of twenty thousand well-trained soldiers under

competent commanders be immediately dispatched to Tibet via Sichuan to be posted at strategically important places there. When stability is restored and enough local soldiers are trained, the number of Han troops in Tibet will be reduced progressively each year until it drops to about five thousand, a force that will be strong enough to keep peace and order in Tibet by that time. As for the Dalai and the Panchen, it is suggested that they be granted titles generously as religious leaders of Tibet while the management of all its internal and external affairs and all the work to implement the new measures be placed in the hands of officials appointed by the Chinese government. This policy of favour plus strength will work to convince the Tibetans that the Chinese government is strong enough to protect them; once convinced of that, how can they possibly think of separating themselves from the rest of the country? And when the British, who take changes in our military strength in Tibet as an indication of our ability to run Tibet, find that we are capable of effective administration of Tibet and there is nothing they can use against us, they will automatically give up their designs on Tibet.

The new policy was endorsed by the Qing government. On the sixth day of the fourth month that year (1906) it authorized Zhang Yintang to "investigate conditions and put things in order in Tibet." On the fourteenth day he was made a major general by imperial edict.

Zhang reached Tibet via Darjeeling on the twenty-second day of the seventh month. On the twelfth day of the tenth month, when he arrived in Lhasa, "he was greeted in the outskirts of Lhasa by the regent and the four *kaloons*. Gurkha chieftains provided a guard of honour, and huge crowds of Tibetans thronged joss-stick-smoke-filled streets to give him a rousing welcome."

The first thing Zhang did, hailed by the people, was exposing the misconduct of You Tai and other Han officials in Tibet and denouncing them to the Qing government. His charges against them were contained in a memorial to the throne dated the eighth day of the eleventh month. Entitled "Suggestions to the Throne to End Malpractices by Government Officials by Meting Out Punishments to Them and Win the Support of the People on the Frontier," the memorial said:

The retinue of a Resident Official is always full of persons dishonourably discharged from former services. They obtain their positions in

his retinue by dishonest means. They are an unscrupulous lot who rob the Tibetan people and steal public funds with impunity. The Residents, who take bribes from them in the form of presents, provide them with protection; they borrow money from the *Shangshang* to make up the differences incurred by embezzlement and then, to pay the money back, tacitly permit them to invent public expenditures. Thus, getting reimbursed for invented defence expenditures has become the only thing that all the officials and army officers posted in Tibet are interested in. Such is the malpractice of government personnel in Tibet.

When a new *kaloon* is to be installed, he is nominated jointly by the Resident and the Dalai Lama for the approval of the Court. But to become such a nominee, the aspirant has to pay the Resident twelve thousand *liang* of silver in bribe money, and this sum does not include other illegal pay-offs. The price for the nomination of a *dapon* or *gyapon* ranges from several hundred to two or three thousand *liang* (of silver). This money the Tibetan officials recover from ordinary Tibetans, shifting the burden to innocent people. The confirmation of a Dalai Lama by drawing lots has become an especially rich source of dishonest money for the Residents. That is why the Dalai Lama disparagingly calls them "butter-tea-making officials." They gave up their rights as Residents when their palms are greased. Even today the Tibetans refuse to accept as justified the confiscation of the former regent Demo's property in the fifteenth year of His Majesty's reign. Also, each year the Treasurer at Jingxi and Ü needs three thousand *liang* of silver to pay for the presents to the Resident. Such is the malpractice of the Resident Officials.

When You Tai took office in the eleventh month of the twenty-ninth year of His Majesty's reign, the British army had advanced only as far as Todpang. The British proposed peace talks to be held at Phari, saying that if the terms of the treaty concluded in the sixteenth year were honoured, they would call off the expedition; at that time they had no intention of attacking Lhasa. But Yu Gang did not go, nor did his successor, You Tai. On the pretext of the Tibetan government refusing to provide him with transport, he sent Li Fulin to the British. Li's journey took a long time due to delays on the way. Later, when the British reached Gyantse and urged him to go there to discuss the matter with them, You Tai, being too scared to go himself, sent Ma Chuanji and Liu Wentong along. The two men returned without accomplishing anything. All this led to the tragedy of the sixth month. When he did go to meet Younghusband, You Tai apologized to the Englishman in a most servile manner, saying that he had no authority over the Tibetan

government and had not been able to obtain transport facilities from them. Younghusband listened to his explanation with a smile, and recorded it in the blue-book as clear proof that China had no sovereign rights in Tibet. Such stupidity did great damage to the country.... For six months after he took office, he had nothing to show for his work and did nothing to settle the dispute even when such opportunities arose. Instead, he hoped that the British military presence in Lhasa would help China force the Tibetans into obedience. Such perversity was shown in a telegram he sent to the Foreign Affairs Board on the seventeenth day of the third month, in which he said that if the Tibetans suffered another military defeat, the situation would improve because he believed that the defeat would make the Tibetans reverse their stand.

You Tai did nothing to prevent the Tibetan monks from concluding the ten-article treaty in the Potala, and when he was told unceremoniously to sign the treaty, he did not know what to do. Later when the Foreign Affairs Board told him not to sign and demanded an explanation, he said untruthfully that the treaty was not signed by Britain and Tibet directly, and that he told the Tibetans to sign it only after repeated discussions with Younghusband during which the British commander threatened that if the treaty was not signed, Tibet would have to pay a daily reparation of Rs. 50,000. Also, he gave the British at Gyantse unrestricted freedom to travel to Lhasa on trade business. All this his telegram to the Foreign Affairs Board dated the tenth day of the eighth month testifies to. Such foolish acts that You Tai committed at the expense of national interests I can not but expose.

When the British troops came to Lhasa, they brought with them a two-day supply of food. The yaks, sheep and fuel that were sent to the British as presents cost about 1,500 to 1,600 *liang* of silver, but in the expense account the figure went up to as much as 40,000 *liang*. In the eighth month before the remittance arrived from the Foreign Affairs Board, You Tai sent a telegram to say that he was running short of funds. Usually, the payment of excessive expenses is made by the Treasurer; but when Li Mengbi honoured the payment of three thousand *liang* (of silver), it was rejected by You Tai, and the sum was paid instead by Yu Zhao of the Foreign Affairs Bureau. It has been learned that the expense incurred by the suppression of the mutiny at Draya and by the *kaloons'* trip to the capital of India for the indemnity negotiations amounted to only six hundred to seven hundred *liang* of silver, but in the expense account it was as much as twenty-thousand *liang*. The Foreign Affairs Bureau is staffed entirely by those who are also secretaries of the Resident Official. The fund of ten thousand *liang*

the Bureau receives annually from the frontier security appropriations has become spoil money for this gang. Such embezzlement of public funds that You Tai is guilty of I can not but expose.

Liu Wentong, a former guard, is a favourite of You Tai's. Claiming to be an extra-commissioned officer awarded for meritorious military services, he has been made commander of the guards for the Resident Officials in Ü with the rank of lieutenant colonel and is at the same time in charge of the Office of Army Affairs in Tibet. This man abuses his power, takes bribes and sells government posts as if they were commodities. Many functionaries of the quartermaster depots have been promoted for no reason at all but for a price of four hundred to five hundred *liang* of Tibetan silver; this is also the amount of money that one seeking to fill the vacancy of a private or a minor secretary has to pay. Lt. Col. Zhou Zhanbiao says that he himself had to pay 1,160 *liang* in gifts before he could take office. Major Li Fulin, after being dismissed from office for misconduct, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel by giving Liu Wentong five thousand *liang* of silver in bribes. Li denies that, but as there is so much talk about this dirty deal, it can not be wholly dismissed as groundless.

When the fighting was tense during the war, You Tai remained inactive, responding neither to the many reports of emergencies from the front nor to the repeated invitations to go to the front to open talks. These reports often found him picnicking with his entourage in the company of prostitutes. Liu Wentong, to ingratiate himself further with You Tai, made him a present of about half a dozen Tibetan girls. Indeed, debauchery has made You Tai insensible to the deceit of Liu, which also explains why the first lieutenant involved in the Bathang case was released on bail. When Assistant Resident Official Lian Yu took office, he angrily refused to receive Liu because of his mean family background and his notoriety. Because of the ill feeling caused by this, the two men refused to sit in the joint administrative meetings for two days until local officials made a special effort to bring about a reconciliation between them. You Tai's connivance with corruption committed by a former guard I can not but expose.... Fan Qirong, who had been dismissed as assistant county magistrate for misconduct, was first made a member of the Secretariate and is now the quartermaster in Tsang and is concurrently an army commanding officer with the rank of major. As this man is a swindler, his appointment incurred strong public criticism. Song Tao, co-magistrate of Jingxi, pocketed six-months of army pay, causing a deficit of over eight thousand *liang* of silver in public funds. Unable to account for the deficit, he fled back to Lhasa

under the protection he had obtained from an English army officer by toadying. This English officer soon became his son's tutor at his request. The way he sought foreign protection for illegitimate ends and foreign help in obtaining government posts shows that Song Tao is the most despicable of men.

These officials, being so notorious for their outrages, do not deserve leniency. It is suggested that as a warning against greed and negligence of duty an imperial edict be issued removing from office these seven officials now in Tibet, namely, Liu Wentong, Song Tao, Li Mengbi, En Xi, Jiang Chao, Yu Zhao and Fan Qirong, and authorizing their detention pending investigation into each of the cases in which they are involved. As You Tai is an official with the second highest rank, what punishment he deserves is a matter to be decided by His Majesty; it would be most inappropriate for me to offer any ideas in that regard. It is also suggested that Kaloon Phuntsok Wangdan be dismissed from office and put under investigation. This man is intensely hated by the people for his greed, stupidity and cruelty, for extorting money from them by imposing excessive levies on them, and for encouraging his subordinates in their malpractice."

On the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month, the Qing government announced the dismissals of You Tai and the other officials in a decree that said:

This is an imperial edict. Zhang Yintang's telegraphic memorial to the Throne has been received. The malpractices of the government officials in Tibet exposed by Zhang, such as corruption, exploitation of the Tibetan people and embezzlement have reached shocking proportions. Liu Wentong, Song Tao, Li Mengbi, En Xi, Jiang Chao, Yu Zhao and Fan Qirong are removed from office and are to be detained pending investigation into each of the cases in which they are involved. Shan You is dismissed from office never to be employed in government service again but to be put under strict government surveillance in his ancestral home to which he shall be banished. Zhou Zhanbiao and Ma Chuanji are to resign for incompetence. Li Fulin is removed from office but is to be kept on so that he may have a chance to redeem himself; if he is found persisting in his old ways, he shall be severely punished. You Tai is dismissed from office for incompetence, inaction and corruption. He is not allowed to return to Beijing but must stay where he is for investigation. Zhang Yintang shall continue to investigate You Tai's case and report his findings to the throne. The Tibetan official, Kaloon Phuntsok Wangdan, is removed from office and put under

investigation.

Zhang's exposé, which led to the downfall of some of the corrupt officials in Tibet, raised the hopes of the people and won the support of Tibetans of all classes. Said Zhang in a memorial to the throne: "My presence in Tibet has caused quite a stir throughout the region. People here are watching me closely, for they believe that I am not just another official posted in Tibet, but someone entrusted with special powers to investigate the administration of Tibet."

The other important thing Zhang Yintang did was put the house in order by instituting new policies for the administration of Tibet. An outline program for the new administration was contained in a report he submitted to the Board of Foreign Affairs on the thirteenth day of the first month in the thirty-third year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1907). Said the report:

Steps should be taken to recover political power in Tibet, to train soldiers and open schools so that Tibet may have a strong defence and be free of such weaknesses as may be used against it. It is essential that the political power be re-gained before the return of the Dalai Lama.... Therefore, the following measures are proposed and submitted to Your Excellency for comment....

1. Generously grant titles to the Dalai Lama and provide him with a rich annual stipend in the manner in which India treats the chiefs of its vassal states. Revive the regency in charge of Tibetan secular affairs on behalf of the Dalai Lama, but the regent should work under the supervision of a Han official.

2. Create a chief administrator who will be superior in rank to the Resident. This administrator will come from the princes and will be commissioned by the monarch. His status and powers will be such as accorded to his counterpart in India by its viceroy.... The chief administrator will have an assistant who will have five officials working under him, namely a councillor, deputy councillor, an advisor and two deputy advisors; they will be in charge of internal and external affairs, military training, finance, education, justice, police, agriculture, handicrafts, trade and mining. Appoint a prefect and a *Tongzhi* (co-prefect) to each of the following places: Yadong, Gyantse, Tashilhunpo, Ngari, Gatok, Chamdo, Nyagrong Todme Bar Sum, the Tsoba Sogu, Kongpo and Bathang. These officials, who are to come from military academy graduates, will lead and supervise Tibetan officials in their administra-

tion of local affairs.... There should be a Han official where Tibetan officials are in charge....

3. Six thousand troops from the new Northern Port Army should be stationed in Tibet for military support. Their supplies and equipment will be provided by the Northern Port Army. These troops will be put under the authority of the Chief Administrator. They will be pulled back in several stages after three years in Tibet, and will be replaced by locally-trained soldiers in order to save frontier defence expenses. The deployment of these troops will be worked out by the Board of the Army.

4. Establish a new Tibetan militia of about 100,000, to be provided for by Tibet itself. This force is to be led and trained by our cadets, who will receive their pay and supplies of weapons and ammunition from us.

5. The Board should order speedy erection of telegraphic lines between Bathang and Lhasa.

6. Build in the shortest time possible ox-cart roads between Tachienlu, Gyantse and Yadong to facilitate the flow of trade.

7. Open in large numbers Han language schools so that the mother tongue may become the common language.... The students will graduate in six years.

8. By an agreement with the *Shangshang* ... Chinese and Tibetan soldiers and civilians with the permission of the Mining Bureau may operate metal and coal mines in Tibet....

9. All the exorbitant taxes and inhuman forms of punishment in Tibet, unknown elsewhere in China, should be abolished to relieve the people of their sufferings.

10. Set up tax bureaus at the salt wells at Kalawusu (Nagchukha) and Numari to collect salt tax. The wells will be operated by both the government and private persons.

11. Wool, yak tails, yak horns, hog bristles and medicinal materials will be Tibet's major exports. Import-export tariffs will be levied by customs to be set up at the three trade-marts.

12. Take back the right to mint silver and copper coins and the right to print paper currencies. Set up banks to help with the circulation of money. These banks will be the sole institutions responsible for paying troops and government officials.

13. The supply depot guard in Ü-Tsang, with its feeble, old members retired, is not in full strength, but it continues to receive its pay as if there were no vacancies; the pay in excess of its actual strength goes into the pockets of private persons. This guard should be replaced by

a police force.

14. Start a newspaper to be published once every ten days in vernacular Chinese and Tibetan to awaken patriotism in its readers and to provide them with modern knowledge.

15. Teach Tibetans how to grow Sichuan tea in order to put an end to the import of Indian tea.

16. There is a gun factory in Lhasa, but it is too small and poorly equipped. Engineers from the Southern and Northern Port armament factories are needed here to expand the factory with new machinery.

17. Brugpa (Bhutan) and Gurkha (Nepal) mean a great deal to the security of Tibet.... Special envoys should be sent to publicize China's might and good will and to form a secret Gurkha-Tibetan military alliance on the basis of the understanding that Tibet and Gurkha are closely related and mutually dependent in security matters.

18. A capable official should be posted in the Indian capital as China's consul general with the secret mission of providing intelligence on India for the defence of Tibet.

19. To implement these measures, approximately two million *liang* of silver will be needed annually, which may be provided by the Board. Tibet, with its vast territory and the richest mineral deposits in China, will certainly become our most valuable colony; if it is managed well, the profit Tibet yields will double itself in ten years' time....

Zhang's proposals, after adoption by the Qing government, became the new program for the administration of Tibet.

On the tenth day of the third month, Zhang, in line with the new policies, ordered the establishment of nine bureaus in charge of foreign affairs, military training, finance, the tea industry and salt tax collection, mining and road construction, trade and handicrafts, education, agriculture, and public security—bureaus of the new administration. Zhang also ordered the publication of two pamphlets: *Elementary Ethics* and *Change Your Habits and Ways*. Translated into Tibetan, the booklets were distributed throughout Tibet.

With detailed, word-by-word explanations, *Elementary Ethics* dealt with the following subjects: "love between father and son," "emotional ties between monarch and subject," "respect of the wife for her husband," "respect of the young for their elders," "loyalty to friends," "be erudite," "be thorough in quest of knowledge," "be pure in mind," "be wise in judgement," "be earnest in what you do," "intelligence," "benevolence," "courage," "filial piety," "broth-

erly love," "loyalty," "faith," "observe the rites," "uphold justice," "be honest and clean," "develop a sense of shame," "be gregarious," "be conscious of public welfare," "set great store by martial qualities," and "be devoted to your work."

Change Your Habits and Ways mainly concerned such do's and don'ts as: "Widows and unmarried girls must not engage in illicit intercourse with men"; "brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins and nephews must not sleep on the same *kang*";* "bury the dead in coffins"; "take a bath every day"; "children at the age seven or eight should begin to learn to read and write in the Chinese language"; "chanting sutras should not be the only thing the lamas are asked to do during the day; they should support themselves by working as farmers, traders or handicraftsmen, and not live on alms"; "widows should not remarry"; "bring your palms together to greet people, bending the body, sticking out the tongue or sticking up fingers as a sign of greeting, which foreigners find foolish, should be abandoned"; "the first floor of a building should not be used for stables or cattle pens"; "men should stop wearing earrings"; "babies of one year old must be vaccinated against smallpox"; "the custom of two brothers sharing a wife ... a custom unknown outside Tibet, is despicable"; "a wife must be faithful to her husband"; and "Tibet should go by the Qing calendar."

These new policies, originating with Zhang Yintang and approved by the Qing government, marked the beginning of the fourth phase in the Qing's administration of Tibet. Being a patriot, Zhang stood opposed to British imperialism for its aggression against Tibet, and for that he was well liked by the Tibetan people. As he was inspired to some extent by the bourgeois Industrial Revolution of the West, and was himself something of a reformer, he was able to come up with the plans to develop agriculture, handicrafts and trade in Tibet, to open mines there, and build roads, start schools, introduce newspapers and open banks in that remote region. These plans, if they materialized, would undoubtedly benefit the Tibetan people.

But the new policies had their negative aspects:

1. The much stressed "recovery of political power," though intended

* *kang*—a heatable platform bed

to defend China's sovereign rights in Tibet, was also aimed at effecting a forced transfer of political power from the hands of the Dalai Lama to those of the ambans, and the replacement of Tibetan officials by Han officials. In a memorial to the throne dated September 1908 (the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), Zhang was quite candid when he wrote "once the political power is in our hands, the Dalai Lama will become a mere puppet. Its recovery, therefore, will ensure stability in Tibet."

2. These policies attempted to "assimilate Tibetans" by imposing upon them the way of life of the Han people, and expecting them to accept against their will the language, habits, customs and ethical code of the Hans.

3. They represented undue interference in the religious practices of the Tibetans such as splitting the lamas into two categories, one observing celibacy, the other not, and fixing arbitrarily the times for the lamas to recite sutras.

4. They were partly a replica of the British colonial policy for India, supported by the belief that Tibet "will certainly become our most valuable colony."

Not surprisingly, the Tibetans in both the upper and lower social strata rejected those parts of the new policies that went against their wishes; the parts that would have played a positive role in the administration of Tibet were implemented only half-heartedly by the Kashag because they clashed with the interests of the big serf owners. Zhang was not unaware of such reluctance. In a communication he sent to the Kashag in May 1907 he wrote:

To meet the urgent need to put things right in Tibet's internal administration and external relations, especially the need to seek ways to end its poverty and weakness, I ordered the Tsonqdu to set up nine bureaus in charge of foreign affairs, military training, finance, the tea industry and salt tax collection, mining and road construction, trade and handicrafts, education, agriculture and public security. I also approved the constitutions of these bureaus, and appointed their officials. All this was done in the hope that these new institutions would work together energetically so that Tibet would become stronger and more prosperous with each passing day. However, in the past several months since their reported establishment, the bureaus, according to an inspection, have shown a poor record of their work.

Charles Bell had this to say of the new policies:

The High Commissioner's [Zhang Yintang's] reforms were unpalatable to most of the Lhasa officials, who had to work hard and on unaccustomed lines. With the Tibetans as a whole he was at first popular, for he stood in their eyes as the barrier against British aggression, and he initiated measures for the development of the country. As his schemes did not bear much fruit and he interfered with old established customs, his popularity to some extent declined. But many Tibetans still cherish a friendly regard for the "Overseas Amban," as he is called, since he came by sea to Calcutta instead of by the overland route through Eastern Tibet.*

In the course of "putting things in order in Tibet," Zhang ran into a thorny problem: the crisis in the relations between the Tashilhunpo and the Kashag. When Zhang arrived in Tibet, the Panchen wrote him a letter asking for the separation of Ü and Tsang. In his letter of reply, Zhang wrote:

Your letter has reached me. As I already gave my explicit instructions regarding the Kahlatsang case in my previous communication, I am surprised to hear again such an argument, which is aimed to win selfish interests in disregard of justice and to the detriment of the overall situation; and this time even the events that took place as long ago as the reign of Emperor Shengzu are used as reasons for the request of the separate administration of the Larang [represented by the Panchen] and the *Shangshang* [represented by the Dalai]. As nothing on file in my office supports these reasons, they are one-sided and the request therefore can hardly be granted. You should know that Ü and Tsang can not be split into two independent regions as the one can not exist without the other and the people of the two regions are of the same race and share the same religious faith. Foreigners now keep coming to Tsang to collect information as part of their schemes to swallow up Tsang so that they may have easy access to Afghanistan and Kashmir. The threat to Tsang comes from these scheming, crafty foreigners, not from Ü. At a time like this when even the concerted effort of all Tibetans would not be enough to ward off foreign aggression, quarrels between brothers, which would gladden only the foreigners, must by all means be avoided.... With your wisdom and sound judgement, you can not fail to understand all that. I suspect that some of your aides must have been feeding you with disinformation for the purpose of fomenting discord. Once these wicked people are exposed, they may

* *Tibet: Past and Present.*

expect the most severe punishment from me. I hope you will dismiss them from their posts and drive them away.... The Buddhist scriptures you have studied should enable you to understand why that should be done. I now reiterate the previous instructions that the matter will be discussed peacefully with the Dalai Lama when he returns to Tibet.

In a memorial to the Qing emperor in 1907 Zhang wrote:

Mutual distrust once again overshadows the relations between the Dalai and the Panchen. Since his interview with the Prince of Wales in the Indian capital, the Panchen, in the unprofessed belief that he can count on Britain for support, has been trying to contend for power with the Dalai. The British, who keep coming to Tsang, have been trying to incite the Panchen and have put him in charge of religious affairs in Dordan in India. They lavish favours on him in the hope that they may succeed in their evil designs.

In another memorial Zhang wrote:

The Dzasa, sent by the Panchen, met me at Gyantse when I reached there on my journey to Tibet. During a conversation with me, he hinted that the Panchen might challenge the Dalai's position.... I told the regent of that in Lhasa, and the *kaloons* were alarmed.

However, Zhang Yintang took no steps to ease the tension between the Tashilhunpo and the Kashag except to reject the Panchen's request for separation.

In May 1907 (the thirty-third year of Emperor Dezong's reign), when his investigations in Tibet came to a close, Zhang Yintang was made a representative by the Foreign Affairs Board to discuss the opening of a trade-mart at Gyantse with the British at Senlo (Simla) in India. After handing over the work that remained to be done to the new amban, Lian Yu, Zhang left Tibet in June; on July 15 he arrived in Senlo for talks with Dainow, the British representative. Coming with him, at the special request of Britain, were Kaloon Wangchuk Gyalpo and a retinue of eight.

In February 1908 (the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) an agreement was reached on the opening of the Gyantse mart, and fifteen regulations of trade between Tibet and India were agreed upon. These regulations set the boundaries of Gyantse mart, described the procedures for leasing of lands for building sites, defined the rights of the administration of the trade-marts, pres-

cribed the ways to handle lawsuits brought in by the inhabitants of the marts, laid down the terms for the transfer to China, after the withdrawal of the British troops, of telegraph wires and buildings erected by the British along the trade routes; they also stipulated that "the Chinese authorities will not prevent the British trade agents from holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people." These regulations gave Britain virtually consular jurisdiction over the Gyantse concession.

On April 20, 1908 (the twentieth day of the third month by the lunar calendar) the regulations were signed in Calcutta by the Chinese plenipotentiary, Zhang Yintang, and his British counterpart, E.C. Wilton. Wangchuk Gyalpo of Tibet also affixed his signature to the document.

On the fifth day of the fourth month of the same year, Zhang left India for Beijing for debriefing.

Reforming the *Tusi* System in Kham

When Zhang Yintang was in Tibet investigating conditions there and working to implement the new policy, Zhao Erfeng was transforming the *tusi* system in Kham with great force. The idea of reforming the system did not originate with Zhao; it had been offered earlier by Lu Chuanlin, then governor of Sichuan, but it had been ignored by the Qing government.

In April 1904 (the thirtieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign) when Assistant Resident Feng Quan arrived in Bathang in Kham, Tibet was waging its second war of resistance against Britain.

The Cabinet, in view of the grave situation in Tibet arising from the war, proposed that Nyagrong be recovered as a step towards the strengthening of the defence of Sichuan. Xi Liang was then ordered by Emperor Dezong to do the job in conjunction with Resident You Tai and Assistant Resident Feng Quan. Xi Liang informed the two Residents of his assignment and told them to try to persuade the Tibetan authorities to recall their officials [from Nyagrong] and cede Nyagrong to the Court in exchange for a sum of money to make up some of the financial losses incurred by the military operations that quelled the riots there several years back. But You Tai, being a timorous man with no

insight, procrastinated, fearing that with the war still going on, the step might give rise to more trouble. Feng Quan, who was eager to recover the region, disagreed with You Tai. Then the lamas in Bathang rebelled, and petitioned the governor of Sichuan that Feng Quan be put to death as an apology to the Tibetans.*

The reform effort immediately ran into the stiff opposition of the lamaseries in Kham, as Feng Quan's first step was to strip the lamaseries in the Bathang region of their political power and take away their land and the people working it. Said *India and Tibet*:

The Chinese official view of these transactions is given in a joint memorial from the General and the Viceroy to the Throne. The memorial stated that Feng recognized that unless the power of the lamas, who had absolute control of the tribesmen, was reduced, there was certainly to be serious opposition to the measures of reform he proposed to introduce. He accordingly requested that the old law limiting the number of priests should be put in force, and he further proposed that for a space of twenty years no one should be allowed to enter the priesthood. The lamas resented this, and spread reports that Feng's troops wore foreign dress and were drilled in the foreign fashion. They also represented that the changes he wished to introduce were solely in the interests of foreigners. His protection of the missionaries was adduced as a further proof of his partiality towards foreigners.

Feng Quan met his death at the hands of the rioting lamas of Bathang who had been angered by his reform efforts.

In a memorial to the throne dated the twenty-eighth day of the fourth month of the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1905) You Tai reported on the riots:

The following information has been provided by Wu Xizhen, county magistrate on probation of Bathang: on the twenty-first and twenty-second day of the second month this year more than five hundred rioting Tibetans under the chief and assistant *tusis* of the Bathang and Tinglin lamaseries raised disorder. They began by pillaging the adjacent areas, and then created disturbances at the reclamation farm in Sonlon. The troops dispatched by Resident Feng Quan to suppress them met with their resistance. These rioters committed arson. In the course of the rioting their number kept growing until it reached as many as 3,500 or 3,600. On the night of the twenty-eighth day, they struck out with

*A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet.

savage force. One group of them put the church building of the French mission to the torch; the priest of the church, Pères Mussot, was missing, and was said to have been killed. Another group blocked the streets while a third group bombarded the mansion of Resident Feng Quan. The mansion was guarded, but as the guards were outnumbered, they were not able to defend it effectively. Major Wu Yizhong and Commissioner Qin Zongfan were killed. By daybreak, the guards had suffered heavy casualties, and Resident Feng Quan had moved to the fort of the *tusi* of Tsagla to avoid confrontation. After looting the Resident's mansion of all its expensive weapons and documents, the rioters surrounded the Tsagla fort in a tight ring. At noon on the first day of the third month, they forced Resident Feng Quan to journey back to Tachienlu, saying that transport awaited. When the Resident reached Dagolung, twenty *li* from Bathang, he was attacked by the rioters lying in wait for him. They murdered Feng and fifty others in his party including commissioners Chen Shiyu, Wang Yilin and Zhao Tong and the guards.

When it was informed of the Bathang disturbances, the Qing government sent Zhao Erfeng, Governor of Jianchang *Dao* (provincial district), and Ma Weiji, Commander of the Sichuan Garrison, to put down the rebellions.

Bathang was recovered on the eighteenth day of the sixth month. By the ninth month peace and order have been restored in Bathang after Zhao's troops captured Chichungou where the riots had originated, and rounded up all the remaining rebels.... In the tenth month, a census was taken and grain tax assessed, and Fu Songmu was made its collector. In the eleventh month, tax bureaus were set up at the salt wells by officials authorized by Zhao, and troops were dispatched by him to attack the Sampelling Monastery in Chadren, Lithang, for its part in the killing of army officers and men. This military operation was not successful. In the first month of the next year (1906) the attack was renewed by an army led by Zhao. It took the place on the eighteenth day of the fourth [leap] month after it wiped out the leaders of the Tibetan rebels there; when the Gongkarling of Dabpa, which had aided the rioters, fell, the area was cleared of all rioters. In the seventh month Zhao was promoted to Commissioner of Sichuan-Yunnan Borderland Affairs. In the middle of the eighth month, after he arrived in Lithang from Dabpa, Zhao transformed the *tusi* system there, and later sent the five battalions under his command to garrison the areas in Lithang and Bathang where the transformation had been completed.... He opened

hotels west of Tachienlu, hired farmers to reclaim the land, and asked the Court to send him Wu Xuemo as an education officer. He employed Americans to prospect for gold, and started a tanning industry in Bathang. To build steel bridges at the ferries, he hired foreign technicians to test the water and survey the sites. He also employed the service of Japanese agronomists to improve farming in Kham. The new commissioner sent men abroad to learn about woolen fabric looms and flour-milling machinery. He ordered the purchase of medicine and recruited doctors for hospitals he set up west of Tachienlu, and proposed to the Court the establishment of Lihua, Dingxiang and Ba'an counties. In a series of memorials to the throne, Zhao urged reforms in Kham in such areas as education, trade, land reclamation and the appointment of government officials. The board allocated to him one million *liang* of silver needed to get the reforms underway.*

Of Zhao's reform efforts Younghusband wrote:

He [Zhao Erfeng] was turning these states one after another into districts directly administered by Chinese officials, and he was making a special set against Lamaism—regulating the numbers who might become priests, curtailing the donations to monasteries, increasing the taxes they had to pay, prohibiting the construction of temples except by Chinese officials, and declaring the inefficacy of the Lama's prayers—excellent reforms in many ways, but when carried out with the severity with which Cao [Zhao] was introducing them in Eastern Tibet, inevitably calculated to arouse anger and suspicion at Lhasa.**

Younghusband also described the measures Zhao introduced:

The head T'u Ssu (chief, *tust*) and the assistant T'u Ssu having been beheaded, the office of T'u Ssu was abolished for ever. Both the Chinese and the tribesmen of Batang were henceforth to be ... subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese officials; ... the people were forbidden to style themselves subjects of the Lamas or of the T'u Ssu. And being subjects of the Emperor, every man was to shave his head and wear the queue. Headmen of villages were to be elected for triennial periods by the villagers themselves, and were to be removable by the villagers if they acted unjustly. Under each district official ... were to be three Chinese and three Tibetans, to be jointly responsible for the collection of the land tax and the hearing of suits, and all six of them were to know both the Chinese and Tibetan languages. The land tax ... according to

* *Biographies of Resident Officials in Tibet.*

** *India and Tibet.*

the fertility of the land, was to be forty, thirty, or twenty percent of the total yield.... Officials in future were to pay for their transport—a very wise and necessary provision. Highway robbery was to be punishable with death, whether anyone was killed or not.... A Government school would be established which all boys from the ages of five or six would have to attend. The barbarous methods of burial practised by the tribesmen were to be abolished. Habits of cleanliness were inculcated. Adult men and women were urged to wear trousers in the interests of morality, and children were to be compelled to wear them. Each family was to take a surname (Han surname). Slavery was to be abolished. The people were warned against smoking opium. The streets were to be properly scavenged, urinals erected, and cemeteries were to be made in low-lying places....*

Zhao was said to be responsible for placing the following restrictions on the lamaseries:

The number of lamas in each temple was not to exceed three hundred, and a register was to be kept of the names and ages of the lamas of each temple. Temple lands were to pay land taxes like other land, though previously this had not been done. On the other hand, the custom of making annual donations in kind to the lamas was to be abolished. So that the lamas, while they had to pay more, were to receive less. The lamas were not to interfere in the administration of the districts.... He [Zhao] ... succeeded in establishing Chinese authority....**

All in all, Zhao Erfeng's reforms were helpful in promoting the growth of the productive force in the Tibetan regions in Kham as they weakened the hold of serfdom there, dealt a blow at the rule of the big clerical and lay serf owners and put an end to the special power enjoyed by the monasteries and the *tusis* in most places. But these measures were not flaw free. After the monasteries and the *tusis* were stripped of their powers, Han not Tibetan, officials were put in charge of the Tibetans in those regions, a measure that served only to further estrange the Tibetan people who took it as a means to impose a Han rule over them. But as a high-ranking bureaucrat loyal to the monarch, what Zhao did was precisely what was expected of him by the class to which he belonged.

* *India and Tibet.*

** *Ibid.*

British Aggression against Ladakh and Bhutan

Ladakh was originally Tibetan territory. In the ninth century when the Tubo Dynasty was convulsing with slave insurrections, Nimagon, a Tubo prince, fled with a small retinue to the Ngari region. He turned it into a small state and became known as the Ruler of Ngari in Tibetan history. Later on, Nimagon split the region into three districts and made his three sons their heads: Mangyul (Ladakh) went to his eldest son, Palde Rigpagon; Shangshung (Guge) was left to the charge of the youngest of the three, Detsuggon, and Purang was given to Drashi Degon, his second son. In the eleventh century one of the rulers of Ngari, Lha Lama Yeshe Od, who brought Atisha of India to Tibet to preach Buddhism, was also the ruler of Guge. In 1630 (the third year of Ming emperor Sizong's reign) when the ruler of Mangyul (Ladakh), Sengge Namgyal, overran Guge, he took the entire region of Ngari into his possession; and with the Phag-gru regime disintegrating and not able to look after things in western Tibet, he was able to maintain his rule of Ngari for as long as fifty years or so.

In 1681 (the twentieth year of Qing emperor Shengzu's reign) war broke out between the fifth Dalai Lama, who had by then become the head of the Tibetan local government, and the ruling lama of the White Sect (Ka-gyu-pa) of Bhutan. The Ladakhi ruler, being in the White Sect camp, joined Bhutan in opposing the fifth Dalai. Because of that, Desi Sangye Gyatso sent Tibetan troops against Ngari. After they overwhelmed the Ladakhis, the Tibetans pursued the fleeing Ladakhis into the territory of Ladakh and occupied its capital city of Leh. Then the maharaja of Kashmir, upon the request of the ruler of Ladakh, Deleg Namgyal, sent some of his troops to his aid. The Kashmirians had an engagement with the Tibetan troops, but the battle ended in a stalemate. In 1683 (the twenty-second year of Qing emperor Shengzu's reign) Tibet entered into peace negotiations with Ladakh and an agreement was signed. By the agreement, Ladakh was to come under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama, and the ruler of Ladakh was to pay an annual tribute to him; Tibet was to supply Ladakh two hundred

pack animal loads of tea each year, and the Ngari region was to be placed under the direct rule of officials appointed by the Dalai Lama. From then on the Ngari region was the Dalai Lama's domain; the map in *National Unification by Emperor Renzong* shows the region as a part of Tibet. In 1828 (the eighth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) the ruler of Ladakh was rewarded the feather and bead of a fifth rank official by the Qing government for wiping out the remnants of the Drangker gang.

In 1834 (the fourteenth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) Wazir and his troops, sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir, invaded Ladakh. Tsephel Namgyal, the Ladakhi ruler, was deposed following his defeat by the invaders whom the Tibetans called Singpas. In 1841 (the twenty-first year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) the Singpas invaded Ngari again, occupying the whole of it. Then Kaloon Tseten Dorje and Dapon Peshi, sent by the Resident, led a Tibetan army in a counter-offensive that ended in the killing of Wazir and the expulsion of the Singpas from Ngari. When Tsephel Namgyal was re-installed on the throne, Ngari was recovered by the Dalai Lama and the annual tribute was renewed. In 1843 (the twenty-third year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) Ladakh was once again invaded by Kashmir. The defending Tibetan army, after losing several battles to the invaders, pulled out of Ladakh. When the Kashmirians occupied Ladakh, they dethroned Tsephel Namgyal for the second time, and made the Grand Lama of Ladakh the ruler of the region; but the lama was a mere figure-head, for the Kashmirians were in actual control of Ladakh. As the Kashmirians respected Ladakh's former ties with Tibet, the annual tribute it paid to the Dalai Lama continued. In 1846 (the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign) the British imperialists annexed Jammu and Kashmir. Claiming that Ladakh was a part of Kashmir under the rule of the government of British India, the British proposed to the Qing government the delimitation of Kashmir's boundary, a move intended to make the Qing accept the British occupation of the Chinese territory of Ladakh.

The Qing government was not totally unaware of the plots Britain was hatching. In its "Instructions to the Military Council" dated the *xinwei* day of the twelfth month of the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign (February 5, 1847) it said:

As the boundary of Tibet has already been determined, there is no need to delimit it again. As for trade, there are already agreements to be honoured at all times. The country [Britain] has occupied the mountainous Jiazhimir [Kashmir] after it won the war with the Sikhs. Now it is asking to have the boundaries determined and to open trade with Tsang. Obviously, what it is asking violates the existing agreements.

The British demands were turned down.

At the same time, Resident Qi Shan submitted to the Qing government a report that said:

The Tod Garpon of western Tibet reported of a request sent in by the Phylings. The messenger who brought in the request said that as the Phylings have won the war, the Singpas and their territories of Ladakh and Kashmir have gone under their authority, and that the Phylings wish to trade with Tangut and would like to discuss trade regulations with our representatives.

In reply the Qing government instructed Qi Shan as follows: "As the imperial commissioner is in charge of foreign affairs, the merchant making the request should contact Qi Ying in Guangdong."

But the Qing government was so ignorant that it did not know that Ladakh was Chinese territory. In its instructions to Resident Qi Shan it said: "Sashiya Letai is to find out whether Ladakh and Kashmir are muslim territories outside Tibet, whether they were in the past vassal states of the Phylings and whether they are associated with the Phylings now."

In his report to the Qing government dated the eighth month of the twenty-seventh year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign (September 1847) Qi Shan wrote:

According to those who returned from investigating the situation on the frontier, things are quiet in the tribes bordering on Phyling; there are no signs of preparation for war. There are no Phylings in Tangut, and except for the reported war between Phyling and the Turan Tribe and the war between Kashmir and Kulang Sen, nothing is happening there.

Qi Shan said nothing about Ladakh. And before the Qing government knew it, Ladakh was lost to Britain.

Britain invaded Bhutan at roughly the same time as it occupied

Ladakh. Like Ladakh, Bhutan was originally a part of Tibet, a territorial status said to have dated way back to the days when Darma (Lang Darma) was the king of the Tubo Dynasty. Its ties with Tibet grew even closer during the Phag-gru and Karma regimes (1354-1642) as its ruling lamas were of the Ka-gyu-pa Sect (White).

When the fifth Dalai Lama toppled the Karma regime of the Ka-gyu-pa and replaced it with the Ganden Phodrang of the Ge-lug-pa Sect (Yellow), Bhutan's ruling lama, being in the White Sect camp, challenged the rule of the fifth Dalai Lama. The Dalai sent an army against Bhutan and war broke out. It lasted for as long as fifty to sixty years beginning during the reign of Emperor Shengzu of Qing through the years of Emperor Shizong until Bhutan placed itself under the authority of Tibet in the early years of Emperor Gaozong's reign when Pholhanas ruled Tibet.

The ruling lamas of Bhutan were the recipients of the honorary title of Nomin Khan from the Qing emperors and paid regular tribute to the emperors and the Dalai Lamas.

The British began their inroads into Bhutan by means of "trade" through the East India Company. In the twenty-first year of Emperor Xuanzong's reign (1841) they offered Bhutan an annual subsidy of Rs. 10,000 in exchange for their occupation of seven mountain passes in Bhutan. Since then border conflicts between Britain and Bhutan never ceased.

In the second year of Emperor Muzong's reign (1863) Ashley Eden, sent by Britain, came uninvited to Punaka, the Bhutanese capital, with a party of armed personnel for talks with Bhutan. The Bhutanese government was at the time demanding the return of the seven mountain passes. Eden outmanoeuvred Bhutan on this issue by concluding a treaty with it. The treaty stipulated that 1. the East India Company was to return to Bhutan all the mountain passes and land it seized from her; 2. mutual non-aggression was to be adhered to by Britain and Bhutan and 3. in the case of aggression committed by any one of the four parties, namely Bhutan, Sikkim, Kuch Behar and the East India Company, against any of the other three parties, the three might occupy the territory of the aggressor. When signing the agreement, Eden wrote beneath his signature "under compulsion" in preparation for future nullifi-

cation of the treaty by Britain.

When he returned to India, Eden proposed immediate military conquest of Bhutan. After some preparation Britain's Assam and Bengal detachments occupied all the Bhutanese mountain passes on the border with India and penetrated into Bhutan's heartland, seizing Kalimpong. The next year Bhutanese troops in an offensive recovered all the lost territories. Soon Britain, with renewed military strength, launched a large-scale attack on Bhutan. Defeated, Bhutan was compelled to conclude a treaty with Britain in November 1865 (the fourth year of Emperor Muzong's reign). By this ten-article treaty, called the Sinchula Treaty, Bhutan was to cede to the British government permanently all the eighteen mountain passes near Rongpu, Kuch Behar and Assam and other tracts of land; Bhutan was to release all the British, Sikkimese and Kuch Behar subjects detained in Bhutan; the British government was to provide the Bhutanese government an annual allowance of not more than Rs. 50,000; the British government reserved the right to defer the payment of part or the entire portion of such allowance; Britain undertook to extradite Bhutanese subjects who committed the crimes specified in the treaty and took refuge in British territory; the Bhutanese government undertook to extradite British subjects who took refuge in Bhutan for the same reason; the Bhutanese government agreed to observe the decisions of British arbitration in the event of disputes with the rulers of Sikkim and Kuch Behar; and there should be free trade between the two governments and no tariffs should be imposed.

In April 1909 (the first year of Emperor Puyi's reign) Charles Bell said to the Indian government, "We should endeavour to persuade Bhutan to place her foreign relations under the British Government, while the latter should agree to abstain from interference in the internal administration of the country." Then

In due course the Indian Government agreed.... When things were ready I went into Bhutan.... I found the Council Members reluctant at first to place the external relations of Bhutan under the British Government, but I was able to gain their consent. The guarantee of non-interference in their internal administration helped me considerably in the negotiations.... On the following day, January 1910 (the first year of Emperor Puyi's reign), the four copies of the treaty were signed and

sealed.*

This treaty was an amendment to the Sinchula Treaty of 1865, adding to it the following two paragraphs:

1. The British Government has increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 100,000 with effect from January 10, 1910.

2. The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations.

By gaining the control of Bhutan's external affairs, Britain had in effect turned Bhutan into its protectorate. In such a position the British imperialists were able to deny the Chinese ambans the right to communicate directly with Bhutanese rulers, and eventually to put an end to the connections Bhutan had with China.

In September 1910 (the second year of Emperor Puyi's reign) the British minister in Beijing protested in a note to the Qing's Foreign Affairs Board the language the amban used in a communication to the maharaja of Bhutan, saying that it was inappropriate; and informed the Chinese government that from then on any communications from the ambans to the Bhutanese maharaja would not be considered valid unless they were delivered through the British government.

The Foreign Affairs Board refused the protest in its note of reply. Said the note:

Bhutan has always been a vassal state of China, and the communications from the Chinese Resident Officials in Tibet to its chieftains have always been in the form of orders and instructions.... The Chinese government does not know of any treaties between Bhutan and Britain, and the Chinese Resident Officials in Tibet will continue to communicate with Bhutan in whatever form they choose regardless of the restrictions the British Government may impose.

To this Britain replied in even stronger language. It not only challenged the fact that Bhutan and Nepal were Chinese vassal states, but threatened force if the Chinese government interfered

* *Tibet: Past and Present.*

in their internal affairs. But the dispute over Bhutan was shelved because of a revolution that took place in China in 1911.

The Dalai Lama In Exile

In this chapter we will look back at what the thirteenth Dalai Lama did after he fled the Potala. Our account is based on his Tibetan biography.

It will be remembered that when the British army reached Chisul, 120 *li* from Lhasa, on the twelfth day of the sixth month of the thirtieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1904), the Dalai returned in great haste to the Potala from the Norpulingkha. After appointing Ganden Tripa Lozang Gyaltsen regent to act in his place as the head of the Tibetan secular and religious administration, the Dalai left the Potala secretly on the night of the fifteenth day of the sixth month in the company of a small escort.

From Lhasa the Dalai headed for the Gu-la behind the Sera Monastery. At daybreak he reached Baya on the other side of the Gu-la. From there, after a simple meal and changing out of his monk's attire into Mongolian clothes, he continued his journey towards the Nagchu.

The Tibetan biography does not mention who made up the Dalai's escort. *India and Tibet* mentions one of them. Said its author:

I heard from other sources that the Dalai Lama was now eight marches off, and had with him the Siberian Buriat Dorjjeff, to whom the Tibetans attributed all their troubles, but who was reported to have very sagaciously advised the Dalai Lama to retire for a bit, as the English would soon calm down and disappear again like the bubbles in boiling water which subside when the water has cooled.

In *A General History of Tibet* the Japanese author also wrote of Dorjjeff. "The Dalai Lama ..." the book said,

Left in panic that night upon reports of imminent danger. Shortly before his departure he had summoned the Grand Lama of the Ganden Monastery and handed him his seal of authority, delegating to him the powers to run Tibet in his absence. Then he left in great haste in the company of seven attendants. This happened on the seventeenth day of the fifth month (?) of the thirtieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign.

On the journey the Dalai Lama was escorted by a party of seventy Buriat Mongols headed by the Tsannyid Khenpo [Dorjjeff]. Probably the Dalai was thinking of availing himself of this opportunity to have an audience with the Russian emperor in the Russian capital.

After he left Baya the Dalai crossed the Panpucha-la and proceeded first to the Taklung (White Sect) and then the Radreng before reaching the Nagchu. On the twenty-eighth day of the sixth month the Dalai resumed his journey from the Nagchu. On the third day of the seventh month he crossed the Tanggula Range, and seven days later on the tenth day he reached the northern bank of the Drichu River. It was not until he arrived in the Qaidam Basin on the eighteenth day of the seventh month that he saw any sign of human habitation. Here the Dalai was welcomed by Mongolian herdsmen led by Sangchen Tsesang, a prince of the Tajinar Mongolians, and received from the prince a large quantity of butter and many good horses. From there on the routes the Dalai followed were dotted with yurts and herdsmen, and at every place he passed through he was greeted and sent off ceremoniously by the local people, Mongolian princes, *khenpos* and lamaist monks.

Towards the end of the eighth month, the Dalai Lama passed through the Jiayu Pass in Gansu Province and entered the territory of Outer Mongolia. On the eighteenth day of the ninth month, he arrived at the Samtan Gyodeling Monastery in Outer Mongolia. On the thirtieth day on his visit to the Gandin Dedeling Monastery, he was welcomed by four officials sent by Jetsun Dampa, the ruling lama of Outer Mongolia, upon the information of the Dalai's arrival in his territory. They presented the Dalai with *hatas*, expressed their sympathy and solicitude, and extended to him an invitation to visit Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia.

The Dalai Lama was received in style when he arrived in Urga on the twentieth day of the tenth month. Ceremonial tents were erected at Shara Asar in his honour by the local government. Here he was greeted by the entire body of the Han and Mongolian officials led by the two imperial commissioners in Outer Mongolia, and received *hatas* from them. Then the lay and clerical dignitaries, in order of eminence, presented their *hatas* to the Dalai Lama; they included the Khenpo Nominhan, Tata Khenpo, Manchu Siya Khenpo, Choji, Wongtse, Gegui and representatives from the Nine

Dratsangs of the Temple of Urga and from the Thirty Khentsans. In Urga huge crowds of people in their holiday best lined the streets to give the Dalai a rousing welcome, the women with their beautiful headdresses, the lamaist monks carrying ritual objects and religious banners and umbrellas of every description, and the lay people holding incense burners with live joss-sticks in them. Colourful banners fluttered atop the buildings and yurts in the capital city. The streets that the Dalai passed through on his way to his temporary residence at the Nyiod Hall in the Gandin Monastery were laid with yellow cotton cloth.

An imperial envoy, sent by the Qing government upon confirmed reports of the Dalai's arrival in Outer Mongolia, came all the way from Beijing to Urga to "call on" the Dalai, bringing with him many gifts for the Dalai from Emperor Dezong and Empress Dowager Cixi.

Judging by the fact that he made his way straight to Urga after he left Lhasa and that he took Dorjieff along, the Dalai had intended to go to Russia. But the Czar, whose country had just been defeated in the Russo-Japanese War and was rocking with a revolution, was too busy trying to fend for himself to spare any effort for further aggression against Tibet; and the Dalai, closely watched by the Qing resident officials in Outer Mongolia, who were later joined by an imperial envoy from Beijing for the same purpose, was not able to go to Russia as he had intended. As an alternative, he sent Dorjieff secretly to meet with the Czar. Said Younghusband in *India and Tibet*:

Early in the following year [1905] we heard of him [the Dalai] sending the indispensable Dorjieff to St. Petersburg with a message and gifts for the Czar. Of this the Russian Director of the Asiatic Department informed our Ambassador, stating that His Majesty had granted Dorjieff an audience, and had accepted the gifts, which consisted of an image of Buddha, a very interesting copy of Buddhist liturgy, and a piece of stuff. The message was to the effect that the Lama had the utmost respect and devotion for the "Great White Czar," and that he looked to His Majesty for protection from the dangers which threatened his life if he returned to Lhasa, as was his intention and duty. The answer returned to him was of a friendly character, consisting of an expression of His Majesty's thanks for his message and of his interest in his

welfare.... The Czar also sent the Dalai Lama a complimentary telegram, in regard to which our Ambassador spoke to Count Lamsdorff in April, 1906. The Russian Chancellor informed Mr. Spring-Rice that the policy of his Government with regard to Tibet was the same as that of His Majesty's Government—namely, that of non-intervention. They wished the Dalai Lama to return as soon as possible to Lhasa, as they considered his continued presence in Mongolia undesirable, but he had fears for the safety of his person on his return, and had asked for a promise of protection. The telegram had been sent in place of this promise, and was designed to reassure, not only the Dalai Lama himself, but also the Emperor's Buddhist subjects, with regard to whom the Russian Government would find themselves in a very embarrassing position should any mishap befall the Lama.

According to the biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Russian minister in Beijing, by order of the Czar, visited the Dalai Lama in Urga on the fifth day of the fifth month in the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1905), and presented to him many gifts on behalf of the Czar. The meeting was also recorded in *A General History of Tibet*, which said: "The current Russian minister to the Qing, Pokotitov, is said to have stopped at Urga in Mongolia on his way to Beijing to assume office last summer, and had a secret meeting with the self-exiled Dalai Lama there."

The Dalai Lama lived in the capital of Outer Mongolia all through 1905. During that year, relations went sour between him and Jebtsun Dampa. According to the biography of the thirteenth Dalai, Jebtsun Dampa at first held the Dalai in great respect, but when he found that his guest was regarded by the Mongolian people with higher esteem than he himself was, he became resentful of the Dalai and wanted him to leave Outer Mongolia. This led the Dalai to contemplate returning to Tibet as early as he could manage.

Meanwhile, the Kashag and the three great monasteries signed a joint petition to Amban You Tai asking for the restoration to the Dalai Lama of the titles he had been stripped of. Said the petition:

The reprimand the Dalai Lama received was justified. But leaving Tibet was the only alternative he had; besides, he is the leader of the Yellow Sect; with the titles removed from him, he may find it difficult to command the obedience of the Tibetans and hold them together. In

view of that, we, the undersigned, are asking for the help of Your Excellency to have the Dalai's titles restored to him by the grace of His Majesty.

On the twenty-ninth day of the fifth month in the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1905), You Tai, when forwarding the petition to the throne, suggested compliance to the request of the petitioners. Said he: "It is advisable to satisfy the Tibetans by restoring the titles to the Dalai Lama." On the sixth day of the ninth month, the emperor's reply came: "A decision will be made on this matter when the Dalai Lama leaves Urga."

At the same time, the Kashag sent a delegation and nine musicians to Urga to take the Dalai Lama back to Tibet. The delegation was composed of Kung Dondrup Dorji, the Dalai's brother; Dzasa Lozang Dondrup, the Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoché and the Larang Chanzod. They were accompanied by representatives of the three great monasteries, the Nyerpa of the Potala's Namgyal Dratsang, representatives of the Tashilhunpo, the Panchen's Sopen Khenpo, and representatives of the Tashilhunpo's four dratsangs. They arrived in Urga on the fourteenth day of the twelfth month in the thirty-first year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1905). The delegates, on behalf of the lay and clerical Tibetans of Ü-Tsang, urged the Dalai to return to Tibet immediately. Thereupon, the Dalai decided to start his journey home in the spring of the next year.

The Dalai Lama left Urga in the fourth month of the next year (1906). He travelled unhurriedly, making his way out of Outer Mongolia by moving towards its border with Gansu Province. En route he made many stops to pay homage to monasteries and to give sermons. At the Dzayan Khural Monastery he was visited on the twenty-fifth day of the fourth month by officials sent by Emperor Dezong and Empress Dowager Cixi; they were Imperial Commissioner Guo Zuo, high-ranking officials from the Board for National Minority Affairs, and a number of minor officials.

On the twenty-seventh day of the fifth month the Dalai left the Dzayan Khural for another lamasery, the Gandin Gejiling. There he preached and gave out sweet butter tea and alms. On the eighth day of the sixth month he started his journey again, this time to the Gandin Tsepeling Monastery in the Samyin Noryan Tribe.

There he watched the performances of Mongolian dancers, equestrians, wrestlers and archers at a big fair held in his honour.

By the seventh day of the eighth month when he reached Muran Khashang, the Dalai had left Outer Mongolia and entered into the region under the jurisdiction of the governor of Sha'anxi and Gansu. He was greeted by an official sent from Xining by Governor Sheng Yun; this official was to look after the Dalai on the journey.

The Dalai and his party arrived in Pingfan County (now Yongdong County), Gansu Province, on the third day of the ninth month. On arrival he was greeted by the Tantse Hutuktu and the Taglung Hutuktu from the Kumbum Monastery. Governor Sheng Yun, on the instructions of the Qing government, was also there to welcome the Dalai. The others on hand to greet him included the Mayor of Xining, the local garrison commander and the prefect.

On the twelfth day of the ninth month the Dalai was welcomed into Xining in grand style. At every county the Dalai passed through on his way to Xining, the local officials, instructed by the Mayor of Xining, accorded to him the best of hospitality, and the roads that needed repair were mended before he arrived.

The day after his arrival in Xining the Dalai received the Dungko Hutuktu of the Kumbum, the Tashi Rimpoche of the Komi Choktang Monastery and the Kashag's trade officials in Xining. They presented him with *hatas* and expressed their sympathy. On the fourteenth day, the Dalai, at the request of the monks of the Kumbum, moved to their monastery and gave a sermon in its Grand Prayer Hall to the monastery's three thousand lamaist monks. From the fifteenth day on the Dalai gave blessings to as many as several ten thousand lay and monastic Tibetans and Mongolians in Qinghai by touching their heads with his hand.

On the fifteenth day of the tenth month, Popon Khenjun Tenzin Choskyi and Chipon (officer in charge of government stables) Jesu, sent by the Kashag, called on the Dalai at the Kumbum and on behalf of all the lay and monastic Tibetans urged him to return to Tibet and resume office. But before he could leave for home, an imperial edict was brought to him through the governor of Sha'anxi and Gansu, ordering him to stay on in the Kumbum until further instructions from the emperor.

Journey to the Nation's Capital

The Dalai's decision to return to Tibet had run into the stiff opposition of the British imperialists. In his memorial to the throne dated the nineteenth day of the second month in the thirty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1906), Zhang Yintang wrote:

In a private conversation with me the commander-in-chief of the Indian army said that Britain knew what to do if the Dalai turned to Russia. The tax official reported that Ma Dun He [transliteration], who was once sent to Tibet by the Indian government, is coming to Tibet to look for routes in preparation for another military attack on Tibet. These are indications that the British are not going to change their minds about Tibet. Steps should be taken to stop the Dalai from returning to Tibet or to keep him in the capital so there will be nothing that may be used as an excuse to start a war.

In a telegram he sent to the Foreign Affairs Board on the twentieth day of the fourth month, Zhang reported what the British army commander had told him: "The commander said that the Chinese government should send the Dalai to prison for maintaining secret relations with Russia through its agent, Dorjieff." In another report he sent to the Board on the twenty-third day of the ninth month, Zhang said:

As the Panchen has been feuding with the Dalai for a long time and is susceptible to British instigation, the Dalai's return to Tibet may provide him with an excuse to start trouble.... With the trade-mart issue not yet settled and the withdrawal of the British troops from the Chumbi Valley not yet effected, it is perhaps wise to delay the Dalai's return to Tibet so that the situation as a whole may not be affected.

Thus the Qing government ordered Sheng Yun, the Sha'anxi-Gansu governor, to keep the Dalai in Xining. On the eighteenth day of the tenth month, the governor said in a telegram to Amban You Tai: "I went to Pingfan to meet the Dalai Lama when he arrived. He is now staying at the Kumbum Monastery and has been ordered by His Majesty not to return to Tibet for the moment." So the Dalai remained in the Kumbum for over a year.

Meanwhile, the Panchen sent to Zhang Yintang a request for an audience with the emperor in the capital. In a letter to Zhang, the

Panchen said:

I am thinking of going to Beijing early next year when I shall be twenty-five years old, to seek such court audience as granted to my predecessors, to listen to the instructions of His Majesty, and to conduct prayer sessions for the longevity of Her Majesty the Empress Dowager, and His Majesty the Emperor. I shall leave for the capital by the northern route as soon as I get permission. Please inform the throne of my request.

When the Kashag learned of the Panchen's request, it went into a long discussion lasting several days, and announced on the twenty-first day that it wanted the Dalai to act immediately and overtake the Panchen in getting a court audience. In a request submitted to the Qing court through Zhang Yintang on the twenty-sixth day of the first month of the next year (1907) Regent Ganden Tripa said:

Just before his departure the Dalai expressed his wish to be granted a court audience in order to report to His Majesty on the situation in Tibet and to listen to his admonition for guidance. The Kashag has now decided to ask the Dalai Lama, who is currently in Xining, to conveniently seek an audience with His Majesty. We ask Your Excellency to submit this request to the Throne.

Zhang Yintang, who was in favour of such an audience, said to the Qing government,

No Panchens or Dalai Lamas have been granted any court audience since after the reign of Emperor Gaozong, a fact which has encouraged powerful neighbours in their designs on Tibet. Now by the will of Heaven, both the Panchen and the Dalai have appealed for an audience with His Majesty. As this will enhance China's image abroad as a country with sovereign rights over Tibet, ... His Majesty is requested to consider their appeals.

It took the Qing government a long time to weigh the pros and cons before it made its decision about the requests. On the twenty-seventh day of the eleventh month of the thirty-third year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1907) the Board of Rites extended to the Dalai Lama an invitation to visit the Wu Tai Mountain as a pilgrim. To the proposed visit to Beijing by the Panchen, however, the Qing government withheld its consent.

On the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month, the Dalai left the Kumbum in the company of two minor officials sent by the Mayor of Xining to look after him on the journey, and a guard of twenty cavalry and twenty foot-soldiers led by an officer by the name of Yin of the Xining garrison.

The Dalai left Lanzhou on the thirteenth day of the twelfth month on his journey east, and on the tenth of the twelfth (leap) month he reached Chang'an (Xi'an). There he bathed in the famed Lintong Spa, and went on a sight-seeing tour of Mount Hua in the company of a few attendants.

The Dalai crossed the Yellow River at the Tong'guan Pass on the eighteenth day. He was greeted at the river by representatives of the governor of Shanxi. Forty cavalry and eighty foot-soldiers sent by the governor relieved the Gansu guard.

The Dalai Lama was received in grand style by the local government of Taiyuan when he arrived in the city on the fifth day of the first month in the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1908). The Dzasa of the Wu Tai Mountain and the grand lamas from the monasteries of the mountain, who had arrived earlier, presented the Dalai with *hatas*, offered their sympathy and solicitude, and extended to him their welcome on behalf of the Buddhist community of the sacred mountain.

On the twelfth day the Dalai left Taiyuan and arrived at the foot of Wu Tai Mountain on the eighteenth day. The county magistrate of Wutai, the Dzasa of Wu Tai Mountain and the grand lamas received him in the Tibetan style, presenting him with *hatas* and mandrals in a ceremonial tent at the approach to the temples. Inside the temple area monks of all the temples there, standing in two long lines, gave the Dalai a warm welcome.

During his stay at Wu Tai Mountain, the Dalai, following his usual practice, gave sermons to the monks, blessed his worshippers and gave out sweet butter tea and alms to the monasteries there.

When they learned of the Dalai's arrival at the Wu Tai Mountain, the diplomatic envoys of imperialist powers in Beijing and some dubious characters from foreign countries journeyed to the mountain to visit the Dalai. The first of such visitors was a German official from Tianjin, who had a long talk with the Dalai. He was followed by a Japanese lamaist monk. He brought the Dalai many

gifts. The American minister in Beijing came in the fifth month. He conveyed to the Dalai the best wishes of his government.

In the next month a Russian high-ranking official, Hongse (Tibetan transliteration), sent by the Czar, came all the way from Moscow to Wu Tai Mountain to see the Dalai. He brought with him many gifts for the Dalai from the Russian emperor and an autograph letter from him. The letter was said to inform the Dalai that the Czar himself had strong faith in Buddhism, and that a lamaist temple had just been built in the Russian capital in which scripture-chanting sessions were regularly conducted by its many lamaist monks.

According to *India and Tibet*, the Dalai wrote a letter to John Jordan, the British minister in Beijing, from Wu Tai Mountain. Said the book:

From Wu-tai-shan he [the Dalai Lama] sent a messenger and a letter to our Minister at Peking. The letter was merely complimentary, and was similar to what the Dalai Lama had addressed to the other foreign representatives in Peking. The messenger said the intention of the Dalai Lama was to return to Tibet in response to the repeated petitions of the Lama Church. Sir John Jordan told his visitor that he could not say how His Majesty's Government would view his intended return to Lhasa. During his absence relations between India and Tibet had improved, and the rupture of friendly relations in 1904 had been the outcome of misunderstanding, which had arisen under the Dalai Lama's administration. The messenger explained that this had been due to the fact that the Dalai Lama's subordinates had persistently kept him in the dark as to the true circumstances in State affairs; but the Dalai Lama now knew the facts, and was sincerely desirous, on his return, to maintain friendship with the Government of India, whose frontiers were those of Tibet.

On the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month in the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1908) the secretary of the Military Council and the governor of Shanxi, sent by the Qing government, arrived at Wu Tai Mountain and asked the Dalai Lama to start immediately for Beijing for an audience with the emperor. The Dalai left Wu Tai Mountain for the nation's capital as asked. At Chunhu he boarded a train. When he arrived in Beijing on the third day of the eighth month, he was greeted at the railway station by Prime Minister La Tong and the Director of the Council for

National Minority Affairs. Also present at the station were the Dungko Hutuktu of Qinghai and the *dzasas* and grand lamas from the twenty-eight temples in Beijing. After the welcoming ceremony, the Dalai was borne in his own palanquin through the city to Huang Si (Yellow Palace) where he was to stay.

Da Shou, Deputy Director of the Council for National Minority Affairs, and Zhang Yintang, Deputy Director of the Board of Foreign Affairs, now in charge of the Dalai's reception, encountered a problem: the Dalai wouldn't follow the etiquette for the court audience. Said *India and Tibet*:

In the rules for his [Dalai's] reception it had been laid down that "the Dalai Lama would respectfully greet the Emperor, and kowtow to thank His Majesty for the Imperial gifts." ... The Dalai Lama was prepared to kneel, but not to touch the ground with his forehead. This might be called "a puerile question of etiquette." But etiquette means a great deal in Asia, and the audience had to be put off eight days, till this point and the question of the exchange of presents had been satisfactorily arranged. The Dalai Lama was to offer forty-seven different kinds of presents, but was to kneel and not kowtow; it was likewise laid down that when being entertained at a banquet by the Emperor, he was to kneel on the Emperor's entrance and departure.

Zhang Yintang offered his suggestions to the government about the etiquette:

The Dalai is known for his defiance and the Panchen for his treachery. That is why when I was in India, I tried to move the two to the capital and have them kept there so that they would not stand in the way when I was putting things in order in Tibet.... We could make the Dalai stay in Beijing for an indefinite period of time now that he is in the capital, but with foreign countries watching us so closely, any indiscretion in doing so, however slight, might subject us to international criticism and hurt the feelings of the Tibetans as well. The best thing to do now is perhaps for His Majesty to generously confer honorary titles on the Dalai, provide him with a sizable monthly stipend and ask him to work on Buddhist scriptures in the Yellow Palace. Winter will soon set in, and the roads in Tibet will be closed to transportation by snow until late spring next year. The Resident should be instructed to seize this opportunity to make all the necessary arrangements quietly.... The diplomatic envoys in Beijing are said to be highly interested in the manner in which the Dalai will be received by

His Majesty. Perhaps a few changes might be made in the old rules for his reception: His Majesty, instead of leaving the throne to welcome the Dalai Lama and offering him a seat, might remain in the throne while the Dalai performs the prostration rite in front of him, in much the same way as His Majesty receives diplomatic envoys and Mongolian princes; then dismiss him after a brief exchange of remarks conducted with him remaining standing. This way the dignity of the Throne may be made felt by him. If the Dalai is to be seated by His Majesty, it may be done at a banquet given in his honour by His Majesty immediately after the audience; and if distinguished members of the royal family and Mongolian princes are invited to the banquet, it will still mean that the privileges the Dalai is traditionally entitled to are respected. The rules for the reception of the Dalai place him in such a revered position that he is not expected to call on princes, dukes and ministers, but in view of the present situation this should be changed. Gifts and presents may be lavished on him, but the rules should be modified. The Dalai should be told that prior to his reception by His Majesty, he is expected, as a feudatory, to pay calls on high-placed government officials, and that in his reception of Han officials, he should treat them as his equals, regardless of their positions, instead of acting like someone superior to them in status as in the old days. This is what the sovereign state should require of the Dalai, and whether he complies will be a matter of interest to foreign countries.

That is why the rules for the reception of the fifth Dalai Lama by the Qing emperor were not followed in the case of the thirteenth Dalai, and because of that, he was extremely unhappy.

On the twentieth day of the eighth month, the Dalai Lama was received by Empress Dowager Cixi and Emperor Dezong.

On the first day of the ninth month, he paid homage to the Yonghe Palace and placed sacrificial offerings on the altar. He did the same the next day at the Maha Kali Monastery, Songchu and Huiyi temples* and the Baita (White Stupa) Temple. During this time, he distributed sweet butter tea and passed out alms to the lamaist monks at twenty-three temples including the Yonghe Palace.

On the sixth day of the ninth month, the emperor gave a banquet in honour of the Dalai Lama in Zhongnan Hai, the imperial garden. Also invited to the banquet were the Dungko

* The names are transliterations from Tibetan.

Hutuktu of Qinghai, the Kundeling Dzasa Lama, the sixteen Grand Khenpos in the Dalai's entourage, Mongolian *Kungs* and princes.

The Dalai then requested another audience with the emperor to take place at a side hall in the palace, to "inform His Majesty of the situation in Tibet."

According to his Tibetan biography, during his stay in Beijing, the Dalai Lama was received in audience several times by the empress and the emperor. On these occasions, the Dalai, besides offering his views on Buddhist scriptures, asked the central government for help in case of attacks on Tibet's Yellow Sect of Buddhism and its people by some countries of alien religion which, he said, with their designs on Tibet, were a constant threat to its religion and security. He said that as Buddhism and the tenets of esoteric and exoteric Buddhism expounded by Tsongkapa were the shared religious belief of the Hans, Tibetans and Mongolians, all the previous emperors of China had unswervingly followed a policy of protecting the people and the country by defending the religion of Tibet; he hoped that the empress and the emperor would continue this traditional policy so that the sacred land of Buddhism might not be exposed to harm. The empress and the emperor, agreeing with him, promised they would do as he requested.

The Dalai also said to the sovereigns that in view of the importance of Tibet and to help both the Hans and the Tibetans in its defence, he wondered if it was possible for him to communicate with the emperor directly instead of going through the ambans, which, he said, often caused delays. To this request the Dalai did not receive any response until some time later when it came in the form of an imperial edict brought to him by the Council for National Minority Affairs. Said the emperor:

The Dalai Lama did very well in observing the decorum required of a subject during Her Majesty's birthday celebrations. For this he deserves to be commended. It is hoped that when he returns to Tibet, he will do still better in obeying the laws and ordinances of the sovereign state. There is no need for him to communicate with me directly; he shall continue to follow the established rules of reporting to the Imperial Resident in all matters and waiting for my instructions.

While rejecting this request by the Dalai, the Qing government,

by an imperial decree, conferred on him an additional title, inscribed in a gold leaf album, of "The Loyally Submissive Viceregent, Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven." Coming along with the title were gifts from the emperor that included an embroidered picture of sixteen Buddhas, a *ruyi* (an ornament with a handle and a cloud-shaped head), two vases and two plates carved out of white jade, four bolts of satin with cloud patterns, another four bolts of high-quality satin, and five more of the material in yellow, blue, red, green and gold respectively. In addition, by a decision of the central government announced to him by the Council for National Minority Affairs, the Dalai was entitled to an annual allowance of 10,000 *liang* of silver, to be paid from the National Minorities Treasury of Sichuan Province.

The Dalai's four *khenpos* also received gifts from the emperor; each of them was given a *ruyi*, a white jade vase, a bronze joss-stick burner, four bolts of golden satin plus eight bolts of ordinary quality, four bolts of yellow silk cloth, and others. Gifts also went to each of the rest of the Dalai's entourage.

The contact the Dalai maintained with foreign diplomatic missions during his stay in Beijing is noteworthy. Said *India and Tibet*:

Sir John Jordan [then British Minister to China] visited the Dalai Lama on October 20 at the Yellow Temple [Yellow Palace]. On arrival he was received by two Chinese officials, one of whom was the aforementioned Mr. Chang. After a considerable delay in the waiting-room—whether due to Mr. Chang or to the Dalai Lama is not mentioned—he was conducted to the reception-hall, where he found the Dalai Lama seated cross-legged on a yellow satin cushion, placed on an altar-like table, about four feet high, which stood in a recess or alcove draped in yellow satin.... A few remarks were exchanged regarding the climatic superiority of North China over Tibet, and the Dalai Lama's journey from Wu-tai-shan to Peking, part of which was performed by train, and then the Dalai Lama made reference to the proximity of India to Tibet. Some time ago, he said, events had occurred which were not of his creating, ... and it was his sincere desire that peace and amity should exist between the two neighbouring countries. He desired the Minister to report these words to the King-Emperor. The message was not in the first instance clearly interpreted by the attendant Lama, but that this was the Dalai Lama's meaning appeared from what followed. Sir John said in reply that the desire for peace and amity was fully

reciprocated by his country; and, on this being interpreted, the Dalai Lama returned to his point, repeated the language he had previously used, and asked that it should be reported to the King-Emperor. The Minister then added that he would not neglect to carry out this request. A pause ensued, and then the Dalai Lama said that if the Minister had nothing further that he wished to discuss, he would bid him God-speed, and, in doing so, presented him with a pound or two of "longevity" jujubes. The reception lasted about eight minutes. The whole proceedings were carried out with perfect dignity.

One gathers from Younghusband's account that when he was in Beijing, the Dalai reversed his stand where Britain was concerned; he was no longer fiercely anti-British but was trying to please Britain. The change was due to the fact that he had long been disillusioned with the Qing government and the fact that the weakening of Czarist Russia as a result of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 had dimmed the prospect of his winning the struggle against Britain with Russia's support. Also, the opposition of Britain to his much-desired return to Tibet had left him with no other choice than begging Britain to let him go, promising that he would do all he could "on his return (to Tibet) to maintain friendship with the Government of India, whose frontiers were those of Tibet" and announcing that "it was his sincere desire that peace and amity should exist between the two neighbouring countries."

Meanwhile, the British imperialists were working in every possible way to win the Dalai Lama over to their side. It was for this purpose that Captain O'Connor, the man who pressured the Panchen into going to India in 1905, was sent to Beijing by the Viceroy of India along with a prince of Drenjong to visit the Dalai Lama. On this development Zhang Yintang had this to say in a memorial he sent to the throne:

The Englishman O'Connor is a man of treachery and a notorious trouble-maker who is responsible for creating all the disputes between India and Tibet. He came to Beijing with a Drenjong prince, and took the prince along with him on his visit to the Dalai Lama. The prince, after the visit, wrote to the Dalai and went to see him on his own.

Judging by the account given in *India and Tibet*, The Dalai and the British finally reached an agreement by which the Dalai would give

up his opposition to Britain and Britain would not prevent him from returning to Tibet. "The day before his [the Dalai's] departure," said Younghusband,

He sent two of his Councillors to Sir John Jordan to pay a visit of farewell on his behalf. In addition to some presents of incense and other articles for the Minister, they brought a "hata" [scarf], which they specially begged should be transmitted to His Majesty the King-Emperor, with a message of respectful greetings from His Holiness. The Councillors said that the Dalai Lama's visit to Peking had been a useful educative influence to himself and his advisers, and had resulted, they hoped, in the resumption of the time-honoured relations with China. It had also enabled them to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to Tibet, and, after the assurances our Minister had given them, they now went back thoroughly convinced that so long as they faithfully carried out the terms of the recent Convention, they could look forward with confidence to the maintenance of friendly relations with His Majesty's Indian Government. This they considered one of the most valuable results of their journey.*

At the same time, the British imperialists, taking advantage of Russia's incapability of large-scale aggression against Tibet as a result of its defeat by Japan and a revolution at home, managed to negotiate a secret convention with Russia. Called "Convention Between Great Britain and Russia," it was signed at St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907 by Sir Arthur Nicolson representing Britain and Master of the Court Alexander Iswalsky representing Russia. The five articles it contained are as follows:

Article I: The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Article II: In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does

* *India and Tibet.*

it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

Article III: The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV: The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

Article V: The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Appended to the convention was an "Annex to the Arrangement Between Great Britain and Russia Concerning Thibet" which said that if "for any reason" the British occupation forces were not withdrawn from the Chumbi Valley, Britain and Russia would "enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject."

The convention bore witness to the criminal attempts of the British and Russian imperialists to deprive China of its sovereign rights in Tibet and replace them with so-called "suzerainty." The convention also enabled Britain to inhibit Russia from poking its nose into Tibetan affairs while Britain, with the rights it had already obtained, would remain free of any restraints of the "Convention." Thus emboldened in their attempt to draw the Dalai to their side, the British imperialists became an even greater threat to the security of Tibet.

Returning to Tibet

When the thirteenth Dalai Lama was in Beijing, Emperor Dezong and Empress Dowager Cixi died suddenly within a short time of each other, and the new emperor, Emperor Xuantong, ascended the throne on the ninth day of the tenth month in the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign (1908). Meanwhile, the Dalai was once again urged to return to Tibet by the Kashag through its representatives Kaloön Changkhyim Pa and the Chucheng of the Potala's Namgyal Dratsang. So the Dalai, turning to his use the confusion in the Qing government following the deaths of the emperor and empress, asked it for permission to return to Tibet.

The government complied and ordered the authorities of the provinces through which the Dalai was to pass that he be lavishly entertained and provided with armed guards.

The Dalai was seen off at the Beijing railway station on the twenty-eighth day of the eleventh month by Prime Minister La Tong, the man who had greeted him upon his arrival.

Soon after the Dalai arrived at the Kumbum in Xining on the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth month, preparations began to expedite his return to Tibet; horses, cooking utensils, food, and fodder were purchased and tents were made. On the ninth day of the third month in the first year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1909) an advance party was sent to Tibet by the Dalai. It was a large group made up of Kaloon Changkhyim Pa, Grand Khenpo Drakpa Lozang, the Sapon Khenpo of the Tashilhunpo, the Lobpon of the Sera's Jépa Dratsang, the Lobpon of the Ganden's Shartse Dratsang and Tibetan soldiers.

The Dalai left the Kumbum on the fifteenth day of the fourth month. Before his departure he placed a *hata* on the image of Tsongkapa in his shrine and presented him with sacrificial offerings. He was then seen off by all the monks of the monastery.

On the fifteenth day of the fifth month when he arrived at Shangde, the Dalai was greeted and joined by Kaloon Lama Lozan Trinley from the Kashag. The local Mongolian inhabitants turned out to welcome him, and entertained him with horse races, songs, dances and wrestling matches.

The Dalai left Shangde on the eighteenth day of the fifth month to continue his journey westward. On the fifth day of the sixth month he reached Tenzin Obo. Here the Mayor of Xining, who had been escorting him, bid him farewell and left for home. Towards the end of the sixth month the Dalai crossed the Driчу and then the Tanggula Range early the next month.

When the Dalai reached Tra Tshangla, which was only one day's journey from Nagchu, on the first day of the eighth month, he was welcomed by a large group of dignitaries from Lhasa including Ta Dronyer Tron Bugpa, representing the Panchen; the son and daughter-in-law of the Sakya ruling lama, the ruling lama of the Tshurphu Kar-ma-pa of the White Sect, the Abbot of the Minchuling Monastery of the Red Sect, the Dalai's tutor Lin Rimpoche, the

Lachokli ruling lama of Lhoka, the Harkhang Dzasa, the Dalai's brother Phurchok Khenpo Jampa Namgyal Palden, Tsepon Khempepa, Lhalu *Kung*, and Chanlochen *Kung*.

The Dalai arrived in Nagchu on the second day of the eighth month. To greet him, welcome tents were erected by the local government at Nyanpo near Nagchu. Tents were also put up there by the garrison commander of Trashi City and Han army officers sent by the amban and the dapons of Ü-Tsang to salute the Dalai. The ninth Panchen travelled all the way from the Tashilhunpo to greet him when he arrived. Also on hand to honour his arrival were the Tashilhunpo lay and monastic officials who had come with the Panchen.

The Dalai entered Nagchu to the loud cheers of its lay and clerical residents. At the Trubkhang Monastery of Nagchu, the first stop he made after his arrival, he was presented with *hata*s and mandrals by the Panchen and the Trubkhang Rimpoche. Then he joined a celebration of his return to Tibet.

The Dalai remained in Nagchu for nearly a month and a half. During this time he grew even more unhappy with the Qing on account of the radical changes then taking place in the political and military arrangement in Tibet. Through the British telegraph office in Gyantse he sent telegrams to the British, French, Russian and Japanese ministers in Beijing. *India and Tibet* records the contents of these cables:

... For a year nothing is heard of him [the Dalai] till a report comes from our agent in Tibet in October, 1909, that he had arrived at Nagchuka (Nagchu), a fortnight's march from Lhasa. He had by this time evidently heard of the proceedings of Chao [Zhao Erfeng] in suppressing Lamaism and destroying the powers of the Lamas in Eastern Tibet, for he now sends telegrams to the British Agent at Gyantse, to be dispatched from there to "Great Britain and all the Ministers of Europe." These reached Gyantse on December 7, 1909. The first of them said that though the Chinese and the Tibetans were the same, nowadays the Chinese officer, named Tao (? Chao) [Zhao Erfeng] and the Amban Len [Lian Yu], who resides at Lhasa, were plotting together against the Tibetans, and had not sent true copies of Tibetan protests to the Emperor, but had altered them to suit their own evil purposes. They had brought many troops into Tibet, and wished to abolish the Tibetans' religion; the Dalai Lama asked, therefore, that "all

the other countries should intervene and kindly withdraw the Chinese troops." The second telegram, to be sent after some days if no reply were received to the first, said that in Tibet, in the case of several Chinese officers, "big worms were eating and secretly injuring small worms." The third telegram was to the Wai-wu-pu [National Minority Affairs Council], and contained the same expression, and added: "We have acted frankly, and now they steal our heart." The point to note about these proceedings is that before the Dalai Lama had even reached Lhasa, he was seriously concerned by the anti-Lamaist proceedings of Chao in Eastern Tibet, and very suspicious of Chinese intentions regarding his own rule in Tibet.

This was the time when Amban Lian Yu was pushing political reforms in Tibet. According to *Biographies of Resident Officials in Tibet*, Lian Yu said in a report to the Qing government dated the eighth month of the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign,

The long isolation of Tibet from the outside world makes it necessary for its people to become literate in the Chinese language and be able to read in that language for enlightenment. It is for this purpose that Chinese language schools were set up last year and later a printing shop, which is equipped with types of the Tibetan alphabet and a complete set of printing machines bought from India. The printing shop is housed in a converted civilian building and is managed jointly by Han and Tibetan officials. Its translators are now working on *The Emperor's Admonitions on a Wide Range of Subjects*, which will be widely distributed. Also planned for publication are books on education and industry. These publications are expected to have an ever-expanding readership as one does not have to know the Chinese language to understand them.... The fourteen graduate cadets from the two Sichuan military academies have arrived in Tibet as I requested. A small military training school will be set up first. Its students will include some twenty young, intelligent and literate soldiers from the garrison troops and the guards, ten Hans from Dam and the Tsoba Sogu, and ten Tibetans. Also to be enrolled are the four Gurkhas who have applied. They will be put on a one-year crash course that will teach them the basics of the art of war, making them useful in maintaining border security.... As soon as Xu Fangzhao is transferred to Tibet as requested, I shall put him and the graduates in charge of training the first group so that there will be enough instructors for future trainees. Funds for the printing shop will continue to be raised in Tibet so it will not cost the government anything. The buildings of the former army training centre in Trashi,

after some repair, will be good enough for dormitories for the instructors, and the planned extensions on both sides of the buildings will serve as dormitories, dining halls and additional classrooms for the trainees.... The cost of all this is estimated at only a few thousand *liang* of silver, which will be met by new appropriations.

In the fifth month of the thirty-fifth year of Emperor Dezong's reign, the month when the Dalai was about to leave the Kumbum on his return journey, Amban Lian Yu and Assistant Amban Wen Zhongyao made the following suggestions in regard to the administration of Tibet in a memorial they jointly submitted to the throne:

1. Regarding the opening of trade-marts: Police force is needed for the trade-marts at Gyantse and Yadong, which were opened in the ninth and tenth months of last year, to replace the British troops now stationed there. The lease of the land for the trade-mart in the remote Gatok should wait until a survey is made to determine the physical boundaries for the mart in accordance with the treaty.

2. Regarding the training of new troops: As soon as the appropriations of 200,000 *liang* of silver arrive from Sichuan and Guangdong, training will begin for a battalion of soldiers for Dam. They will be followed by those for the Tsoba Sogu, with more to be trained after them. A short-term military training school was established last year.... An annual appropriation of 500,000 *liang* of silver from the Board will be needed.

3. Regarding the garrison troops of Chamdo: Chamdo, although long under the jurisdiction of Sichuan, still remains in the charge of the local *hutuktu* for administration; the same is true of Draya. Zhao Erfeng should be told to limit his reform effort to increasing the strength of the local garrison there and to convince the local leaders that the garrison is merely for defence and will not interfere with local financial affairs; otherwise, those of the natives belonging to the Yellow Sect might be turned into tools in the hands of the Dalai Lama or join the Tibetans in their opposition to us.

4. Regarding the routes the army will follow: With the plans for the advance still to be announced, it is difficult to say how the Tibetans will react to them. Anyway, the army will face fewer hazards if it uses the main roads than if it follows the trails, and it can easily change its line of advance by taking the detour through the territory of the Tsoba Sogu if it runs into obstacles on the main roads.

5. Regarding the opening of schools: The sixteen schools run on a

trial basis have been funded by donations from government officials, but they are not enough to make education accessible to all. Their funding should be included in government budgets if education is to be made more accessible.

6. Regarding the reclamation of waste land: As the majority of the Tibetan population are monks, vast tracts of land lie waste in Tibet. But the reclamation should not begin now because the work involved in recruiting manpower for the purpose would be too formidable to handle.

7. Regarding the opening of mines: Tibet is rich in mineral resources. It is a waste to leave them untapped, and is dangerous, too, because foreigners covet them. We suggest that government permissions be given to selected merchants to open and operate mines here. As the Tibetans regard their land as sacred, we may begin with the Tsoba Sogu, and if the operation proves to be profitable, the Tibetans will automatically follow suit.

In conclusion, the ambans urged the immediate adoption of their suggestions, which they said were vital to the Tibetan administration. Apparently, these suggestions were part of the overall effort to implement the new policy for the administration of Tibet formulated by Zhang Yintang.

In the same year (1908 or the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign), Zhao Erfeng finished reforming the *tusi* system in the Tibetan areas of Tachienlu, Lithang, and Bathang. Tachienlu became Kangding Prefecture; Hekou County was set up at Zhongdu; Lithang was now Lihua District, administered by a district magistrate; Dabpa, now Daocheng, and Kungkaling became counties under the administration of a deputy county magistrate; Bathang became Ba'an Prefecture; Sampa became Sampa District, administered by a prefect; Chadren, renamed Dingxiang, and Yanjing were made into counties. All these places were put under the jurisdiction of Kangding Prefecture with the leading positions in the governments monopolized by Han officials, thus stripping all political power from the *tusis* and the lamaist monasteries.

In the eleventh month of the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Dezong's reign, Zhao Erfeng took the reform to Derge. *Biographies of Resident Officials in Tibet* says:

When his reform program for the *tusi* system in Derge was approved

by the Court, [Zhao Erfeng] started his journey. On the sixth day of the eleventh month he entered Tibet by way of Tachienlu. The rest of the journey took him through Taning, Dawu, Dramku, Trehor, Mazur, Khangsar, Beri, Rongba, Tshayul, Lungtso, Lhaku and Lodo. On the twenty-third day he reached Derge and set up his headquarters at Gonchen. On the twelfth day of the next month, his troops attacked Ngabang Jampal Rinchin and other brigands at Dzinkhog and sent them fleeing to Dzachukha. In the first month of the first year of Emperor Xuantong's reign, when he learned of an impending military attack by Tibetan troops from Nyagrang, he sent Fu Songmu on the thirteenth day with an army to intercept them at Tromthe, but the Tibetans did not come. On the nineteenth day of the fourth month, Zhao's army attacked Dzachukha and defeated the brigands at Mamo on the fourth day of the fifth month, putting them to flight; and when the pursuing troops that Zhao dispatched on the eleventh day of the sixth month put the fleeing enemies to rout at one stroke at Khana after a ten-day march, Derge was cleared of brigands and the *tusi* asked to have the regions under his rule reformed. Then the residents were assembled to discuss tax regulations.

Zhao Erfeng turned Derge into five counties: Sershud and Danko counties in Derge's former northern region, Derge County in the central region, and Palyul and Tangphug counties in the southern and western regions respectively; each county had a Han official heading its government.

After the Dalai Lama left Beijing, but before he reached Tibet, the Qing government made two major decisions regarding Tibet. One was the appointment of Zhao Erfeng as Resident Official in Tibet and Commissioner for Sichuan-Yunnan Border Affairs, and the other was a military expedition to Tibet, the sixth of such expeditions the Qing made. In the sixth month of the first year of Emperor Xuantong's reign, when the Dalai had left the Kumbum, a crack army of two thousand men in three battalions from the Sichuan garrison under the command of Prefect Zhong Ying left Chengdu for Lhasa via Tachienlu and Chamdo.

These decisions brought the Qing government into a head-on collision with the members of Tibet's upper strata. Zhao's appointment as amban was tantamount to announcing that the reform that had abolished the *tusi* system would soon be introduced in

Tibet, which would mean not only the loss of power of the Tibetan aristocracy and the major monasteries, but also the loss of power of the Dalai Lama as the ruler of Tibet. So the decisions were unanimously opposed by Tibetan leaders, who threatened that if the Chinese army entered Tibet despite their opposition, there would be war.

The Qing government ignored the protests and went ahead with the expedition. But the Sichuan troops were badly disciplined; they brought nothing but misery to the Tibetans in the places they passed through. Even Zhong Ying had to admit that in his *As I Saw It*. He wrote: "During the expedition, some soldiers of the 1st Battalion took firewood from the civilians without paying for it and forced Tibetans to work as porters. They even beat them." This incurred the hatred of the local Tibetans for the expeditionary army. To resist the Qing army, local militias were secretly organized by order of the Kashag. But the Qing was not to be stopped in its military venture. To make it a success, it ordered Zhao Erfeng in a telegram to lead an army to join forces with the expeditionary troops at Chamdo.

Such was the military and political situation in Kham and Tibet when the Dalai Lama reached Nagchu, and it was against this background that the Dalai appealed to the Council for National Minority Affairs and foreign diplomatic envoys in Beijing for "the withdrawal of the Sichuan army."

On the twelfth day of the Tibetan ninth month in the year corresponding to 1909, the Dalai Lama resumed his return journey from Nagchu. En route he stopped at the Radreng and Taglung monasteries. From the Taglung he sent a messenger to Beijing by sea from India with autograph letters from him to foreign ministers in Beijing. *Recounts India and Tibet*:

The Dalai Lama also at this time sent a messenger by Calcutta to Peking with a letter to British Minister, dated November 7, from the Tacheng [Taglung] Temple, three days' march outside Lhasa. This messenger reached Peking on February 7.... This message, which was delivered on February 21, was to the effect that, having arrived in Lhasa territory, the Dalai Lama was concerned to find that active measures were being taken in the country by Chinese troops, and hoped that anything our Minister could do would be done. This messenger ... also

delivered similar letters to the Japanese, French, and Russian ministers, and the Russian Minister informed Mr. Max Müller, our Chargé d'Affaires, that the letter to him was couched in more definite terms than that addressed to Sir John Jordan, and asked directly for Russian help against the aggression of the Chinese.

The Dalai Lama reached the outskirts of Lhasa on the thirtieth day of the tenth month, and on the ninth day the next month he was welcomed back to the Potala with great ceremony by the lay and monastic residents of Lhasa.

With the seal of authority returned to him by Ganden Tripa Lozang Gyaltsan, the Dalai Lama was now once again in control of Tibet's government and ecclesiastical affairs.

On the day the Dalai entered Lhasa, something very unpleasant happened that further worsened the relations between the amban and the Dalai. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* records the incident:

Lian Yu was given the cold shoulder by the Dalai Lama when the amban, in the company of his subordinates, greeted him in the east suburb of Trashi upon his return to Tibet. Angered by the humiliation, Lian Yu himself went to the Potala and searched the palace for Russian weapons, which he said the Dalai had smuggled in. The search turned up nothing. Then he sent soldiers to Nagchukha to look through the Dalai's baggage. They searched it thoroughly, but found no guns. They helped themselves to many of his things in the process.

In retaliation, the Dalai cut off the amban's supplies of firewood, food and maintenance manpower and closed all the post-staging stations. Meanwhile, he assembled local militias in an effort to prevent the Sichuan army from entering Tibet, and sent a representative to the British trade agent in Gyantse to discuss the situation with him. Records *India and Tibet*:

An official was sent by the Dalai Lama and Council to our Trade Agent to represent the situation to him. He reached Gyantse on January 31 of this year [1910], and said that the Chinese troops were still at Chiamdo [Chamdo], but as Tibetan troops were massed at only half a day's march from that place there was not the least doubt that there would be bloodshed if the Chinese persisted in coming to Lhasa.

Flight to India

Shortly after the Dalai's return to Lhasa, the Sichuan army left Chamdo on its westward march. In a battle west of Chamdo it defeated the Tibetan forces that had been ordered by the Dalai to block its advance.

On the eighth day of the second month in the second year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1910), the Sichuan army ran into the stubborn resistance of Tibetan troops at Gyamda (Taizhao). The Tibetans had burned all the food and fodder that the amban had stored there, but this last effort they made to hold off the expeditionary army ended in their own total defeat by the Sichuan army. Of the battle Commander Zhong Ying said in an order he issued: "The atrocities committed by the Tibetan soldiers when they swarmed to Gyamda from Kongpo to resist us were beyond description. For these atrocities they were given a sound thrashing by the 1st Battalion under its commander, Chen Qing, in an engagement at night."

After it won the battle at Gyamda, the Sichuan army pressed on to Lhasa. Alarmed, the Dalai Lama asked the ambans for help. On the ninth day of the second month, the day after the defeat of the Tibetan army at Gyamda, Assistant Amban Wen Zongyao went to the Potala for a face-to-face talk with the Dalai as requested by the latter through the Nepalese representative in Tibet. During the talk,

The Dalai told the amban that he would 1. order an immediate withdrawal of the Tibetan troops deployed in various places for resistance; 2. express formally his gratitude to the Court for the titles granted him and 3. resume all the supplies to which Amban Lian Yu was entitled. To ease his anxiety, Wen likewise promised the Dalai that 1. strict army discipline would be stressed when the troops reached Lhasa so there would be peace and order and the local residents would not be harassed; 2. all the matters would be settled by peaceful means; 3. there would be no encroachment upon the rights of the Dalai Lama as Tibet's spiritual leader and 4. the personal safety of lamaist monks would be guaranteed as a sign of good faith.*

Judging by the concessions he offered the amban, the Dalai

* *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet.*

apparently had no intention of fleeing to India at first.

On the twelfth day of the second month in the year corresponding to 1910 the Sichuan army marched into Lhasa. It was the Tibetan first month of the year, and more than twenty thousand lamaist monks were celebrating the Monlam Festival at the Jokhang Monastery in Lhasa. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recounts what happened that day:

Lian Yu sent his guards to meet the advance party of the Sichuan army upon its arrival in Lhasa. On their way back, the guards opened fire on the policemen, killing one of them; the Jedrung Lama of the Jokhang was also shot to death at Glaze Bridge. Then the guards wantonly fired at the Potala, wounding a number of its monks. The shooting created great alarm in Lhasa and frightened its residents. Worried about his personal safety, the Dalai left Lhasa for India with his aides. Lian Yu reported the Dalai's flight to the government in a telegram and was ordered to bring the Dalai back.

The biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama gives the following account of the incident:

At noon on the third day of the Tibetan first month, about one thousand Han soldiers, armed with all sorts of weapons, entered Lhasa. It was the day when Lhasa was celebrating the Monlam Festival. When the Han soldiers met the organizer of the festival, Phunkhang Teji, Tse Dronyer Jamyang Gyaltzen and their servants on the streets, they hit Phunkhang and dragged him to their camp for questioning. And when the Han soldiers opened fire on the Jokhang and the Potala, Lhasa was thrown into great confusion and all the shops were closed.

At sunset that day the Dalai hastily summoned the abbot of the Ganden Monastery, the Tsemonling Hutuktu, to the Potala and delegated to him the power to run religious and government affairs as regent during his absence. He told the abbot that because of the extraordinary circumstances he had to leave and take refuge somewhere. At midnight the Dalai Lama left the Potala for the Norpulingkha. After quick preparation for the journey, he left Ramagang in a leather boat before daybreak. He sped down the Lhasa River, covering two-day's distance in one day's time, taking no breaks for meals until he reached the Jasam Larang Monastery. There the Dalai made a brief stop, allowing his horses to be fed, and spending the night.

Soon after the Dalai arrived at the Jasam Larang, some one hundred cavalymen sent by Lian Yu to track him down reached Chisul Dzong on the other side of the river. When they were looking for ferry boats, the Dalai sent Dazang Dadul (later to become a *tsarong*), one of his close attendants, to hold them up on the opposite bank with a small party of Tibetan soldiers. The Tibetans shot at their pursuers with firelocks, killing about a dozen of them. With the Han soldiers pinned down on the other side of the river, the Dalai got away. He made his way to Pete and then headed for Nankartse, reaching the Samding Monastery (a monastery with a female Living Buddha by the name of Dorje Phagmo) on the Yardrol Tso. He left the monastery after hiding there for three days and continued his journey at double speed despite snow storms, not daring to make any more stops. As he was crossing Dangla Mountain after passing through Dognathang and Phari, the snow was so deep that it almost touched the belly of his horse. He was not recognized along the way as he disguised himself in the robe of a low-ranking monk official and used the saddle and bridle of such a monk.

After crossing Dangla Mountain, the Dalai went straight to the residence of Macdonald, the British trade agent at Yadong, and took a day's rest there.

Macdonald recorded what happened following the Dalai's arrival at Yadong in his book *Twenty Years in Tibet*. He wrote:

It was five o'clock in the afternoon, and quite dark, when the Dalai Lama reached Yatung. He came straight to the Agency House, and asked for British protection.... I had received instructions from the Government that if the Grand Lama claimed sanctuary in the Agency it was to be given to him, and I was therefore able to welcome him and to grant his request for protection while under my roof.... His six ministers were accommodated in my sitting-room.... The Tibetan escort billeted itself in the Agency Bazaar nearby.... The next morning I received a letter from Chung Yuk Tong, the Chinese Commissioner of Customs, asking permission for Chinese officers to occupy the dak-bungalow in Yatung. This permission I readily granted.... When the Chinese arrived at the Agency they immediately asked me to arrange a conference between themselves and the Tibetan ministers, and requested permission to interview the Dalai Lama. The ministers did confer with them, but only after a great deal of argument and persuasion did the former allow any

of the Chinese to see His Holiness, and then only on the strict understanding that I should be present, and that they would ask no questions. The object of the Chinese in asking for this audience was to assure themselves that it was really the Dalai Lama in Yatung and not merely a substitute playing his part. They did their utmost to persuade the ministers not to leave Tibet, but the latter were willing to remain only on the condition that all the Chinese troops who had been dispatched from Lhasa and Gyantse in pursuit of His Holiness be ordered back to their headquarters, and that the reinforcements that had arrived in the capital from China be sent back to Peking forthwith. As was to be expected, the conference ended in a deadlock.... Then came the matter of them seeing the Dalai Lama, who at first flatly refused to have anything to do with them. Only on my promising personally to search every one of the Chinese for concealed weapons, and to conduct them myself, one by one, into his presence, did he consent to receive them. Accordingly, having gone over each Chinaman very carefully, ... I led them one at a time into the Presence. Each of them offered the Dalai Lama a silk ceremonial scarf, receiving a bare nod of acknowledgement in return. The prelate uttered not a word during the whole of the proceedings. After they had left the Lama, the Chinese did their best to induce me to persuade him and his ministers to remain in Tibet. I, of course, refused to attempt to influence either party, Chinese or Tibetan.... Before leaving the Agency they assured the Tibetan ministers that they would telegraph the conditions on which the former were willing to remain in Tibet to the Chinese Government, asking them to await a reply from Peking, which would arrive in a day or two.... On the afternoon of 21st February 1910, I read and translated a telegram addressed to the Dalai Lama by the Pharijong headmen to the effect that the main body of Chinese troops was then crossing the Tang Pass, eight miles from Pharijong. This meant that, by doing a forced march, they would be in Yatung by the evening of the next day.... Early the next morning I informed the Dalai Lama that information had just been received that the Chinese troops were about to leave Pharijong. He was still in bed when I gave him this news, and he hurriedly arose, dressed, and prepared to take to the road. His ministers also lost no time in getting ready, and within an hour the whole party, muffled to the eyes, to escape the recognition of which member was the Dalai Lama, left the Agency for the Jelap Pass. They were escorted by the Tibetan militia, and succeeded in reaching the frontier safely. They had a very rough journey across the pass, for it was snowing hard when they left Yatung, and continued so the whole day. Once they reached the frontier the

militia returned, leaving the Lama and his six ministers to travel on alone.

From Yadong, the Dalai wrote to the British government asking for its protection. Of this Macdonald wrote:

Before leaving Yatung, the Dalai Lama handed me a statement regarding his flight, which I at once translated and forwarded to the Foreign Office in Simla. It ran as follows: "The Chinese have been greatly oppressing the Tibetan people in Lhasa. Chinese mounted infantry arrived there and fired on the people, killing and wounding them. I was obliged, with my six ministers, to make good my escape. My intention is now to go to India for the purpose of consulting the British Government. Since my departure from Lhasa I have been greatly harassed on the road by Chinese troops. A force of two hundred Chinese infantry was behind me at the Chaksam Ferry, and I left a small party there to hold them back. A fight took place there, in the course of which two Tibetans and seventeen Chinese were killed. I have left a Regent and acting ministers at Lhasa, but I and the ministers who are with me have brought our seals with us. I have been receiving every courtesy from the British Government, for which I am grateful. I now look to you for protection...."

The Dalai's flight prompted the Qing government to strip him of the title of Dalai Lama and to order the amban to select a soul boy to replace him. In a proclamation announcing the decision, the Qing government said:

Ngawang Lozang Tupden Gyatso Jigrab Wangchug Chogle Langje, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, has been bestowed with favour and abounding kindness by the late Sovereign, but instead of showing gratitude for them by working as a devoted and disciplined monk for the propagation of the Yellow Sect, he has been acting, since he assumed the responsibilities of the *Shangshang*, so arrogantly and tyrannically as none of his predecessors ever did. Moreover, he has been violent and disorderly, has dared to disobey Imperial commands, oppressed the Tibetan people and precipitated hostilities with foreign countries. In the sixth month of the thirtieth year of Emperor Dezong's reign he was temporarily deprived of his titles by the late Emperor upon the Resident Official's denunciation of him to the Court for his ignominious flight during the disorder. But when he returned to Xining from Kulun

* *Twenty Years in Tibet.*

[Urga, now Ulan Bator], the Court, in view of the hardships he had endured during the long journey, instructed the local government to accord to him the best treatment it could in the hope that he would repent of what he had done and turn over a new leaf. Last year when he was in the capital, he was received in Court audience, granted an addition to his titles and was the recipient of many gifts from the Court; and when he started on his return journey to Tibet, the Court provided him with an escort. During the journey he made excessive requisitions for supplies each time he made a stop. But the Court tolerated all that because it hoped that the Dalai would understand that the indulgence shown to him meant that the past was forgiven and future improvement was expected of him. However, after he returned to Tibet, he spread groundless rumours about the Sichuan army and tried with false reasons to resist its presence in Tibet. But, as it should be apparent to the Tibetan people, the army has been dispatched there for the sole purpose of preserving order and protecting the trade-marts. In addition, the Dalai tried to defame the Resident Official and stopped all the supplies to him. Numerous efforts were made to bring him to reason, but he would not listen. When the Court was informed by Lian Yu and others in a telegram that the Dalai had left his residence secretly, without the knowledge of the proper authorities, on the night of the third day of the first month soon after the Sichuan army arrived in Tibet, and was nowhere to be found, the Court ordered the Resident to bring him back and make proper arrangements for him. But so far his whereabouts are still unknown. It is indeed irresponsible of the Dalai to have deserted more than once his office as the religious leader of Tibet. Moreover, the Dalai has been found to be a capricious and cunning man who has alienated himself from the Court and disappointed both the State and the people, thus disqualifying himself as the leader of the *hutuktus*. In view of that it has been decided to remove the title of Dalai Lama from Ngawang Lozang Tupden Gyatso Jigrab Wangchug Chogle Langje as punishment. From now on, he is to be treated as a commoner in Tibet or in refuge anywhere outside Tibet. The Resident Official is to seek soul boys and to select one of them by drawing the tablets bearing their names from the gold urn as the true reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama, who, with the approval of the Court, will carry on with the propagation of the religion.

The Court is impartial in praising the good and punishing the evil. As both the lay and clerical Tibetans are the children of His Majesty, they should not betray him in his effort to keep peace on the border and defend the Yellow Sect, but abide by the law and maintain peace

and order when the decisions contained in this edict are announced.

In addition to stripping the Dalai of his title, the Qing government dismissed from office all the ministers who fled with the Dalai, and ordered their arrests. For their punishment, Lian Yu suggested in a memorial to the throne:

The deposed Dalai is cunning and treacherous and has committed many crimes. Of the *Shangshang* officials who have fled with him, the dismissed Kaloon Paljor Dorje and Drungyig Chenpo Tenzin Wangpo should be executed summarily upon their arrests for treason and collaboration in the perpetration of crimes; the dismissed Kaloon Phuntsok Dondrub, the dismissed Lama Kaloon Kyilru Palzang, Dapon Delzang Gyaltsen and Sho Depa Legdrub should be sent into exile with the latter two dismissed from office when they are captured, for ganging up for criminal purposes and for the destruction of staging-post stations. Tseten Wangchuk, a *kaloon* still in office, and Jangtud Dorje, a *dapon* illegitimately appointed by the Dalai, should be removed from office and put under arrest for their involvement in the conspiracy and outrageous behaviour.

The announcement of the decision to depose the Dalai Lama was greeted by a wave of protests from Buddhists in China and abroad. According to *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

A conference of the lamaist monks in Darjeeling, India unanimously adopted a resolution demanding 1. the restoration to the Dalai Lama of his title, as they considered its removal by the Chinese government an affront to Buddhism; 2. the withdrawal of troops from Tibet by the Chinese government and 3. the dismissal of the amban from office.... In a joint memorial cabled to the Court, the governor of Xinjiang, the commander of the Yili garrison and the commissioners in Uliyasutai, Kobudu, Tarbahatai, Kulun and Altai expressed their disapproval of the Court's decision and asked the Court to call back the deposed Dalai and appease him. But the government refused.

To mitigate the opposition to its decision, the Qing government made the ambans the scapegoats. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recounts: "When the affairs in Tibet came to a head, the Court reprimanded the ambans for mishandling the situation. Assistant Amban Wen Zongyao tendered his resignation. The Court accepted it and ordered him to return by way of Sichuan for consultation on Tibetan affairs." In the seventh month of the

second year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1910) Wen sent a confidential memorial to the Qing government from Chengdu reporting the situation in Tibet and suggesting moves to be made. In conclusion he said:

What China needs for its administration of Tibet is an approach different from that adopted for the rest of the country, and an emphasis on effective control. Tibet should not be changed into a province now, but should be governed in the way a province is governed; its people should not be forced to change their way of life to that of the Hans but should be treated with as much care as the Han people are treated. With the Tibetans, a policy combining might and benevolence should produce better result than with other national minority groups such as the Mongolians. Now that the Dalai has been deposed, the leadership in the administration of Tibet, in my humble opinion, should be shared by the *hutuktus*, a system the superstitious Tibetans can accept as they believe in their reincarnation, and abolish altogether the system of incarnate Dalai Lamas so that power will be decentralized, leaving Britain and Russia with no one powerful enough to woo for selfish ends. As for military training, education, the opening of mines, the reclamation of wasteland, trade and colonization, they should be done in order of importance.

Faced with the grave situation in Tibet and the need to pacify the Tibetan people, the Qing government reversed some of the wrong decisions it made in connection with Tibet. It cancelled its appointment of Zhao Erfeng as amban and sent him to Sichuan as governor, dropped the idea of putting a new Dalai Lama on the throne, and sent men to India to try to talk the Dalai into returning to Tibet. But "the Dalai was suspicious of the intentions of the Qing. He demanded the restoration of his title, the withdrawal of troops from Tibet and the removal of Lian Yu from office. As the Qing Court would not withdraw its troops and dismiss the amban, nothing came of its effort to persuade, and the Dalai remained where he was."

The reversion of these decisions was merely the modification of some of the steps the Qing government took in relation to Tibet, not a change of policy. For example, Lian Yu made great efforts to effect political reform in Tibet by exploiting the power vacuum in

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet.*

the upper strata caused by the flight of the Dalai. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recounts:

When things in Tibet began to calm down, the Court decided to separate the government and the church in Tibet before a new Dalai Lama was installed. By this separation the Dalai would be in charge of Tibetan religious affairs while the amban would be in command of trade and foreign affairs with the power to make decisions on the basis of the instructions of the central government, and the Dalai would be barred from interfering with his authority. The Board of Foreign Affairs would notify foreign ministers in Beijing on the details of the separation and declare to them that the Chinese government would henceforth consider null and void anything that was done in connection with Tibet without approval requested through the amban, and that it would not recognize any treaty the Dalai Lama might conclude with foreign countries without its permission.

With respect to this, Lian Yu suggested two steps to be taken: structural adjustment in the Tibetan government and an increase in the number of Han officials in key government positions. Said he in a memorial dated the twelfth month of the year corresponding to 1910:

The restructuring of government should lay emphasis on the clear definition of areas of responsibility and the scope of authority of each official.... The government structure in Tibet is too simple to be effective. There are only two Resident Officials in Tibet; when they are at odds with each other on important matters, the government will stop functioning normally and an impossible situation will be created where honest officials will not know what to do while shady characters will have an opportunity to do whatever they like. This situation often subjects us to the contempt of the Tibetans and the ridicule of friendly countries.

The position of the Assistant Resident Official still remains vacant and needs to be filled now. Also, two councillors are needed, one for Ü and the other for Tsang. The Ü councillor will be the first councillor who will assist the Resident Officials to handle all important matters in accordance with the instructions of the Residents; the Tsang councillor will be the second councillor who will assist the Residents to handle trade affairs, connected with the three trade-marts in accordance with their instructions. Candidates who have the qualifications for the two positions will be recommended by the Residents for official appoint-

ment by the Court. Their creation may help the administration of Tibet as it will set the scope of authority of the Residents in clear terms and put the right people in the right places.

Lian Yu went on to suggest that

The areas west of Lhasa be provided with a commissioner to be stationed in Chisul; those east of it be provided with another commissioner to be stationed in Gyamda, and the Tsoba Sogu be also provided with such an official. They will be in charge of legal matters and supervise taxation in these places and at the same time get the work underway in education, handicraft industry, trade, land reclamation and the survey for mineral and salt mines.

The Qing government adopted all these proposals and appointed Luo Changqi first councillor and Qian Xibao second councillor.

In the book *Lian Yu's Memorials to the Throne on Tibet* two passages about the Dalai's flight to India are noteworthy. One is contained in a memorial dated the twentieth day of the second month in the second year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1910). In this memorial, entitled "A Detailed Account of the Deposed Dalai's Flight and a Request for the Punishment of the Tibetan Officials Fleeing with Him," the amban wrote: "After he learned that the army was approaching, the deposed Dalai, frightened, took the unexpected step of fleeing from the Potala the next night. He had intended to go to Tsang, but before he reached there, he changed his mind, as a result of instigation, and went to India instead." If we are to believe what this memorial says, the thirteenth Dalai Lama's original destination was not India but "Tsang." "Tsang" was the Tashilhunpo; he had intended to seek the protection of the ninth Panchen Lama. But then, as he was not sure if the Panchen was powerful enough to guarantee his personal safety, "he changed his mind" "before he reached there."

The other passage is in a report from Lou Changqi dated the eighteenth day of the eleventh month in the second year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1910). Entitled "A Detailed Report on the Failure of the Mission to India to Bring Back the Dalai by Persuasion," the document said,

The deposed Dalai had his residence at a place called Balunpo [transliteration] behind a mountain in Darjeeling. I sent men to him to

arrange a meeting.... I met with him on the afternoon of the ninth day of the ninth month.... The deposed Dalai was cunning when he talked to me. He claimed that it was he who had stopped the Tibetans from trying to fight the Sichuan army and prevented them from joining the British. He explained that he had come to Darjeeling because he had planned to go to Beijing by sea, but when he learned he had had his title removed, he was too ashamed to present himself in the capital. He said he would very much like to return to Tibet as he was being asked to, but he made his return subject to the condition that there should be no changes in Tibet's church and administration unless they were discussed one by one and officially recorded as measures to remedy the situation in Tibet.

What the Dalai meant was that he had planned to go to Beijing by way of India and take his grievances against Lian Yu to the Qing monarch. That would have been the correct approach to the settlement of the disputes between him and the amban and a concrete expression of his recognition of the Qing government's jurisdiction over Tibet, but he could not do as he wished because when he got to India the Qing government had ordered the "removal" of his "title," making him "too ashamed to present himself in the capital." The Dalai might have added that he knew he was likely to be thrown into jail if he had gone to Beijing; it was this fear that kept him in Darjeeling, and made him adopt his wait-and-see policy. His exile to India, therefore, should be blamed chiefly on the erroneous policy of the Qing government towards Tibet.

While the Dalai was in India, Lian Yu tried, as his predecessor did, to install the Panchen on the Dalai's throne. The Panchen had been invited to Lhasa and rewarded the Sichuan army with three large silver ingots. Writes Macdonald in his *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

The Lama told me it was true that the Chinese wanted him to take the Dalai Lama's place in Lhasa, but that he had flatly refused. He admitted that he had sat in the latter's throne-room during an interview with the ambans, but explained that this was only because no other seat had been provided. He seemed to think that this incident had been deliberately planned by the Chinese to implicate him in their schemes. The Tashi Lama insisted that he went to Lhasa on this occasion only under compulsion, and that he would sooner die than act contrary to the Dalai Lama's interests. He appeared to be desirous of maintaining

friendly relations with both the British and the Chinese, and spoke with evident appreciation of his visit to India, where he had met His Majesty King George, then Prince of Wales, in Calcutta. He remembered His Majesty, and asked after his health, and that of the Royal Family.

During his stay in Lhasa, the Panchen noticed that his presence there was not viewed favourably by Tibetan leaders. So he declined the offer of the Dalai's position and returned to the Tashilhunpo in 1911 (the third year of Emperor Xuantong's reign). Macdonald had this to say about the Panchen's trip to Lhasa in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

... It must be noted that the Chinese had officially deposed the Dalai Lama from the rulership of Tibet in 1910, after his flight to India, and had asked the Tashi Lama to take his place. The Tashi Lama was wise enough to refuse to do this, but committed a political blunder in going near Lhasa at all during that time. His visit at least gave the impression that he was prepared to consider the Chinese offer.... The Tashi Lama soon saw the folly of remaining there, and returned to his monastery towards the end of 1911....

Macdonald was wrong. The Panchen did nothing improper when he went to Lhasa he was invited by the amban, nor did he do anything wrong when he declined the offer of the Dalai's position, because he did not want to betray the larger interests of the nation and to upset the balance of power in Tibet. Nothing he did can be called a "political blunder."

Meanwhile, Zhao Erfeng remained in Kham after he was appointed governor of Sichuan, and for over a year he continued with great zeal to reform the *tusi* system there, and worked on a proposal to create a Xikang province in the region east of Gyamda and west of Tachienlu. Recounts his brief biography:

On the fourth day of the sixth month in the year corresponding to 1910, Zhao Erfeng arrived in Draya [south of Chamdo] with an army. During an inspection tour to Jendum Thang in Draya, he reviewed legal cases and reformed the *hutuktu's* tax regulations there ... and provided Draya with a commissioner. In the ninth month, when the natives of Sangan declared war on him, he took his troops to Konchog on the twenty-first day of the ninth month, and sent Fu Songmu with army to attack Sangan. The army took the place after a ten-day battle, and beginning with the eleventh month Sangan had a commissioner. In the

twelfth month, Zhao checked the census and grain levies in Konchog and provided it with a commissioner. Then he journeyed eastward. Having arrived in Bathang in the first month of the third year of Emperor Xuantong's reign (1911), he examined Tibetan students there and in a reply to the Court asked for government appropriations for the schools. In the second month, the troops he sent subdued the lamaist monks who had held out against him for several years in the Nangzang Monastery in Derong, Bathang. Then a commissioner was installed in Derong.... On the sixth day of the fourth month, he recommended Fu Songmu to the Court for the post of acting commissioner for Sichuan and Yunnan. The next day the Court informed him of its acceptance of his recommendation in a telegram. On the eighth day Fu assumed office. The next day Zhao left Bathang with Fu. They arrived in Khangsar and Mazur, and appointed a commissioner for Ganze. Then they ordered the *tusis* of Lingsang, Beri, Trehor, Tongkhor, Dado, Yukhog and Tsagla to turn in their seals of authority and accept the reform.... Amban Lian Yu had previously asked the Court in a telegram for a joint military attack on Pome by troops from the border regions. So Zhao and Fu in a joint memorial to the Court asked to be permitted to send Deputy Commander-in-Chief Feng Shan to join in the attack with two thousand men. On the twenty-eighth day of the fifth month Zhao and Fu descended on Nyagrang from Ganze. They drove out the Tibetan officials there and recovered the territory. Then they installed a commissioner for Nyagrang and called a meeting of the inhabitants to discuss the levies of grain. When they arrived in Dawu from Nyagrang on the fifteenth day, they explained to the inhabitants at a gathering why there must be a commissioner for Dawu. When they arrived in Tachienlu on the twentieth day, they ordered the *tusis* of Gothang and Drase to surrender their seals of authority and accept the reform of their system. The next day at a public gathering they talked to the residents of Tachienlu on the necessity for the reform of the *tusi* system. On the twenty-second day Zhao Erfeng entered Sichuan. On the way he had the official seals of the Dzaling, Lingpa and Drenpen *tusis* surrendered to him. On the eighth day of the sixth month Zhao assumed office as governor of Sichuan.

On the sixteenth day of the sixth month in the year corresponding to 1911, Fu Songmu, Acting Commissioner for Sichuan and Yunnan, proposed the creation of a Xikang province in a memorial to the Qing government. Said the memorial:

The lamaist *tusis* recognize only the authority of Tibet; to them the

Court is nonexistent. Since the twentieth year of the reign of Emperor Dejong, they have rebelled again and again, compelling as many military actions by the Court: in Xiangcheng (Chadren) the *tusi* entrenched there killed their superiors; in Tibet men sent from Draya attacked the imperial envoys; in Tanning they killed our soldiers over the mining dispute, and in Bathang they murdered government officials because of a dispute over land reclamation.... Now the reform of the *tusi* system has been completed in enough regions of county size for them to form a province.... As this frontier region has been called Kham since ancient times, and as it is situated in the west, the new province may be given the name Xikang [*xi* means west in Chinese]. With a garrison there, the new province will serve as a shield protecting Sichuan and Yunnan provinces and strengthen the security of Tibet.

But the proposal was shelved because of the 1911 Revolution.

British Imperialist Plots to Sever Tibet from China

As soon as the Dalai Lama crossed into Kalimpong from Yadong on his flight to India, Charles Bell, the British political representative in Sikkim, was summoned to Calcutta by the Indian government for a secret meeting to discuss what to do about the Dalai Lama. Said Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

The Dalai Lama and his Ministers now turned to those towards whom until recent years they had been invariably hostile. The position was unprecedented; a few years earlier it would have been impossible. We had to consider how we should treat him and his Ministers, the heads of the country with which we had lately been at war. I was summoned to Calcutta to confer with the Government on these matters. Lord Morley's instructions to the Indian Government were to adopt a strictly noncommittal attitude on all points at issue between China and Tibet. But it seemed important to utilize this opportunity of strengthening our friendship with Tibet, by according good treatment to the sacred personality of the Dalai Lama. The Indian Foreign Office appreciated the position and allowed me to place at His Holiness's disposal a house with retired grounds on the outskirts of Darjeeling, and to give him periodical presents of food and other things in accordance with Tibetan custom. The total cost during the two years

or so that the Lama remained was, I think, less than five thousand pounds, an insignificant amount, when compared with the lasting good name that we gained.

After resting in Kalimpong for a few days, the Dalai went to Darjeeling at Bell's invitation. During his short stay there, he had his board and lodging paid for by Britain. In Darjeeling he met with Bell for the first time. This is what Bell wrote about the meeting in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

I went to Darjeeling before the Dalai Lama arrived there, and had my first interview with him immediately upon his arrival. After the usual complimentary exchanges, he dismissed all his attendants and we sat together alone. He then declared that the Chinese Emperor had promised him in Peking that there would be no curtailment of his former power and position as Dalai Lama, and that no harm would be done to the Tibetan people. These promises had been broken.

In March 1910 the Dalai and his entourage left Darjeeling for Calcutta in the company of Charles Bell. In Calcutta he met with Minto, Viceroy of India on March 14. *India and Tibet* says of the meeting:

From Darjiling the Dalai Lama proceeded to Calcutta, where, on March 14, after an exchange of formal visits, he had a private interview with the Viceroy. He expressed his reliance on the British Government and his gratitude for their hospitality. The difficulties between Tibet and Britain in 1888 and 1903 had been caused by China. The promises of the Emperor and Dowager Emperess had been disregarded by the Amban, who had clearly shown that he would leave the Tibetans no power. He appealed to us to secure the observance of the right that the Tibetans had of dealing directly with the British. But he further desired the withdrawal of Chinese influence, so that his position might be that of the fifth Dalai Lama, who had conducted negotiations, as the ruler of a friendly State, with the Emperor. There should also be withdrawal of Chinese troops. The Treaties of 1890 and 1906, to which they were not parties, could not be recognized by the Tibetans. He was cut off from communication with the Regent whom he had left at Lhasa, although he and his Ministers were the Government of Tibet, and had the seals of office. All travellers were stopped and searched by the Chinese, and, unless sent secretly, no official letters got through. He had received some private letters. He would not return to Lhasa unless this matter was settled satisfactorily. What his eventual destination would

be he could not say; he wished to return to Darjiling for the present. After the violation of the promises which the Dowager Empress gave him, he would not trust the Peking Government's written assurance. Intrigue on his part against the Chinese he denied. The Amban was altogether hostile, and a hostile policy had been adopted by the Chinese.... He inquired, at the conclusion of the interview, how his appeal was answered. In reply Lord Minto said that at present he could give no reply at all, but that he was very glad to make his acquaintance, to extend hospitality, and to hear his views, which would be placed before His Majesty's Government.

That is the British version of the interview; just how truthful it is is hard to say. If what it says is true, then the views expressed by the Dalai were those of the reactionary big serf-owners of Tibet.

After he returned to Darjeeling from Calcutta, the Dalai lived in a rented house called Padabuk until the fall of 1911 (the third year of Emperor Xuantong's reign) when he went to Kalimpong. The Bhutanese king had vacated a large and magnificent country house he had in Kalimpong to accommodate the Dalai. The Dalai did not leave Kalimpong until the day he started on his journey home.

Once the British imperialists had the Dalai in their pocket, they changed their tactics in their aggression of Tibet. Previously, they resorted to military conquests and tried to bind Tibet with treaties. Now with the Dalai in their control, they planned to engineer through the Dalai the severance of the members of the Tibetan upper class from China with the deceptive promise to "help Tibet win independence from China" so that they would fight their motherland and the Han people instead of Britain. The British imperialists believed that their new tactics would enable them to turn Tibet into a *de facto* British protectorate and colony and run it without the physical presence of British officials there.

The change of the Dalai's position was dictated by the interests of the class he represented; it also had to do with the effort the British imperialists made to lure him to their side when he was in Beijing. And the wrong decisions the Qing government made in regard to Tibet also contributed to some extent to this change. Had it not been for the appointment of Zhao Erfeng as amban, had it not been for the wanton killing committed by the Sichuan army in Tibet, the conflict between the Dalai on one side and the amban

and the Qing government on the other might not have culminated in the former's flight to India, although such conflict would have remained as acute as ever. However, the switch of the Dalai's stand involved only a section of the Tibetan upper class, not everyone in that social stratum. The Panchen, for example, stayed on good terms with the Qing government in spite of what happened. As for the labouring people of Tibet, the bulk of the Tibetan race, the Dalai's flight to India did not in the least affect their resolve to fight the imperialists. The demonstration by Lhasa residents protesting the presence of Charles Bell in their city and the beating of the Tsarong, the leader of pro-British elements, were clear indications that the Tibetan people remained as active as ever in their struggle against the British imperialists.

After the Dalai's interview with the Viceroy of India, the British imperialists assumed the role of the Dalai's protector. In June 1910 Britain sent two battalions of infantry, four guns and some sappers to a place called Langthang on the Indian-Tibetan border. The secretary of the British embassy in Beijing informed the Qing's foreign affairs board of this troop movement in a note dated June 19. The note said that the presence of Indian troops in Langthang was for the protection of British merchants in Tibet, and guaranteed that unless in the case of extreme danger, the troops would not go beyond the border and provoke the Han garrison troops. But it threatened that if the thirteenth Dalai returned to Tibet and turmoil ensued, endangering the lives and property of British merchants, the British-Indian troops at Langthang would enter Tibet to protect them.

Judging by what the note said, the presence of British troops at Langthang was undoubtedly intended as support for the Dalai in his effort to return to Tibet and his attempt to sever Tibet from the motherland. Macdonald did not make a secret of the Dalai's intentions. He wrote in *Twenty Years in Tibet*: "From the time he left his country, the Dalai Lama had been constantly working through emissaries with the object of freeing Tibet from Chinese domination."

During his stay in Darjeeling, the Dalai remained in close contact with the Kashag and maintained secret communication with it through travellers to and from Tibet and through correspondence

with it. According to his biography, he received representatives from the Kashag, including Khendrung (grand secretary) Tenzin Choskyi, Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoche Phalha Jampa Chogsang and Chipon (officer in charge of government stables) Rikashag Sey in Darjeeling soon after he returned from Calcutta. Representatives from the three great monasteries and Yanggong Rimpoche of the Ganden's Gyangtse Dratsang were also among his visitors. They crossed into Darjeeling by detouring along the trails on the border, and brought to the Dalai his supplies and reports from the Kashag.

Tibet After the 1911 Revolution

In the fall of 1911 (the third year of Emperor Xuantong's reign) a revolution broke out in China. The British imperialists took this opportunity to urge the Dalai Lama to stage anti-Han riots all over Tibet as part of their plot to tear the region away from China. According to the biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, soon after the eruption of the revolution, the viceroy of India, Minto, paid a special visit to the Dalai in Darjeeling and had a long talk with him behind closed doors. After that, the Dalai sent Dazang Dadul (Tsarong) to Tibet on the secret mission of organizing attacks on the Han people in Tibet.

In September 1911, violent quarrels broke out within the ranks of the Sichuan army stationed in Lhasa. Reports *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

When disputes arose in September following the scramble for the right to build railroads in Sichuan, the Sichuan troops stationed in Tibet took the incident as an excuse to stir up trouble. To bring them under control, Zhong Ying, their former commander, was released from custody in Trashi by Lian Yu at the request of Second Councillor Qian Xibao. But Zhong took vengeance on his personal enemies: under the pretext of pacifying the troops, he murdered [First Councillor] Luo Changqi on a mountain trail south of Kongpo, then he put Legal Councillor Fan Jin and Secretary Li Weixin to death, and finally he killed He Guangxie and his son in cold blood. At the time a revolution was sweeping interior China. Zhong organized a task force for the

protection of the monarch with Lian Yu as its commander, and demanded from the Tibetan local government 100,000 *liang* of silver in army pay and five thousand yaks and horses for the trip back to Sichuan. Too frightened by the strength of the Han troops to refuse, the Tibetan local government paid them 60,000 *liang* of silver and provided them with all the transport facilities they asked for. But Lian Yu did not move the troops back to Sichuan after he got the money. And the soldiers, their pockets now bulging with money, took to whoring and gambling, and when they had squandered all their pay in a short time, they began to hunt down women and loot the shops. In the rampage they destroyed nearly all the houses in the vicinity of the Jokhang.

Meanwhile, a section of the Sichuan army led by Xie Guoliang defected to the Kashag. The defectors fought Zhong Ying's men for ten months.

In November, the Sichuan troops stationed in Yadong mutinied. According to *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

In November 1911 came the overthrow of the Monarch and the establishment of the Republic of China. The immediate effects of this, as far as Tibet was concerned, were that the Chinese garrison and officials in that country were left without orders or pay. Chaos reigned in their motherland, and the trouble quickly spread to the Chinese in Tibet. Dissension broke out among the officials, some declaring for the Monarchy, others upholding the Republic.... In accordance with their political beliefs, the rank and file of the Choten Karpo garrison had mutinied, had seized the persons of their monarchist officers, and looted their belongings. They had tied their commander to a stake, with the avowed intention of torturing him to death. The troops also demanded their arrears of pay, which, of course, the officers were unable to give.... The Chinese garrison of Choten Karpo, short of food and money, began to loot neighbouring Tibetan villages, intimidating their remaining officers into acquiescence.... I heard next day that there had been fighting in which both sides had suffered casualties, several Chinese also having been taken captive.... A week later the Chinese at Old Yatung, the frontier post, decided that there was nothing to be gained by remaining in Tibet without pay and in the midst of a hostile people. They sold their rifles, ammunition and equipment to the local Tibetans, and marched over the Jelap Pass to India.

What the Yadong troops did (most of them later returned to China

from India) was copied by the Sichuan soldiers stationed in Phari. *Twenty Years in Tibet* records what happened there:

... The Chinese garrison of Pharijong ... shortly afterwards arrived in the Chumbi Valley.... The Tibetan Trade Agent at Yatung, the Pishi Depon, and the commander of the Chinese were each frightened of the other.... Eventually, I managed to get them together, and soon had them talking. Finally, they arrived at the point where the Chinese wanted to sell the Depon thirty rifles and some ammunition.... After a lot of haggling, as I knew would be the case, a price of fifty Indian rupees per rifle was agreed on, the ammunition being thrown in free. As soon as the purchase money was paid the Chinese handed over the rifles, and moved out of Tibet to India.

In March 1912 (the first year of the Republic of China), when there was nothing left in Lhasa for them to loot, the Sichuan soldiers under Zhong Ying turned to the Sera. The monastery was then a storehouse of riches as aristocrats, government officials and wealthy merchants of Lhasa were taking refuge there. But the attackers were repulsed by the monastery's monks. The following is an account of the violent incident in *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

In the third month of the first year of the Republic of China, the Sichuan troops attacked the Sera monastery, firing on it from all sides for three days in an attempt to loot its wealth, but the Sera did not fall to them, and when several thousand of its monks poured out of the monastery, striking with great force, the Sichuan troops were put to rout. The victorious monks then took [their camps in] Trashi, put their quarters to the torch and destroyed the walls around them. By then the *Shangshang* had recruited more than ten thousand new soldiers to make up for the heavy casualties inflicted on the Tibetans by the Sichuan army. For many days on end these soldiers under the command of Xie Guoliang engaged Zhong Ying's troops in fierce battle. The *Shangshang* also issued a proclamation on behalf of the Dalai Lama ordering monk officials and lamaist monks throughout Tibet to attack Han troops.

The following is the main content of the Dalai's orders issued by the Kashag:

The people in the interior provinces have overthrown the monarch and established a new government. Tibet will henceforth not abide by

the decisions made and decrees issued by the Hans regarding Tibet, and officials sent to Tibet by the new government, recognizable by the blue clothing they wear, shall not be provided with any supplies except *ula* services. Now that the Tibetan people can no longer rely on Hans troops for protection, what is to be done to consolidate the position of Tibet is a question to which my people should give much thought. The *dzongpons* throughout Tibet have met and sworn themselves into an alliance [by drinking the blood of sacrifices] for joint action in the future.

The Han officials and troops are in Tibet for the sole purpose of monopolizing the powers of our government. Their failure to honour the agreement to protect the Tibetan people has proved them to be unworthy of our trust. Now they are robbing us and trampling on our rights, depriving us of our homes and reducing us to roaming refugees. Such atrocities are unheard of. They are apparently intended to keep us under the yoke forever. What has made these atrocities possible? The presence of the Hans in Tibet! Therefore, all the *dzongpons* and local chiefs, from the day this proclamation is issued, are expected to take resolute action. They are to drive out all Hans from their areas; for those whose areas have no Hans living in them, it is necessary to guard them closely to keep off the Hans. There is nothing more important than clearing Tibet of every single Han.

This proclamation and the canvassing by Dazang Dadul among the various monasteries soon produced a Tibetan militia of more than ten thousand with Dazang Dadul as its commander-in-chief. The militia, under his unified command, attacked the Sichuan troops in Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse.

In this turmoil that involved all of Tibet, the majority of the aristocrats, both lay and clerical, threw in their lot with the Dalai; only the Tangyeling Monastery of the Panchen's faction and most of the Drepung monks sided with the Qing government. Said *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*: "When taking refuge in the Drepung, Lian Yu gave Zhong Ying his seal of authority, making him acting amban. Confronted with extreme danger, they appealed to the Panchen for aid. The Panchen complied by secretly ordering the monks of the Drepung to help them." Charles Bell gives a similar account of this in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

The Tashi Lamà's Government had secret relations with the Chinese, and offered no help to their Lhasan brothers, until compelled almost

by force. The ten thousand monks in the Dre-pung Monastery, the largest in Tibet, sided with the Chinese, until some of their leading monks had been executed, and even then gave only a half-hearted support to the Head of the Faith. For the largest college in this monastery is peopled by monks from the borders of China, who are by no means prepared to fight against the Power that overshadows their homes. The Ten-gyeling Monastery, whose head [the former regent Demo Hutuktu] had been imprisoned with such severity that he died, when the Dalai came to power, and whose property had been appropriated, fought openly for the Chinese.

Among those who sided with the Qing were also some of the kaloons. Records *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

The Sino-Tibetan trouble in Lhasa ... came to a head in September 1912. There was continuous and heavy fighting, in which the Tibetans were as a rule worsted, chiefly owing to treachery in their own ranks. It was found that the Chinese were always informed beforehand of any move that the Tibetans intended making. A careful check was instituted, and a high Tibetan official was found to be sending messages fastened to arrows into the Chinese yamen. He was executed on the spot, and this salutary example put a stop to similar leakage of news. One of the then chief ministers of Tibet, the Tsarong Shap-pe—there were four shap-pes in the Kashag: one monk, three laymen, holding the second rank in government—the only one to remain behind and carry on his duties when the Dalai Lama and the rest of the ministers fled to India, was also suspected of pro-Chinese activities. The lamas of the Sera Monastery dragged him from the council chamber at the Potala and killed him without any form of trial. Several other high Tibetan officers, including one of the sons of the murdered Tsarong, were also suspected of aiding the Chinese. They were killed by the Sera priests at the same time.

The Sichuan troops that were picked by the commander-in-chief of the new Tibetan militia as its first target of attack were those stationed in Gyantse. Writes Macdonald in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

On receiving information that trouble was brewing, I went with all haste to the former place (Gyantse), in the hope of settling matters between the Chinese and Tibetans peaceably. Prior to my arrival the Gyantse Tibetans had sent a body of troops to prevent the Chinese garrison of Shigatse from joining up with that of Gyantse. This move

was the signal for the opening of hostilities.... A body of Tibetan troops had set out to ambush a party of Chinese coming to Gyantse from Shigatse, and for this purpose had hidden themselves in a house at Yayegang.... They fired on the passing Chinese, who at once returned their fire. The Chinese then attacked the house, and killed several Tibetans, among them the second-in-command of the party.... The Tibetans threw down a white scarf, intimating that they surrendered. They were disarmed, tied pigtail to pigtail, and marched into Gyantse. There, after an inquiry by the Chinese, thirty-six of them were shot, and their commander beheaded. I arrived just as this had happened, too late to prevent it. A body of Chinese troops from Lhasa, roughly one hundred in number, arrived shortly afterwards to reinforce the Gyantse garrison, and fighting between the Chinese and Tibetans became general.... Tibetan troops in considerable numbers now began to arrive from the country north of Gyantse, gathered by Chensa Namgang [Dazang Dadul] of Chaksam Ferry fame. With these soldiers the Tibetans were able to surround the paper factory.... One day both the Chinese and Tibetan delegates arrived at the Post together, and, having greeted each other with the utmost punctiliousness, announced their desire to come to a definite understanding. The position seemed to be that while the Chinese had good modern rifles and plenty of ammunition, they had no food. On the other side, to force their opponents out of the paper factory, the Tibetans ... would certainly suffer many casualties in doing so. The proposal now was that the Chinese should deposit their weapons with me, and that as soon as the Tibetans had deposited ten thousand rupees, as payment for these, I should hand the rifles over to the Tibetans, and the cash to the Chinese, who undertook to leave Tibet without giving further trouble. On their part, the Tibetans promised to provide the Chinese with free transport and rations as far as the frontier at the Jelap Pass.... The problem was eventually solved by the Tibetans paying over, on the spot, nine thousand two hundred and fifty Chinese rupees, and receiving in exchange one hundred and forty-four rifles, plus a large quantity of ammunition. The demand for free transport and rations was also agreed upon.... Four copies of an Agreement were drawn up, and signed by the Chinese and Tibetan leaders, and by the Nepalese representative and myself as private witnesses.... The Agreement was dated 3rd April 1912.... Once they had received the money for their arms, the Chinese left Gyantse, and reached India without any serious trouble.

With the Sichuan troops in Gyantse put out of action, Dazang Dadul's militia launched its attack on those stationed in Shigatse.

Twenty Years in Tibet records the events surrounding this incident:

After the conference in Gyantse both Chinese and Tibetans sent word to their compatriots in Shigatse to cease hostilities, as peace had been made. Despite these instructions, however, the Chensa Namgang [Dazang Dadul], who had returned to Tibet, attacked the Chinese in the Shigatse fort, but was beaten off with heavy losses. After this futile effort a treaty similar to that made in Gyantse was effected between the Chinese and Tibetans in Shigatse, the former selling their arms and ammunition in order to obtain funds for their journey to China. They went down to India by the same route as their Gyantse confrères. During the fighting in Shigatse and its environs some stray bullets had struck the walls of the Tashilhunpo Monastery, where the Tashi Lama was in residence. This prelate, alarmed for his safety, promptly fled towards Khamba Jong, a town on the northern Sikkim-Tibet frontier. I was in Gyantse at the time, and a courier arrived with a letter addressed to me from His Serenity asking me to meet him at Kala, a staging-post on the Gyantse-Pharijong road, on a matter of life and death. As things were quiet in Gyantse I was able to proceed at once to Kala.... His Serenity was very glad to see me, and so were his ministers.... He asked me what course he should pursue in these troubled times, and I strongly advised him to return to the Tashilhunpo and to remain there quietly, watching events. After considering for a while he decided to do so, especially as I pointed out to him that to absent himself from Shigatse at this time would only lead to his being suspected of pro-Chinese sympathies. His enemies would be certain to connect the departure of the Chinese and the Lama's flight.

Now that Gyantse and Shigatse had been cleared of Sichuan troops, the Dalai Lama decided it was time for him to return to Tibet. On the tenth day of the fifth Tibetan month in the year corresponding to 1912 (the first year of the Republic of China) the Dalai left Kalimpong for Tibet. He was seen off with great pomp by the British officials stationed in Kalimpong. At Atsakara send-off tents were erected in his honour by the king of Drenjong. When he arrived in Phari from Yadong, he was provided with a guard of two hundred fully armed monk soldiers from the three great monasteries. At the Ralung Monastery the Dalai was greeted by the Panchen who had journeyed from the Tashilhunpo for the purpose. Recounts *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

By this time both the Grand Lamas had telegraphed to the Govern-

ment of India asking that I should be sent to Ralung to attend the conference, and to act as a mediator between them. However, much as I would have liked to have been there, I felt that since Ralung was within the sphere of the Gyantse Agency it would be more fitting if the British Trade Agent from that place attended the meeting.

A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet records the event this way: "The Panchen greeted the Dalai in Gyantse. The Dalai imposed a fine of 400,000 *liang* of silver on the Panchen for aiding the Hans. The Panchen paid the fine with money borrowed from a British official. From then on, the relations between the two began to deteriorate."

Of the feud between the two *Twenty Years in Tibet* writes:

[That matters had not been settled was apparent from] a letter I received from the Lonchen Shokang shortly after his return to Lhasa. It was only when I read this that I realized the extent of the hatred some of the Dalai Lama's ministers bore towards the Tashi Lama. Among other accusations, the following chief charges were brought against him and his ministers: 1. that the Tashi Lama had gone to Lhasa at the invitation of the Chinese, during the absence of the Dalai Lama, and had seated himself on a throne in the place usually occupied by that of the latter.... 2. that certain of the Tashi Lama's ministers were pro-Chinese in their sympathies. 3. that at the time of the Younghusband Mission, in 1904, the Tashi Lama's Government was reluctant to assist the Central Government at Lhasa. 4. that the Tashi Lama's Government was in arrears of revenue to the extent of several lakhs of rupees, these arrears having accumulated since 1904. The Lonchen Shokang asked me to arrange for the publication of these charges in prominent Indian newspapers....

These records show that the two men had by now become bitterly opposed.

The Dalai did not go to Gyantse after he left the Ralung but journeyed to Nankartse Dzong by way of Dralakamo. In Nankartse, he stayed in the Samding; he was not yet able to return to Lhasa because the war was still on there.

Soon after he came to the Samding, he received letters from Lian Yu and Zhong Ying asking him send his representatives to Lhasa for negotiations. The Dalai made Lochen Changkhyimpa, Sera Tripa Rimpoche Tsawa and Tse Dronyer Tenzin Gyaltsan repre-

sentatives to the peace talks in Lhasa. *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* writes of the negotiations:

On July 6, 1912, the Tibetan forces in Lhasa closed in on Zhong Ying's troops in a general offensive. The Sichuan troops had by now run out of supplies and were being attacked from all sides. When they couldn't hold out any longer, they asked on July 30 the Gurkha representative in Tibet, Kapotin, to mediate a truce. Then four terms of peace were agreed upon. They were: 1. The Sichuan army was to hand its arms and ammunition to the Gurkha representative to be stored up in Tibet. These arms and ammunition were not to be removed from the place of deposit without the joint permission of the Han, Gurkha and Tibetan representatives. 2. All the Han troops were to return to China via India, but the imperial envoys and officials in charge of grain supply and national minority affairs were to remain in Tibet. 3. Imperial envoys were permitted to retain thirty rifles and commanding officers, sixty. 4. After the Han troops left Tibet, an indemnity was to be negotiated to compensate for the losses in property caused by the riots.... On August 16, Zhong Ying, in the presence of the Gurkha representative, handed over to the Tibetan government roughly 1,500 mausers of various types, three guns, one machine-gun and eighty boxes of cartridges.... After the agreement was signed, the majority of the Han troops stationed in Tibet left Lhasa on September 1 for home via India.

Tibet's consent to the continued presence in Tibet of the ambans and other officials, as provided for by one of the peace terms, meant that the Dalai was not insisting on the separation of Tibet from the motherland. But the collapse of the Qing empire, of which Lian Yu was a henchman, had made it impossible for him to stay in Tibet as amban. Because of that the connection between the local government of Tibet and the central authority was temporarily cut off.

The Dalai remained in the Samding Monastery for about two months. After the cease-fire agreement was signed, he left for Lhasa on the twenty-ninth day of the eighth month, and reached the Chokhor Yangtse Monastery after crossing the Yarlung Zangpo at Nyihsu. As the Sichuan troops had not completed their withdrawal from Lhasa, the Dalai had to stay in the Chokhor Yangtse until the sixth day of the twelfth month. On the sixteenth day of that month he was welcomed back to Lhasa with as much pomp as when he

returned from Beijing.

The first thing the Dalai did after his return was to punish the monks and monasteries that had supported the amban. Records *Twenty Years in Tibet*: "Having entered the Potala, one of his first acts was to disestablish the 'royal' monastery of Tengyeling, and to disperse its monks, who were accused of aiding the Chinese. This monastery has since been turned into a Post and Telegraph Office." *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* offers a similar account: "When the Han soldiers left Lhasa for India, some of the monks that had helped the Hans went with them. This incurred the hatred of the Dalai, who then had the grand khenpo of the Drepung assassinated in Phoddo Dzong."

Next, the Dalai rewarded with promotions those who had distinguished themselves in the war against the Sichuan army. Leading the list of those promoted was Dazang Dadul, commander-in-chief of the Ü-Tsang militia; he rose from being a commoner all the way to the status of a *dzasa*, and was given all the estates and retainers of the pro-Han *kaloön* Tsarong, who had been killed by the Sera monks, thus becoming known as the Tsarong Dzasa. Following Dazang was Regent Tsemonling; as he had handled Tibetan affairs to the immense satisfaction of the Dalai during his exile and had led the Tibetans in their struggle to drive out the Sichuan troops, he was rewarded with the title of *hutuktu*, a seal bearing the title, the trappings of a *hutuktu* including all the clothing compatible with his position, saddles, *bob chok* (satin bags carried across the shoulders by the Dalai's attendants), yellow canopies, and many estates. The regent's *chanzod* was promoted to the position of *khenjun*. The two others rewarded were the Sera's *lhaje* (title of a monk official), who was appointed superintendent of the Dam Eight Banners by the Dalai for his competent leadership of the monk soldiers in their resistance against the Sichuan troops, and the Ganden's *lhaje*, who, for the same reason, was made the *dzongpon* of Tsona by the Dalai.

Another thing the Dalai did after his return to Lhasa was to call a meeting of the local headmen of various *dzongchis* to hear their opinions on what internal and external policy Tibet should adopt for the future. *Tibet: Past and Present* says:

After the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in 1912, orders were sent to each district in the two central provinces (Ü-Tsang) to send four representatives to give their opinions both on matters of external policy and on any features of the internal administration that seemed to them in need of reform.... Among the questions then discussed were: With what Foreign Power or Powers should Tibet make friends? Should the size of the army be increased, and, if so, how should the revenue to pay for this be obtained? What reforms, if any, should be introduced into the administration of justice? To the first question the usual replies were: "Make friends with Britain; she is the nearest to Lhasa. Make friends with any one Power and then stick to her. Make friends with China; she is strong and populous. Unless you can insure some other strong Power helping Tibet, China will take revenge on us later." Regarding the raising of revenue, the replies were: "Make the landed estates of the aristocracy pay rent and give cash salaries to those who serve the Government, instead of paying them, as at present, mostly by their rent-free grants of land." "Make the monastic estates pay rent and give the monasteries subsidies in cash." But others objected that the three great monasteries (Sera, Drepung, and Ganden) would never obey an order of that kind. "Increase the size of the army. Pay the soldiers in cash and give land to their parents. Increase the amounts lent to the traders from the Government treasuries, and thus increase the revenue." The preoccupation of the campaign in eastern Tibet prevented much action being taken on the suggestions of the people. But the army has been increased, as has the amount lent to the traders. And to some extent the soldiers are now paid in cash. The representatives were mostly managers of landed estates, large or small, government or private. They stated their opinions more readily than might have been expected, for it was the first time in the history of Tibet that such a gathering had taken place. In difficult matters of foreign policy, however, especially where China was concerned, the Dalai Lama preferred to rely on the advice of his Ministers or on his own initiative. For the National Assembly took too long a time over its deliberations. And by writing conciliatory letters, the Chinese won over a good many of its members to their side.

Bell's account indicated that although the Tibetan upper class was not happy about the way the Qing government ran Tibet, not everyone in that class stood for the suspension of ties between the local government of Tibet and the central authority, least of all the clerical and lay Tibetans in the lower class. Even Charles Bell had

to admit to the existence of this sentiment. He wrote in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

There is undoubtedly a pro-Chinese party in Tibet among the officials, the priests, and the people. This is due to the natural affinity and the long connexion between the two countries.... Among the peasantry too we hear from time to time of those who express a wish that the Chinese would return.... Though bent on freedom from Chinese control, the Tibetans do not, it would appear, desire a complete severance of their long-standing political connexion with China.

Evidently, the temporary disruption of the connection between Tibet and the central authority was entirely the work of the British imperialists and a handful of pro-imperialist separatists in power in the Tibetan upper class, a disruption that betrayed the will of the broad masses of the Tibetan people in both the upper and lower classes.

The Sichuan Army's Attempt to Return to Tibet

Simultaneously with the campaign in Tibet to expel the Sichuan army, widespread armed riots raged in Tibetan Kham, where Zhao Erfeng had transformed the *tusi* system, to drive out Han officials and soldiers and return the deposed *tusis* and the monasteries to power. Writes Xie Bin in *The Tibetan Question*:

The Dalai Lama ... at the same time called on the Tibetans living on the Sichuan-Tibetan border to take this opportunity to declare independence. When the Tibetans rose in response to the call, the forces that Zhao Erfeng and Fu Songmu had spent many years fostering in these regions were put out of existence overnight. Soon reports of the fall of Lithang to the rebels, the killing of its magistrate by them, the surrender of Yanjing and the flight of Han troops reached Beijing one after the other. The only regions that successfully held out against the attacking Tibetans were the three counties of Luding (formerly Dzaling, Drenpen and Lingpa), Kangding (formerly Tsagla) and Ba'an (formerly Bathang) in the south, and the eight counties of Daofu (formerly Mazur and Khangsar), Zhanhua (formerly Nyagrong), Luhuo (formerly Tongkhor), Ganze, Derge, Danko, Sershud and Chamdo in the north.

By now the government of the Republic of China had been established in Beijing with Yuan Shikai as president. The new government, which claimed to represent "a republic of the five nationalities," was no different in class character from its predecessor, for the change of government meant merely the substitution of the Han landlord class, which oppressed the nation's minority races in much the same way as the Qing government did, for the Manchu aristocracy. That explains why Yuan Shikai ordered Yin Changheng, military governor of Sichuan Province, to crush the insurgency in Kham with the Sichuan army. Recounts *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

On June 14 in the first year of the Republic [1912] the central government ordered Yin Changheng in a cable to launch a military attack in the west. In anticipation of misunderstanding on the part of Britain, Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang told the British minister in person that the military operation was solely aimed at putting down the insurgency in Tibet, and expressed the hope that Britain would maintain strict neutrality in this matter.... On August 11, the central government provided Zhong Ying and Yin Changheng with 400,000 *yuan*, a loan from the Shanghai-Hong Kong Bank, for the expedition, and urged Yin to start at the earliest date possible.... [The impending war] caused great excitement in Ü, and the Dalai, frightened, appealed to Britain for help.

The British minister in Beijing lodged a strong "protest" in a note to the Chinese government. The note contained five points, which were: 1. China must not intervene in the internal administration of Tibet and must not convert Tibet into a province. 2. Chinese troops in Tibet must be limited in strength. 3. As Britain recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet, it asked for the conclusion of a new treaty to replace the old one. 4. China must protect the communications between India and Tibet that had been disrupted by Chinese troops. 5. If China refused the above demands, Britain would not extend its diplomatic recognition to the government of the new Chinese republic.

A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet records:

On September 7 British Minister Jordan, acting on the instructions of his government, called on Deputy Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing at the Foreign Ministry to lodge a protest to the effect that if the govern-

ment of the Chinese Republic insisted on sending armed forces into Tibet and would not stop the military push westward, the British government would not only withhold its recognition of the Chinese Republic, but would militarily assist Tibet to win its independence.

The British demands were refused by the Foreign Ministry of China in a formal reply to the British government dated December 25, 1912. The reply in its main part read:

1. The British government's protest demands in its first point that the Chinese government not intervene in the internal administration of Tibet and not convert Tibet into a province. The 1906 Convention and the other treaties stipulate explicitly that China, not any other country, has the right to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet. It is, therefore, groundless to say that the Chinese government has no such right. The conversion of Tibet into a province is an important government affair of the Republic.... But it is a misunderstanding to think that the conversion will be effected now.

2. The British government's protest states in its second point that Britain would not agree to the stationing of Chinese government troops in Tibet in unlimited numbers. It is not true that the number of these troops is not limited. As provided for by the treaties, the Chinese government limits its troops in Tibet to a number adequate only for the maintenance of internal order in Tibet.

3. The British government demands that a new treaty regarding Tibet be concluded on the grounds that China has only suzerainty, not total sovereignty, over Tibet. As everything regarding this matter is provided for in explicit terms in the two treaties concluded by China and Britain regarding Tibet in 1904 and 1906, there is no need for a new treaty.

4. The British government's protest alleges in its fourth point that Chinese troops disrupted communications between India and Tibet. The Chinese government has never disrupted such communications intentionally, and will make an even greater effort to protect them in the future.

5. The British government declares that if the Chinese government does not accept its demands, it will not recognize the government of the Republic of China. But the recognition of the Chinese Republic is a matter not to be connected with the Tibetan issue. It is hoped that Britain will be the first country to extend its recognition to the government of the Chinese Republic.

By this time the Sichuan and Yunnan armies had joined forces

on the Lancang River in Xikang, and Yin Changheng, in a plan for operations in Tibet he submitted to the Beijing government, had suggested that the armies advance to Lhasa.

The British imperialist government strongly opposed the entry of the Sichuan and Yunnan armies into Tibet in another note and disputed China's full sovereignty over Tibet, alleging that the stipulation in the 1906 Convention between China and Britain saying no foreign state was permitted to interfere with the internal administration of Tibet also applied to China. On the question of Han troops in Tibet, the note said that by an agreement between China and Britain, China was to keep two hundred soldiers in Tibet only as the guards of the Resident Officials, but, the note said, Zhao Erfeng of the Qing Dynasty violated this agreement by sending about 5,000 to 6,000 troops to Tibet and caused the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. The note went on to say that the recent attack on Chadren by Yin Changheng with increased strength was a prelude to an attack on Tibet. In conclusion the note refused the replies of the Chinese government, accusing it of lack of sincerity.

While applying diplomatic pressure on China, the British imperialists were busily cultivating pro-British sympathies and fanning anti-Han sentiments in the Tibetan local government. According to *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*, in April 1913 (the second year of the Chinese Republic),

A conference at the Potala called by the Dalai of the Tibetan local government officials and lama *khenpos* adopted four resolutions. They were: 1. All the Hans originating from the interior must leave Tibet within six months. 2. All the Hans who had settled down in Tibet must leave within a year. 3. For the next thirty years Han troops would not be permitted to stay in Tibet. 4. If the government of the Chinese Republic sent its troops to Tibet and the Tibetans were not strong enough to stop them, Tibet would ask Britain to keep the troops off, and would reward Britain with special rights for its help.

In response to these resolutions Britain proposed six terms to the Tibetan authorities. They were: 1. Britain would provide Tibet with all the armaments it needed after it declared independence. 2. In return for Britain's help with its independence, Tibet was to put the management of its financial and military affairs in Tibet under the supervision of British representatives. 3. Britain was to provide

Tibet with a loan of £3,000,000, retaining the right to choose anything as mortgage. 4. Britain would defend Tibet against the troops of the Chinese Republic on their approach to Tibet. 5. Britain would be the first country to recognize an independent Tibet and would undertake to seek its recognition by other countries. 6. Tibet would adopt an open-door policy and grant Britons the right to travel in Tibet without restriction.

According to *The Tibetan Question*, the Beijing government backed down in face of the intimidation of the British imperialists. It ordered the Sichuan army to halt its advance, and went back to the traditional policy of mollifying the Tibetans.

Minister of the Army Duan Qirui told a secret meeting of the Upper House of the Provisional Parliament that military means was to be abandoned in dealing with Tibet to prevent British interference, and that the Dalai Lama was to be the only man to communicate with and the Tibetans were to be pacified so that they might be removed from British influence.... At the secret meeting Premier Zhao Bingjun declared that the Dalai Lama would be given back his title as a means of pacifying the Tibetan people, that envoys would be sent to Tibet to explain the underlying significance of republicanism, that no changes would be made in the Tibetan social system against the will of the Tibetan people and that all the treaties concluded with Britain in the Qing Dynasty would be honoured:

On October 28, 1912, the restoration of the title of the Dalai Lama was decreed. In April 1913 the Beijing government appointed Lu Xingqi commissioner for Tibet; he was to leave for Lhasa by sea. According to *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*, after the Beijing government called off the expedition, the Dalai, through the military governor of Xinjiang, Yuan Dahua, raised with the Beijing government five terms for the restoration of ties between Hans and Tibetans. These terms were: 1. Tibetans were to enjoy the same rights as the Chinese. 2. The central government was to provide Tibet with an annual subsidy of 5,000,000 *yuan*. 3. Tibet was to have the right to grant mining concessions to foreign countries on the condition that the treaties concluded between Tibet and Britain not be violated. 4. Tibet was to be free to train its own military forces; troops stationed in Tibet by the central government were not to exceed 1,500 men. 5. The central govern-

ment was to devise for Tibet its system of civil service, but the posts in the Tibetan government should be filled by Tibetans.

Meanwhile, representatives of the Dalai Lama negotiated with Yin Changheng in Tachienlu on the following five terms: 1. The Tibetan people were to be treated on equal terms with Hans, Manchus, Mongolians and Huis. 2. The Tibetan people were to keep their own religion. 3. Tibet was to remain Chinese territory. 4. Educated Tibetans who spoke Chinese were to become eligible for positions in the Chinese government, and the central government at Beijing might post Han officials in Tibet. 5. The annual stipend for the Dalai Lama was to continue.

But the British imperialists did not like the idea of direct contact between the Tibetan authorities and the Beijing government. The first thing they did to prevent the re-establishment of such contact was to refuse to give the Beijing-appointed commissioner for Tibet permission to pass through India on his way to Lhasa. Said Charles Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

... We should not recognize any right on the part of China to control Tibet's internal administration. It was accordingly decided that we should, if necessary, apply pressure in this direction by refusing passage through Sikkim to Chinese officials going to Tibet.... And to have permitted these officials to establish themselves in India or the border States near the Tibetan frontier would have been a source of embarrassment to both India and Tibet.

Thus Commissioner Lu Xingqi was stranded in India and unable to proceed to Tibet.

The next move the British imperialists made to disrupt relations between Tibet and the central government was to prevent them from entering direct negotiations. Accordingly, Britain proposed a tripartite conference of China, Britain and Tibet to settle all the outstanding issues among them, and threatened that "if China refuses to come to the conference and conclude a new treaty regarding Tibet, [Britain] will negotiate such a treaty directly with the Tibetan government."

Under the pressure of the British imperialists, the government of the Chinese Republic agreed to the proposed tripartite conference. For the conference site, China suggested Beijing or London,

while Britain insisted on its choice of Darjeeling in India. Finally, it was agreed that the conference was to be held in Simla, India.

The Simla Conference

The Simla Conference opened on October 13, 1913 (the second year of the Chinese Republic). Representing China were Commissioner for Tibetan Affairs Chen Yifan (Ivan Chen) and Assistant Commissioner Wang Haiping. The British representative was Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, secretary in the Indian Foreign Office. He was assisted by Archibald Rose, previously of the British Consulate to China, on issues concerning China; and Charles Bell, British Political Representative in Sikkim, on issues concerning Tibet. Tibet was represented by Lonchen (Silon) Shatra, who was assisted by Teji Trimonpa, Khenjun Tampa Derje and Rinshi (official of the fourth rank) Tado. A representative from each of the three great monasteries was also present at the conference.

Before the Tibetan team left for the conference, Charles Bell, sent by Britain, had met with Lonchen Shatra in Gyantse. Bell instructed him on how to haggle with the Chinese representatives at the conference, and told him to collect documents concerning the boundaries between the Han and Tibetan regions to support his claim for the "detachment" of Tibet from China. *Tibet: Past and Present* gives some details of what went on between the two: "While the Chinese Plenipotentiary was lingering in China," said Bell,

I met Lon-chen Shatra in Gyantse. He was on his way from Lhasa to attend the Conference as Plenipotentiary for Tibet.... I advised him to bring down all the documents he could collect bearing on the Tibetan relationship to China in the past and on the former's claims to the various provinces and districts which had from time to time been occupied by China.

The conference opened with the Tibetan representatives, at British instigation, demanding in strong language that 1. Tibet become independent; 2. Tibetan territory include Qinghai, Lithang, Bathang and the region as far as Tachienlu; 3. the Indian-Tibet trade regulations signed in the nineteenth and thirty-fourth years

of the reign of Emperor Dezhong be revised by Britain and Tibet without the participation of China; 4. China not post officials in Tibet; 5. as the monasteries in China and Mongolia recognized the Dalai Lama as their religious leader, all their abbots be appointed by the Dalai Lama; and 6. all the taxes illegally collected in Nyagrong be returned to Tibet and the losses sustained by Tibetans be compensated for.

In a report to Yuan Shikai, Chen Yifan wrote:

The Tibetan representatives have adopted an extremely uncompromising stand since the beginning of the conference. They have refused to accept our terms on the pretext of ill-feelings on the part of Tibetans, which they claim were caused by the destruction of monasteries and casualties inflicted on their soldiers by the ill-disciplined troops in Tibet under the command of a certain general. They also repudiate China's sovereignty over Tibet.

Judging by the terms raised by the Tibetan representatives, the conference was a plot hatched by the British imperialists in collusion with Tibetan pro-British separatists with the aim of forcing China into concluding a treaty to legalize Tibet's separation from the motherland.

In accordance with the instructions of the Beijing government, the Chinese representatives put forward a six-point counter-proposal which said: 1. Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and would remain as such; 2. China would post in Lhasa a Resident who would have all the rights enjoyed by his predecessors, and who would have an escort of 2,600 men, of which 1,000 would be stationed in Lhasa and the remaining 1,600 would be posted in places as the Resident saw fit; 3. Tibet's foreign and military affairs should be conducted in accordance with the instructions of the Chinese Central Government; Tibet was not permitted to conclude any treaties with foreign countries without the intermediary of the Chinese Central Government; 4. Tibet would set free Tibetans jailed for being friendly with the Hans, and return to them their frozen assets; 5. Point Five in the Tibetan proposal could be negotiated; and 6. if the trade regulations were to be revised, the revision should be negotiated between China and Britain on the basis of Article Three of the Convention relating to Tibet concluded by China and Britain on the fourth day of the

fourth month of the thirty-second year of Emperor Dezong's reign.

The issues on which the Tibetan representatives, at British instigation, engaged their Chinese counterparts in bitter argument were mainly those concerning sovereignty and boundaries. *The Tibetan Question* recounts:

Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan representative, demanded in his proposal that the boundary of Tibet, as an independent country, should start south of Artungtaga in the Kunlun Mountains in southern Xinjiang, extend to the whole of Qinghai and encompass the western sections of Gansu and Sichuan, regions around Tachienlu and those around Adunzi in northwestern Yunnan; that no Chinese officials and troops be stationed in Tibet, that Tibet should have the right to conclude trade treaties directly with Britain and determine the scope of their rights without the medium of China, and that the Dalai Lama should be recognized as the leader of Buddhism in Mongolia and China.

In a counter-proposal Chinese Representative Chen Yifan reaffirmed that Tibet was an integral part of China. As for the rights China formerly enjoyed in Tibet, the proposal stated that China could modify them in deference to the desires of the Tibetan people, and Britain should respect these rights. The proposal said that China would not convert Tibet into a province on the condition that Britain undertook not to annex Tibet or seize any part of Tibetan territory. The proposal insisted that the Chinese Resident in Tibet should have an escort of 2,500 men to be stationed in Lhasa, that Tibet's foreign and military affairs should be placed under the control of China and that without the medium of China, no foreign countries should be permitted to communicate directly with Tibet, except the British trade agents in Tibet, who, as provided for by the 1906 Convention, could do so with Tibetan officials on trade matters. The proposal demanded amnesty for Tibetans labelled pro-Han by the Tibetan authorities and the return to them of their confiscated property. As for the recognition of the Dalai Lama as the leader of Buddhism in China and Mongolia, the proposal said that the matter could be negotiated later. On the issue of revising the Sino-British trade regulations of 1893 and 1908, the proposal said that any changes in them must be preceded by consultations among all parties concerned. The proposal refused to accept a boundary by which only Chamdo and the region east of it were to be placed under Chinese rule.

Those were the main points of contention between the Tibetan representative and Chen Yifan. Then the British representative,

posing as a mediator, offered an eleven-point "compromise" program. Says Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

On the British side a compromise was proposed, dividing the country into Outer and Inner Tibet, as already recorded. The boundary between these two was to follow in the main the frontier between China and Tibet established in 1727 (the fifth year of the reign of Qing emperor Shizong or in the time of the seventh Dalai Lama). Nya-rong, however, was to be transferred from Tibetan to Chinese rule. It had stood by itself, an *enclave* administered by Tibet though on the Chinese side of this frontier, which passed west of Ba-thang, and thence north and north-west. Tibet in particular objected to the loss of the rich territories of Der-ge and Nya-rong from her autonomous area.

The so-called "compromise" program was actually a trap set for the Chinese representatives. Under the program, Tibet, Qinghai, Xikang and the Tibetan areas in Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan were to be called Tibet; the areas west of the Jinsha River were to be termed Outer Tibet while those east of the river, Inner Tibet. Outer Tibet was to be detached from China and Inner Tibet was to be placed under the joint administration of China and Tibet. It was, in short, a program intended to make the Chinese government accept an independent Tibet.

Yuan Shikai, not daring to challenge the British position, accepted in the main the "compromise" program, agreeing to the creation of Outer and Inner Tibet; the only thing in dispute was the boundary between the two Tibets. After much argument and concession, the Chinese representative proposed that

The areas north of Dangla Range, Qinghai within its original boundary, Adunzi, Bathang and Lithang remain under the rule of the interior government of China, and the land east of the Salween River including Derge, Nyagrong, Chamdo and the Tsoba Sogu should form a special district and retain the original name of Kham.*

Finally, the British side made some "concessions," proposing that "all the land northeast of Bakangpota Range [or the Katasuchilao Range in central Qinghai where the Yellow River rises] and Ahme-maching Range [or Greater Rock-Pile Mountain in the Yellow River Bend in Qinghai] should be included in the territory of Qinghai,"

* *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet.*

and that "Jinchuan [in northwestern Sichuan], Tachienlu and Adunzi should be excluded from Inner Tibet and incorporated into China, while Nyagrong and Derge should be made a part of Inner Tibet."

On April 27, 1914, Britain presented a draft treaty based on the eleven-point "compromise" program and tried to get the Chinese representative to sign it. The chief provisions of the draft treaty were:

1. Tibet was divided into two zones, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. The former is the part nearer India, including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; the latter the part nearer China, including Ba-tang, Li-tang, Tachienlu, and a large portion of eastern Tibet.

2. Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognized, but China engaged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province.

3. Great Britain engaged not to annex any portion of Tibet.

4. The autonomy of Outer Tibet was recognized. China agreed to abstain from interference in its administration, which was to rest with the Tibetans themselves. She agreed also to abstain from sending troops, stationing civil or military officers (except as in 6 below) or establishing Chinese colonies there. Britain was to abstain from all these things throughout the whole of Tibet, but to retain her Trade Agents and their escorts.

5. In Inner Tibet the central Tibetan Government at Lhasa was to retain its existing rights, which included among other things the control of most of the monasteries, and the appointment of local chiefs. But China was not forbidden to send troops or officials or to plant colonies there....

6. A Chinese amban was to be re-established at Lhasa with a military escort limited to three hundred men.

7. The escorts of the British Trade Agencies in Tibet were not to exceed three-fourths of the Chinese escort at Lhasa.

8. The British Agent at Gyantse was authorized to visit Lhasa, in order to settle matters which could not be settled at Gyantse."

A map of Tibet was attached to the back of the treaty, showing the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet in red and blue lines.

Chen Yifan, intimidated by the British representative, initialled the draft treaty. In a telegram he sent to the Beijing government

* *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet.*

** *Tibet: Past and Present.*

afterwards, Chen reported:

The British representative told me that the Tibetan representative had signed the draft treaty, and that if I did not sign it today, he would strike Articles Two and Four from the draft and would conclude a treaty with Tibet without consulting me. As he insisted on my signing it, I decided to do so as an interim move to prevent the whole thing from falling through.

When the provisions of the Simla draft treaty and Chen Yifan's signing of the treaty were reported in the newspapers in China, the whole nation was outraged. Public opinion denounced Chen as "a muddle-headed official who betrayed the country and disgraced the people," "a man so ignominiously thoughtless that it is no exaggeration to say that he has brought about the demise of Tibet," "a criminal who deserves more than death."

The nationwide protest prevented Yuan Shikai from ratifying the treaty. He ordered Chen by wire not to sign the final instrument, and on May 1 sent a note to the British minister in Beijing to the effect that China would not accept the article regarding the boundary, although she agreed in the main to the rest of the draft treaty. On June 6, British Minister Jordan sent a note of reply to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying that since China had refused to sign the treaty, it would not be entitled to the benefits the treaty provided.

So the Simla conference came to nothing. On July 3, 1914, British and Tibetan representatives signed the final document of the treaty. The Chinese government in a formal note of protest to Britain declared that China "will never accept any treaty regarding Tibet concluded between Britain and Tibet without the approval of the Chinese government."

Britain ignored the note and resorted to intimidation, declaring that with the treaty concluded between Britain and Tibet all the privileges China was entitled to by the draft treaty had automatically come to an end, and that the British government would do everything it could to aid Tibet in its resistance against Chinese aggression.

What followed was an indefinite period of recess of the Simla conference because the First World War had broken out, and

Britain, though no longer able to take care of things in the east on account of the war, would not give up its aggressive designs on Tibet.

Before the Simla conference, Tibet had concluded an illegitimate treaty with Outer Mongolia. It was said to have been signed in Urga by Dorjjeff on behalf of the Dalai Lama. According to *Tibet: Past and Present*, the treaty was signed in January 1913 (the second year of the Chinese Republic), and its chief provisions were:

Whereas Mongolia and Tibet, having freed themselves from the Manchu dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent States, and whereas the two States have always professed one and the same religion, and to the end that their ancient mutual friendship may be strengthened ... have agreed on the following:

Article 1 The Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet, approves of and acknowledges the formation of an independent Mongolian State....

Article 2 The Sovereign of the Mongolian people Je-tsun Dampa Lama approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Sovereign of Tibet.

Article 3 Both States shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

Article 4 Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.

Article 5 Both States, each on its own territory, shall afford mutual aid to their subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or on State business.

Article 6 Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall, as formerly, carry on mutual trade in the produce of their lands—in goods, cattle, etc., and likewise open industrial institutions.

Article 7 Henceforth transactions on credit shall be allowed only with the knowledge and permission of official institutions....

As the treaty was secretly negotiated by the Dalai Lama without the knowledge of Britain and would not have had its support, Britain was taken aback at the news of its conclusion. Writes Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

During the Simla Conference in 1913-14, between British, Chinese, and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries, the atmosphere was clouded by a report that Tibet and Mongolia, through the agency of Dorjjeff, had signed a treaty of alliance. Mongolia was at that time falling more and more

under the power of Russia, and the terms of the alleged treaty were such as seemed likely to establish an ever-increasing Russian influence in Tibet, an influence which could not fail to endanger British and Indian interests. But such information as came to me rendered me sceptical as to whether any treaty was signed. I inquired of the Tibetan Prime Minister, who was his country's Plenipotentiary at this Conference, what were the facts. He referred to the Government at Lhasa, which replied to the following effect: "The Dalai Lama never authorized Dorjeff to conclude any treaty with Mongolia. The letter given to Dorjeff was of a general nature, asking him merely to work for the benefit of the Buddhist religion."

These developments showed that there were clashes of interest not only between British imperialists and Czarist Russia, but between British imperialists and Tibetan upper circles as well.

New Measures to Strengthen Serfdom

Britain's aggressive designs on Tibet, carried out under the pretext of "helping Tibet with its independence effort," did not stop at engineering Tibet's total separation from the motherland; they were also aimed at grabbing more land through an armed invasion of Xikang in the east by the Tibetan army. For this purpose, Britain spared no effort to help the Kashag build up the Tibetan armed forces, which, with merely three thousand men and primitive equipment, were not at all strong enough to mount an attack on Xikang. In 1914, after the Simla conference, by a decision of the Kashag, a *maje-kang* (general headquarters of the Tibetan army) was formed with the Tsarong (Dazang Dadul) as *maje* (command-in-chief) and Teji Trimonpa as *maje junwa* (deputy commander-in-chief). This was the beginning of Tibet's modern army. Writes Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

The Tibetan Government was then aiming at a regular army of ten thousand men, both for defence against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal order. The intention was that this army should be divided into battalions of five hundred each. Each battalion was to be officered by one *de-pon* (colonel), four *ru-pons* (captains), ten *gya-pons* (sergeants), and fifty *chu-pons* (corporals). A small force indeed for a country with an area of five hundred thousand square miles.... It is

difficult to raise money to meet the expenses of regular troops, for large sums are spent on religious institutions; and large estates which might otherwise be yielding revenue are vested in the monasteries as well as in the nobility. And if it is hard to find the money, it is still harder to find the officers.

A British military academy in Gyantse began to train army officers for the new Tibetan army. Many high-ranking officials such as *dzasas* and *tejis* were sent there by the Dalai to receive training. Of this academy Macdonald wrote in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

... The Tibetan Government decided that some of their troops should be trained in modern methods of warfare. To this end, the permission of the Government of India having been obtained, batches of Tibetan soldiers, fifty at a time, with their officers, were sent down to Gyantse for training under the British and Indian officers of the Trade Agents' escort. With only a few intervals, Tibetan troops were being thus trained up to 1924.

When these British-trained officers were assigned to regimental duties, a regular Tibetan army was formed. The Dalai had planned to set up thirty regiments, each to be designated by one of the thirty letters of the Tibetan alphabet (Ga regiment, Ka regiment, for example) but he managed to create only twelve of them, due to the difficulties in raising funds.

In order to keep the new army supplied with weapons and ammunition, the Kashag had a machinery plant built in Trashi with a Khachi (Muslim) as its engineer. The plant was later converted into a mint and printing shop, producing silver and copper coins, paper currency and postal stamps, because it could not turn out guns and ammunition in large quantities; for these supplies, Tibet had to depend entirely on Britain.

The British also advised the Dalai to send Tibetans to England to receive education. Writes Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

During his stay in Darjeeling I had advised the Dalai Lama to send some Tibetan boys to England for education.... Four lads of the upper middle class had been sent.... One was sent to learn about mining; another ... did ... manage to acquire some knowledge of survey and map-making; the youngest, a bright, clever body, took up electrical engineering.... The eldest, Gong-kar, was given a military career, serving

ten months with the 10th Yorkshires and nine months with the artillery at Woolwich.... Unfortunately the lads were sent back to Tibet before their training was completed. Thus the experiment has not hitherto gained such success as greater care might have ensured to it.... Gongkar was the first to return to Tibet. He rendered useful service in helping to train the raw Tibetan soldiery in Lhasa in up-to-date methods.

According to the biography of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, four Tibetans were selected to go to England. They were Ringang, Mondrong, Kyibuk and Gokharwa. They were taken to London in 1915 (the fourth year of the Chinese Republic) by Tsepon Lungshar, who was appointed by the Kashag as their superintendent. Ringang studied to become an electrician, Kyibuk was trained in telegraphy, Mondrong studied mining engineering and Gokharwa, military science. After they returned to Tibet in 1920, Kyibuk had telegraph lines set up between Lhasa and Gyantse (those from Gyantse to India were erected by the British) and became the director of the Lhasa Telegraph Office which had been created under his supervision. Gokharwa died soon after he returned. Mondrong was commissioned by the Tibetan government to mine for gold in Lhasa, but the operation had to stop on account of the strong objection of the monasteries over a toad discovered during the mining, which they said was a bad omen. Soon after that Mondrong died, and with him the interest in mining in Tibet. Ringang took over the Tibetan machinery plant, and in 1927 (the sixteenth year of the Chinese Republic) built a hydropower plant in Lhasa to supply downtown Lhasa with electric light. He had a technician hired from India to assist him. After them, no Tibetan students were sent to England, but many went to India to study. In 1916 a group of young Tibetans including Tsongkhorka's son, Sonam Gongchug, were sent to India by the Dalai to study military science. In 1921 another group, this time young aristocrats including Shodrung Demenpa, were sent by the Dalai to receive military training at the British military academy in Gyantse, and Shodrung Jeshu Senpa, also sent by the Dalai, studied the installation and operation of telephone and telegraph office in Darjeeling, India. Meanwhile, three monk officials, Tsedrung Maru Chenra Wochug, Tsedrung Chodan Tandar and Rida Gandan Riji, were sent to India

to learn English. In 1923 Chanlochen Gong was in Gangtok, Drenjong, to learn about the Indian military system and the handling of modern weapons. In the same year, Dorin Teji, also sent by the Dalai, toured India, studying the political, economic and cultural arrangement in that country and how it operated.

These measures had to do with what the Dalai Lama and a number of upper class Tibetans saw in India. They were apparently impressed by the modern establishments of the British there, and what they saw produced in them a desire to effect some reforms in Tibet. This led to the sending of young aristocrats to study in England and India, and the "new measures." Besides those mentioned above, the measures worth mentioning were:

The establishment by order of the Dalai of Manzikang, a research institute of medicine and the calendar. This institute, headed by Khenrab Norbu, a well-known doctor from the Drepung, trained students sent by order of the Kashag from Ü-Tsang, Xikang and Ngari in traditional Tibetan medicine and the Tibetan calendar.

The setting up of an experimental tea plantation in Chabchurong near Pome in 1923 by order of the Dalai. Rupon Letsenpa Jampa Kelzang was the manager of the plantation. This undertaking represented an effort to keep all the lay and clergy supplied with tea, their national beverage. But the whole thing fizzled out, probably because of poor results.

The establishment in the same year of a police force (*pulisi dapon* in Tibetan) in Lhasa by order of the Dalai. Sodwang Legdan was appointed police *dapon* and Tsedrung Khenrab Kunzang his assistant. Police duty points were set up at important intersections in Lhasa, and a committee consisting of Khenjun Ta Lama, Tsedrung Khenrab Tsultrim, Kasho Dokhar Sey, Mipon Changrongpa and Shodrung Chingzurpa was appointed by the Dalai Lama to draw up a public security law and supervise the training of the police.

The setting up by order of the Dalai of post offices (*Dragkhang* in Tibetan) in Tibet in 1925. Tsedrung Dragpa Chogyal and Shodrung Pelshiba, one a monk and the other a layman, were appointed *draje* (postmaster generals). The printing shop was commissioned to produce postal stamps for the post offices. The post offices

reported to the Kashag every six months on their business and turned in their revenues to the bank (*ngulkhang* in Tibetan). The Tibetan postal service, with a post station every forty-five *li*, was run entirely on the basis of the staging-post system created by the ambans of the Qing Dynasty. As it operated inside Tibet, reaching only Lhasa, Gyantse, Shigatse and Phari, it had no outside connections.

The creation of the telegraph office in Lhasa in the same year. Shodrung Kyibuk, the returned student from England, and Tserung Chodan Tandar, who had studied in India, were appointed its directors by the Dalai. It was required to submit a report every six months to the Kashag on its business and turn in its revenues to the bank. Its lines reached only Gyantse, where they were connected with the British-run telegraph office.

And finally, the bank. Set up in the same period as the above-mentioned establishments, it had Phunkhang Kung as its first manager. Later the Tsarong Kaloön was put concurrently in charge of it; after him, Sangpho Dzasa was its manager. The bank, after its establishment, began reforming the Tibetan currency. The form of currency in use in Tibet had been the *tramka* (one *tramka* was the equivalent of 0.15 *liang* of Tibetan silver), a monetary unit introduced by the ambans as far back as the reign of the Qing emperor Gaozong. The copper coins of the new currency came in four denominations of two and a half *fen*, five *fen*, seven and a half *fen* and one *qian*. The silver coins were issued in two units of one and a half *liang* and three *liang*. Also put in circulation were Tibetan monetary certificates in a number of denominations such as fifty *tramka* and one hundred *tramka*. These certificates could not be cashed, but their issues were kept below a ceiling, and each new issue required the withdrawal from circulation of the previous one.

To implement the "new policy," the Dalai made a number of important changes in the government system. One of them was the creation of a *silon*. The *silon*, an equivalent of the Bodkyi Gyalpo (chief administrator) of former days, exercised leadership on the Dalai's instructions over the Kashag in its day-to-day work. The first *silon* was Shatra, the Tibetan representative to the Simla conference. He was succeeded by Shokhangpa, and when Shokhangpa retired on account of old age in 1926, the Dalai's nephew,

Kunga Wangchuk Kung (Langdun) filled the vacancy. For more than two hundred years since the Qing government abolished the office of chief administrator in the fifteenth year of Emperor Gaozong's reign, it had been the Living Buddha who was in charge of the *Shangshang*. Now the Dalai put the power of running the *Shangshang* back into the hands of a lay aristocrat.

Tax reform was the most difficult part of the new policy, as it produced widespread repercussions and met with vehement objection. The creation of the new army and other institutions all meant increased spending of the Kashag, and this inevitably led to more taxes. Writes Charles Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

To meet their new military charges, the Tibetan Government had, in 1914, imposed two taxes. The first was on the salt, which is produced in large quantities in the Chang Tang (Northern Tibet); the second on hides. These being insufficient, they proposed to levy a tax on wool, which is one of the chief products of their country and their chief export to India. For fear of possible objection, under Article IV of the Lhasa Convention, they asked the permission of the Indian Government to levy this, at the rate of approximately one rupee per maund—equalling thirty-six shillings per ton, i.e. about five per centum *ad valorem*. The Indian Government gave its consent.... The uniforms of the soldiers were made in Lhasa, the woollen cloth coming mostly from the Tsang province and from the districts south of Lhasa. The food was supplied from the Government granaries, which are found throughout Tibet, for a large portion of the Government revenue is paid in grain, meat, butter, tea, &c.

The increased taxation strained the relations between the Kashag and the monasteries, and made the already bad relations between the Kashag and the Tashilhunpo even worse. A large area in Tsang was under the jurisdiction of the Panchen. During the Qing Dynasty, only the Tashilhunpo had the right to collect taxes and land rents in this area to the exclusion of the Kashag. So the imposition of taxes on it by the Kashag caused deep resentment of Tashilhunpo officials and the residents of the area. In an attempt to force the Tashilhunpo into submission to the Dalai, the Kashag appointed two *gyedzongs* (governors-general of Tsang) for Shigatse to be in charge of the sixteen *dzongs* of Tsang including the four under the jurisdiction of the Panchen and over thirty independent

shikas (manor estates). The first two *gyedzongs* were Khenjun Lozang Dondrub, a monk official, and Musha, a lay official. With the installation of the *gyedzongs* came not only taxes on wool, yak tails, hides and salt produced in the areas under the Panchen's rule but blatant interference in the monastic affairs of the Tashilhunpo. In June 1915 (the fourth year of the Chinese Republic) the Panchen, in an autograph letter to the Dalai, complained about the interference in the Tashilhunpo's affairs by the *gyedzongs*, and proposed a meeting with him to settle all the outstanding issues. In his letter of reply to the Panchen, the Dalai turned him down.

Invasion of Kham by the Tibetan Army

Instigating a military invasion of Xikang by the Tibetan army so that the mutual slaughter of the two major races of the Chinese nation would make them sworn enemies was the most wicked of the British imperialists' plots to turn Hans and Tibetans against each other.

In September 1914 the Dalai Lama appointed Kaloon Lama Domed Jichab governor-general of Xikang. A regiment of the Tibetan army led by Dapon Tsulkowa went with him to Kongpo Gyamda, as ordered by the Dalai, where they were to make operational preparations for the invasion of Xikang. Soon after they left, the Dalai dispatched 150 militiamen to Gyamda from Gyantse, Shigatse and Dingri as reinforcements. In October 1914 the Dalai appointed another *dapon*; this time it was Khyungrampa, who was to lead a force of 300 men to the Tsoba Sogu for its defence and to prepare his men for an attack on interior China. At the time, three battalions of the Sichuan army under the command of Peng Risheng were stationed in the Chamdo-Riboche-Tsoba Sogu region. They were pitted against the Tibetan forces near Riboche, and the superior weapons they had prevented the Tibetans from launching an immediate attack on them.

In September 1917 an armed conflict flared up between the Sichuan army and the Tibetan forces at Riboche. Records *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*: "In September 1917 Yu Jinhai of the artillery troops stationed at Riboche attacked the

Tibetans in a squabble over grass. In the conflict two Tibetan soldiers were captured and sent to Chamdo. Peng Risheng, Commander of the Border Army, had them beheaded without any investigation into the cause of the conflict. The enraged Tibetans then resorted to arms."

This happened when the First World War was still on, and the imperialist countries could not afford to be distracted by what was happening in Tibet. At home, civil wars between the northern and southern warlords, especially the one between the warlords of Sichuan and Yunnan had forced the Tibetan question into the background. Believing that this was the best time for them to stage-manage an armed invasion of Kham by the Tibetan army, the British imperialists, after the Riboche incident, "supplied Tibet with 5,000 rifles and 5,000,000 cartridges" for the military adventure.* The Sichuan army sustained one defeat after another at the hands of the assaulting Tibetan forces until it lost to them all the territories west of the Jinsha River.

The following is an account of the war given by *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

In January 1918 Riboche fell, and the commander of the First Infantry Battalion fled to Chamdo. On January 22, Peng Risheng ordered an attack on Aouyue (eighty *li* south of Chamdo) by the Third Battalion of the Border Army under the command of Zhang Kaisheng, and at the same time sent the Tenth Battalion under the command of Cao Shufan to Chemdum to mount a pincer attack. But Zhang Kaisheng's men were repulsed as soon as they reached the enemy-held territory, and were driven back to Chamdo. Because of Zhang's defeat, Cao Shufan lost the battle and fled back to Draya, and when Draya soon fell, Cao surrendered.... On February 19 Nganda County was lost, and the troops under the command of Feng Yunshu retreated in defeat to Guro Zampa (thirty *li* west of Chamdo). In late February, the Tibetan army launched its attack on Chamdo. When Peng Risheng moved the Guro Zampa troops to Chamdo for support, the Tibetan army, taking advantage of the troop movement, occupied the mountains north of Chamdo. On the night of March 3 detachments of troops sent by Peng converged on the mountains in an attempt to recover them, but they were repulsed, being left without a commanding officer. On the 22nd,

* *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*.

the Tibetan army made an unsuccessful attack on the Yunnan Bridge. That night the Tibetan soldiers threw up a stone wall near the bridge. The Sichuan soldiers guarding the bridge only a short distance away did not notice any activity until the next morning when they saw the wall. And when Ragdo Gang fell to the Tibetan army on April 3, all the strategic points guarding Chamdo had been lost. Finally, when the Sichuan Bridge was captured by the Tibetans on the 15th, Chamdo was fully exposed to the attackers. So Peng Risheng wrote to the *kaloön* proposing a cease-fire. The *kaloön* replied: "All we want you to do now is to lay down your arms." At a meeting of officers called by Peng on the 16th to discuss what to do, the officers offered no ideas. But when Zhang Nanshan, Commander of the Seventh Battalion and Magistrate of Chamdo, proposed to abandon Chamdo, all the others objected and chose to surrender. Then five conditions for surrender were raised for negotiation with the *kaloön*. These conditions and the negotiated results were as follows:

(1) After the Han soldiers were disarmed, they were to receive from the Tibetan army all the pay that was ten to more than twenty months overdue. To this the Tibetans said that these soldiers would be provided with reasonable amounts of travelling expenses. (2) The soldiers were to be issued with safe-conduct passes soon after they surrendered, and be provided with *ula* services for their trips from Chamdo to Tachienlu. To this the Tibetans said that the Han soldiers must clear out within a week of disarmament. (3) Hans travelling from Chamdo to Tachienlu were to be guaranteed that they would not be molested or robbed. The Tibetans promised that they would provide them with armed escorts. (4) Hans of various communities were to be protected against any harm to their lives and property. The Tibetans said that they would certainly be protected. (5) Hans living west of Tachienlu who had married Tibetan women were to be allowed to take their wives to the interior with them without any interference. The Tibetans said that they could do so and that they would be issued with grain rations.

On the 19th the battalions were disarmed; some of the soldiers surrendered their weapons voluntarily. In the afternoon Zhang Nanshan drowned himself in the river. On the 21st, the advance party of the Tibetan army marched into Chamdo.... On the 24th, when Kaloön Jampa Tendar arrived in Chamdo, he ordered that all the prisoners of war, both officers and men, be sent to Tibet in batches instead of being repatriated to Tachienlu. This breach of promise Peng accepted without a protest. Each day from that day on, the prisoners were put on their

way in groups, each given barley flour as travelling expenses (six *liang* for battalion commanders, four for company commanders, three for NCOs and one for privates). Towards the end of that month, Tangphug County fell, and Jiang Guolin, Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Border Army and magistrate of the county, surrendered.... On the 4th, during a census check of Chamdo's residents and an inspection of wounded Han soldiers ordered by the *kaloön*, dozens of Tibetans who had defected to the Sichuan army were identified. For punishment, these Tibetans had their feet chopped off or noses removed. Those whose feet were severed were subjected to the additional torture of having their wounds burned with hot butter. Altogether thirty-three of the Tibetans lost their feet, and more than forty had their noses chopped off.... Then the Tibetan army struck north and south from Chamdo in two contingents, and in a mighty sweep smashing all the resistance of the border army, captured the seven counties of Derge, Danko, Sershud, Palyul, Gong, Wucheng and Ningjing. Then Chen Xialing, Garrison Commander of the Sichuan Border Region ... sent to Lhasa two county magistrates, Wang Jiuqing and Li Fangque, to negotiate a settlement. Meanwhile, he wrote a letter to the Tibet commissioner, Lu Xingqi, then stranded in India, asking him to inform the Dalai of his appeal for a truce pending a settlement of the issue by the central government. But Chen received no reply. In July, Commanding Officer Zhu Xianwen engaged the Tibetan army in a fierce battle at Rongpatrag in Ganze. After more than twenty days of sanguinary battle Zhu's troops managed to establish their position on the east bank of the Yarlung, and held it against the Tibetan army across the river. In August, when Chen Xialing sent another negotiator to Lhasa, a reply came from the Dalai, saying that as he had no intention of offending his Chinese patrons, he would agree to a cease-fire to be negotiated by Han, Tibetan and British representatives.

After the advancing Tibetan army reached the vicinity of Ganze, the British imperialists instructed Eric Teichman, a British deputy consul who had sneaked into the locality, to act as a mediator. At the time the British believed that

If the fighting had continued, another month or two would possibly have seen several thousand more Chinese prisoners in Tibetan hands, and the Lhasa forces in possession of all the country up to Tachienlu. In this event the Tibetans would have reconquered the whole of southeastern Tibet, including Nyarong, Ba-tang, Li-tang, and the other districts that had been annexed to the Chinese province of Szechuan

two hundred years ago and held by them ever since. But the Chinese would not have recognized any settlement that took from the areas which they regarded as part of China proper, and the Tibetans were not strong enough to hold their outposts so closed to Chinese armies and the centres of Chinese population.*

This revealed what was behind the British offer to mediate: they hoped that the truce would give Tibet time to become firmly established in the regions they had occupied and accumulate strength for a renewed attack on Kham.

Teichman arrived in Chamdo in August 1918, and only after he had discussed moves to be made with Kaloon Lama, the Tibet-appointed governor-general of Kham, was the representative of the Sichuan army, Deputy Commander Liu Zanting, invited to Chamdo for negotiations. Then a thirteen-point cease-fire agreement was signed. Its main provisions were: (1) The Han army was to be stationed in Ba'an, Yanjing, Yidun, Derong, Lihua, Ganze, Zhanhua, Luhuo, Daofo, Yajiang and Kangding; the Tibetan army was to be stationed in Riboché, Nganda, Chamdo, Tangphu, Danko, Sershed and Derge. Neither army was to violate the temporary line of demarcation. (2) The agreement forbade the use of force as a means to settle disputes between officers of the two armies and their troops in the forward positions. If such a dispute arose, the British consul was to be informed of it in detail without delay and asked to intervene. (3) By the agreement, there was to be no massing of troops in large numbers on the Han-Tibetan border. The number of Han troops stationed in Bathang and Ganze was not to exceed two hundred men in each place; the same applied to the number of Tibetan troops stationed in Chamdo and Ningjing. (4) the agreement was a provisional document, to be finalized by representatives of the governments of China, Britain and Tibet, but the finalized version was not to change in any way the present accord.

The cease-fire agreement boiled down to one thing: forcing the Sichuan army to accept the *de facto* occupation of the seven counties in Kham by the Tibetan army. So, as *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet* recounts, "Chen Xialing, considering the

* *Tibet: Past and Present.*

agreement humiliating, declared it null and void."

Frustrated in the scheme, Teichman went to the front in Ganze, and negotiated a four-point agreement for troop withdrawal with Han Guangjun, a Sichuan army negotiator, and Dapon Khyun-grampa of the Tibetan army. By the agreement, the Sichuan army was to evacuate to Ganze, and the Tibetan army to Derge; neither army was to make any advance in one year's time beginning the day of evacuation, pending a settlement to be negotiated in Chamdo by representatives of the president of the Chinese Republic and the Dalai Lama. The time set for the evacuation was from December 17, or the twelfth day of the Tibetan ninth month, to December 30, or the twenty-sixth day of the Tibetan ninth month.

The one-year cease-fire agreement was intended by the British to give the Tibetan army the time it needed to secure its position in Derge and the other counties it had occupied against a counter-offensive by the Sichuan army. The Sichuan army accepted the one-year cease-fire arrangement because it knew it did not have the capability to launch a counteroffensive at the time.

After the cease-fire agreement was signed, Teichman was sent to Beijing by the British to join the British minister in China in the negotiations with the Beijing government. They suggested that a tripartite conference attended by China's central government, Britain and Tibet be convened to settle all outstanding issues. They said they would drop the name of Inner and Outer Tibet provided that China refrained from disputing the occupation of the territories by the Tibetan army. Recounts *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

When the meeting was resumed at the Foreign Ministry, the British minister put forward a program for the settlement of the issue. By the program the names of Inner and Outer Tibet would not be used, and the area of Inner Tibet as previously specified would now be divided into two parts, the one including Bathang, Tachienlu, Daofu, Luhuo and Nyagrong would be put under Chinese rule and the other, consisting of the area west of Derge, would go to Tibet. The Foreign Ministry replied that China could hardly accept such a division because it left China with far too few places to be recovered while giving Tibet a disproportionately large chunk of territory. As China would not budge, the British minister said that Gongtok might be added to interior China,

explaining that the place was an important point of communication between Xining and Ü, and that Gongtok, together with Nyagrong with its gold deposits, which would be returned to China as already specified, meant a great deal to China and that their value was not to be measured in terms of size when compared with the region west of Derge, which was nothing but wasteland. When asked what would be done about the land south of the Kunlun Mountains and north of Dangla Range, a region that would have been a part of Inner Tibet as previously specified, the British minister said that the place was very close to Lhasa, and the stationing of troops there by the Beijing government might lead to conflicts, so it must be made Tibetan territory. He went on to say that he could not understand why China was insisting on its claim to a stretch of barren land like that. The Foreign Ministry told him that China's insistence was based on the fact that the region was under the jurisdiction of Qinghai Province and that the government had no right to make any territorial changes. To avoid conflicts, the ministry added, China would guarantee to maintain the *status quo* in that region. But the British minister would not listen.... Meanwhile, Ma Qi, Garrison Commander of Ninghai on the Gansu border, declared in a cable addressed to the whole nation that the government had no right to cede the region to Tibet because the region, inhabited by the twenty-five tribes of Jyekundo, was run like any other region in the interior: it had a government office in charge of local affairs, was guarded by the border troops from the garrison headquarters at Jyekundo, and was about to be converted into a county. The provincial authorities of Xinjiang, Sichuan and Yunnan also cabled their opposition.

As a result of the opposition from these local forces, the Beijing government suspended the Sino-British talks on Tibet.

In 1919 the Beijing government sent a mission to Tibet and established direct contact with the Dalai Lama. Records *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*: "The State Council cabled the governor of Gansu Province, Zhang Guangjian, asking him to send from Qinghai Zhu Xiu, Li Zhonglian, Lama Kulangtsang of the Red Sect and a small retinue to Tibet as special envoys to make friendly contact with the Dalai for the purpose of defusing the crisis." When the envoys arrived in Lhasa in December 1919, they were treated by the Kashag as a mission from an enemy country, and the audience the Dalai granted Zhu Xiu took place in a section of the army barracks next to the Norpulingkha where the Dalai received

foreigners.

The mission returned to Qinghai in April 1920 after staying in Lhasa for over four months. Records *A Sixty-Year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*:

At a farewell banquet he gave in honour of the departing mission headed by Zhu Xiu, the Dalai said that he would not have turned to Britain had it not been for the high-handed treatment he received from the ambans. He thanked the envoys for their coming to Tibet, and hoped that the president would soon appoint a plenipotentiary to settle the outstanding issues concerning Tibet. He assured Zhu Xiu that he was all for the motherland and would work for the well-being of the five nationalities. As for the Simla draft treaty, the Dalai said it could be revised. He then handed the envoys a formal letter in Chinese and Tibetan, and asked them to take to the governor of Gansu and the garrison commander of Ninghai many presents from him, including *hatas*, miniature gold Buddhas, Tibetan incense and Tibetan herbal medicines. At the same time a messenger from the Panchen also brought to the envoys a formal letter in Tibetan and many gifts, an act showing that the Panchen stood by the new republic more firmly than the Dalai did.

Bell Goes to Lhasa on Shady Business

The British imperialists, as part of their scheme to undermine Han-Tibetan relations, protested to the Beijing government against Zhu Xiu's mission to Tibet and sent Charles Bell, former British political officer in charge of Sikkim, on a mission to Lhasa. In *Tibet: Past and Present*, Bell gives an account of the developments that led to his mission.

I... arrived at Gangtok ... in mid-January 1920. At the same time the Chinese Mission [led by Zhu Xiu], after a long journey through eastern Tibet, arrived in Lhasa. In due course they proposed new, and ostensibly favourable, terms of settlement to the Tibetan Government, requesting the latter to depute their Representatives to China to negotiate a final agreement. They did not, however, succeed in effecting any thing definite. After a stay of four or five months, in April 1920 they quitted the Tibetan capital and returned to China. But Chinese influence in Lhasa was considerably augmented. The general position appeared to

me tangled and unpromising. I therefore urged that I should be permitted to accept the Dalai Lama's oft-repeated invitation to visit him and the Tibetan Government in Lhasa. I had been many times so invited, but our own Government had hitherto not seen their way to permit me to accept. The Tibetans were almost in despair at our turning the cold shoulder to them. The Chinese Mission had done what it could to poison the minds of the Tibetan Government and people against us. If I went to Lhasa, I could explain the position in personal conversation with the Dalai Lama and the members of his Government, and do my best to restore confidence and friendliness.... In October of this year [1920] ... the question of my visiting the Tibetan capital had ... been decided, and accordingly I received a telegram from the Indian Government, asking me to conduct a Mission to Lhasa, in order to convey to His Holiness the Dalai Lama friendly greetings from the British Government and to explain the present political position. We left Yatung ... for Lhasa on the 1st November 1920.

Bell arrived in Lhasa on November 17, 1920. At Kyidtsal Luding a ceremonial tent was erected in his honour. Bell received a *hata* from the personal representative of the Dalai, a *dronyer*, and was accommodated, according to the Dalai's wishes, in the summer residence of a former Tibetan regent, which was only half a mile from the Norpulingkha.

What Bell tried to do in Lhasa was not only prevent Tibet from making any effort to normalize its relations with the motherland, but also to make the already strained relations even worse. He believed that if he could get the Tibetan army to renew its attacks on Xikang and Qinghai, and if possible, on Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan as well, there would be no improved relations between Han and Tibetans, and that the pro-imperialist separatist faction of the Tibetan upper circles, with its wild dream of a "great Tibetan state," would support such a military adventure. He told the Dalai and the Kashag that Tibet needed, among other things, a stronger army and heavier taxation. He writes in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

My private conversations with the Dalai Lama, which were frequent, ranged over a wide variety of subjects. Sometimes the power of Tibet to defend itself came under discussion. During one of these conversations—which were entirely informal—being asked my opinion, I expressed my view that the Tibetan army was inadequate. It consisted only of some five thousand men. I thought that it should be increased

gradually, as funds and equipment became available, till it reached about fifteen thousand. This seemed the lowest number that would offer a reasonable prospect of defence against foreign foes and internal disturbances....

An expanded Tibetan army would mean more taxes. So Bell proposed to the Dalai taxing the monasteries and the aristocrats. He writes in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

The chief obstacle which confronts the Tibetan Government in their present circumstances is the difficulty of raising additional revenue to support the new army. As in other Asiatic countries, land would naturally be the sheet-anchor of Tibetan finance. But large areas of this have been alienated to the monasteries and to the nobles. The Government can resume these only in extreme cases, as in that of the ill-fated monastery of Ten-gye-ling. The expenditure by the State on monasteries, both by these rent-free grants and by direct subsidies in money, barley, butter, tea, &c., is enormous. Approximately one-half of the entire revenues of the country, realized or realizable, is spent on the priests. One-fourth is spent on the nobles, though this is partly repaid by services rendered. The result is that the State has to face the expense of administration with its resources greatly diminished, for some three-fourths of its revenue is alienated.... During my stay in Lhasa in 1912, it was proposed to take the bold step of taxing the estates more recently acquired by the monasteries and other landed proprietors. The consent of the National Assembly, which is guided by the influence of the priests and the nobles, was gained. A Committee was appointed to work out the details.

But the new taxes would actually fall not on the monasteries and the aristocrats as it appeared, but on the common people working for them.

The proposed imposition of new taxes to meet the expenses of an expanded army immediately ran into the stiff opposition of lay and clerical Tibetans, and especially of the three great monasteries.

Not long after Bell's arrival in Lhasa, Tibet celebrated its New Year. More than twenty thousand monks from the three great monasteries gathered in the Jokhang for the annual Monlam festival. When these monks were reported to have killed some Englishmen in a riot, troops were sent by the Dalai to suppress them, and an armed conflict ensued. Meanwhile, there were rumours in the foreign press that Bell and some others of his mission

had been killed. This violent outbreak of popular anti-British sentiment is mentioned in *Tibet: Past and Present*.

February is the beginning of the Tibetan New Year. The Festival known as "The Great Prayer," the chief festival of the whole year, lasts for three weeks. Lhasa as usual was crowded with monks. Owing to quarrels between the leaders of the monks and certain military officers, there was at this time a grave danger that monks, of whom there were some forty thousand in the neighbourhood, might break out, loot and kill. The Dalai Lama was aware of the danger and did the most sensible thing by putting Lhasa out of bounds for the military. The good people of Lhasa were openly terrified, and many of them removed their belongings and hid them in villages far and near. Lhasa has an unenviable reputation for murderous outbreaks in which many people are killed and a great deal of property is destroyed. In the towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong, on the Indian frontier, rumours were rife to the effect that we of the Mission had been assassinated. The Tibetans everywhere attributed to me the increase in their army which was destined to curtail the influence of the powerful priesthood. And no doubt they had good reason for thinking so, for His Holiness had apparently taken the suggestion from me and was pushing the matter through with characteristic energy.... Out of the four councillors on the Grand Council, which constitutes, under the Dalai Lama and Prime Minister, the government of Tibet, one was dismissed and two were fined. Three colonels were dismissed and two lesser military officers ... were fined. The leading priests were summoned before His Holiness and warned to keep the monks under strict control. They were reminded that if fighting broke out, their monasteries would be seriously damaged and they themselves heavily punished.

Five months after the outbreak of the violent incident, five thousand monks of the Drepung decided to attack Lhasa to drive out the Englishmen there. But before they could leave their monastery, three thousand troops sent by the Dalai had surrounded it and disarmed them. Writes Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

Another outbreak occurred five months later in the Dre-pung Monastery, but on a smaller scale, only five thousand monks being involved.... The monks threatened to attack Lhasa. Affairs of this kind are apt to turn against the foreigner of alien religion who has penetrated into the land. The priestly classes, scenting in the foreign influence a menace to their religion and themselves, are especially inclined to be

hostile.... The Tibetan Government summoned three thousand troops to Lhasa and besieged the monastery, which in due course submitted. The affair was settled with a wise admixture of force and leniency.

When the Indian government learned of the Lhasa riots, it instructed Bell to return to India immediately. But Bell "urged the necessity of remaining [in Lhasa], on various grounds, and this view ultimately prevailed." But he could not afford to ignore the anti-British sentiment that was running unabated among the monks of the three great monasteries; he sent for Macdonald, British trade agent at Gyantse, asking him to come to Lhasa to "mediate." Writes Macdonald in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

It appeared that the Tibetan Government had recently considered increasing the strength of its standing army from five to fifteen thousand men. This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of the powerful monasteries of Drepung, Sera and Ganden, who feared that their lamas would be recruited for the new regiments, and that they and other monasteries would be stripped of some of their estates, the revenue from which would be applied for the maintenance of the new troops. The proposal was first made just prior to the arrival of the Bell Mission in Lhasa. A certain section of official opinion in Tibet unjustly blamed the mission as the originator of the unpopular scheme. The trouble was that such persons as held this view would not publicly state their case.

I visited Sera Monastery, the senior abbot of which was an old friend of mine. He received me cordially. He too stated that the monasteries feared the loss of some of their estates, and also the loss of recruits to the priesthood. It appeared that Sera, at any rate, would oppose the proposed increase in the army with all means in its power. He concluded that the solution would be a gradual increase in army strength, rather than the recruitment of the full force immediately. In this way, he asserted, it would be possible for the differences to be adjusted. He insisted, moreover, that all new recruits for the army should be brought in from the outlying provinces, and trained outside Lhasa, so that the strain of maintaining them would not fall on that city.

When next I visited the Dalai Lama he said he considered that the suggestion to increase the army gradually was worthy of consideration. He realized that any innovation in this direction was bound to meet with opposition in his country, as his people, and especially the lamas,

* *Tibet: Past and Present.*

were ultra-conservative. That he had decided to introduce his proposals gradually was evident from the statement of my friend the abbot of Sera, who, when I next saw him, told me that everything had been amicably settled. The Dalai Lama's hand was being forced by the progressive party among the lay officials to make the sudden increase in the army, to which the monkhood and the ordinary people were opposed.

Bell returned to India in September 1921, after spending almost one year in Lhasa. He had been trying to sow dissension between Hans and Tibetans by proposing the expansion of the Tibetan army and attempting to instigate a renewed attack on Kham, but owing to the stiff resistance from the broad masses of the Tibetan people, both lay and clerical, he had to leave without being able to carry the plot through.

The Panchen's Flight to the Interior

The Panchen faction had under its administration a large domain in Tsang, with its people and monasteries, and since the reign of the Qing emperor Shizong, the faction was under the direct leadership of the ambans, enjoying an equal status with the Kashag. Now with the ambans gone, the Kashag was trying to put the Tashilhunpo under the Dalai's rule, and was beginning to impose levies of money, grain, troops and taxes in the Panchen's domain; and when the Tashilhunpo objected on the ground that it had never had to pay anything to the Kashag, antagonism developed between the two factions. In October 1920, the Tashilhunpo sent to Lhasa a delegation consisting of Drongsu Khenjun Garabpa Lozang Tsering, Nyerche Rimshi Donkang, Lesser Drungyig Dangchenpa Lozang Gyaltsen (Wang Lejie), Letsangpa Donkyil Migmar Dondrub and Letsanpa Dramen Dondrub, to negotiate with the Kashag on taxation of wool, yak tails, sheepskins and salt. But the talks broke off because the Kashag refused to make these goods tax-free as requested by the Tashilhunpo delegates.

In 1921, the Kashag set up an army grain office (*babshi lekhang* in Tibetan). Its officers, appointed by the Dalai, were Drungyig Chenpo Lozang Tankyong and Tsepon Lungshar. The office was

in charge of fixing the amounts of grain to be levied from various areas in Tibet for army use. When Tashilhunpo officials were told that their quota was 10,000 *ke* (approximately 125,000 kilograms), or a quarter of the total levies of grain, they became even more dismayed. In October Drungyig Chenpo Deleg Khangsar and Senior Stable Officer Deleg Rabtan, sent by the Panchen, arrived in Lhasa. They asked the Kashag to exempt the Tashilhunpo from such levies, but they were turned down.

All that led to a serious deterioration of the relationship between the Kashag and the Tashilhunpo. The Panchen tried in vain to ask the British to mediate. Writes Macdonald in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

For several years prior to 1923 relations between the governments of Lhasa and Shigatse had been growing steadily more strained. Even in 1922 the Tashi Lama was very much alarmed at the turn that matters were taking, for in that year he wrote asking me to act as a mediator between himself and the Dalai Lama. This I was unfortunately precluded from doing by the regulations of the Indian Government, which rightly forbids its representatives in Tibet to interfere in any way with the internal affairs of that country. The people of the Shigatse province protested against having to supply free transport and labour to Lhasa officials travelling in their districts. They maintained that, as direct subjects of the Shigatse administration, these facilities should be supplied to their own officers only....

Trouble between the two Grand Lamas finally came to a head because money was required for the maintenance of the army and for the defence of the eastern frontiers. At this juncture His Serenity the Tashi Lama was taking a cure at the hot springs of Je, a place four days' journey to the west of Shigatse. He returned to his capital at once. Certain of his ministers had been summoned urgently to Lhasa, and they had been thrown into prison.

At the first sign of really serious trouble between the Lhasa and Shigatse Grand Lamas I sent a man to the latter place, to His Serenity, to inquire after his well-being, and the very same night that he returned to his Shigatse headquarters the Tashi Lama, with his chief adherents, and about a hundred followers, rode away from the Tashilhunpo Monastery, heading for an unknown destination.

Liu Jiaju, in his book *The Great Master Panchen Lama*, recounts the Panchen's flight as follows:

On the night of November 15 of the twelfth year of the Chinese

Republic (1923), the Panchen, knowing that reconciliation was no longer possible, left secretly for Northang under the cover of darkness, accompanied by fifteen high-ranking monks. Travelling non-stop, the party crossed the Tsangqing River and reached the grasslands via Jeye in only seven days and nights, a distance which usually took a trader a month's time to cover; and even by then no one in Tsang knew that the Great Master had left. On the night of the 18th of that month, the Panchen's officials, Solpon Khenpo Lozang Gyaltsen, Chodpon Khenpo Wangdu Norbu, Senpon Khenpo Gardan Robgye, Phurchok Khenpo Lozang Pandan, Lozang Ngangyal, Drungyig Chenpo Wahg Lejie, Dronyer Drungzurlo, Ding Khangpa Tsering, Ximgappa Sangyal Gyatso, Sol Thabpa Lozang Tubten and attendant lamas left secretly to catch up with the Great Master. This party of more than a hundred men was almost drowned while negotiating the Tsangqing River.... After travelling double time for five days and nights, they joined the Great Master and were glad that they had made the escape. Then they travelled south for another three days, and when they were about to reach the main road, the Buddha suddenly turned north, and the rest of the party followed him. Later when they realized that if they had continued their journey south, they would have run into a party of soldiers sent to pursue them, they were glad that the Great Master had made the wise decision. From then on, the party avoided main roads by wading rivers and following difficult trails in the mountains. When they reached Tsitsugn Tsathang after an exhausting three-day trek, they came across the returning camel caravan of Shab Drung Khenpo (tutor of Outer Mongolia's Jebtun Dampa). The caravan took the Buddha to interior China.

Meanwhile, the Ü military authorities in Tsang, on learning that the Panchen had fled east, telephoned the news to the Dalai from Gyantse, and at the same time sent Tsepon Lungshar and Dapon Tsulko with a thousand troops to intercept the Panchen's party. But soon they had to give up because they did not know what route the Panchen was following, and heavy snow was closing all the roads in the mountains.

With the Panchen gone, the Dalai took over the Tashilhunpo and put it under the leadership of the Kashag. He appointed Khenchen Phurchok Lozang Tenzin Tashilhunpo's Dzasa Lama in charge of the administrative and religious affairs in place of the Panchen. The Dzasa Lama's responsibilities were collecting taxes in gold, silver and grain in the areas under the Panchen's jurisdiction for use by the monasteries and their monks; fixing corvée quotas

for the *dzongs* and manor estates under the Tashilhunpo's rule and distributing corvée services, and collecting in the areas under the Tashilhunpo's jurisdiction surtaxes in grain, wool and salt and turning them to the Kashag for military use.

The Dzasa Lama had five assistants provided for him by the Dalai. They were Tse Dronyer Lozang Renchin, Nyerche Solpon Dechen, Shodrung Jampa Kazang, Tsedrung Lozang Drashi and Tsedrung Kyenrab Wangchuk. They were charged with the responsibilities of running the *dzongs* under the Tashilhunpo and the administrative and religious affairs of the Tashilhunpo itself.

The Kashag treated the people in the Panchen's domain very badly, so badly that even the British found it distasteful. Writes Macdonald in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

The absence of that prelate from his country is causing great uneasiness among devout Lamaists. His own subjects of the Tsang province are groaning under the burden of the new taxation imposed by the central government, which has now placed its own officers in charge of the districts formerly directly administered from Shigatse. In that city is stationed a Lhasa official of ministerial rank. He is assisted by four fourth-rank men. Orders have been issued that all taxes and arrears of revenue are to be exacted to the last farthing....

Before he left Shigatse the Tashi Lama left a letter for the Dalai Lama, in which he stated that he was going to Mongolia for the purpose of raising money, and that he had no intention whatever of being the cause of civil strife in Tibet. Once he had left the country, the central government published a bulletin to the effect that the Tashi Lama had gone away of his own accord, and that they had not threatened him in any way, nor could they take any responsibility for his flight.

According to Macdonald, after he fled to interior China, the Panchen asked to be allowed to return to Tibet, but when he could not get any guarantee for his personal safety, he dropped the idea. Writes Macdonald in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

The Tashi Lama asserts that he wishes to return to his monastery, and the Dalai Lama replies that he is at perfect liberty to do so. The former, however, before he will return to Tibet, requires some substantial guarantee of his personal safety, and that of the ministers who are sharing his exile. He once asked if the Government of India would provide his guarantee, but this, of course, could not be done. At the

time of writing, the Tashi Lama has left Peking, and is resident at Mukden, in Manchuria, where he is well treated. He lives in a palace, specially built for his accommodation by the Chinese government.

Contacts Between Tibet and the Central Government

The British imperialists were worried about the strong popular anti-British sentiment in Tibet that persisted even after Bell's departure. They hoped a reign of police (that is, secret police) they trained might bring the thoughts and actions of the Tibetan people under their control. But, as in previous schemes, they were frustrated in this one by the Tibetan people. Macdonald writes of this event in *Twenty Years in Tibet*:

A police force was inaugurated by my friend, the Tsarong Shap-pe. He persuaded the Dalai Lama, in the face of bitter opposition from the entire Church party, to sanction his scheme. Having been approached by the Lhasa authorities, the Government of India lent them the services of Mr. Laden La, of the Bengal Police, to organize the police force. Mr. Laden La, a Sikkimese by birth, speaking Tibetan as his mother tongue, and with considerable experience in dealing with hill peoples, was peculiarly suited for this work. He knew personally many of the high officials with whom he would have to come into contact, and was a great friend of the Tsipon Lungshar....

Mr. Laden La proceeded to Lhasa, and began his work, adapting Indian police methods to the conditions in Tibet. He was hampered, however, by the peculiar customs of the Tibetan capital, whereby, at certain times of the year, all administrative and executive powers are withdrawn from the civil authorities, and placed in the hands of the lamas of the three great monasteries, Drepung, Sera, and Ganden. The material with which he had to work was not of the best. The rank and file of the new force were practically conscripts, sent in by owners of great estates, who, naturally, did not part with their good men. The pay of a constable was small, and offered no inducement to the ordinary citizen to join the force. Training the new police must have been terribly uphill work, and Mr. Laden La is to be congratulated on the results he managed to achieve. His duties unfortunately told on his health, and after a year he was compelled to return to India to recuperate. Once he had left, the police force, for various reasons, went

to pieces. Continual friction existed between the military and the police.

From its very inception the Lhasa townspeople hated the police force. The new police were unfortunately apt to be a trifle overbearing, over-conscientious in the performance of their duties, and prone to make arrests on the slightest pretext. Lhasa citizens were unused to this kind of treatment, and naturally detested the new guardians of the law. Today there remain less than fifty constables, who have now been placed under the control of the Mipon, or city magistrates. Almost every one of the commissioned ranks appointed to the police have been degraded or dismissed, so bitterly did the citizens, high and low, dislike the innovation, and those who had anything to do with it. One of the police officers, Pema Chandra, attempted to flee from Lhasa, owing to persecution, but was caught and shot by the soldiers sent in pursuit.

Not reconciled to their failure, the British imperialists came up with an even more vicious plot. They recruited some young pro-British officers from the Tibetan army, and instigated them to overthrow the Kashag in a coup and replace it with a government of young army officers. (Some sources say that the British planned to depose the Dalai and establish a secular regime in Tibet). The man leading this conspiracy was the Tsarong Kaloon. He and a group of young officers formed a clandestine clique that would strike when the time came. But before they could do so, one of the officers in the clique informed the Dalai of the conspiracy. Immediately the Dalai removed the Tsarong from his position as commander-in-chief of the Tibetan army, dismissed all the young officers in this clique from their posts and closed down the British-run military academy in Gyantse. The aborted coup was described in *Twenty Years in Tibet*.

About this time another grave scandal in the capital brought about the downfall of many of the most promising young officers in government employ. The excuse for their degradation was that they had adopted European dress and manners, and had cut their hair short, but the real reason lay deeper than this. Several of the younger military officers had signed a pact to assist each other, in every way, in the conflict that was even then brewing between the civil and military powers. One person, however, though present at the conference at which this compact was drawn up, refused to sign it, and revealed the matter to the government. This informer, Dzasa Trumpa, was afterwards appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan forces, displac-

ing the Tsarong Shap-pe, who was alleged to be at the head of the military faction. The Dzasa, however, did not hold his position for long, for he became an opium addict, and was dismissed, being succeeded by Tsipon Lungshar....

The Tsarong, though stripped of his post of commander-in-chief, was allowed by the Dalai to keep his position as *kaloön* in consideration of his past services, and was assigned the work of building a machinery factory in Trashi and a hydropower plant. But the presence in Lhasa of foreign engineers he hired gave rise to rumours among the locals that he was helping the British establish a consulate. The rumours soon led to public protests and the Tsarong was almost beaten to death by the protesters. This outbreak of violence was described in *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*.

The Tsarong, leader of the pro-British faction, was planning to build a consulate office in Trashi for the British. For a long time he had been scheming to depose the Dalai with their help. That is why the Tibetans mobbed the foreign engineers working for the construction of the British consulate office and inflicted such injuries on the Tsarong as almost killed him.

By now shifts had appeared in the relations between the Dalai's faction and the British imperialists as the latter's outright interference in Tibet's internal affairs had become an immediate threat to the Dalai's position and the interests of the class the Dalai represented. Aware of such a threat, the Dalai began to think of resisting the British by reuniting with the various nationalities of the motherland. Writes Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present*:

There are still many Tibetans who look towards China. They feel that their country is not strong enough to stand alone, and fear that, "unless it joins the Chinese Commonwealth as one of the Five United States, it is likely in time to be overrun by Indians", as one expressed it to me.... Among Tibetans who have been brought into contact with Indians, some fear that Indians may come to Tibet and endeavour to obtain influence there. For various reasons they do not desire too close a connexion with India.... Tibet's natural affinity is no doubt with the races of the Chinese Commonwealth. In religion and ethics, in social manners and customs, there is much common ground. Historically, the connexion is from the beginning of time. This bond with China will

presumably remain. It is not, however, likely to be one of Chinese domination.... When she at length secures recognition of the integrity and autonomy of her territory, she may not unreasonably enter the Chinese Commonwealth; but it seems likely that she will do so only on terms of equality.

In short, at that time those in the Tibetan ruling circles could not make up their minds about what to do; they realized that "too close a connexion" with foreign countries was to be avoided and desired fraternal ties with the other nationalities of the country, but they were not sure if they would be treated "on terms of equality."

By this time the Nationalist-Communist united front had collapsed as a result of the failure of the 1925-27 Great Revolution in China, but the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government that had been established in Nanjing was claiming that it would stay faithful to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policy of "equality for all nationalities of the country." The claim gave the Dalai illusions. In the winter of 1928, he sent Khenpo Lozan Pasang, his resident representative at Wutai Mountain, to Nanjing to interview Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang gave him a letter for the Dalai. That was the beginning of contact between Tibet and the Kuomintang government.

In July 1929, the Kuomintang government put out feelers by sending Liu Manqing to Lhasa. A woman employee at the Office of Civil Affairs, Liu was sent on this mission as a representative of Gu Yingfen, director of the Civil Affairs Office. After being stranded in Chamdo for some time, Liu arrived in Lhasa in the spring of 1930. On March 28, she had an interview with the Dalai, during which the Dalai was noncommittal. A second interview did not take place until May 5, after Liu announced towards the end of the previous month that she was returning to the interior.

During the second interview the Dalai talked on a wide range of subjects and asked Liu to report what he said to the Kuomintang government. The following are excerpts of what he said as recorded in Liu's book *My Mission to Xikang and Tibet*:

China in the past has always treated Tibet with indifference, regarding it as barren and worthless land. Now I am glad that the new government, shortly after its establishment, has sent you here to express concern for and sympathy toward Tibet.... I hope this warm feeling will last and lead to concrete mutual assistance. What I expect

most of China is real unity and peace. When I learned of the rebellions, I prayed daily for their suppression.... As for Xikang, I would like you to tell the government that it should replace the sadistic army officers there, who subject my people to brutal treatment, with an honest civil official of clean reputation. I am ready to withdraw the Tibetan troops there at any moment. As the place is Chinese territory, there is no need to argue which one of us own it. Resorting to force ... would be as senseless as a quarrel between two brothers....

Recently the Indian people have been suffering a great deal from the brutal oppression of Britain to crush their resistance. China should stand on the side of weak nations and give them its practical help.

The British, indeed, have a mind to draw me to their side. Nevertheless, I know the importance of guarding the national sovereignty and I have never surrendered a bit of it in spite of the necessity of having to deal with them, their characters and customs being so different from ours. When China is internally consolidated, the Xikang-Tibet question can be easily settled in a conference. As for sending Tibetan delegates to the conference (the national conference convened by the Kuomintang government), I am afraid such delegates would not be able to do anything useful because Tibet is run on religion, and its people are not interested in politics and are not well-informed in regard to the interior. But as such an invitation has been extended, I shall see that a few young men will be sent to the conference.... All I ask the government to do is to provide Tibet in the near future with weaving and leather-manufacturing machines together with skilled workers.

What is noteworthy is the Dalai's reference to Xikang and Tibet as "Chinese territory," hence "there is no need to argue which of us own it," and his belief that "when China is internally consolidated, the Xikang-Tibet question can be easily settled in a conference." These statements indicate that the Dalai stood for the unity of the motherland as he accepted the fact that Tibet was part of China and the fact that the Xikang-Tibet question was China's internal affair.

Prior to Liu Manqing's mission to Tibet, the Dalai had sent Kunchok Jungnas, a resident Tibetan *khenpo* at the Yonghe Palace in Beijing, to Nanjing to tell Chiang Kai-shek that (1) the Dalai had never entered into any alliance with Britain; Tibet's contact with Britain could not have been avoided because it was one of the countries bordering on Tibet; (2) the Dalai harboured no hostility

towards the Han people and (3) the Dalai would welcome the Panchen's return to Tibet. In December 1919, Chiang Kai-shek wrote a letter to the Dalai and sent Kunchok Jungnas on a "goodwill mission to Tibet."

Kunchok Jungnas reached Tibet by way of India and arrived in Lhasa in February 1930. At this time, the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the Kuomintang government had worked out an eight-point draft program "for the settlement of the Tibetan question" and wanted the Dalai's answer to it. The eight points and the Kashag's response to them are as follows:

1. Q: How might relations between Tibet and the Central Government be restored?

A: If the Central Government would treat the patronage relationship between China and Tibet with sincerity and good faith as it previously did, Tibet on its part, having always shown sincerity in its dealings in the past, would from now on make an even greater effort to give full support to the Central Government.

2. Q: How shall the Central Government exercise administrative control over Tibet?

A: It would be advisable to work out a written understanding on the measures to be taken for securing a fundamental stabilization in both the political and the religious affairs of Tibet.

3. Q: How shall the autonomy of Tibet and its scope be defined?

A: As from now on, the patronage relationship between the Central Government and Tibet is going to be faithfully observed and the Central Government is to show sincerity to make Tibet feel safe and secure, the area over which autonomy is to be exercised should naturally be the same as before. It is expected that the Central Government will return to Tibet those districts that originally belonged to it but which are now not under its control so that a perpetual peace and harmony will surely be the result.

4. Q: Shall the Dalai and Panchen lamas join the Kuomintang?

A: On account of his advanced age and the tremendous burden in managing temporal and religious affairs, and also considering the fact that he is not able to proceed to the capital until the consent of the three great monasteries and of the members of the Upper and Lower Tantric Houses is obtained, the Dalai Lama is not at the present time in a position to join the Kuomintang. As the Panchen Lama is now residing in interior China and his duty has always been confined to the religious affairs of the Tashilhunpo, for he has no political affairs to

attend to, he should be available for membership in the Kuomintang. It must be understood, however, that he has never had any say in the settlement of Tibetan affairs.

5. Q: Shall the relative positions of the Dalai and the Panchen Lama and their respective jurisdiction in political as well as religious affairs be maintained as before or new provisions be made?

A: Political and religious affairs have always been administered by the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Panchen Lama has had only the Tashilhunpo Monastery in his control. Actually the Tashilhunpo Monastery was built by the first Dalai Lama. It was the second Dalai Lama who entrusted the administration to a fellow monk and conferred upon the latter the honorary title of Panchen, when he moved his seat to Lhasa. Later, in view of the tutor-disciple relationship existing in turn through generations between the Dalai and the Panchen, the fifth Dalai Lama awarded this monastery to the fourth Panchen Lama. If this age-old practice were to be continuously observed, all Tibetans would be only too pleased.

6. Q: How shall the Dalai welcome the Panchen back to Tibet and how shall the Central Government escort him?

A: Among the Panchen's retinue, many employed the terms "Anterior" and "Ulterior" Tibet with intent to sow discord. They disobeyed orders of the Tibetan Government and acted frequently against their superiors. Both their thoughts and conduct are corrupt. In the year Jia Chen (1904), the Panchen went to India and conspired with the British, but all his efforts were of no avail, and he returned to the Tashilhunpo. In the year Xin Hai (1911), he intrigued with Resident Lian Yu and made an attempt to seize the reins of government and control of the church during the absence of the Dalai Lama. But his efforts were thwarted by the opposition of the people and especially of the clergymen of the three great monasteries, and he had to return to the Tashilhunpo. According to established practice, the Panchen should contribute one quarter of the provisions for the army. Not only did he fail to make such contributions, he also committed acts in violation of law. Had the offenders been punished strictly according to the letter of the law, there would have been no such state of affairs as now exists. It is only in consideration of the long-standing and close tutor-disciple relationship between the Dalai and the Panchen through generations that a policy of tolerance and forgiveness has been followed. Yet these people not only remained unrepentant, but further advised and urged the Panchen to flee from the Tashilhunpo. A dispatch inviting him back was soon sent to the Panchen, but he refused to accept. He then fled

to Urga and had secret dealings with the communists. Only upon the death of the Chief Lama of Mongolia was he obliged to come to interior China. Consequently, the Tibetan Government dispatched officials to the Tashilhunpo to take proper care of the monastery. Now, these offenders are still conspiring and making trouble. As the matter stands, Tibet would find it very difficult to welcome them unless they can give a satisfactory explanation as to their reason for taking flight.

7. Q: Has the Dalai Lama the intention of setting up in the Capital an office for the convenience of keeping closer contact? As to its expenses, the Central Government is prepared to grant the necessary funds.

A: At first, offices are to be set up in Nanjing, Beiping, and Xikang. If and when such offices are required for other places, applications will be filed accordingly.

8. Q: Is there anything else that Tibet expects of the Central Government?

A: For the purpose of protecting itself against aggression, Tibet's hope for the present is only that the Central Government will supply it with arms. In case any other help may be needed in the future for strengthening its security, it will make requests to the Central Government.

Kunchok Jungnas returned to Nanjing with these replies in August 1930. He had now been made by the Dalai Tibet's chief resident representative in Nanjing. In December Xie Guoliang, a member of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, left for Tibet via India with his secretary, Tan Yunshan. He was sent by the Commission to make further contact with the Dalai. (Xie was formerly the Sichuan army officer who defected to the Kashag and fought Zhong Ying.) But he died in Chisul, and Tan Yunshan went to see the Dalai in his stead.

From Lhasa Tan Yunshan asked the Kuomintang government for approval of the following guidelines he suggested for negotiations with the Kashag:

Tibet is part of China, and the Central Government at Nanjing is the Central Government of all China (composed of the Han, Manchu, Tibetan, Mongolian, Hui and Miao peoples). The relations between China and Tibet are those between a Central authority and a locality or a special region. The negotiations this time are those conducted between the Central Government and the local authorities of Tibet. The

settlement of the so-called China-Tibet issue means the solution to the problem of the union of and cooperation between the Central Government and the Tibetan local authorities for the well-being of the nation.

But Tan never received any reply from the Kuomintang government regarding the proposed guidelines, and after staying in Lhasa for a few months he went home via India. Before his departure from Lhasa, he was asked by the Dalai to contact Gandhi in India on his behalf. Tan met with Gandhi at Bardoli in India, and "did what the Dalai had asked to do for him." What can be said of the Dalai's offer of contact with Gandhi is that the Dalai at least sympathized with India's movement for national independence, a sympathy stemming from his dislike of imperialism. And when the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing was established in 1931 with Tsultrim Tenzin and others appointed by the Dalai as its officials, the relations between the local authorities of Tibet and the Central Government began to improve.

The contact with the Kuomintang government was intended by the upper circles of Tibet to find out whether that government was strong enough to help Tibet free itself from the control of the British imperialists, and also served as a warning to the British imperialists that if they should be so foolish as to carry their meddling with Tibet's internal affairs too far, Tibet would return to the embrace of the motherland. Such a policy was generally described by writers on Tibet as "sitting-on-the-fence policy."

What is also noteworthy was the Dalai's contact with the Japanese imperialists. Charles Bell in *Tibet: Past and Present* called attention to such contact.

Far and near in Tibet at this time [when Bell was in Lhasa] one could notice a growing admiration for the other Island Empire, the Empire of Japan. It was felt that Japan had aided Mongolia against the Bolsheviks, that she was a strong Power, and that she was steadily advancing nearer to Tibet. Mongolia was flooded with Japanese rifles, cheap and serviceable. If the British rifles were held back, let the Japanese be obtained. What then would have been the outcome of continuing our policy of aloofness? Tibet would be compelled to turn to China and Japan....

In another part of the book Bell writes:

The war between Japan and China, and that between Japan and

Russia, kindled Tibetan interest in the growth of the Island Power, whose relationship with themselves, both in race and religion, afforded them natural gratification. Before these victories, Japan was no more than a name to the Tibetans. But during the last two decades some half dozen Japanese have penetrated into the country and resided at Lhasa. One of these, Mr. Ekai Kawaguchi ... travelled in secret and under a disguise.... Subsequent Japanese travellers have lived openly in Lhasa; one of them was employed by the Tibetan Government in the training of troops. During my year in Lhasa there was one Japanese in the Se-ra Monastery. He was studying hard.... Tibetans have thus come to understand and admire the power of Japan.... A few Tibetans have visited Japan. Prominent among these are the Commander-in-Chief.... Articles on Tibet appear from time to time in the Japanese newspapers. One of these [was] written towards the end of our stay in Lhasa.... And from various other indications it is abundantly clear that the Japanese, both officials and non-officials, take a great and increasing interest in Tibetan affairs.

The Japanese imperialists had been coveting Tibet for a long time. For espionage purposes they sent Ekai Kawaguchi and Enga Teramoto to Tibet as "Buddhists" to "study Buddhist scriptures" at the three great monasteries. These Japanese "lamaist monks" must have made great efforts to draw the Dalai towards Japan. But just how the thirteenth Dalai responded to their efforts is hard to say for lack of historical documents in Tibetan in this connection.

The Tibetan Army Renews Its Attack on Kham

The British imperialists, exasperated by the Dalai's decision to set up the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing, resorted to international hooliganism. They instigated an armed invasion of Tibet by Nepal in an attempt to force the Dalai into keeping a cold distance from the motherland, which, they hoped, would lead to further deterioration of the relations between Tibet and the motherland. Meanwhile, they created the impression that they were staying out of the war, so they would be able to act as a mediator should the war reach a stalemate. Recounts *An Outline History and Geography*

of Tibet:

The Dalai ... sent his representative to the capital with the message that he accepted the authority of the Central Government.... Alarmed at this development, the British, as a first step, sent to Tibet a great number of their men who, using every means to create ill feeling between the Han and Tibetan people, tried to keep the Tibetans from joining the people in the interior. Then the British resorted to force, instigating an armed invasion of Tibet by Nepal.

Incidentally, some minor disputes had developed at that time in the commercial relations between Tibet and Nepal. Again, *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*:

Nepalese merchants in Tibet were exempted from taxation. In the eighteenth year of the Chinese Republic (1929) when the Dalai, because of financial difficulties, decided to terminate the exemption and impose taxes on Nepalese merchants in Tibet, the Nepalese resisted openly. In the ensuing public agitation, the Dalai had one of the protesters arrested, but he managed to escape and took refuge in the Office of the Nepalese Resident Representative in Tibet. Soon, when the Dalai learned where he was hiding, he had him captured and shot. Such a trifle would not have led to the confrontation in battle between two opposing armies; it did because the British imperialists were looking for an excuse for an invasion of Tibet by Nepal to force the Dalai into submission; the king of Nepal acted as the British wished because refusing such a formidable power as Britain was out of the question for him.... In the eighth lunar month of the eighteenth year of the Chinese Republic (1929), the Nepalese king gave all the officers and men a three-month home furlough as part of the preparation for a large-scale invasion of Tibet. At the same time twenty-four county magistrates were ordered by the king to build roads about two *zhang* (approximately 6.5 metres) wide for military motor-vehicles going to Tibet; the king was to supply all the equipment needed. In the eleventh month, arms, ammunition and food were procured, pack animals requisitioned, and over twenty thousand Nepalese soldiers in active service in India were recalled. The next month, following mobilization orders, an expeditionary army led by Nepal's crown prince set out.

At the time Tibet was defenceless along its border with Nepal as most of its troops were massed on the eastern front in Xikang. The Dalai, upon reports of the approaching invaders, asked the Kuomintang government for aid, and the imminent danger of war

caused public concern in the interior. The Kuomintang government sent a representative to Nepal "to discover the truth." Reports *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*:

In the twentieth year of the Chinese Republic (1931) the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, with the approval of the Government, sent Ba Wenjun, a counsellor of the Commission, to Nepal to investigate the cause of the conflict between Nepal and Tibet. Ba was very well received in Nepal. When the war ended, Ba returned to Nanjing with many gifts from Nepal for the Government.... It was discovered that the hostilities between Nepal and Tibet were entirely the work of the British imperialists, and that Nepal fought the war against its will, for Nepal, a tiny kingdom, had no choice but bow to the might of Britain.

The invasion was intended by the British imperialists not as a real war but as border skirmishes with which to intimidate the Dalai Lama; when the Dalai, let down by the Kuomintang government, had to once again knuckle under to the British imperialists, asking them to mediate, he was doing exactly what the British wanted him to do. So a British "mediator," a political officer in Sikkim, arrived in Lhasa in 1930. According to *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*, "It was learned later that the Indian government sent a team of representatives to Lhasa, who, after close consultation with the Dalai, were able to arrange a cease-fire."

Just what agreement resulted from the talks is not known for lack of information in that connection. All that is known is that Nepal's military invasion of Tibet was brought to an end, and Tibetan army launched its second attack on Kham in June 1930. Judging by these events, the British imperialists apparently ordered the termination of the Nepalese invasion in exchange for the Dalai's promise to launch another war on Kham. But as the Dalai was intimidated by the might of the British into accepting the condition, the second invasion of Kham was committed largely against the Dalai's free will.

In June 1930, the Tibetan troops stationed in Derge, Xikang, taking a dispute between the Dargye Monastery and the headman of Beri as an excuse, attacked the Sichuan garrison troops at Ganze. According to *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*:

In the nineteenth year of the Chinese Republic (1930), the Living

Buddha of Beri, Nyagra Drulku, enlisted the support of the Dargye in his effort to win domination over the headman of Beri.... He offered the Dargye fifteen households of servants which had been given to the Nyagra Monastery by the former headman of Beri, and the Dargye accepted the offer without questioning the legitimacy of doing so. When the Beri headman raised objections, the Dargye used force. At daybreak on June 18, several hundred mounted soldiers made a surprise attack on Beri and took the place. Then an orgy of burning and looting by the invaders followed. The Sichuan troops, rushing to the scene to restore peace, were held up by the Dargye troops entrenched across the river.... The Tibetan army stationed at Dargye, instead of helping to effect a withdrawal of the Dargye troops, provoked a war with the Sichuan troops.... The armed conflict caused by the dispute over the servants between the Dargye and Beri was merely a local incident and did not concern Tibet. But the Dalai sent his troops beyond the boundary of Tibet to fight a war. During the war these troops not only aided the Dargye in its attack on Ganze, when they occupied Zhanhua (Nyagrong), they took prisoner its magistrate, Zhang Cipei, his subordinates and their families, more than thirty of them in all, and bundled them off to Chamdo.... The weapons the Dalai's troops used during the invasion were all made by an ordnance factory in Bombay, and the troops fought under the command of British officers.

On the matter of Britain supplying arms and ammunition to the Tibetan army, the Chinese ambassador to Britain asked the British Foreign Office for an explanation. The Foreign Office replied that the Indian Government was acting in accordance with its treaty obligations, but, it said, future military supplies would strictly be for the purpose of self-defence and the maintenance of public order, and expressed the readiness of the British government to mediate and to help in finding a peaceful solution. In reply the Chinese ambassador said, "The dispute between the central government and Tibet is China's internal affair; therefore, we decline any offer of mediation."

Tibet's invasion of the Xikang region occurred at a time when the local warlords of Sichuan were locked in a war among themselves. This accounted for the abandonment of Ganze and Zhanhua by the garrison troops at the approach of the Tibetan troops and their capture of the local government appointed magistrate.

Following the fall of Ganze and Zhanhua, Sichuan local author-

ities asked the Kuomintang government to negotiate with the Dalai for a halt of the attack by the Tibetan army. In April 1931, the Kuomintang government appointed Tang Kesan, an official of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to investigate the case in Ganze and adjacent areas, and sent a telegram to the Dalai through his representative in Nanjing, Kunchok Jungnas, asking him to order a stop of the attack and send men to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the issue. In May, the Dalai cabled his reply, saying that he had ordered a cessation of the military action, pending negotiations with representatives of the central government for a peaceful settlement. Towards the end of that month, Tang Kesan was told in Xikang by the Kuomintang government in a telegram to proceed to Ganze for talks with the Dalai-appointed representative, Dapon Kyungram. But when Tang reached Luhuo, he was told by Kyungram in a letter that he, the *dapon*, was not a representative to any negotiations, but was merely in charge of his reception. Some time later, Tang received a letter from Kaloon Mantodpa, Tibet's chief representative at Chamdo, in which the *kaloon* said, "I have the honour to inform you that I have been authorized to attend to matters concerning the Xikang incident." Tang then told the *kaloon* in a letter that he was eager to meet him in Ganze and get the talks underway. It was a long time before Tang was told by Kaloon Mantodpa in a letter that he, the *kaloon*, could not meet him because he was no longer a representative and was handing the job over to his successor. Once again the talks were delayed. It was not until the spring of 1932 that Dapon Kyungram was empowered by the Dalai to enter negotiations with Tang Kesan. The talks produced a draft cease-fire agreement. Its main points were: (1) Ganze and Zhanhua were to be garrisoned temporarily by Tibetan troops. (2) Daofu and Luhuo were each to be garrisoned by two hundred Han troops, and Ganze and Zhanhua were each to be garrisoned by two hundred Tibetan troops. The two armies were to refrain from attacking each other. (3) As the Dargye was formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ganze Monastery, all the disputes with Beri were to be referred to Kyungram for unprejudiced arbitration. (4) All captured officers and men were to be repatriated; all expenses incurred during their captivity were to be paid by the Sichuan army.

What the agreement was aimed at was the acceptance by the command of the Sichuan army of permanent occupation by the Tibetan army of the territories it had seized. As such, the agreement, when made public, caused a wave of protests in Xikang by its entire population. According to *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*:

When the people of Beri learned that by the agreement Ganze would be garrisoned temporarily by the Tibetan army and all the disputes between the Dargye and Beri would be referred to Kyungram for arbitration, they protested in tears. They went to Luhuo to make their stand known to the local authorities, and at the same time, the entire tribe, led by the wife of the Beri headman, told the Special Envoy and the Commissioner of their fears. They said that the peace agreement, if signed, would enable them to return to their homeland, but since Ganze would then be put under the control of the Tibetan army, they would certainly become targets of retaliation by the Tibetans and the Dargye Monastery for being amicable with the Han people, and in the case of a dispute, Kyungram would certainly stand on the side of the Dargye to the great disadvantage of Beri. Consequently, they said, the entire tribe would be reduced to slavery.... The local military and administrative authorities of Xikang and the people of the province also joined in the protests. As a result, the peace talks broke off.

Meanwhile, Kelzang Tserim, the chief of a local faction in Xikang, taking advantage of the civil war between the Sichuan warlords and of the Sichuan army's being attacked by both internal and external enemies, announced without warning on March 9, 1932 the establishment in Ba'an of a "Committee for the Establishment of Xikang as a Province" and a "provincial army of Xikang." The announcement was accompanied by the slogans "Xikang for the people of Xikang" and "Expel the Sichuan army." Soon after that, more than ten counties including Yanjing, Chadren, Dabpa, Yidun, Derong and Gyalthang fell to the insurgents.

Simultaneously, other trouble was brewing in Xikang. Tang Kesan, the representative of the Kuomintang government in Xikang, and Ma Xiao, a brigade commander of the warlord army of Liu Wenhui stationed in Xikang, were both Muslims, and Tang was also on intimate terms with the four strongmen of Northwest China—Ma Bufang, Ma Buqing, Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin.

Tang thought he could use these connections to stage a coup in the province. According to *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*:

Tang, being also a Muslim, was on very good terms with men like Ma Fuxiang and Ma Hongkui.... They planned to drive Tibetans out of Xikang with the combined military effort of all the Muslim troops in Gansu, Qinghai and Xikang, and form a new provincial government of Xikang.... But soon ... when Ma Xiao was killed in mutiny and Tang returned to Chengdu, the plot fizzled out.

Tibet's military occupation of Ganze and Zhanhua lasted for more than two years. This was possible because the Sichuan and Xikang warlords were too busy fighting among themselves to do anything else.

In August 1931, a British political officer in Sikkim, arrived in Lhasa. Sent by the British imperialists, he was to try to bring the war Tibet was fighting in Xikang to Qinghai by getting the Tibetans to attack Jyekundo in Qinghai, believing that the extended war would drive still another wedge between the two nationalities of Huis and Tibetans in China. The Dalai, shortly after meeting with him, put Drungyig Chenpo (secretary-general) Ngo-shiba Thupten Gedun in charge of military and administrative affairs in Jyekundo. The *drungyig chenpo* left for Qinghai on the night following his appointment. Soon Tibetan troops were reported to have invaded Qinghai. In November the English political officer returned to Drenjong after staying in Lhasa for about three months.

The Tibetan troops began their assault on the defence zones in Jyekundo in January 1932. This time the pretext for attack was a land dispute between the local Ganden and Dudtsi Dil monasteries. *Essays on the Frontier Question* by Gao Changgui gives the following account of the event:

Zurmang of Jyekundo is administered by the Ganden Monastery. Ninety years ago when the monastery joined the camp of the Yellow Sect, the Dalai, as requested by the monastery, appointed a *khenpo* as its supervisor. The *khenpo*, with the powerful Ganden behind him, grew increasingly domineering.... In a display of defiance against this evil-doer, the inhabitants refused the corvée his monastery assigned them. In retaliation the Ganden took away forcibly the crops grown in the

nearby fields. Since then for over a decade the Ganden would come each year to take possession of the crops as if it owned the land. As the land was in the possession of the Dudtsi Dil Monastery of the Older Sect and of the Zurmang tribe, the Dudtsi Dil monks and some of the tribesmen appealed several times to the Jyekunda garrison headquarters and the magistrate for justice. They won the case, but the Ganden ... took the dispute to the Dalai, who then instructed the *sawang chenpo* (governor-general) of Chadmo to look into the matter. Soon, the representatives of the *sawang chenpo* went into negotiations with the local authorities of Jyekundo, but nothing came of the talks.... In the twentieth year of the Chinese Republic (1931), the new garrison commander of Jyekundo, Ma Biao, declared that as the land over which the dispute had arisen was clearly in our possession, Tibet had nothing to do with its settlement.... Then Tibet, made unbearably arrogant by its military victory in Xikang, sent a large body of troops to the Jyekundo area in the name of protecting the Ganden, and when they began to attack the positions of the Jyekundo garrison troops, war broke out.

"In December of the twentieth year of the Chinese Republic," the book goes on to say,

Kunpo Ngabo, the Tibetan *sawang chenpo* of Chamdo, demanded the withdrawal of Qinghai troops from Greater and Lesser Zurman, warning that the troops and residents in the areas south of Kokonor must not resist the Tibetan troops in any manner but welcome them when they arrived. Commander-in-Chief Ma Biao, refusing to be provoked, reported the demand to the provincial government. Then Secretary Wang Jiamei, sent by Divisional Commander Ma Bufang, and the headmen of Jyekundo went to meet the *khanchung*. They told the Tibetan, among other things, that as Qinghai and Tibet had always lived in peace and never held anything against each other, armed conflicts between them should be avoided by all means. The *khanchung*, pretending to accept the views, agreed to meet again the following year at a place mutually agreed upon to discuss the dispute between Zurmang and the Ganden. But on March 24 of the twenty-first year of the Chinese Republic (1932), the Tibetan army made a surprise attack on Greater and Lesser Zurmang with heavy fire power.

The Tibetans attacked Qinghai with a much superior force of more than four thousand men as against only a little over five hundred of Ma's troops. The garrison troops sustained heavy losses;

their Battalion Commander Ma Zhanhai was killed in action, and the survivors retreated to Jyekundo. The Tibetan army, after seizing Greater and Lesser Zurmang, pressed on to Nanchen. As the defence at Nanchen was weak, Ma Bufang ordered the evacuation of its garrison troops to Jyekundo. On April 3 Nanchen fell to the Tibetans. Then the victorious Tibetans continued their advance until they laid siege on Jyekundo. As Ma Bufang feared that "the loss of Jyekundo would imperil the whole of Qinghai," he ordered the defending troops to hold on at any cost, and at the same time appealed to Chiang Kai-shek for aid in arms and money, and assembled troops for reinforcement.

In July 1932 when the newly assembled Qinghai troops reached the battle front at Jyekundo, they mounted a counteroffensive, during which they put the Tibetan troops to rout, recovering not only Nanchen but many of the counties east of the Jinsha River in Xikang which had been lost to the Tibetans since the eighth year of the Chinese Republic. *Essays on the Frontier Question* gives an account of the battle.

First, Divisional Commander Ma Bufang sent Brigade Commander Ma Xun with over a hundred men to Jyekundo on a morale-boosting mission. Then he ordered Brigade Commander Ma Lu to bring over one thousand men to the aid of the defenders of Jyekundo. A counteroffensive was then launched by the Qinghai troops on the Drichu on July 14, with the aim to recover the lost territories. After the battle of Xiwu, the reinforcements led by Regimental Commander La Pingfu reached Jyekundo and the siege was broken following a battle fought on the night of August 20. The Qinghai troops then attacked Greater and Lesser Zurmang with concentrated fire power in a counteroffensive. The battle was fought at the Damthog Monastery on August 24. On the 27th Lesser Zurmang was recaptured. The victory was followed by the recovery of Greater Zurmang on September 2 and Nanchen two days later. On September 12 the reinforcements led by Brigade Commander Ma Lu arrived at Jyekundo. On October 5, the Qinghai troops, after suffering a minor defeat three days earlier, resumed their attack on the Damthog Monastery, recapturing the Maokhou She Monastery.

With the whole of Qinghai now cleared of Tibetan troops, the victorious Qinghai army pressed on, penetrating into Xikang more than a hundred *li*, recovering Sershud, Danko and the other county

seats lost to the Tibetan army in the eighth year of the Chinese Republic.

The sweeping victory scored by Ma's troops at Jyekundo and their penetration into Xikang brought about quick, dramatic changes in the war situation in Xikang. The Tibetan army in Ganze and Zhanhua had to retreat to the west of the Jinsha River because its flanks were now fully exposed to attack and its supply and communication lines could be cut off any time. Kelzang Tserim and Liu Wenhui finally made peace when the former surrendered his troops and power to Liu and left Xikang. With Kelzang Tserim gone, Liu was able to dispatch a brigade of his troops to coordinate the attack by the Qinghai troops on Zhanhua and Ganze. The Brigade, taking advantage of the Tibetan troops' withdrawal to the Jinsha, recovered Ganze, Zhanhua, Derge and other county seats, winning back all the territories east of the Jinsha that had been lost to the Tibetans, and setting up its positions facing those of the Tibetans across the river.

After the Tibetan army retreated to the west of the Jinsha, Ma Bufang in his telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek and Liu Wenhui proposed a pincer attack by the victorious Qinghai and Xikang armies on Chamdo. This development prompted the British chargé d'affaires to China to make a presentation in person to the Foreign Ministry of the Kuomintang government. Citing the Simla Convention, he said that the proposed attack on Chamdo would be an act of aggression against Tibet, and threatened that the military action, if taken, would produce grave consequences. To this the Foreign Ministry replied: "As China did not sign the Simla Convention, the document is invalid." But still, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Qinghai and Xikang forces to halt military action pending peace negotiations with the Dalai. The Dalai, knowing that his position had been weakened by the repeated defeats of the Tibetan army and the loss of all the territories Tibet grabbed east of the Jinsha, and beset by the impoverishment of Tibet and strong anti-war sentiments among the people as a result of ceaseless war, proposed peace talks with the Kuomintang government.

On October 8, 1932 Deng Jun and Jiang Yuwen, negotiators authorized by Liu Wenhui, met their Tibetan counterparts, Dapon Kyungram and Dapon Kyibuk, at Gongtok. The negotiators

reached a six-point cease-fire agreement. Its main points were:

1. The outmost line of defence of the Han troops was to run along the east bank of the Jinsha River along its upper and lower reaches; the outmost line of defence of the Tibetan army was to run along the west bank of the Jinsha River along its upper and lower reaches.

2. The time for the withdrawal of combat troops of both sides was from October 8 to October 28; the outmost line of defence after the withdrawal was to be located in Palyul, Danko and Derge for the Han troops, and in Renda, Tangphug and Wucheng for the Tibetan army. The number of troops stationed in each of the places was not to exceed two hundred.

3. Beginning on the day the cease-fire went into effect and the troop withdrawal began, communications between the two sides were to be restored, and the traders and people of both sides were to be allowed to travel without restrictions.

The peace talks between Qinghai and Tibet, however, dragged on for a long time; it was not until June 15, 1933 that a truce was signed. The main points of the accord were:

1. The *khenpos* of the Ganden were to be nominated by the monks of the monastery for approval by the Dalai Lama. Their powers were to be limited to religious matters as traditionally was the case, and were prohibited from interfering in political affairs.

2. The religious powers of the Chenko and Damthog monasteries were to be returned to the *dzodpa*, but neither side was to station its troops in any of the two places.

3. When a peace accord was reached, the Tibetan side was to withdraw its troops first, to be followed by the withdrawal of Qinghai troops in fourteen days. Both sides were to evacuate within one month's time the troops that had been added to those originally stationed where they were. After the withdrawal, the troops of both sides were to keep within their areas and were not to violate the other's territory.

4. Both sides would protect all the monasteries and temples.

5. Both sides would protect traders and people travelling between Qinghai and Tibet.

6. All the officers and men taken prisoner by the Qinghai troops were to be returned to the Tibetan side following the signing of

the accord.

Later, an agreement was reached on measures to compensate for the losses the Dargye monks suffered during the hostilities.

With that Tibet's second invasion of the Xikang region, instigated by the British imperialists, ended in failure. There were a few isolated outbursts of armed conflict between Tibetan and Sichuan troops after that, but they did not cause any major shifts in the front-line positions of either side.

The Rivalry Between the Dalai and the Panchen

As the civil war raged in Xikang, a fierce verbal battle was waged between the two factions of the Dalai and the Panchen.

The Panchen chose exile in the interior not because he liked it; he was there to seek the help of the motherland for his return to Tibet and its guarantee against persecution. But he hit a bad time; with the country torn apart by civil war between northern and southern warlords, the central government was not able to do anything to relieve Tibet of its problems. Under these circumstances, the Panchen was compelled, during his exile, to keep moving from one place to another in Inner Mongolia, Northeast China and North China.

After the Kuomintang set up its government in Nanjing, it posted its representative in Tibet, and the Dalai likewise set up an office in Nanjing. This development rekindled the hope of the Panchen faction of returning to Tibet, and was taken by them as an indication that the Kuomintang government might be counted on for help. In February 1929, the Panchen established official relations with the Kuomintang government when it granted his request for the opening of an office in Nanjing headed by Lozang Gayltsen. The establishment of the Panchen's Office in Nanjing was accompanied by a declaration, which said emphatically, "Historically and geographically, it is impossible for Tibet to be independent of China; and China without Tibet would be weakened. Therefore, unity will benefit China and Tibet alike while separation will

certainly bring harm to both."

When Nepal invaded Tibet towards the end of 1929 at the instigation of the British imperialists, the Panchen, then staying in Shenyang, sent a delegation to the Kuomintang government with a request. The delegation, composed of Grand Khenpo Wang Lejie, A-huu Sanpa, resident representative in Sichuan, Fu Kangan, director of the Panchen's Office in India, and Lozang Gyaltsen, arrived in Nanjing from Shenyang by sea. The request read:

In view of the large-scale military invasion of Tibet by Nepal, I request permission to organize a guard to join in the war for the defence of Tibet. I also ask you to provide the guard with 5,000 rifles, 250,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 uniforms and a fund of 100,000 *yuan* for army pay. If these can not be made available at the present moment, I ask to be allowed to raise them on my own so that I may be able to protect my homeland against the imperialists.*

Later developments indicated that the Kuomintang government did not give the Panchen the permission he asked for. Then in a letter dated July 23, 1930 to Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang, the Panchen wrote in detail of his thoughts and feelings since his escape to the interior, and once again asked the Kuomintang government to help him return to Tibet. His letter read:

It has been eight years since I arrived in the motherland. I am deeply grateful to the reception accorded me. As the country is beset with problems and endless internal troubles, I have not been able to contribute to the settlement of the Tibetan question but am waiting patiently for such opportunities to arise.... The present invasion is possible because we are not united. This shows that internal rifts not only invite foreign aggression but lead to repression at home with foreign encouragement. This is a bitter lesson that you must have learned. At present, the Tibetan people, being subjected to untold sufferings, are crying for help, and help should be extended to them without further delay. Tibet stands in Southwest China as a barrier against foreign aggression, which means that neither Tibet nor the motherland can do without the other. So long as Tibet remains a problem, there can be no unity of the Chinese nation and no security on the nation's southwestern frontier. I am grateful to be told of the promise to help Tibet that the late Premier Sun (Dr. Sun Yet-sen) made in his instructions. His promise

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet.*

shows beyond doubt that he was genuinely committed to the cause of equality for all and to the well-being of the people in the frontier regions. But the unsettled life I have been living in the past eight years has been caused by the fact that the unhappy events taking place one after another in the motherland have hindered any effort to bring about stability on the frontiers. All I hope to see is the restoration as soon as possible of peace in the motherland and an effective government. Besides making effort to settle the dispute with Nepal, more should be done to keep Tibet in the family of the five nationalities. When the traditional harmony is restored to the Han and the Tibetan people so that I shall be able to return to Tibet, I shall never forget who has made that possible, and the entire people of Xikang and Tibet, relieved of their sufferings, will do everything they can to show their deep gratitude.*

In 1931 the Kuomintang government asked Tibet to send its delegates to a national conference in Nanjing to draft a constitution for the so-called "period of preparation for democratic rule." The invitation led to a bargaining between the Dalai and the Panchen faction over the number of delegates to be sent to the conference. According to *The New Annals of Mongolia and Tibet*:

In regard to Tibet's representation at the national conference, the Dalai said in a telegram to the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs that as he was the temporal and religious leader of Ü and Tsang, he had the exclusive right to choose the delegates. The Panchen in his telegram to the Commission said that the distribution of the Ü and Tsang delegates to the national conference should follow the precedent set by the two Chambers of the Parliament of the Northern (warlords) Government, to which Ü and Tsang shared an equal number of delegates. The bargaining went on for a long time with neither faction willing to make concessions. As the opening date of the conference was drawing near, the commission, in order to assure that the schedule of the conference was not upset, decided to intervene. It proposed a quorum of six delegates from the Dalai and four from the Panchen. The proposal was accepted by the resident representatives of the Dalai and the Panchen in Nanjing after long negotiations between them and the commission. But the Dalai, claiming that six delegates were not enough, asked for the addition of three nonvoting delegates, and the Panchen asked that five nonvoting members be added to his delegation on the

* *The Great Master Panchen Lama.*

grounds that the four did not make half of the quorum. Then they sent their respective lists of delegates to the commission for approval by higher authorities. In a report accompanying the lists to the General Office of Electoral Affairs of the National Conference, the commission said that after weighing the pros and cons, it decided that in view of the efforts being made at that moment to settle the Tibetan issue, the interests of the Dalai and the Panchen should receive equal attention so that neither of them would be hurt in their feelings, and that their repeated requests for an increase in the size of their delegations were a clear indication of their loyalty to the Central Government. In view of that, the report concluded, it seemed wise to grant their requests as a token of our concern for the people in remote regions. The commission's proposal provided the solution to the distribution problem.

The six delegates the Dalai sent to the national conference were Kunchok Jungnas, Chopel Thubten, Wu Mingyuan, Tsultrim Tenzin, Ngawang Gyaltsen and Jampa Chowang, with Tsultrim Nyima, Lozang Sangye and Jampa Nyantrag as the three nonvoting members of the delegation. The four delegates representing the Panchen faction were Lozang Tsaltrim, Lozang Gyaltsen, Lozang Wangyal and Wang Lejie; the nonvoting delegates were Shao Zhang, Jin Xiaoben, Bai Ruilin, Hai Tao and Fan Zepei.

On May 4, 1931, the Panchen arrived in Nanjing from Shenyang, and the next day joined the national conference at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. During the conference, the four delegates representing the Panchen submitted a proposal for "the restoration by the Central Government of the former administrative system in Tibet." The proposal read:

Since ancient times Tibet has been a region called San-wei, consisting of Kham, Dbus and Gtsang. Kham, or Kang, is where Tachienlu, Lithang, Bathang and Chamdo are located today. Dbus, or Ü, refers to the Potala, or Lhasa. Gtsang, or Tashilhunpo, is known as Tsang today.... Ever since the establishment of the Yellow Sect by Tsongkhapa during the reign of the Ming emperor Chengzu several centuries ago, the Dalai and the Panchen, incarnate disciples of Tsongkhapa, have been the leaders of the Sect in Ü and Tsang. Because of this division the Government of the Qing Dynasty made it a custom to post its senior resident official in Tibet in Ü and assistant resident official in Tsang. To deny the traditional division and the existence of the separate domains of the Dalai and the Panchen is, therefore, an indication of lack of

understanding of Tibetan history and geography. Since the founding of the Republic of China, interior China and Tibet have been beset with one problem after another, one result of which has been my flight to the interior. It has been nine years since I left Tibet; although my return to it has become a matter of great urgency for the people of Tsang, the government still does not know what to do about it. If the present situation is allowed to continue in Ü and Tsang, the government may find itself limited in exercising its authority there. With a view to achieving the unity of the country and stability in the frontier region, we avail ourselves of the occasion of the convocation of the National Conference to submit the following proposal for its deliberation:

1. Exercising leadership for the Yellow Sect has always been the main concern of the Dalai and the Panchen, the two religious leaders of Tibet, and matters of administration in both Ü and Tsang are handled in consultation with the resident officials. But the posts of these officials have been made meaningless by the poor performance of those assigned to them since the founding of the Republic, as has been indicated by cases where they confused their scope of authority and made conflicting decisions. The government, therefore, is requested to install, by referring to the former system, two officials for the separate administration of Tibet, with one of them posted in Ü and the other in Tsang, acting at the same time as commanders of the garrison troops in Tibet. This arrangement will prevent either Ü or Tsang from trying to dominate the other.

2. The treaties concluded with Britain on Tibet in the sixteenth year of the reign of the Qing emperor Dezong and the thirty-second year of his reign all underscored the point that Britain undertook not to occupy or annex Tibet or to interfere in its political affairs, and that China would not permit any foreign country to do that.... As our country did not sign the Simla Convention negotiated by Chen Yifan and Britain in the third year of the Republic, Tsang will not have the obligation to accept any future treaties that Ü may conclude unilaterally with Britain without the participation of China.... Henceforth, all negotiations with foreign countries should be conducted by the Central Government, and Tibet should not be allowed to conclude any treaty without permission so that the territorial sovereignty of the country may not be violated.

The above recommendations for the administration of the internal and external affairs of Tibet are the key to the solution of the Tibetan problem. There are other issues to be dealt with, such as communications, taxation and the legal system, which need thorough reform, but

they can wait and will not be elaborated upon here until the separate administration of Ü and Tsang and the relations with the Central Government in the field of internal and external affairs are restored.*

The national conference did not adopt any resolution on Tibet; all it did about the issue was to include Article 80 in the constitution, which said in vague language that "the forms of local government in Mongolia and Tibet shall be determined by a separate set of laws to be made in the light of the conditions existing there." Disappointed with the national conference, the Panchen wrote Chiang Kai-shek another letter on May 16, in which he once again raised the question of his returning to Tibet and repeated his insistence on the restoration of China's sovereignty in Tibet. The letter read:

Throughout the dynasties of Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing, Tibet has benefited from the help interior China extended to it in putting down rebellions and defending the Buddhist doctrine. During the quarrel between the Hans and the Tibetans in the first years of the Republic, I, despite the resentment against me, extended help to the Han people in Tibet who were then in distress. I did that out of my gratitude for what the motherland had done for Tibet. Then as a result of the unexpected attacks of my rivals, I was compelled to make the hazardous journey to the interior, and have since been left without any help but the prospect of a long exile. In recent years, messengers have been busy travelling between interior China and Tibet, and Ü has pledged, through its representatives to the capital, its allegiance to the Central Government.... I appeal to you, in the name of the Tibetan people, to work out, in the shortest time possible, a plan to settle the Tibetan problem once and for all while the representatives of both sides are still in the capital, which is a rare opportunity. Such a plan would enable me to return to Tibet at an early date to make your might and kindness known far and wide; it will also bring happiness not only to the lay and clerical population of Tibet but to the whole country as well.**

On July 1, 1931, the Kuomintang government officially conferred on the Panchen the title of "Great Master of Infinite Wisdom, Defender of the Nation and Propagator of the Doctrine," complete

* *The Great Master Panchen Lama.*

** *Ibid.*

with a gold seal and a certificate of the title. At the same time he was made a recipient of an annual stipend of 120,000 *yuan*.

The granting of the title to the Panchen to the exclusion of the Dalai greatly offended the latter as well as the Kashag. They ordered the Tibetan office in Nanjing to start a campaign against the Panchen and protested the treatment the Kuomintang government accorded to the Panchen. On May 20, 1932, Kunchok Jungnas, Tibet's chief representative in Nanjing, and Ngawang Gyaltzen, another Tibetan representative, raised four demands with the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government and the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. The demands were:

1. Withdraw from the Panchen the title, seal and title certificate and remove him from his new position.
2. Confiscate immediately or declare a ban on the arms and ammunition the Panchen has purchased, and keep the Panchen in Peiping or Nanjing for the time being.
3. Stop immediately the Panchen's stipends and the payment for his accommodations.
4. Order an immediate shut-down of all Panchen's offices in the interior.

Meanwhile, the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing made public a declaration by the three great monasteries and Tsongdu, which condemned the Panchen. The full text of the declaration follows.

Surrounded by snow-covered mountains, the whole of Tibet is blessed by Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara who brings happiness to the earthly beings in response to their sundry wishes. The Dalai Lama is the manifestation of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, a fact proved beyond doubt by the teachings of the Supreme Buddha of India and the Buddhist scriptures in Tibetan.

The Tashilhunpo Monastery was founded by Gedun Truppa, the first Dalai Lama, a fact which is recorded in the Kadam Legbum and other canonical texts. After its establishment, the Dalai Lama devoted all his energies to its administration and the training of its clergymen. In the lingering moment of his life, he put his disciples, Zanpo Drashi Lungrig Gyatso and Yeshe Tsemo, in alternate charge of the monastery. Since then its head has been called Panchen, meaning "great ability" in Sanskrit. The monastery is also where the second Dalai Lama, Ganden Gyatso, gave regular sermons to its monks for the propagation of Buddhism. When he finished with the construction of a monastery in

Chokhorgyal, he returned to the Tashilhunpo at the request of Panchen Yeshe Tsemo. He contributed a great deal to the monastery, and when he had to return to Lhasa, he made his disciple, Lhatsun Lozang Tanpo Tashilhunpo's abbot. Thanks to all these efforts, the next two Dalai Lamas, Sonam Gyatso and Yonten Gyatso, were able to propagate Buddhism in Mongolia and the interior, bringing about an upsurge of Buddhism in these areas and laying the foundation for the extensive dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism.

When the fifth Dalai Lama was Tibet's temporal and spiritual leader, he had the support of the people, and Tibet lived in peace. In an obscure monastery called Bengon, there lived a petty monk by the name of Bensapo Lozang Chogyen. Impressed by his ability, the Dalai Lama brought him to the Tashilhunpo where, at the Dalai Lama's request, he preached the Buddhist doctrine. For that he earned the name Panchen, and was the first of all the successive Panchens. That is how the Tashilhunpo grew under the patronage of the Dalai Lamas and how generous they were in their treatment of the Panchens, the accounts of which are to be found in Buddhist scriptures.

The current Panchen took his *gelong* vows from the current Dalai Lama. The rules and discipline demand that a *gelong* hold his tutor in such regard as he does the Buddha; he is not supposed even to tread on his tutor's shadow, and of all the good deeds required of him, abstention from killing is the most important. But the current Panchen, instead of observing these rules, has committed many outrages, the worst of which are described below.

The Panchen threw his uncle, Jolag Dondrub, into prison at Ngamring Dzong and had him clubbed to death by way of reprisal for the grudges his uncle bore against his mother. The murder was revealed as a result of a quarrel among his subordinates, and the case was brought to the Lhasa government. The government authorized Civil Official Jampa Tanzin and Tsekhong Sarjung Sey to investigate the case, and their investigation confirmed the charges of murder. By law the Panchen would have been punished, but the Dalai Lama, out of his kindness towards him as his protégé, pardoned him and punished only his subordinates.

Drutsang Senpon, his predecessor's brother, was subjected by the Panchen to excruciating torture for advising against his wrong-doings. Indeed, anyone among his friends, relatives or subordinates whose honesty incurred his displeasure, however slight, would invariably have his property confiscated by him. The Lhasa Government, attributing the atrocities to the lack of proper religious upbringing during his child-

hood, sent Radreng Hutuktu to him as his instructor in religious education in the hope that he would turn over a new leaf. But he rejected the help; he even refused to be initiated by him. Radreng could do nothing, and eventually returned to Lhasa.

When Tibet was defeated by Britain in the year of Jia Chen (1904), the Tsongdu decided to appeal to the Chinese emperor for aid, as he was the patron of Tibet. All the members of the Tsongdu joined in the appeal, signing a petition to be submitted through the resident official; the Panchen was the only one who refused to have any part in that appeal. When the British troops were pulled back to India, he went with them in the hope that he might be protected by the British and enlist their support for his schemes. He returned to the Tashilhunpo only because he had failed to pull them off.

When the Panchen returned, the Dalai Lama was away in the interior. Under the pretext of welcoming the Dalai Lama back to Tibet, the Panchen sent his uncle, Jamyang Tanpa, to the interior to arrange for his visit to the capital in an attempt to make the Central Government turn its back on Tibet. But he failed in this attempt.

When the Dalai Lama was taking refuge in Darjeeling, Jagdzod was sent to Beijing by the Panchen to buy support for him with pearls and jewels. Later when Jagdzod came to Lhasa in the company of Supervisor Ma from Gyantse, he declared, with the support of Resident Lian Yu and Zhong Ying, that as the Dalai Lama had been deposed, the Panchen had been entrusted with the full power of Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, and the Panchen did install himself on the throne in the Zimchung Nyiod Khyil. By doing so the Panchen committed the worst sin a *gelong* can commit against his tutor, in total disregard of the vows he has taken from him.

The Tashilhunpo and the Panchen are entitled to the tributes from the areas placed under their administration by the successive Dalai Lamas. The families in these tribute-paying areas, like those under the direct administration of the Lhasa Government, are required to perform corvée for the Tibetan government. But the Panchen unilaterally cancelled the corvée, thus increasing the burden of the tribute-paying families in Tsang to such an extent that their very existence was threatened. So these families complained to the Lhasa Government, and a *drungvig chenpo* and a *tsepon* were authorized to investigate their complaints. But the Panchen withheld all the *katan yigrig* (land title deeds) from the investigators. His refusal to cooperate made it necessary to bring the two sides involved in the case to Lhasa, and new investigators, a *dronyer chenpo* and a *tsepon*, were appointed to continue

with the examination and questioning. Only after the defendants repeatedly failed to explain the discrepancies between what they said and what the documents recorded, did they admit to their offence.

Providing the Lhasa government with cattle, horses and other things is the obligation of all the peasant families in Tibet, an obligation from which none of them are to be excused. In case of default, money in compensation for the default must be paid to the families that fulfilled the obligation. As the tribute-paying families under the Panchen failed in this obligation, their accumulated debts reached a huge amount. The Dalai Lama, in view of the Panchen's being his protégé, not only cancelled all these debts but reduced part of the taxes for the leading tribute-paying counties in Tsang under the Panchen's administration as a token of his solicitude for them. That is how the case was closed—no more debts and lighter taxation, and the Panchen ought to have been satisfied. But he wasn't, for he attempted to make the ordinary families pay the taxes imposed on the Tashilhunpo. As these families were quite limited in their resources, how could they pay them?

In times of war, the Tashilhunpo is required to provide the army with one-fourth of its pay and provisions; this has never been a problem. However, during the successive wars with Britain since the year of Wu Zi, the Tashilhunpo defaulted in the payment of that money in spite of repeated warnings, and as a result of that, the Tashilhunpo became heavily indebted to the Lhasa government. But the Dalai, in another gesture of magnanimity, cancelled the interest on the debts, and asked the Tashilhunpo to pay the debts in yearly instalments. Such magnanimity, however, was not appreciated by the Panchen, for he turned this matter into an excuse on which he fled the Tashilhunpo in the armed escort of more than a hundred able-bodied monks on the eighteenth day of the eleventh month in the year of Gui Hai (1923). By doing so the Panchen violated the rule by which he is required to report to the Dalai Lama on every action he takes. During the flight he was dressed like a layman, carried a gun, and pretended that he was on a holiday at the hot spring resort. As a *gelong*, how could he be so un-religious as to abandon his monastery and its monks in total disregard of Buddhist discipline? Everyone in Tibet was amazed, wondering if that was the way he showed his gratitude for the generosity he received from the Dalai Lama.

When he learned of the Panchen's flight, the Dalai Lama, out of his concern for the well-being of his protégé, told the Kashag, "I am going to write to the Panchen and try to persuade him to return to Tibet immediately. You should also tell him that you want to see him back

so that he will not become homeless." So a party was sent to the Panchen to deliver to him an autograph letter from the Dalai Lama, a letter from the Kashag and presents for him. But the Panchen was travelling day and night, his journey facilitated by the yak-hair felt tents erected by an advanced party along the northern routes, and by a caravan of camels and horses sent from Urga to meet him on the way; so by the time the party sent by the Dalai Lama reached the Nagchukha, the Panchen had already left the place. The party could do nothing but return, and asked another group to deliver the letters and presents to the Panchen in Xining.

The Dalai Lama and the members of the Kashag have never done anything wrong where the Panchen is concerned, but still he took such an action. In fact, in everything he did, he showed hostility towards Tibet, an attitude which people of all communities in Tibet find puzzling.

Since the Panchen's flight, the Tashilhunpo Monastery has been receiving more contributions, its monks have been getting better supplies; scripture offerings have increased, and the life of the people in the tribute-paying areas has become easier. All this has been made possible by the generosity of the Dalai Lama. This year the Panchen turns forty-nine years old and find himself in misfortune. To dispel it, specially funded massive prayer sessions were conducted in the Tashilhunpo and other monasteries.

Such were the generosityes the Dalai Lama bestowed on the Panchen, generosityes that leave nothing to be desired. However, the Panchen, instead of making an effort to repay them, is now engaged in activities harmful to Tibet during his present stay in the interior. Isn't it wicked?

The Panchen has never had any say in either temporal or religious affairs that concern the whole of Tibet. The only seal he has is the one inscribed with *namchu wangdan* [not a seal of authority—tran.]; and the Central Government has never granted him any seal of authority. But on the eleventh day of the Tibetan fifth month last year, the Panchen, to our surprise, received from the Central Government the title of "Great Master of Infinite Wisdom, Defender of the Nation and Propagator of the Doctrine," along with a gold seal and a title certificate, and was provided with a monthly stipend of 10,000 *yuan* and a monthly accommodation allowance of 30,000 *yuan*. All his aides who are hostile to Tibet, such as Ta Lama Nordrang, were assigned to various government positions by the Central Government. As these people are allowed to engage in whatever activities they wish in whatever provinces they choose, they constitute a grave menace to Tibet's political

stability. If the Central Government does not withdraw these decisions made in their case, we are afraid that all the prospects of good relations between the Central Government and Tibet will be ruined.

Had it not been for the favours bestowed upon his predecessors by the previous Dalai Lamas, the Panchen, with his humble ancestral origin in an obscure monastery called Bengon, would not have been put in charge of the Tashilhunpo. Now he is making illegitimate claims to greater prominence by hiding the truth from the central authority. Isn't he asking too much?

The Dalai Lama, as the leader of Tibet, works whole-heartedly for the happiness of his people and for an ever-improving government. His good work benefits everyone in Tibet. For that the people hold him in such esteem as no one else can claim, not even the Panchen with all his preposterous attempts to outshine him.

Such is our declaration which, totally free of prejudice, has been adopted by the Tsongdu. We are forwarding it to the various agencies of the Central Government through the representatives of the Lhasa government so that they may be informed of the truth. If the Central Government continues to hold back investigations into the harmful activities of the Panchen and his aides, we may send an all-Tibetan deputation to the Central Government to petition our case. We are determined to go on with what we are now doing until the Panchen is stripped of his title and his aides of their government positions.*

Shortly after the Kashag's declaration was made public, Lozang Gyaltzen of the Panchen's Office in Nanjing made a counter-statement on behalf of the Panchen, in which the Dalai was accused of ten crimes. The statement in full reads as follows:

The Dalai and the Panchen have always commanded the same degree of respect and trust of the Tibetan people, as evidenced by the saying in Tibet, "As the sun and the moon share prominence up above, so do the Dalai and the Panchen down below." They are equal to each other in status, and neither one is more important than the other. This equality is recognized in such government publications as *The Regulations for the Administration of National Minority Affairs*, and such books by individual writers as *A General History of Ü-Tsang*. Kunchok Jungnas was distorting this fact when he said that the Panchen had no political authority in Tibet.

Soon after the Qing Dynasty was founded, the Panchen was the first to pledge Tibet's allegiance to it. That is why the Panchens were treated

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet.*

with more respect than were the Dalais all through the Qing Dynasty; and as a result of that, Tsang enjoyed more amiable relations with the Central Government than Ü did.

Until the end of the reign of the Qing emperor Shizu, Tibet remained a tribute-paying country to China. In the fifty-fifth year of Emperor Shengzu's reign when Tibet was occupied by the Dzungar Mongols, the Qing Government sent an army of several ten thousand troops to fight the Dzungar invaders, and when that war, which lasted five years, ended in the expulsion of the Dzungars, the administration of Tibet was returned to the Tibetans.

During the reign of Emperor Gaozong, two more expeditions were conducted by the troops of the Central Government; the first one crushed the rebellion of Gyumey, and the next drove out the Gurkha aggressors. These military victories were followed by the installation of Resident Officials in Tibet. Since then the approval of the Central Government to be obtained through the residents were needed for important matters such as the confirmation of incarnate Dalai Lamas by lot-drawing and the selection, appointment or removal of the *kaloons*. Since then Tibet has been a part of Chinese territory. Any allegation by foreign countries that Tibet is not a part of China is, therefore, groundless and represents their attempts to sow dissension with malicious lies.

The Dalai Lama is an arrogant dictator. In internal affairs he attempts to control both Ü and Tsang to the exclusion of the Panchen; in external affairs he plots Tibet's independence from China by encouraging efforts aimed at disrupting China's unity. The Great Master Panchen, who is well informed of world events and is keenly aware of the intrigues of foreign powers, is convinced that the support of the central government is essential to the existence of Tibet. Proceeding from this conviction, he has refused to sign any secret treaties, is opposed to Tibet's independence, aids the garrison troops and protects the Han people in Tibet. In short he may be counted on to exert himself where interests of the nation are concerned. Such is his loyalty to the country, a loyalty untainted by any selfish considerations.

Perversity is what characterizes the Dalai's behaviour. During the 1911 Revolution, he turned his back on the Central Government, expelling Han officials and driving Han troops from Tibet. This is the first crime the Dalai committed.

The Dalai fawns on enemies for their protection. He sided with Russia in his opposition to Britain, and then betrayed China by throwing himself into the embrace of Britain. His collusion with foreign

countries has done great damage to Tibet. This is his second crime.

When Demo Hutuktu was regent running the Lhasa government and the church on the instructions of the Dalai, the Panchen and the residents, his loyalty and honesty won him the respect of the people. Coveting his power, the Dalai threw him into prison, where he eventually died, in the year of Yi Wei; then the Dalai assumed the regent's office. Resorting to treachery and murder to seize power that did not belong to him is the third crime the Dalai has committed.

When the Dalai was told after his return from India in the first year of the Republic that the Tengyeling Monastery had aided the Han troops in army pay and provisions, he ordered secretly the siege of the monastery with a large body of troops and the slaughter or banishment of its monks. Of all its five hundred-odd clergymen, no one was spared this tragic fate. Instant death befell other Tibetans who were suspected of pro-Han sympathies, no matter how slight. Murdering his own people in cold blood in violation of Buddhist teachings is the fourth crime the Dalai has committed.

The Dalai authorized excessive legal penalties that run contrary to traditional practice. It is quite common in Tibet today that even trifles, if they incur the Dalai's displeasure, can cost a man his nose or feet. A countless number of the Han soldiers stranded in Tibet at the end of the Qing Dynasty were subjected to such barbarous torture. The current representative in Nanjing of the Tsoba Sogu of Xikang, Phuntsok, bears witness to such cruelties; he had his nose chopped off by the Dalai for his pro-Han sympathies. Subjecting innocent people to barbarous torture is the fifth crime the Dalai has committed.

After the Panchen left Tibet, the Dalai seized the property of all the monasteries in Tsang and the property of the *khenpos* who went with the Panchen. In addition, he forcibly took away the effects of as many as several hundred families. Fattening his own purse by taking illegal possession of other people's property is the Dalai's sixth crime.

The Dalai Lama, who controls Tibet to the exclusion of others, prohibits communication between the Hans and Tibetans. The prohibition applied even to such non-political activities as trade. Death is the penalty for even unintentional offenders. Obstructing communication between the interior and Tibet in contrary to modern trends of the world is the Dalai's seventh crime.

According to recent reports, the Dalai has conceded foreigners the right to drill for oil at Ningjing Mountain in Xikang. Similar concessions involving other mines have also been granted by him. Currying favour with foreign countries by surrendering national interests to them is the

Dalai's eighth crime.

In recent years, one unwarranted tax after another has been imposed by the Dalai on the people. Today even ears and hoofs are taxable; every human being has to pay tax for his ears, and every beast for its hoofs, regardless of age. Those Hans living in destitution [in Tibet] are not spared either; every month they have to pay the government two Tibetan *yuan* as what is euphemistically called the "free-food tax" for permission to beg in the streets. Robbing the people by imposing on them such taxes as are un-heard of in history is the ninth crime perpetrated by the Dalai.

In addition to his attempt to create a separatist regime in Tibet, the Dalai Lama turned a minor dispute between the Dargye Monastery and Beri into an armed conflict between Xikang and Tibet, during which his troops occupied first Ganze and then Nyagrong. The problem thus created still remains unsolved. Recently his troops invaded Suneng in Qinghai. Such unprovoked armed invasion of neighbouring provinces is the tenth crime committed by the Dalai Lama.*

Meanwhile, the Tibetan army had invaded southern Qinghai and was attacking Jyekundo from all sides. On September 18, a conference on the defence of the western regions attended by representatives from the military commands of Sichuan, Yunnan, Sha'anxi, Gansu and Qinghai provinces was called in Nanjing to discuss plans to cope with the situation arising from the second invasion of the Xikang region by the Tibetan army. At the conference the intense struggle between the Dalai and the Panchen faction made itself felt. The Panchen offered a twelve-point plan to the conference for the solution of the Tibetan problem. The following is a summary of his proposal:

1. Tibet pledges its absolute obedience to the central authority.
2. All the treaties that Tibet has concluded with foreign countries but are not recognized by the Central Government are null and void.
3. The Central Government will be in charge of Tibet's external affairs.
4. Tibetan troops that have invaded Xikang shall be withdrawn immediately and a Xikang provincial government shall be established without delay.
5. Tibetans originating from Tsang who are now in the custody of the Dalai shall be released immediately.

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet.*

6. The Central Government is requested to appoint high-ranking officials as administrators of Ü and Tsang.

7. A line of demarcation between Ü and Tsang shall be determined by the Central Government without delay, and boundary markers shall be erected to make sure that the line is respected.

8. The Dalai will be in charge of Ü, and the Panchen in charge of Tsang, with clear distinction between administrative and religious responsibilities to ensure mutual non-transgression of power.

9. Before the Panchen returns to Tibet, Ximeng in Qinghai shall be made available for the followers of the Panchen to settle in.

10. The Panchen is to receive from the Central Government a monthly stipend of 100,000 *yuan* as previously determined, until he returns to Tibet.

11. The Central Government is requested to give the Panchen permission to organize and train two guard regiments and provide them with weapons and pay.

12. The Central Government is requested to provide five radio transmitters and twenty long-distance buses to facilitate communications and improve transportation between Mongolia and Tibet.*

The defence conference also heard what Kunchok Jungnas, the Dalai's representative, had to say. "The dispute between Xikang and Tibet began as a minor incident," Jungnas said.

It escalated because those involved in it were prejudiced against each other. A peaceful settlement of the conflict can now be easily arranged with the Dalai in Tibet by impartial, high-ranking officials authorized for this purpose by the Central Government. If both sides treat each other with sincerity by putting the interests of the nation before anything else, hostility will give way to hospitality. Those who say that the Dalai does not want the Panchen to return to Tibet are ignorant of the truth. It has never occurred to the Dalai to seize the Panchen's power. The grudges they held against each other, if not fueled by the malicious lies of shady characters, would not have become mutual suspicion which eventually led to the departure of the Panchen from Tibet. I am sure that the Dalai will not do anything improper to the Panchen and the people will be very glad to see him back any time he returns to Tibet. However, there are rumours that the Panchen will return with a big army. If that is true, I can not say for sure that the crisis will not worsen.*

* *The New Annals of Mongolia and Tibet.*

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet.*

What Kunchok Jungnas said represented a departure to some extent from the stand adopted by the declaration mentioned earlier; he even said that the Panchen was welcome to return. This was an indication that the Dalai's faction had by now adopted a different approach to dealing with the Panchen.

The defence conference did not make, and could not have made, any decision on ways to put an end to the military attack on the Xikang region by the Tibetan army. All it did was to suggest to the government a peace conference "to settle all the disputes between Xikang and Tibet in good faith" with Tibetan representatives. Such a conference never materialized; the hostilities in Xikang and Qinghai were brought to an end by a cease-fire agreement signed at Gongtok, and a Qinghai-Tibetan peace treaty following a successful counterattack by the Qinghai army, which pushed the Tibetan troops to the western bank of the Jinsha River.

In August, 1932 the Kuomintang government was contemplating the appointment of the Panchen as "Western Borderland Publicity Commissioner." When the Dalai's faction learned of it, it lodged a written protest with the Executive Yuan, and asked the Kuomintang government to investigate the following matters:

1. Who should be held responsible for causing the suspension of relations between the Central Government and Tibet, the military oppression of Britain and the grave mistake from which Tibet is now suffering?
2. Is the stockpile of armaments the Panchen has built since his arrival in the interior intended as a means to defend the country, to fulfill his ambitions, to support the Central Government or to betray Tibet?
3. Who should be blamed for the war between Sichuan and Tibet, and for the escalation of the dispute between Xikang and Tibet?
4. The aides of Chairman Shi were heavily bribed into recommending the Panchen for the position of western borderland publicity commissioner. This is a clear case of favouritism which goes against the interests of Tibet as an integral part of the country's western frontier.
5. Kelzang Tserim has all along had the support of Chairman Shi in his illegal occupation of Bathang. He assisted Kelzang Tserim in leaving Tibet and establishing a base in Xikang so Kelzang Tserim would be able to use military force against Tibet.

Shi Qingyang, Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, did not answer these charges until they were made public. His response:

The hostilities between Sichuan and Tibet and the armed conflict in Qinghai were all provoked by Tibet. As the government persisted in a policy of restraint where the wars were concerned, how could it be accused of using military force? What happened in Ganze and Nyagrong were acts taken by local officials in self-defence against invaders. As for appointing the Panchen commissioner, the decision was made as long ago as August last year. What is being done now is merely the implementation of that decision, which is certainly something that no amount of bribes can make happen.*

In December 1932 the Kuomintang government asked the Panchen to come to Nanjing for another visit so it could discuss with him matters concerning Tibet and his return home. At the same time, it officially announced the Panchen's appointment as Western Borderland Publicity Commissioner. On December 24 the Panchen was inaugurated in the auditorium of the Kuomintang's Government Mansion. Shortly after that, on February 7, 1933, Ngachen Rimpoche Tenzin Jigme, Secretary-General Lozang Gyaltzen (Wang Lejie) and Letsanpa Lodrung Gyal left for Tibet via India by sea. They were to deliver an autograph letter from the Panchen to the Dalai and to discuss with him matters concerning the Panchen's return to Tibet. After a long journey they arrived in Lhasa in April and met with the Dalai.

The Panchen's return to Tibet was taken as a matter of great importance not only by the Dalai's clique but by the British imperialists as well. Williamson, British Political Officer in Sikkim, came to Lhasa immediately after the arrival in the city of the Panchen's envoys. He discussed with the Dalai what should be done about the Panchen's return.

What went on between the Dalai and the Panchen's envoys is recorded in *A Brief Political and Religious History of Tibet*.

In the twenty-second year of the Republic the Panchen's emissaries, Ngachen Dorje Chang and Tibetan Secretary-General Wang Lejie, came to Lhasa with an autograph letter [from the Panchen]. They called on

* *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet*.

the Dalai, the Guru, informing him of [the Panchen's] wish to return to Tibet with his subordinates and of his request that all the rights he formally enjoyed in Tsang be restored to him. The Dalai accorded the emissaries impressive hospitality. He told them that he had realized that all the unhappy things were caused by the mutual distrust and suspicion of their aides. He expressed his desire for the Panchen's early return and said that he looked forward to working with him for the well-being of the Tibetan people. The reports of what the Dalai said brought immense joy to the Panchen.

The negotiators reached an agreement by which the Kashag would restore to the Tashilhunpo the four *dzongs* of Lhatse, Ngamring, Phuntsoling and Khamba and a number of estates, and each of the four *dzongs* was to be run jointly by two *dzongpons*, one appointed by the Kashag and the other by the Tashilhunpo, until the Panchen returned; then the Kashag would recall its *dzasa* lamas and *dzongpons*, restoring all political and religious powers to the Tashilhunpo on the condition that the Kashag would continue to levy taxes and corvée in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Tashilhunpo, a condition which amounted to the *de facto* recognition of the Kashag's control over the Tashilhunpo.

The keen interest the Kuomintang government showed in helping the Panchen to return was connected, as the situation at that time indicated, with its attempt to establish a pro-Kuomintang regime in Tsang in opposition to the Dalai's government. That is why the Kuomintang government never paid any attention to the repeated protests of the Dalai's faction against first the granting of the title to the Panchen and then against his appointment as commissioner. As for the British imperialists and the Dalai clique, they were thinking of other things when they agreed to the Panchen's return. They knew that no amount of slander could hurt the Panchen, whose prestige among the Tibetan people placed him in a position second only to the Dalai. Besides, they were afraid that if he lived in exile outside Tibet for any longer time, he might be won over by other imperialists, most likely the Japanese imperialists, and become a serious menace to Tibet. The best thing to do was to cajole him into coming back to Tibet by making compromises; once he was put under the control of the Kashag, he would not be able to cause them any trouble. This explains why the Dalai

clique said that it would "welcome" the Panchen's return and made compromises on some technicalities.

Tightening Monastic Discipline

According to his Tibetan biography, the thirteenth Dalai Lama in his later years made great efforts to improve discipline in the Yellow Sect. Corruption and bribery, prevalent in political life in Tibet, had seeped into the church. Smoking, drinking, whoring, gambling and hiring oneself out for menial labour were quite common among the monks, eroding monastic discipline at its very foundations. Concerned about these devious practices, the Dalai decided to take rigorous measures to stop them.

In the winter of 1928, when the Dalai learned that most of the *khenpos* of the major monasteries, who had nothing to show for their monastic studies, had bribed their way up the ladder in the church, he summoned the *khenpo* of Lhasa's Upper Tantric Apartment, Lozang Yonten, to the Potala, and tested him personally. The *khenpo* did poorly in the test and was sacked immediately by the Dalai. Meanwhile, the Dalai sent three monk officials to the three great monasteries to investigate the discipline situation there, to find out if their *khenpos* and *lobpons* were qualified for their jobs, and if there were any cases of embezzlement of funds.

The annual Monlam festival at Lhasa is also an occasion to qualify *lharampas* (a degree of monastic study of the Yellow Sect) by examination. In the first month of the year corresponding to 1929, informers reported that the candidates for the *lharampa* for that year had won their recommendations by the three great monasteries by bribing the *khenpos*. So the Dalai joined in that year's Monlam and examined the candidates himself. The results of the examinations confirmed the informers' reports; many of the candidates knew so little about Buddhist scriptures that they fell far short of the qualifications of *lharampa*. These candidates were expelled and the *khenpos* who had taken bribes were punished by the Dalai.

In the spring of 1930, the Dalai discovered that the managing lama of the Ramoche had pocketed a large sum of money from the

funds provided by the Kashag to pay for the butter used to fuel the lamps on the shrine of Sakyamuni in that monastery. He ordered a thorough investigation into the case by the *shirpon* (the law court) and two *khenpos* of the Upper Tantric Apartment. The investigators conducted audits, recovered the money and punished the offender severely.

Meanwhile, acts in wanton violation of monastic discipline by the monks of the three great monasteries came to the Dalai's notice. The monks, for example, did not wear *lagam* (monks' mantles) as they were required to when attending scripture-chanting sessions in the grand praying halls or accepting alms. The Dalai decreed strict prohibition of such un-religious acts and ordered severe punishment of offenders by the *shengo* (monastic discipline inspectors) of major monasteries. In another order the Dalai prohibited the monks of the three great monasteries from drinking, smoking, playing chess and leaving the monasteries at night in laymen's attire to seek pleasure—acts not allowed by religious discipline. Said the order:

All the beings of the three realms are required to behave in conformity to the doctrine of Sakyamuni and the doctrinal discipline formulated by Tsongkhapa, the ruling lama of the three realms, on the basis of his study of Esoteric and Exoteric Buddhism. While conscientious study of the Buddhist doctrine is expected of all beings, emphasis is laid on the observation of the three commandments by the monks of the three great monasteries.... They must not drink, smoke, play chess, picnic on summer days or pass themselves off as laymen by changing out of the monks' clothing they wear during the day in order to make illegal nocturnal calls. Monks are prohibited from going to the country in disguise to seek pleasure from singing and dancing, or blackmail the people there by abusing the power they have. The *lobpons* and *geguis* of all the major monasteries are expected to see to it that no misconduct goes uncertified. Those who committed such acts in the past are pardoned, but offenders from now on will be given increased punishment.

The monks of the three great monasteries were in the countryside for two different purposes. Those from aristocratic families went there to engage in drinking fits, to visit prostitutes and bully the people. The others, the majority, went there to beg food by

chanting sutras. These were poor monks from families of serfs who found it difficult to live on the meagre rations and alms they received. According to his biography, the thirteenth Dalai Lama was highly displeased when he learned that many monks of the Ganden had left for the countryside with their scripture books because they were inadequately provided for, and were roaming there offering the farmers sutra-chanting services in exchange for food. An investigation he ordered conducted in the Ganden into the cause of shortages of supplies revealed that the continuous expansion of its clerical staff had brought to the monastery more monks than it was able to adequately provide for, causing an annual deficiency of 6,895 *ke* (a measuring tool used in Tibet, holding approximately 12.5 kilograms) of barley in rations and of 5,400 *liang* of silver in tea money. The Dalai ordered the Kashag to make up for the deficiencies and bring back the mendicant monks. Meanwhile two Kashag officials were sent to Kham, Ü, Tsang and Ngari to seek donations in the name of the Dalai. The target was 5,500 *ke* of barley and 45,000 *liang* of Tibetan silver. They would go to the Ganden as loan funds, the interest on which would become a source of support for the monks.

But the donations did not relieve much of the shortages these monasteries faced, because they went to the pockets of the top monks who, coming from aristocratic families, were in control of the major monasteries, subjecting the majority of the monks from families of serfs or slave herdsmen to their oppression and exploitation; as a result, the condition of the poor monks remained largely unimproved despite the donations.

So all these efforts the Dalai made to tighten monastic discipline in the Yellow Sect fell short of their goals; what is worse, the situation was threatening to get out of hand. In 1931, he issued another order. In stern language the order warned the monks once again against drinking, gambling, taking part in drunkun brawls, dancing and dice throwing. In addition, it prohibited monks from engaging in secular activities including working as labourers or seasonal farm workers; they were required to spend all their time meditating, chanting the scriptures and taking part in dialectical debates. Offenders would be charged with violating religious discipline and Buddhist doctrine, and would be punished accordingly.

"It has been learned," said the order,

That the attendance by the monks of the three great monasteries at the regular assembly at the grand praying halls depends on whether alms will be distributed on these occasions. They will be present at the assembly if they will be given alms; otherwise, they will stay away from it. This is an offence against doctrine and discipline. From now on all monks must join the regular assembly whether alms are distributed or not. The *wongtses* (monk officials presiding over the assembly) are expected to carry out this order without fail.

In addition to the required presence at the assembly, attendance at the monthly *mangga* (morning assembly), *chula* (noon debates) and the three *solchan* sessions (held on the 8th, 15th and 30th of every month) is required of all the monks. Absence from these gatherings is strictly forbidden.... Some monks have been known to meditate in their own homes during the one-and-a-half confinement period every summer (when the monks were forbidden to leave their monasteries for fear that they might step on insects and kill them). From now on monks shall meditate inside their monasteries, not in their homes.... From now on alms from the Kashag, aristocrats and merchants to the three great monasteries shall be distributed to the monks in amounts compatible to their ranks as prescribed. No reductions or increases shall be made without permission, and there shall be no practices of favouritism.

That the Dalai Lama had to go such lengths to improve the discipline situation indicated that the heyday was over for the Yellow Sect and decline had set in. His efforts were also a manifestation of the relationship between church and politics in Tibet, for defending the Yellow Sect was defending the interests of the Tibetan ruling class, a fact borne out by what happened following the defeat of the Tibetan army in its invasion of the Kham region in 1932. The war caused strong public criticism of the Kashag. In an effort to divert the criticism and prevent public disturbances, the Dalai availed himself of an occasion to claim that the war was fought to defend the Yellow Sect against "the advent of Communism." (The Kuomintang was at the time waging a war of "suppression of the Communists," and world imperialisms were clamouring for an "armed intervention in the Soviet Union.") In her book *My Mission to Xikang and Tibet*, Liu Manqing wrote,

A platoon leader of the Tibetan army told me what happened. After

the war broke out, rumours began to circulate among Tibetans that the Sichuan, Qinghai and Southern Xikang armies were advancing to Lhasa. Many people favoured a peaceful settlement, but Dalai's aides were determined to fight on. They stepped up conscription and increased taxes. This incurred the resentment of the monks of the three great monasteries and the people in general, and a popular uprising was imminent. Alarmed, the Dalai, availing himself of the opportunity of the Monlam Chenmo, spoke to a gathering of monks and lay people, trying in earnest to talk them out of their rebellious mood. The Dalai lives in seclusion and is not accessible to the ordinary monks and people. This time he made an exception by speaking personally at a public gathering, admonishing his listeners on the importance of unity to tide Tibet over the times of difficulty. He spoke for several hours in a grave tone, moving the audience to tears.

Later the Dalai rendered the speech into a proclamation addressed to all the people of Tibet.

This extraordinary effort by the Dalai succeeded to some extent in alleviating public resentment against the Tibetan government, but the problem remained until after the death of the Dalai when the Tsarong was removed from office and Lungshar was punished by having his eyes gouged out, events that dealt a heavy blow to the pro-imperialist separatist forces in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama Passes Away

According to his Tibetan biography, the thirteenth Dalai fell ill on the thirteenth day of the tenth month in the Tibetan Water-Cock year (1933), he had lost much of his appetite, was too weak to move about for being short of breath, and was overcome with dizziness.

Beginning on the day the news of the Dalai's illness was made public, the monks of the Jokhang, Ramoche and the three great monasteries prayed daily for his recovery and longevity.

At about high noon on the thirtieth day of the tenth month, the Dalai's condition worsened; he was no longer able to speak or keep his eyes open. He lingered on in this condition until 6:30 in the evening when he "passed away in the cross-legged sitting posture."

Soon after he died, his attendant *khenpos* placed his body on his

throne. They took off the everyday monk's clothes he died in, dressed him in the divine dragon robe, and covered his face with a red cloth. On the table in front of him were placed sacrificial offerings and lighted butter lamps. The retired abbot of the Ganden led the chanting of Lacho Detong Chermema, praying for the release of his soul.

Meanwhile, offerings were placed before the images of all the deities in the Potala, Jokhang and Ramoche, and religious services were conducted by the monks in front of these images. By order of the Kashag, the divine lamps were to be kept burning for three weeks atop the buildings of the three great monasteries of Ganden, Sera and Drepung, the four major *lings* (Kundeling, Shideling, Tangeling and Tsemonling), and the buildings on the divine and earthly estates (monastic and manorial estates). The order also banned for the period of mourning the wearing of long turquoise earrings (those worn on the left ear by aristocrats), *Padrugs* (women's triangle-shaped ornamental headgear), expensive clothes in bright colours, the use of pennants on the corner eaves of monasteries, homes and shops, and of the decorative cloth strips on the windows.

At a special meeting to discuss the funeral arrangements, the Silon, the *kaloons*, the Gyigyab Khenpo, the Solpon, Senpon and Chodpon decided to set up a committee, to be headed by the Tsan Shepa, to draft a public announcement calling for prayers for the early rebirth of the Dalai, to distribute alms and sweetened butter tea to all the major monasteries in Ü, Tsang, Ngari and Xikang and conduct religious services in these places.

The Dalai's body remained in the sitting position for three days. It is said that during this time a red and white liquid mass that flowed from his nose hung almost two feet long. On the third day when his body became limp, it was carried in a specially made palanquin to the Dekyi Ngotsar Palkhyil Hall in the escort of three hundred lamaist monks from the Potala's Namgyal Dratsang, Lhasa's Meru Monastery, the Shideling, Kundeling and Chokpori. Here, amid prayers, his body was washed with scented water and placed behind butter lamps and offerings, ready to receive the respects of the lay and clerical Tibetans of Lhasa.

The Dalai's body lay in state for fourteen days. During this time,

hatas were presented in his memory at a ceremony called *dungja* first by the representatives from the three great monasteries and the four *lings*, followed by the members of the Dalai's family, *kaloons*, *kungs*, the Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoché, the Guru, the Tsan Shepa and the three grand *khenpos* of Solpon, Senpon and Chodpon. At another ceremony called *dungbu*, the Kashag honoured the memory of the Dalai by placing one thousand butter lamps in front of his remains.

Following the dignitaries, representatives from various parts of Tibet—monasteries, *dzongs* and *shikas*—who had converged on Lhasa, paid homage to the Dalai, presenting *hatas* to him and contributing as much silver, gold and jewelry as they were able to for the construction of a stupa to enshrine his remains.

Following the announcement of the death of the Dalai by the Kashag, monks of all the sects of Tibetan Buddhism throughout Tibet began to chant the Nurchon Soldeb for the early rebirth of the Dalai. In Lhasa, all the clergymen of the Upper and Lower Tantric Apartments, led by the Abbot of the Ganden, placed one thousand butter lamps in front of the Dalai's portrait in the Nyiod Khang Hall, and conducted a seven-day prayer session in the hall, chanting Dechog, Songdu and Jigche. In the Jokhang, three thousand monks, one thousand from each of the three great monasteries, chanted the Monlam. Tea and food were provided for them by the Kashag.

After the public homage, the remains of the Dalai were treated for preservation. The process began with the removing of the clothes from the body. The body was then washed again with scented water and was applied with a layer of antiseptic. This step was followed by the wrapping of the body in white cloth except the head and arms, and after it was soaked in salt solution, the body was placed facing south, wearing the Bugyan Rignga Hat and the Wangche Divine Robe, in a specially made wooden shrine in the middle of the hall.

On the twenty-second day of the twelfth month, another special meeting was called by the Kashag to discuss the construction of a stupa for the Dalai's remains and the building of a hall to house the stupa. Those at the meeting decided that the stupa was to be made of gold, modelled on the one for the fifth Dalai Lama, and

that a Lhakhang Geleg Dodjo Hall was to be erected next to the Potala's Red Palace to house the stupa. The decisions were made on the unanimous opinion of those at the meeting that the thirteenth Dalai Lama deserved as much reverence as the fifth and seventh Dalai Lamas did, having contributed immeasurably to the church and government of Tibet and to the well-being of the Tibetan people. As for the funds, those at the meeting estimated that the money contributed by the public in memory of the Dalai was more than enough to cover the expenses of the memorial hall and the stupa. They also decided to build five images of the thirteenth Dalai to be enshrined for public worship in the Lhakhang Geleg Dodjo, the Main Hall of the Potala, the Jokhang, the Potala's Buddhist Texts Printing Office and the Norpulingkha.

During the Monlam Festival of the Wood-Dog year (1934), the Kashag gave out alms in generous amounts in memory of the Dalai. In the second month of that year, the Kashag decided to extend the Tsulchog Festival of that month by two days, making it twelve days instead of the ten originally planned. The two extra days were devoted to the saying of prayers to bless the deceased Dalai Lama, and the praying monks were provided with tea and food by the Kashag.

By the rules set by the Qing government, when a Dalai Lama died, the Kashag was required to report his death to the ambans and the Panchen, and monks would be assembled by the Panchen to chant scriptures for the release of the Dalai's soul. Accordingly, the Kashag sent a telegram to the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing, asking it to inform the Kuomintang government and the Panchen (who was then in Outer Mongolia) of the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. The telegram to the Panchen read:

We are forwarding the following telegram from the Silon and the Kashag to the Panchen Lama through the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing: "The Buddha of Great Compassion, the Khanchen Dalai, passed away in early evening on the 17th (December 17, 1933). Offerings were presented in his memory by your representative, the Ngachen Lama, as required by custom. You are requested to pray in memorial services for the fulfillment of his wish for an early rebirth.

Accordingly, large-scale religious services in memory of the Dalai were organized by the Panchen. According to *The Great*

Master Panchen Lama:

In December, all the staff of the Panchen's headquarters were grieved to learn of the Dalai's death on the 17th, and the Great Master himself was overwhelmed by especially deep sorrow. He immediately sent *khenpos* of all ranks and the section chiefs of his office to the monasteries in Qinghai, Xikang, Mongolia and Tibet and to the major temples in the Wutai Mountains to conduct religious services in memory of the Dalai. He funded these activities with 100,000 *yuan* from his stipends. At the same time he requested the Central Government in a telegram to generously award the Great Master Dalai with posthumous titles and honour his memory with the highest possible form of respect.... The Panchen personally wrote for use in all the monasteries prayers for the return of the Buddha Dalai.

The Kuomintang government treated the death of the Dalai with great reverence. In December 1933 it decreed the granting of posthumous titles to the Dalai, and on February 15, 1934 it called a large memorial meeting in Nanjing. Among those present at the meeting was the Panchen. He had left Bailingsmiao on January 15, 1934 for Nanjing. On February 20 he was made a councillor of the Kuomintang government.

Tupden Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, was born on the fifth day of the fifth month of the Tibetan Fire-Mouse year (1876 or the second year of the Qing emperor Dezong's reign), and died at the age of 58 on the thirtieth day of the tenth month of the Tibetan Water-Cock year (1933). He was the longest-lived Dalai Lama since the eighth. He assumed temporal and religious powers at the age of twenty (1895 or the twenty-first year of the Qing emperor Dezong's reign), and remained in office for thirty-eight years until his death. During these years he went into exile twice (the first time in Outer Mongolia and the interior for five years and the second time in India for two years), leaving his responsibilities to the regents; but even then, when policy decisions had to be made, representatives of the Kashag would travel thousands of miles to hear his instructions. Throughout those thirty-eight years he remained Tibet's administrative and religious leader.

According to his Tibetan biography, the thirteenth Dalai was also a diligent scholar. After he returned from India, he took lessons from many tutors in Lahnda, Urdu (languages spoken in

India), Chinese, Mongolian and English. Beyond Buddhist philosophy, in which he was well versed, his interests ran to modern sciences such as political science, law, economics, astronomy, phonology and geography; he enjoyed discourses on all of these subjects.

He was especially interested in medicine and was said to know enough of it to treat the ill.

The thirteenth Dalai was the author of a number of books that he managed to write in spite of his heavy administrative responsibilities. According to his Tibetan biography, he had five books to his credit. They were *The Story of Guru Phurchog and the Stupa*, *Annotations on Phonology*, *On Monastic Discipline*, *Explanations of Buddhist Texts* and *Manuscripts of Sermons Given at Major Monasteries in Mongolia, Qinghai and Xikang and at the Monlam Festivals*. Wood-block editions of these five books are in the collection of the Buddhist Texts Printing Office of the Potala Palace.

Huang Musong's Mission of Homage to Tibet

Shortly after the death of the thirteenth Dalai, Tibet witnessed a coup of moderate violence. By a decision made by a conference of the representatives of the three great monasteries and the clerical and lay officials of the Kashag, the Tsarong was removed from office as *kaloön*, Lungshar was stripped of his position as commander-in-chief of the Tibetan army, and Jansel Kunphela, an attendant of the late Dalai, was taken into custody. Not long after that, Lungshar was arrested and punished by having his eyes gouged out and his property confiscated, and Kunphela was banished to Lokyu. (He later managed to escape to India.) The Tsarong, now a mere *dzasa*, had lost all the political power he once enjoyed.

For lack of sufficient evidence, it is hard to say with any finality just what caused the coup. However, an examination of the political attitude of the Tsarong and Lungshar may give us some clues. The two men were the leaders of the pro-imperialist separatist faction. The Tsarong stood firmly for the "reform" of Tibet's internal administration and Lungshar was an ardent supporter of

the armed invasion of the Kham region. For such positions they were resented by many people even when the Dalai was still alive, and were most hated by the conservative forces, who made up the majority of the Tibetan ruling class. The coup, therefore, could not have been engineered by the British, but was brought about by a struggle within Tibet's hierarchy, in which the conservatives dealt a crushing blow to their pro-British opponents. But as the Tibetans, with their anti-British sentiment, identified themselves with the coup, it was widely acclaimed in Tibet.

The conference of the Kashag and the three great monasteries also appointed Radreng Hutuktu regent until the next Dalai Lama assumed office. On January 26, 1934, the Tibetan Affairs Office in Nanjing forwarded to the Executive Yuan a telegraphic message from the Kashag. The Kashag's telegram read:

The conference unanimously agreed to appoint Radreng Hutuktu to perform the duties of the supreme Dalai Lama before his rebirth and his coming of age after his rebirth. Radreng Hutuktu has been known since childhood for his extraordinary intelligence and wisdom, and is respected throughout Tibet for what he has achieved in his religious training and academic studies. The oracular message obtained before the image of Bodhisattava Paljorlogshuje in the Potala Palace speaks highly of the selection. We have decided to ask Radreng Hutuktu to act during the transitional period as Tibet's administrative and religious leader, with the Silon and the Kashag remaining in charge of political and military affairs. Please inform the Central Government of our decision.

On January 31, the Executive Yuan cabled its approval of the decision.

These developments—the coup, the downfall of the leaders of the pro-British clique, and the Kashag's reporting of the appointment of the regent—were misinterpreted by the Kuomintang government as initial steps taken by the Tibetan upper class towards better relations with the central government. To find out just what the Kashag's position was, the Kuomintang government sent Huang Musong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to Tibet as an emissary for the officially announced purpose of offering condolences for the late Dalai Lama. Of Huang's mission to Tibet, *An Outline History and Geography of Tibet* writes:

To the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Central Government responded by calling a massive memorial meeting in Nanjing and sending a mission headed by a high-ranking official, Huang Musong, to Tibet to pay homage to his memory and to officiate at a ceremony to grant the Dalai the posthumous title of Great Master of Patriotism, Magnanimity, Benevolence and Sagacity. Prior to Huang's departure, a series of meetings was called to discuss what policy should be adopted toward Tibet. The meetings came to the conclusion that the policy was to be based on the principle of national equality as upheld by the late Chairman Sun (Dr. Sun Yat-sen). It was decided at the meetings that the Tibetan Government would have authority in handling all matters except those of foreign relations, defence and trade with foreign countries, which would be the responsibilities of the Central Government. It was also decided that the Office in Tibet was to be re-opened and headed by honest officials to facilitate communication between the Central Government and Tibet and help Tibet with its development and the establishment of a modern autonomous government. By another decision of the meetings, the stipends for the Dalai and the Panchen and the subsidies for the three great monasteries, formerly provided by the Qing government, would continue. Also discussed were plans to build highways and airfields as a first step to develop a communications system in Tibet, exemption of customs duties for trade between Tibet and the interior, and measures to protect the interests of Tibetan traders in the interior.

In April 1934, Huang Musong left Nanjing for Tibet via Xikang. When he arrived in Lhasa in August, he was given a warm welcome by the Kashag. On the day of his arrival, following the practice of the Qing's ambans, he first offered worship at the Jokhang and the Ramoche and then distributed alms to the monks of the three great monasteries. The title-granting ceremony took place on September 23 in the Main Praying Hall in the Potala with the presentation of a jade certificate bearing the title and a jade seal to the portrait of the Dalai. At another ceremony on October 1 at the Dalai's memorial hall in the Potala, Huang offered condolences for the Dalai. Simultaneous with the dispatching of Huang's mission to Tibet, a delegation of observers to the ceremonies, including Li Dan and others, was sent from Qinghai to Tibet by the Kuomintang government; it was to assist Huang on his mission.

To counteract the missions the Kuomintang government sent to

Tibet and forestall any agreement that might be reached on the restoration of good relations between the two major nationalities of China, the Hans and the Tibetans, the British imperialists sent a delegation of their own to Tibet. Headed by White, the delegation arrived in Lhasa at the same time as Huang's mission. These Britons claimed that they had come to offer condolences for the Dalai and join the ceremonies in his memory, but the real purpose of their presence in Lhasa was to undermine the forthcoming negotiations by fomenting distrust.

Upon its arrival in Lhasa, the British delegation was welcomed by the Kashag as warmly as was Huang's mission. It was accommodated in Deijilingkha (the house where Charles Bell was lodged), and its members were present at all of the banquets and ceremonies.

Huang Musong stayed in Lhasa for about three months. During this time the negotiations between him and the Kashag went through many sessions. The following are the guidelines he drew up on the basis of the decisions by the Kuomintang government and proposed to the Kashag for the talks.

A. Two fundamental points that Tibet is asked to observe:

1. Tibet must be an integral part of the territory of China.
2. Tibet must obey the Central Government.

B. Declarations in regard to the political system of Tibet:

1. Buddhism shall be respected by all and given protection and its propagation shall be encouraged.

2. In the preservation of the traditional political system, Tibet shall be granted autonomy. The Central Government will not interfere with any administrative measures within the authority of the autonomy of Tibet. On foreign affairs, there must be unified action (with the Central Government). All administrative matters nationwide in character shall be administered by the Central Government, such as:

- a. Foreign affairs shall be directed by the Central Government.
- b. National defence shall be planned by the Central Government.
- c. Communications shall be managed by the Central Government.
- d. The names of important officials of Tibet, after they have been elected by the autonomous government of Tibet, shall be submitted to the Central Government for appointment.

C. The Central Government shall grant Tibet autonomy, but for the purpose of exercising full sovereignty in an integral part of its territory,

the Central Government shall appoint a high commissioner to be stationed in Tibet as representative of the Central Government, on the one hand to carry out national administrative measures, and on the other to guide the regional autonomy.

The Kashag, after much discussion, responded by putting forward the following ten-point counterproposal:

1. In dealing with external affairs, Tibet shall remain an integral part of the territory of China. But the Chinese government must promise that Tibet will not be reorganized into a province.

2. Tibetan authorities, big or small, external or internal, and Tibetan laws, regulations, etc., may be subjected to the orders of the Chinese government provided such orders are not, either religiously or politically, harmful to Tibet.

3. Traditional laws and regulations dealing with the internal affairs of Tibet shall remain independent as at present, and the Chinese government will not interfere with Tibetan civil and military authorities. On this matter things shall remain in accordance with the oral promises made at different times in the past.

4. To maintain the present peaceful condition of Tibet, there shall be friendly relations with all its neighbouring states and all the peoples believing in Buddhism. In the future, any important treaty between Tibet and any foreign country shall be made by joint decisions with the Chinese government.

5. One representative of the Chinese government may be stationed in Tibet, but his retinue shall not exceed twenty-five. There shall be no other representatives, either civil or military. This representative must be a true believer in Buddhism. When a new representative is appointed to replace the old, the route he and his retinue take to and fro must be by sea and not through Xikang.

6. Before the recognition of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and before his taking over reins of government, the inauguration of the regency and the appointments of officials from the *kaloon* up shall be conducted or made by the Tibetan government as at present. Of such inauguration and appointments, the representative of the Chinese government in Tibet shall be notified soon after they have taken place.

7. Those Hans who have long resided in Tibet and have been under the jurisdiction and protection of the Agricultural Bureau since the Han-Tibetan War of the year *ren zi* (1912) shall remain under the control of the Tibetan government and abide by the local laws and regulations. The representative of the Chinese government shall exer-

cise no control over them.

8. Military forces to be stationed on the borders of Tibet for defence purposes shall be dispatched by the government of Tibet as at present. If and when there should be foreign invasion, the Chinese government shall be consulted on military measures to be taken.

9. For permanent friendship and harmony, to avoid any possible disputes, and to maintain peace on the borders, the northeastern boundary between Qinghai and Tibet should be maintained as proposed during the negotiations of the year before last, with Guro, which has long been under Tibet, to be included on the Tibetan side. As for the boundary between Tibet and Sichuan, the territory and people, together with the administration of Derge, Nyagrong and Dargye, should be turned over to the Tibetan government at the earliest possible date.

10. The Chinese government should not give asylum to or acknowledge as representative, any Tibetan, ecclesiastical or secular, who has rebelled against the Tibetan government and escaped to China proper.

These ten points might as well have been dictated by the British imperialists, for they were not much different in essence from the terms raised by Britain at the 1914 Simla Conference.

Huang Musong left Lhasa on November 28, 1934 via India, having promised that the proposal of the Tibetan side would be studied in Nanjing.

In a report he submitted to the Kuomintang government after his return to Nanjing, Huang gave a detailed account of his mission to Tibet, and offered his views regarding the situation there. The following remarks in his report merit our attention.

The Tibetan people are truly well disposed towards the Han people, and the Dalai did mean to seek good relations with us. Now Tibet has sent its emissaries to the capital on various occasions to pledge its allegiance and ask for the re-establishment of the former system. It is hoped that the government will respond favourably to everything and will not let the opportunity of success slip through its fingers.

If Huang was correct in his observations, then the thirteenth Dalai should be regarded as a man with a measure of patriotism.

The only tangible result of Huang's mission was the establishment, with the Kashag's consent, of a Lhasa Office under the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs with Liu Puchen, a member of the Commission, left behind in Tibet as its director. The

office had no say in the internal and external affairs of Tibet. It had a transceiver from the Ministry of Communications for commercial purposes, and ran a primary school in Lhasa (mainly for the children of Han and Hui families in Lhasa), a clinic and a weather station, with a total staff of only forty to fifty persons.

The establishment of the Lhasa Office was taken by the British imperialists as an excuse to ask for the creation of a similar office of their own in the city, and their request was granted by the Kashag. The British office had under it a hospital that gave free medical treatment to Tibetans and a school training radio technicians for the Kashag. An employee of the office, a Sikkimese by the name of Rai Bahadur, was the holder of the Tibetan title of *dzasa*. It was in this capacity that he attended meetings and ceremonies of all kinds and observed communications between the Kashag and the Lhasa Office of the Kuomintang government.

The Panchen's Return to Tibet Is Obstructed

After Huang Musong returned to Nanjing, busy preparation by the Kuomintang government got underway to provide the Panchen with an armed escort for his return to Tibet. In 1934 the 4th Plenary Session of the 4th Central Committee of the Kuomintang appointed Cheng Yun special escort envoy to accompany the Panchen back to Tibet. (Later, Cheng, upon his resignation, was succeeded by Zhao Shouyu.)

As guidelines for the escort mission, the Kuomintang government issued on September 21, 1936 "Instructions for the Special Escort Envoy Accompanying the Panchen on His Journey Back to Tibet." The "instructions" contained eleven points, a summary of which follows.

1. Tibet is a part of Chinese territory and should continue to maintain close relations with the Central Government.
2. Tibet is not allowed to conclude any treaties with foreign countries.
3. The treaties that Tibet has concluded with foreign countries

should be referred to the Central Government for final decisions on them.

4. The Central Government will grant Tibet autonomy; a program for the autonomy will be drawn up.

5. Important matters concerning Tibet's political, military and foreign affairs and those nationwide in character shall be administered by the Central Government.

6. The Central Government allows Tibet to keep its traditional system of government and church.

7. The Central Government respects Tibet's religion.

8. The political status of the Dalai and the Panchen as well as their temporal and religious powers shall remain the same as before.

9. The troops now stationed in Xikang and Tibet and the administrative regions there shall remain the same. Communications should be restored immediately. All questions about the delimitation of boundaries will be discussed and settled in the future.

10. The Central Government will post its resident officials in Tibet as state administrators and directors of regional autonomy.

11. Tibet may establish an office in the capital to be headed by a commissioner. It will be reasonably funded by the Central Government.

Before the Kuomintang government issued the instructions, the Panchen had already begun busy preparation for his return to Tibet. On March 11, 1935 he sent to Chiang Kai-shek a plan for his return. Its main points are as follows:

1. Regarding the latest developments in connection with the Tibetan issue: according to reports from the Ngachen Rimpoche and Wang Lejie, who went to Tibet for the second time several months ago, the negotiations between Ü and Tsang may soon come to a satisfactory conclusion. In such circumstances I could even return to Tibet with a light escort. But I hear that concrete proposals for the settlement of the outstanding issues between the Central Government and Tibet are yet to be made.... I have come to the interior to prove my loyalty to the motherland and to promote the unity of the five nationalities, not to seek my personal interests. It is my hope that the gentlemen at the helm of the state will soon produce guidelines for the settlement of the

Tibetan issue through pressure and persuasion.

2. Regarding publicity for government policy: ... I shall travel to Qinghai and from there on to Xikang as scheduled. As an expression of my gratitude to the country for what it has done for me, I shall do my best to publicize government policy and work for the unity of the five nationalities. I shall seek financial assistance for the repair of damaged monasteries, make an effort to relieve the sufferings of the lamaist monks who have been forced to leave their monasteries, make inventories of monastic property and tighten monastic discipline, and do all I can to help the people in distress.... A relief fund of reasonable amount provided by the Central Government for the distressed may be necessary to convince the people in the frontier regions that the party and the government will always be there when needed.

3. Regarding construction projects: ... After I return to Tibet, the first thing I plan to do is to build badly needed highways connecting Qinghai, Xikang, Ü and Tsang. This will be followed by the establishment of telegraphic and postal offices in the major counties. I also plan to set up primary schools in the *dzongs* and *shikas*. Their curriculum will begin with Tibetan, and then Chinese and elementary science will be added. Students will be selected at regular intervals for further study in the interior. The initial cost of these undertakings is estimated at 1,000,000 *yuan*, which the government is requested to make available at an early date.... We shall be very glad if the government will send experts and technicians through the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Communications to assist us in these undertakings.

4. Regarding what is needed for my return journey: ... An armed escort of moderate size as a guard of honour and token of the might of the country is essential to my party, no matter how my journey back to Tibet is arranged. It is my hope that the government will see to it that the escort will have the best in equipment and discipline so that my party will be able to travel with dignity.*

As the Panchen did not say that the planned construction projects were meant only for the areas under the Tashilhunpo, they must have been for the whole of Tibet, but nowhere in that part of the plan was the Kashag mentioned. As such, the plan was likely to cause misunderstandings and opposition on the part of the Kashag. So the Kuomintang government revised it and called it "A Preliminary Plan for the Construction of Tibet." After it was final-

* *The Great Master Panchen Lama.*

ized by the Executive Yuan, the plan was sent to the Council of Khenpos through the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs as a reply to the Panchen's proposed plan. The following is the important part of the reply:

The construction of Tibet means first of all the development of a communications system and the promotion of education. In Tibet, the mountains are formidable, the roads too rugged for transportation; the land is mostly unfertile, and most of the people live in poverty; transportation of commercial goods and military supplies is extremely difficult. With its backward culture, with its people in want of enlightenment, and with other unfavourable conditions, it is almost impossible for the Central Government to launch in the foreseeable future any development projects in Tibet, although it does have the intention of helping the people there. What the Panchen proposes to do in Tibet after his return, such as building highways, starting telegraphic and postal services and opening schools, is indeed very important. But with the Central Government cutting back on its administrative budgets, it would be difficult for it to provide these undertakings with the huge amounts of money they would need. Furthermore, conditions in Tibet are very special; if these undertakings are embarked upon with undue haste, the Tibetan side may become suspicious of their intentions. This preliminary plan for the construction of Tibet has been drawn up by taking the Panchen's proposals into account. The undertakings listed below are kept within the financial capabilities of the country and have been decided upon in the light of the present relations between the Central Government and Tibet.

1. Highways: ... A highway connecting Xining and Lhasa along the ancient staging-post route has been planned.... Engineers from the Ministry of Rail Transportation will be sent there along with the Panchen's party to survey the site. They will draw up a plan for its construction and work will begin when the plan is approved by higher authorities.

2. Telecommunications: ... As an initial step, an electric generator with a capacity of five hundred watts will be installed in the Tashilhunpo for the purpose of speeding up communications. Engineers from the Ministry of Communications sent along with the Panchen's party will be responsible for the installation.

3. Postal service: ... Ways are to be found to put the Lhasa Post Office (now under the Lhasa government) under the administration of the General Post Office. Officials from the General Post Office will be sent

to Lhasa by the Ministry of Communications along with the Panchen's party. They will look for ways for the transfer, and draw up plans for the organization of the post office and its future development.

4. Schools: ... Five primary schools will be set up in the Tashilhunpo and other suitable places when the Panchen returns to Tibet. These schools may not follow those in the interior in curriculum and organization....

The Panchen will grant the engineers and officials sent from the ministries the temporary titles of advisers to or councillors of the Office of the Western Borderland's Publicity Commissioner; with these official titles they will better be able to perform their duties as assistants. For the present moment, it is not possible to develop industry, commerce, agriculture, mining or public health in Tibet. But officials from the government offices in charge of these affairs will be sent along with the Panchen's party to make on-the-spot investigations in preparation for future construction in these fields.*

The advice against "undue haste" on the part of the Panchen's faction showed that the Kuomintang government anticipated an unfavourable reaction on the "Tibetan side" (meaning the Kashag); but as its guiding thought indicated, what the reply meant by "the construction of Tibet" was largely helping the Panchen's faction and the areas under its control.

The Kashag made known its stand regarding the Panchen's return. It sent men to the Panchen to welcome him, but at the same time declared that the Panchen was not permitted to take a single "Han official or soldier" into Tibet or he might expect stiff opposition to his re-entry. Said the Ngachen Rimpoche, the Panchen's negotiator in Tibet, in a telegram to Panchen from Lhasa on August 16, 1935:

The Lhasa government can not wait to see you back in Tibet. A party of lay and clerical officials and *khenpos* of the three great monasteries it has selected will soon arrive in Qinghai to welcome you. Representatives of Tsang have already left for Qinghai with three hundred of your servants. Please do not return with Mongolian or Han soldiers, and come straight back to Tsang so the Ü Government will have no excuse to block your return.

* *The Great Master Panchen Lama.*

On May 9, 1936, the Kashag sent a telegram to the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, openly objecting to the sending of troops to Tibet by the Central Government. The telegram read:

No troops of the Central Government will be allowed in Tibet before the Central Government and Tibet reach an agreement in their negotiations. If the Panchen returns with government troops, there will be public panic; and if an accident results, it may lead to the severance of relations between the Central Government and Tibet.... Please make a better plan and do not bring a single soldier or government official to Tibet.

In June 1936, the Panchen arrived at the Labrang Monastery in Gansu. He was greeted by the representatives of the three great monasteries who had come at the same time to welcome him back to Tibet. They were Khenpo Ngawang Khechog of the Drepung, Khenpo Lozang Kumchog of the Sera, Geku Dondrub Gyatso of the Ganden, and others, about a dozen in all. Arriving at the same time were more than three hundred welcome representatives from the Tashilhunpo headed by Ngulchu Rimpoche. They brought with them a communication in Tibetan from the Kashag to the Panchen, excerpts of which in translated version were sent to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission by the Council of Khenpos. The main points of the communication were:

1. Since the passing away of the Dalai, every monk, layman, woman and child has been praying for your early return to the land of Tibet. The members of the Kashag, as a sign of good faith, have decided to send representatives to welcome you, and hope you will make an early start. We are glad to inform you that the terms for settling the issues between Ü and Tsang are mostly acceptable.

2. As the differences between the Central Government and Tibet are yet to be settled, we hope you will return without any Mongolian or Han soldiers so there will be no threat to the government and religion of Tibet. This is the common stand of all Tibetans. If you do not accept it, your re-entry will be absolutely impossible.

3. To avoid conflict, the Mongolian and Han officials of the Central Government in your escort must stop at the border; they will not be allowed even an inch on the Tibetan side of the border. An escort of Tsang soldiers will be provided for you when you reach the Tibetan border and need an escort.

In a comment at the end of the letter the Council of Khenpos said:

What the Kashag says in this letter represents merely the opinion of a handful of those in power; it is not at all the opinion of the people.... The Panchen will make no changes in his plan and will enter Tibet next spring. It is hoped that the Central Government will persist in its decisions and follow them through. We believe the Central Government knows what to do if the Tibetan side uses force to block the entry of Han soldiers into Tibet when they reach the Tibetan border next spring.

On December 18, 1936 the Panchen reached Jyekundo. There he met with Khanchung Champa Chowang, who had been sent to Jyekundo by the Kashag as another welcome representative. He repeated to the Panchen what the Kashag said, warning him that he was to "return with a light escort, unaccompanied by Han officials." Meanwhile, a letter from the headman of Chamdo reached the Panchen. It said: "I had all the transportation facilities ready for you until recently when I was instructed by the Tibetan government not to provide you with any such facilities. Please do not proceed any farther west for the time being." The Panchen headquarters referred the problem to the Kuomintang government. But with Beiping and Tianjin having fallen to the Japanese aggressors following the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, and Shanghai under threat, the Kuomintang government was not able to attend to matters connected with Tibet; it merely suggested the halt of the journey to Tibet in its reply telegrams to the Panchen headquarters and the Office of the Special Escort Envoy. Soon after the envoy received the telegram, he sent a communication to the Panchen. It said:

I have been instructed by the Executive Yuan in a telegram received on the 23rd last month to recommend to Your Holiness temporary suspension of your journey to Tibet.... Your Holiness is requested to send a telegram to the Kashag through the representatives of the three great monasteries, telling it in clear-cut language that (1) it must not obstruct the entry into Tibet of the special envoy and his retinue and the guard of honour, who have been sent by the Central Government to escort the Great Master on his journey back to Tibet; (2) the settlement of the remaining differences between Ü and Tsang shall wait

until the Great Master returns to the Tashilhunpo and (3) the Kashag shall provide transportation facilities for the Great Master and the escort party of the Central Government as soon as they reach Tibet. If the Kashag cables its acceptance of all the three points within ten days, Your Holiness and I will ask the Central Government to make a final decision on this matter. If there is no response from the Kashag in ten days, or if its response is negative, that will be a clear indication that it still does not trust Your Holiness. In that case, it may be advisable to stop your journey for the present moment as suggested by the Central Government.

But the Panchen and his aides were eager to return, and the representatives of the three great monasteries were anxious to see the Panchen back in Tibet. So the representatives of the Panchen headquarters and of the three great monasteries went into consultation with the Kashag. The meeting ended with the Tibetan side agreeing to let the envoy of the Central Government into Tibet on the condition that they must leave Tibet after a rest period of a few months following the accomplishment of their mission, and that there must be "international guarantee" of their withdrawal. The Kashag said in a telegram: "The Han officials and soldiers accompanying His Holiness the Panchen must not be allowed to enter Tibet if they do not agree in explicit terms to leave. This is the decision of the Tsongdu.... As a precaution, the government must have the guarantee of a foreign country with regard to the escort." In September 1937, the three great monasteries offered a compromise solution to the problem in a telegram to the Panchen. "The decision of the Tsongdu," said the telegram,

Against the entry of Han officials and soldiers into Tibet should be taken seriously. We suggest, that, in order to win the understanding of the clerical and lay populace, you return straight to the Tashilhunpo by the northern route, and that in a month or two after your return, you send every one of the Han officials and soldiers back by sea. We hope you will obey the orders of the Lhasa government, and will do nothing that may harm the sacred tutor-disciple relationship. We request in all earnest the Great Master to sign a written statement guaranteeing that will be done. After we submit this written guarantee to the Tibetan government, we shall arrange transportation facilities for you.

Soon after that, the Kashag sent to the Council of Khenpos a similar telegram saying that

A signed statement by the Panchen's Council of Khenpos is needed, guaranteeing that the Han officials and soldiers accompanying the Panchen will leave Tibet unconditionally by sea or by the northern route after a three-month's rest. As for the other matters, we agree to leave them alone for the time being until the Great Master attends to them. We join everyone in Tibet in asking His Holiness to return to Tibet at an early date.

As these telegrams showed, the three great monasteries and the Kashag dropped the condition of an "international guarantee," but insisted that the Panchen promise to send all the "Han officials and soldiers" back to the interior, and demanded, as the three great monasteries did in their telegram, that the Panchen "obey the orders of the Lhasa Government." As these terms were unacceptable to the Kuomintang government and the Panchen's faction, the Panchen agreed on October 1, 1937 in a communication to Special Escort Envoy Zhao Shouyu to suspend his journey. In the communication the Panchen quoted the telegrams from the three great monasteries and the Kashag, and wrote in conclusion,

Their telegrams carry many implications, but no sign of a sincere welcome to my return. What they show is an attempt to pull me away from the Central Government and turn me into someone at their back and call. During my stay in the east in the past fifteen years, I have been treated royally by the Central Government. I take it as my obligation to the Party and the State to contribute my share to the unity of the five nationalities and peace on the frontiers. For the sake of national interests I would rather sacrifice everything I have than see any damage done to the prestige of the Central Government. I have now decided to stop proceeding to the west for the time being as ordered by the Executive Yuan, and await new opportunities.

With this the issue of the Panchen's return was temporarily dropped.

The Panchen's failure to return was caused not so much by the open opposition of the Kashag as it appeared, but by the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the British imperialists, as evidenced by the information contained in *The Great Master Panchen Lama*. In 1934, when the Kuomintang government decided to send the

Panchen back to Tibet, the British ambassador to China, Alexander Cadogan, an embassy official, Tiechman, and the British consul visited the Panchen in Nanjing on March 8 and 27 respectively. They told him that "the Great Master was expected to return to Tibet by sea to take charge of the administrative affairs of Tibet." This was a trick; if the Panchen was to return by sea, he would not be able to take "Chinese officials and soldiers" into Tibet. The Panchen was said to have turned down this proposal. On November 9, 1935 Cadogan lodged a "protest" with the Foreign Ministry of the Kuomintang government, alleging that the dispatching of Chinese troops to Tibet was in violation of Article III of the Simla convention. The Foreign Ministry refuted the charge, saying that the armed escort of three hundred men were "entirely guards, not soldiers." Cadogan countered that since the Panchen already has his own guards, it would not be necessary for the Central Government to provide him with an escort. On November 27, a secretary of the British embassy went to the Foreign Ministry of the Kuomintang government to inform it orally that in view of the disagreement of the Tibetan authorities and of Article III of the Simla convention, the British government objected to the providing by the Chinese government of the proposed guard of honour of three hundred men to escort the Panchen Lama. To this the Foreign Ministry replied that (1) the Tibetan authorities "never disagreed" with providing the Panchen with an escort and (2) as the Chinese government never signed the Simla convention, "the Chinese government does not think it proper" for Britain to cite the convention. On October 24, 1936, the new British ambassador to China told the Foreign Ministry that he had been asked by the Kashag to warn the Kuomintang government that Tibetan soldiers would fight if the Panchen tried to enter Tibet in the company of soldiers. On August 17, 1937, the British ambassador said in an oral message to the Foreign Ministry that "he had been instructed by his government to declare that Britain objected to the Panchen's entry into Tibet with a guard of honour." Referring to a photocopy of a letter from the Kashag to the British trade agent at Gyantse, in which the Kashag opposed the entry of Han officials and the guard of honour into Tibet and asked, in the name of peace, the British government to intervene, the British ambassador said in a

note to the Foreign Ministry that he hoped the letter should dispel the doubts of the Foreign Ministry about the request of the Lhasa government to mediate, and asked the Chinese government to stop what it was doing about the Panchen's return. Apparently, what the Kashag meant by "international guarantee," a point on which it insisted for a long time, was British intervention. This was how the British imperialists and the Tibetan pro-imperialist separatist forces collaborated with each other on the issue of the Panchen's return.

Frustrated in his effort to return to Tibet, the Panchen fell seriously ill. According to *The Great Master Panchen Lama*:

On November 4, 1937, the Great Master fell ill and was examined by Medical Khenpo Lozang Longgyal.... For four days he could hardly eat anything, for food made him sick. And for a sharp pain in his left chest, he could not sleep.... Edema developed in his legs, and the condition went from bad to worse. By the 26th ... the swelling had spread above the knees and at the same time he had developed a cough and asthma, and had begun to pass blood and feel thirsty. The doctor could not do anything.... At 2:50 on the morning of December 1, the Great Master died in the Ranyag Gon of the Jyekundo Monastery in Qinghai.

Choskyi Nyima, the ninth Panchen Lama, was born in 1883 (the ninth year of the Qing emperor Dezong's reign) and died in 1937 at the age of fifty-five. Beginning in 1923 when he escaped to the interior, he lived in various parts of the motherland for fifteen years until his death in Qinghai. He never managed to see his native home again.

Following the death of the Panchen, the Kuomintang government ordered the entire staff of the Council of Khenpos to move the remains of the Panchen to Ganze in Xikang where they would be kept temporarily. At the same time it sent Dai Chuanxian, Chairman of the Examination Yuan, to Ganze to offer religious tribute and condolences for the late Panchen, and announced its "decisions in regard to the Panchen headquarters after the demise of the Panchen." These decisions, among others, were, (1) to dissolve the Office of the Publicity Commissioner for Tibet; (2) that the Panchen headquarters would remain in operation and the central government would continue to fund it; (3) to stop the payment of the annual stipends of the Great Master; (4) that the

Panchen's Office in Nanjing would remain in operation; and (5) to dissolve the Office of the Special Escort Envoy.

Ganze was at the time garrisoned by Regiment 815 of Liu Wenhui's army. During an armed conflict known as "The Ganze Incident" between the garrison troops and the staff of the Panchen headquarters in December 1939, the latter were overwhelmed and the survivors retreated to the border between Qinghai and Xikang. In 1940, with the consent of the Kashag, Secretary-General Wang Lejie, Dronyer Jampa Langda and more than four hundred others, sent by the Council of Khenpos, brought the remains of the Panchen to the Tashilhunpo Monastery where they were enshrined. The members of the Council of Khenpos, along with their families and the guards, numbering more than four hundred, moved to Shangde (whose inhabitants were in the Panchen's camp) in Qinghai for land reclamation. Meanwhile, the search began for the incarnate soul boy of the Panchen.

Part Three

Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama

The Search and the Enthronement

Tenzin Gyatso, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, was born in a peasant family at Qijianchuan (Taktser in Tibetan), forty *li* south of Huangzhong County in Qinghai Province, on the fifth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Hog year of the sixteenth Tibetan calendrical cycle (1935). His father was Chocho Tsering, and his mother Deji Tsering. They had five sons, of whom Tenzin Gyatso was the fourth, coming after, in birth order, Thubten Jurmed Norbu, Gyalo Thondrup and Lozang Samtan; the youngest son, the fifth, was the Living Buddha of Ngari. Tenzin Gyatso has two sisters: Tsering Drolma, who was married to Phuntsog Drashi, and Yeshe Padma.

After Tenzin Gyatso was confirmed as the fourteenth Dalai Lama, the family moved to Tibet, and became members of the Tibetan aristocracy. Known as the Taglha, the family possessed a large number of feudal estates and serfs granted by the Kashag in accordance with established tradition.

Before he became the fourteenth Dalai, Tenzin Gyatso was known by his childhood name of Lhamo Dondrup. After his confirmation, he had his head shaved by Regent Radreng Hutuktu and was given the name Jetsun Jampel Ngawang Lozang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso Sridsun Wanggyur Tsungpa Medpai Dechenpo, or Tenzin Gyatso for short.

Following the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, three search parties to look for his reincarnation were organized by the Kashag in 1934. The party headed by the Keutsang Rimpoche was to look for the soul boy in Qinghai, the one led by the Khangser Rimpoche

was assigned to Xikang and the one with the Phurchok Rimpoche at the head was to journey to southern Tibet. In May 1935, the Keutsang Rimpoche, Kheme Sey and another man, the search party to Qinghai, arrived in Jyekundo. As instructed by the Kashag, they asked the Panchen, who was then stopping at Jyekundo on his journey to Tibet, to "reveal to them the name of the place where the Dalai had been reborn and the name of the soul boy. The Great Master gave them the names of three boys and told them where they could be found, and sent the Tsechogling Rimpoche and the Ngulchu Rimpoche to assist them in their search." In a letter to Ma Bufang, the Panchen said: "On account of the war between Qinghai and Tibet several years ago, the Rimpoche is full of misgivings about travelling in Qinghai.... I humbly request you to give him all the assistance you can when he arrives."

Over two years after arriving in Xining, Keutsang Rimpoche's party found a soul boy in a Tibetan peasant family at the Qijia-chuan, south of Huangzhong County. The boy, who was to become the fourteenth Dalai Lama, was four years old when he was found. *Lhasa Reports* describes the discovery of the soul boy.

Kunchok Jungnas, a former Tibetan official in the Central Government, told me that the following revelations led to the discovery of the soul boy: (1) The Dalai faced east when he died, a hint that he would be reborn in that direction. (2) The Nechung Chosgyong had prophesied that the Dalai would be reborn in a Han region in the northeast. (3) When Regent Radreng viewed the vision in the sacred lake, he saw a farm house near the end of a road; in front of the house there was a tall willow tree with a white horse tied next to it and a woman standing under it with a baby boy in her arms. Radreng had a picture of the vision drawn, complete with all the details, and told the Keutsang Rimpoche and Kungzangtse (Kheme Sey) to go northeast and look for the scene shown in the picture. The search took as long as two years and ended, as expected, in the discovery of the soul boy's family in Qinghai.

Following the discovery, the Keutsang Rimpoche, joined by the others with him, asked the provincial government of Qinghai for permission to move the soul boy to Tibet "to be accommodated as a revered monk." Ma Bufang refused. "In the winter of the twenty-

* *The Great Master Panchen Lama.*

seventh year of the Republic (1938), the Lhasa government reported to the Central Government on the discovery of three soul boys claiming to be the incarnate thirteenth Dalai, and asked it to send a high-ranking official to Tibet to preside over the confirmation ceremony."^{*} In response to the request, the Kuomintang government sent Ma Bufang a telegram ordering him to provide the soul boy with an armed escort for his journey to Tibet, and funded the escort mission with 100,000 *yuan*. Ma, under orders, organized an escort of a cavalry battalion led by Divisional Commander Ma Yuanhai. They started from Xining in July 1939, and arrived in Lhasa in early October.

The arrival of the soul boy in Lhasa brought wild joy to the clerical and lay populace of Tibet. Among those welcoming him into the city were tens of thousands of Tibetans who had come from afar to watch the ceremony. The soul boy was immediately brought to the Norputingkhā and received tribute from Tibetan officials and civilians in much the same way as a Dalai Lama would."^{*}

Before the arrival of the soul boy in Lhasa, the Kashag was divided on which one of the three children was the genuine soul boy. Regent Radreng was strongly in favour of the Qinghai candidate and Silon Langdun objected. According to *Lhasa Reports*, "In the twenty-seventh year of the Republic (1938), the Silon was dismissed from office by a decision of the Tsongdu on account of his disagreement with Radreng over the choice of the soul boy." With the Silon gone, the regent became the most powerful man in Tibet.

In March 1939, the Kuomintang government sent Wu Zhongxin, Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to Lhasa as its representative to preside over the confirmation and enthronement ceremonies of the new Dalai. Wu arrived in Lhasa via India in December 1939 and was given a warm welcome by the Kashag and the Tibetan people.

Soon after his arrival in Lhasa, Wu found the soul boy situation had changed; instead of three candidates, there was only one. According to *Lhasa Reports*:

^{*} *Lhasa Reports*

^{**} *Ibid.*

Previously, Regent Radreng reported to the Central Government that three soul boys had been discovered, and asked it to send its representative to perform the confirmation formalities. Now that there was only one soul boy left and he had already received tribute, caution was needed in handling the matter, which seemed to be intended for acceptance as an established fact.... It was said that the Qinghai boy had distinguished himself by his extraordinary intellect and was accepted by all in Tibet as the reincarnation of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. In view of this, the Tsongdu decided that the confirmation formalities would not be necessary, and citing the precedent set by the thirteenth Dalai Lama, asked the Central Government for permission to omit them. With regard to this decision Wu said that the matter must be referred to the Central Government, not to him, for verification and decision, and that he could do no more than forward their request to the Central Government.... After repeated consultations, it was decided that the confirmation formalities would be omitted on the following conditions: (1) Wu was to examine the soul boy personally to determine whether the boy possessed the extraordinary intellect as he was said to; and (2) Radreng was to sign a formal request to the Central Government for the omission of the confirmation formalities. The conditions were accepted by the regent.

But something unexpected happened when the soul boy was about to be "examined." During the discussion at the Norpulingkha between Wu's representatives and the Khenchen Phurchok Rimpoche to arrange for the examination, the latter said that Wu Zhongxin should "perform the prostration rituals" before the soul boy when he was seated in the hall. He went on to say that "seating the soul boy in the hall is a decision by the Tsongdu, and it is customary in Tibet for such audience to take place in a hall," adding that "the decision is final." This was an attempt to deny Wu the right to "examine the soul boy."

When we reported this to Wu, he was highly displeased. He summoned Kunchok Jungnas, admonished him in stern language, and told him to inform Radreng immediately that either the agreement already reached was honoured or all the representatives of the Central Government would leave Tibet.* Wu's protest softened up Radreng. The next day the regent apologized to Wu through his representative, saying that the whole thing was a misunderstanding caused by the lack of infor-

*The original reads "would return to Tibet," apparently a linguistic error.

mation on the part of the Khenchén Phurchok Rimpoche, and asking Wu to fix the date and name the place for the meeting with the soul boy. Wu then decided that February 1 and the Lotus Pavilion in the Norpulingkha would be the time and place for the examination.*

The reason the Kuomintang government insisted on the so-called "examination" was because it was the only thing it could do to save face on this matter, for it did not have the power to veto the candidate.

At the "examination," Wu gave the soul boy four presents as a token of recognition. On February 5, 1940, the Kuomintang government issued the following decrees: "Lhamo Dondrup, the soul boy from Qinghai, being endowed with profound wisdom and extraordinary intellect, and being the reincarnation of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, shall be enthroned as the fourteenth Dalai Lama without the confirmation formalities." and "As a special favour, the Executive Yuan shall appropriate, through the Ministry of Finance, 400,000 *yuan* to meet the expenses of the enthronement of Lhamo Dondrup, who has been decreed to succeed as the fourteenth Dalai Lama."

The Kashag then fixed the date of the enthronement ceremony in the Potala for February 22, 1940.

Simultaneous with Wu Zhongxin's arrival in Lhasa, Basil Gould, British Political Officer in Drenjong, was sent to the city by the British imperialists with an entourage. In the guise of "observers of the ceremonies," they had come to Lhasa to watch Wu Zhongxin, undermine Han-Tibetan relations and sabotage the political talks between Wu and the Kashag. But with the Kuomintang government now driven to southwest China by the Japanese aggressors and consequently too weak to manage Tibet, Wu was said to have entered into no negotiations with the Kashag; all he did was "preside" over the Dalai's enthronement ceremony and "grant" Radreng the honorary title of "Buddhist Master of Patriotism and Universal Doctrine"—mere gestures to show that the Kuomintang government exercised its sovereign rights in Tibet.

The seating of Wu Zhongxin at the enthronement ceremony had been a problem. According to *Lhasa Reports*,

* *Lhasa Reports*.

Differences arose over the seating arrangements. The Tibetan side was to seat Wu opposite to Radreng on the same elevation as the Sikon. Wu objected on the grounds that such an arrangement was beneath his position as the representative of the Central Government in charge of the enthronement and as the highest-ranking official in charge of Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. He demanded that he should at least be given the same treatment as was due to the Qing's Resident Officials on such an occasion, that is, a seat to the left of the Dalai Lama on the same elevation as he and facing south. After repeated consultations, the Tibetan side complied.

What the Kuomintang government gained from this seating arrangement was again nothing more than the preservation of a bit of face; Wu was accepted as someone at least equal in status to the Qing's Resident Officials.

Wu Zhongxin and his entourage left Tibet for Chongqing via India in April 1940. Immediately after his departure, the Kashag, following the custom established in the Qing Dynasty, sent Dzasa Ngawang Gyaltsen to Chongqing to "express thanks" to the Kuomintang government. (During the Qing Dynasty, the Dalai Lama, upon his enthronement, was expected to "thank" the emperor "for his grace.")

"The Radreng Incident"

During Radreng's regency, relations between Tibet and the Kuomintang government improved. The regent accepted the title the Kuomintang government offered him, proclaiming him a Buddhist master, and his men were able to raise funds in major cities in the interior for the renovation of the Radreng Monastery. In 1943 he was elected alternate member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang at its sixth plenary session, which means that he had joined the Kuomintang before his election.

Radreng was at the head of the Lhasa government during the first few years of China's war of resistance against Japan, when Chiang Kai-shek was making some effort to resist the Japanese, albeit not in earnest. The regent was a man with anti-imperialist tendencies. Because of his objections, the British were not able to

open schools in Lhasa, and when the war against Japan broke out, he led scripture-chanting sessions in the three great monasteries to pray for China's victory.

Unhappy about the regent's close ties with the Kuomintang government, the British imperialists instigated a smear campaign by the separatist elements within the Kashag against the regent with the aim of forcing him out of office. They had the Nechung Chosgyong prophesy a three-year "misfortune" for Radreng and advise him to leave office temporarily and meditate in confinement to ward off evil spirits. To defuse the attack, Radreng requested, and obtained from the Kashag in 1941, a three-year leave of absence, and turned his duties over to his tutor, the Taktra Rimpoche. Taktra, 70, was a minor Living Buddha of low status. Radreng picked him because he thought that with him as the acting regent, it would be easy for him, Radreng, to resume the regency at the end of the three-year leave, and that the arrangement would make it possible for him to stay in control of the government and the church during his absence. With the future thus planned, he retired to a life of quietude at his monastery, the Radreng, in northern Tibet.

But it was not long before the Taktra Rimpoche became a tool of the pro-imperialist separatists as a result of the pressure they brought upon him from all sides. With Surkhang and his like promoted to the position of *kaloön*, the Kashag fell into the hands of the pro-imperialist elements and Tibet's relations with the motherland worsened rapidly. In the summer of 1943, the Kashag, in a surprise move, announced the establishment of a "Foreign Affairs Bureau" and notified the British and Nepalese resident representatives in Lhasa and the Lhasa Office of the Kuomintang government that "from now on the Kashag and the Regent will no longer be available for direct contact on any matters; they shall be referred to the Foreign Affairs Bureau before they are forwarded to them." This move, which was nothing short of a farce staged by the separatists at the instructions of the British imperialists, was meant to turn the representatives of the Kuomintang government into a "foreign" mission like those of Britain and Nepal, and to show that Tibet was "an independent country." The Kuomintang government,

In view of the fact that the matter was connected with China's sovereign rights in Tibet, instructed the Tibet Office in a telegram to maintain the usual procedures in its communication with the Tibetan authorities and not to have anything to do with the Foreign Affairs Bureau. The instructions pointed out that by creating the bureau, Tibet was trying to change imperceptibly its traditional relationship with the central authorities; therefore, the instructions said, the representatives must persist in their position even if their persistence might lead to a stalemate.

So, when the Kashag tried to force the representatives of the Kuomintang government to make contact with the Foreign Affairs Bureau, threatening to cut off their supplies if they refused, the representatives stood their ground and frustrated the attempt.

Not reconciled to their frustration, the British imperialists and their Tibetan henchmen tried another move. In March 1947, an "Asian Relations Conference" was called in New Delhi, India. All Asian countries participated, and Tibet was invited as a "country." Deliberately, the imperialists had the "lion in the snow mountains" standard of Tibetan Buddhism displayed as Tibet's "national flag" at the conference, side by side with the national flags of the other participating countries. What was even more outrageous was that a map of Asia in the conference hall showed China without Tibet. It was said that "the matters were amended only after the Chinese delegation protested." Apparently, these tricks were intended to elicit tacit acceptance of Tibet as an "independent country" by Asian nations.

Not long after the "Asian Relations Conference," Tibet witnessed the "Radreng Incident." When his three-year leave of absence expired, Radreng asked Taktra to honour the agreement to let him resume office. Taktra, now controlled by the separatist forces, refused. This touched off a bitter struggle between the two men. Radreng, still striving to fulfill his aspirations, was not going to retire from the political scene of Tibet. With the secret support of the Lhasa Office of the Kuomintang government and the promise of financial aid by the Kuomintang, Radreng began to plan a comeback. Prior to the incident, rumours were rife in Lhasa that "Radreng is planning a coup with the Sera monks to overthrow Taktra by force," "the Kashag is going to send troops to attack the

Radreng Monastery," and "Radreng is planning to flee to Xikang." On April 14, 1947, Kaloon Surkhang, sent by the Kashag with two hundred soldiers, went to arrest Radreng in his monastery on trumped-up charges of "treason" brought against him by the treacherous separatist elements. Radreng's men in Lhasa, who had learned of the impending arrest, left for the Radreng Monastery to warn Radreng of the danger, but the soldiers, marching twenty-four hours non-stop, beat them to the monastery. Radreng, totally unaware of the plot against him, was then staying at his riverside residence about one *li* from the monastery. Immediately after the soldiers surrounded Radreng's country residence before daybreak, they put Radreng under arrest and took him to Lhasa.

During imprisonment, Radreng was subjected to questioning by the members of the Tsongdu. A press report from Lhasa entitled "The Coup in Tibet," carried in Chengdu newspapers in September 1947 wrote: "When asked at a trial 'why should Tibet keep close ties with China?' Radreng replied, 'Religiously and geographically, China and Tibet are inseparable. When Lhasa fell to Younghusband's army in 1904, it was China that paid all the indemnities for Tibet in much the same way as it would have paid a ransom.' "

According to the monthly *Newsletters From the Northwest*, the Kuomintang government contacted the Kashag by wire after Radreng's arrest in an effort to rescue the former regent. "The main points of the Central Government's orders were," the magazine revealed, "one, preserve the doctrine of Buddhism and refrain from bombarding monasteries; and two, Radreng deserved leniency as he was the holder of the title of *hutuktu* granted him by the Central Government, and had rendered valuable aid in the discovery of the fourteenth Dalai Lama." These orders the Kashag ignored.

After Radreng was brought to Lhasa, several hundred armed monks from the Gye Dratsang of the Sera (of which Radreng was a member), led by Dratsang Khenpo Ngawang Gyatso, stormed into Lhasa in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue Radreng from prison. This was followed by the siege of the Sera by Tibetan soldiers, who engaged the monastery's monks in a fierce battle of two days and one night. Eighty to ninety monks were killed, over a dozen were taken prisoner and the Gye Dratsang was ransacked. Ngawang Gyatso and over a dozen followers broke through the

encirclement and fled to Xikang.

On May 7, 1947, not long after the attack on the Sera's Gye Dratsang, the pro-imperialist separatists had Radreng strangled to death in his cell. His body, as required by custom, lay in state for three days for the public to pay its last respects.

The murder of Radreng infuriated the monks of the Radreng Monastery. Five hundred of them took up arms and killed all the sixteen soldiers stationed at the country residence of the former regent. Then a battle raged between several thousand soldiers sent by the Kashag on an attack on the Radreng Monastery and the monks entrenched in the monastery. The monks held out against the Kashag troops for seven days and nights until they were overwhelmed by the attackers and surrendered. Yeshe Trultrim, Radreng's Solpon Khenpo, leading a small party of about a dozen men, broke through the encirclement and fled to Xining through the Qinghai grasslands.

After they took the Radreng Monastery, the soldiers plundered it of all its treasures, gold, silver and grain; even furniture of good quality was not spared. Radreng's riverside residence and two others in Radreng's Lharang in Lhasa were razed to the ground. The Kashag stripped Radreng of the title of *hutuktu*, thus reducing his reincarnation to nothing more than a minor living Buddha. Most of the estates of the Radreng Monastery and their tenants were confiscated; the small portion of them that was not confiscated was to provide the five hundred monks of the Radreng with their annual rations of food. Chocho Tsering, the fourteenth Dalai's father, a close friend of Radreng's, was poisoned to death, and all the monk and lay officials who were associated with Radreng were either dismissed from office or were transferred to posts without much responsibility.

The "Radreng Incident," which saddened the people and gladdened the enemy, was a tragic event; for a period of time after the tragedy, the separatists held sway in Tibetan politics.

The "Hans, Go Home!" Incident

The "Radreng Incident" came at a time when the world situation

had undergone drastic changes following the conclusion of World War II. Britain, now no longer a "supreme world power" and too weak to meddle in the internal affairs of Tibet, could not but give way to the U.S. imperialists.

The U.S. imperialists had started their inroads into Tibet long before the end of World War II. In September 1942, the U.S. government sent Lt. Col. Ilia Tolstoy to Tibet with a delegation. It brought gifts and a letter from President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama. The delegation, after its arrival in Lhasa in December 1942, went into secret talks with the Kashag. The delegation stayed in the city for more than three months until their departure in March 1943. That was the beginning of contact between Tibet's separatist forces and the U.S. imperialists.

In October 1947, the Kashag organized a trade mission to visit the U.S. and Britain for "trade" surveys. The mission, headed by Tsepon Shakabpa, with Khanchung Drekhang (a Phari tax officer) and Pangda Yarphe (governor of Dromo) as its members and Dapon Surkhang as interpreter, represented an illegitimate diplomatic effort by the imperialists and the Tibetan separatist forces to win the recognition of Tibet as an "independent country" by the governments of Britain and the U.S.

The mission ran into a number of technical problems. One of them was the passport and visa problem, as Tibet had no "diplomatic relations" with the U.S.; foreign exchange was another, because Tibet had no trade relations with foreign countries and therefore did not possess foreign currencies. These problems took the mission to Nanjing in early 1948. The Kuomintang government tried to dissuade the mission from making their trips, and said that if they insisted on going, they must carry Chinese passports. Ignoring the warnings of the Kuomintang government, the mission contacted U.S. Ambassador John L. Stuart secretly. Through Stuart the mission obtained visas for the U.S. from the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong with the illegal "passports" issued by the Kashag. For foreign exchange, the mission sold in Hong Kong to Indian businessmen an export licence for raw silk that the Kuomintang government had issued to the Kashag. In July 1948 the mission arrived in Washington.

In a preposterous statement issued to the press soon after they

arrived in San Francisco, the mission said, "We have come to establish friendly relations with your country," and

Tibet is surrounded by three countries: the Soviet Union to the north, China to the east and India to the south. We can not possibly show favour to any one of them by granting it special privileges and ignoring the other two. That's why we deny them any such privileges.... We hope to obtain from the U.S. government a loan of \$8,000,000 to back the Tibetan currency. We also hope your country will supply us with large quantities of machinery and electric equipment in exchange for our medicinal materials and wool.

Later in Washington, the mission said to reporters, "The relations between China and Tibet are merely religious. China has no jurisdiction at all over the Tibetan people; what passports we use for foreign travel is none of China's business."

After staying in the U.S. for about three months, the Tibetan trade mission went to London, and after a short stay there, it went on, in the winter of 1948, to France, Switzerland, Italy and India, and when it returned to Tibet in March 1949, it had nothing to show for its trips—none of these countries would recognize Tibet as an "independent country."

When the mission was in the U.S. and Britain, a spurious National Assembly was convened by the Kuomintang government in May 1948 in Nanjing to "elect a president." The Kashag, as asked by the Kuomintang government, sent its representatives to the assembly; they were Dzasa Thubten Samphel, Dzasa Khemeypa, Khanchung Thubten Zhangpo, Rimshi Khemey Sey, Tse Dronyer Thubten Tsedun and Tse Dronyer Thubten Trinley. When the assembly came to the election of the "president" and "vice-president," the Tibetan representatives announced unexpectedly that they would not take part in the voting, claiming that they had come as "foreign observers to the assembly," indicating that Tibet had "detached itself" from China.

By the spring of 1949, the political scene in China had changed completely. The three major military campaigns fought in the Liaoning-Shenyang, Beiping-Tianjin and Huaihai areas had ended in the annihilation of the main forces of the Kuomintang army; the People's Liberation Army had swept across the Changjiang (Yangtze) River, liberating Nanjing and Shanghai, and the Kuo-

mintang government had fled to Guangzhou (Canton). The liberation of the whole country was only a matter of time, and the Tibetan people were to put an end to the control and aggression of the imperialists to which they had been subjected for more than half a century. However, the U.S. and British imperialists would not give up their designs on Tibet. The Tibetan separatists, on their instructions, evacuated the Tibet Office in Nanjing just before the liberation of the city by the People's Liberation Army, and on July 8, 1949, the Tibetan authorities, in a surprise move, told the Lhasa office of the Kuomintang government to "evacuate immediately its personnel and their families to the interior as a necessary measure to prevent the spread of Communism." At the same time they seized the Lhasa radio station, put government organizations stationed in Tibet and their staffs under armed surveillance and pressed them to leave Tibet. In addition, the Kashag gave notice over the radio station in Kalimpong in India to the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the Kuomintang government, saying "to make sure that no Communists remain in Tibet in disguise, we are asking all the personnel of the central authorities stationed in Tibet to evacuate. We have already informed them and their families that they must return to the interior within a specified time." As the Kuomintang government was then fleeing in great panic, it was completely beyond its ability to do anything about the matter. So its personnel and their families, numbering over a hundred, left for home via India in three batches by the specified time.

Apparently, the "Hans, go home!" incident was intended by the Tibetan separatist forces, who engineered it at the instigation of the U.S. and British imperialists, to sever all political ties between Tibet and the motherland. It also represented their vain attempt to check the advance of the People's Liberation Army to Tibet and carve Tibet out of China. An Indian news agency, voicing the opinion of the British imperialists, said in a dispatch dated July 27 that Tibet had never accepted China's suzerainty, and that the issue had been a source of "disputes." The dispatch went on to say that when the thirteenth Dalai Lama died, "China" only sent its representatives to offer condolences, and that for the enthronement of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, "China" again sent just its representatives, who, the

dispatch said, eventually stayed on in Tibet. A British news dispatch of the same day alleged that Britain never accepted "China's claim" that Tibet was part of China and was under its jurisdiction. UP reported from Washington on August 10 that foreign affairs authorities said that the Tibetan authorities were trying to break free of "China's nominal suzerainty" by exploiting the plight of "the Chinese government."

The Xinhua News Agency in an editorial published on September 2, 1949 expressed China's just and solemn stand with regard to the "Hans, go home" incident. The editorial read:

The expulsion from Tibet of the people of Han nationality and of the Kuomintang personnel in Tibet by those in power in the Tibetan region was plotted by the British and the U.S. imperialists and their follower, the Indian government of Nehru. This "anti-Communist" incident engineered by the British, American and Indian reactionaries in collusion with the local authorities of Tibet is aimed not only to prevent the Tibetan people from winning their liberation at a time when the liberation of the whole country by the People's Liberation Army is in sight, but also to turn them into colonial slaves of foreign imperialism by further depriving them of their freedom and independence.... In their vain attempt to swallow up Tibet, the British and Indian reactionaries have the audacity to deny the fact that Tibet is part of Chinese territory. Such denial is sheer nonsense uttered by the aggressors, for it is not supported by any maps published in China or in any foreign country, nor is it supported by any documents about China's internal and external affairs.... The People's Liberation Army is determined to liberate the entire territory of China that includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan Island and Taiwan; it will not stop until every single inch of the land of China is brought under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China.

On September 7, the *People's Daily* carried an editorial entitled "The Chinese People Are Determined to Liberate Tibet." It read:

It is understandable and should be regarded with approval that the Tibetan authorities drove out the mission in Tibet of the spurious Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the reactionary Kuomintang government.... But that is not the point. What is important is that behind the incident one sees the wild ambitions of the imperialists. They are attempting to drive a wedge between Tibet and the motherland by exploiting the opposition of Tibetan people and the

Tibetan minority peoples to the reactionary Kuomintang government's erroneous policy of discrimination against the national minorities. Like a bunch of looters robbing a burning house, the imperialists, at a time when the Kuomintang reactionary government is fast disintegrating and when the People's Liberation Army has not yet reached Tibet, are trying to steal Tibet from China, rob China of its territorial integrity and set the stage for their anti-Communist activities, hoping in vain to obstruct or delay the liberation of the Tibetan people and the Tibetan minority peoples so that they may keep them in enslavement. The Chinese people are firmly opposed to all these schemes.... The Tibetan local authorities alleged that it was to "prevent Communist activities" that they drove out the mission of the spurious Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. Such an allegation is entirely groundless; what is more, it is entirely wrong and extremely reactionary for them to use it as a pretext. Apparently they did so at the instigation of the British and U.S. imperialists in violation of the interests of the Tibetan people and the Tibetan minority peoples. The Tibetan people and the Tibetan minority peoples, long enslaved by the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries, should unite and lay bare the intrigues of the U.S. and British imperialists in order to remove the imperialist shackles on Tibet and prepare for the liberation of Tibet by the advancing People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the whole country.

These two editorials, published one immediately after the other and declaring that "the Chinese people are determined to liberate Tibet," threw the U.S. and British imperialists into confusion. Previously, the British mission in Lhasa had been handed over to the Indian government, and the British head of the mission, Hugh Richardson, was going to retire in 1949, to be replaced by an Indian official. However, following the "Hans, go home" incident, the Indian government suddenly announced that Richardson was going to stay with the mission for one more year. Richardson was an "old Tibet hand" and a vicious aggressor; he masterminded the "Hans, go home" and all the other incidents. That explains why the British imperialists and the Indian authorities decided to prolong his stay in Tibet.

The decision to extend Richardson's term of office drew the criticism of fair-minded Indians. An Indian newspaper, for example, said that India should have an independent foreign policy in

dealing with "Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet," and that "free India" should seek friendly cooperation with others and not meddle in their affairs. Instead, the paper went on to say, India seemed to be following the White House in its foreign policy as one would gather from the oust of the Sikkimese government and India's policy toward Nepal and Tibet.

To aid the Tibetan separatists in their vain attempt to resist the liberation of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army, the U.S. imperialists sent Lowell Thomas to Tibet in early August 1949. Posing as a "radio commentator," Thomas, an arch-spy, spent about two months in Lhasa and went home in October. Wrote Yershov in an article entitled "The Imperialist Conspiracy Against Tibet":

When Thomas returned to Calcutta on October 10 with what seemed to be a letter from the Dalai Lama to [President] Truman, he said that the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan regent and the foreign minister had come to the unanimous conclusion that they were capable of containing Communism, and that they "hoped to get outside help." When Thomas arrived in New York on October 16, he said that the Tibetan rulers "hoped that the U.S. would provide them with modern weapons and military advisers."*** According to U.S. press reports, the U.S. is prepared to recognize Tibet as an independent country, will support Tibet in its application for UN membership and provide the government of the Dalai Lama with military aid.

In his book *Out of This World*, Lowell Thomas, Jr. writes of the talks Thomas had with the Kashag in Lhasa.

These problems [Communism and China] were the main reason the Dalai Lama and his government had given us [Lowell Thomas and his son Lowell Thomas, Jr.] permission to visit Lhasa. By the lucky timing of our request we have been chosen to tell our countrymen about Tibet's international problems and to ask Washington what military aid the United States might be able to give Tibet.... The ministers [members of the Kashag], without any fancy camouflage, came to the point directly: "If the Communists strike Tibet, will America help? And to what extent?" [To this Thomas replied,] The Chinese Communists, if they invade, probably will do so by way of the northern plateau and desert, from the Kumbum and Lake Koko Nor region. By that route it

* Re-translated from the Chinese.

** Ibid.

is about six hundred miles to Lhasa. The first two hundred miles would be simple. But from then on it might not be too difficult for skillful guerrilla forces to harass an invader, cut his supply lines and make his venture too costly. The most important requirement, of course, is skilled guerrilla forces. To create these, Tibet needs arms and advice principally from the outside. Arms would include weapons especially adapted to guerrilla warfare, such as Garand rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades and mines. The kind of advice needed is technical instruction in the proper use and maintenance of this modern equipment, and in the most advanced methods of guerrilla strategy. I believe that there is sufficient manpower in Tibet for defence purposes, if it is properly equipped and trained.... Indeed, we got the impression in Lhasa that allied troops, beyond a small group of military advisers, would not be welcome.

One gathers from the book that those who asked for American "military aid" were only a handful of the pro-imperialist separatists in power; the broad masses of the Tibetan people and the majority in the upper circles were against any collaboration with the U.S. That was the impression Thomas gathered from his stay in Lhasa, which led him to say that "allied troops, beyond a small group of military advisers, would not be welcome."

Agreement Signed for Peaceful Liberation

The Chinese people won an epoch-making victory in their revolution in 1949. By then, the whole country except Taiwan and Tibet had been liberated, and on October 1 that year the founding of the Central People's Government was proclaimed in Beijing.

Towards the end of 1949, when the vanguard units of the People's Liberation Army reached the Ganze region east of the Jinsha River, preparations for the liberation of Tibet had begun. This development threw the U.S. and British imperialists and the Tibetan separatist clique into great confusion. UP reported in January 1950 that the Tibetan authorities, to show their "independence," was planning to send a "goodwill mission" to the U.S., Britain, India, Nepal and Beijing. What was behind this report was an attempt to get the Tibetan authorities to ask Britain and the U.S. to interfere with the liberation of Tibet by the People's Liberation

Army. In a statement published by the Xinhua News Agency on January 20, 1950, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry denounced and exposed this intrigue, and pointed out that the Kashag should be sending a delegation to Beijing to discuss ways of fulfilling the legitimate desire of the Tibetan people to be a member of the Chinese nation. The Xinhua dispatch read:

Everyone in the world knows that Tibet is part of Chinese territory and no one has ever refuted that. The Lhasa authorities have no right to authorize any "mission," still less to show their so-called "independence." That the governments of the U.S., Great Britain, India and Nepal should be chosen as the audience of the propaganda about Tibet's independence, and that such an attempt should have been publicized by the United Press of the U.S. shows that what is reported in the news dispatch, if not the fabrication of the U.S., is nothing more than a puppet show staged by the U.S. imperialists and their collaborators in their aggression against Tibet. What the Tibetan people want is to be a member of the national family of democracy of the People's Republic of China with appropriate regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government, as provided for by the Common Program of the People's Consultative Conference. If the Lhasa authorities send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate the peaceful liberation of Tibet on the basis of that principle, such a delegation will naturally be accepted. If not, and if the Lhasa authorities send an unlawful "mission" at the instructions of imperialist aggressors against the wishes of the Tibetan people for disruptive activities in betrayal of the motherland, such treasonable act of the Lhasa authorities will not be tolerated by the Central People's Government of China, and any country accepting such a mission will be regarded as hostile to the People's Republic of China.

When the Panchen's Council of Khenpos learned of the "goodwill mission," it voiced its opposition on behalf of Tibetan patriots in a telegram to the Central People's Government dated January 31, 1950. The telegram read:

We have just learned of the attempt of the reactionary Lhasa authorities to send their unlawful representatives to the U.S., Britain and other countries in the form of a "goodwill mission" to indicate that Tibet is "independent." This is an attempt made in collusion with the imperialists to defy the People's Government for the criminal purpose of detaching Tibet from the motherland in betrayal of Tibet's interests.

It is universally acknowledged that Tibet is Chinese territory; the Tibetan people consider themselves members of the Chinese nation. What the Lhasa authorities are doing violates the territorial integrity of the country against the wishes of the Tibetan people. In view of that, we, in the name of the Tibetan people, are urgently requesting the sending of a righteous army by the government to liberate Tibet, clear out the reactionaries and drive the imperialist forces from Tibet so that the defence of the country's southwestern frontier may be strengthened and the Tibetan people emancipated. We vow to serve the people and the motherland by providing leadership for Tibetan patriots and mobilizing the Tibetan people in general in our effort to assist the Liberation Army.

The refutations and warnings of the Foreign Ministry spokesman worked. The Kashag's mission dropped the idea of asserting Tibet's "independence" by visiting Britain, the U.S. and other countries. What it would like to do now, it said, was to meet the negotiators of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, but the purpose would be the same: keeping the People's Liberation Army off Tibet. AFP reported from Calcutta on May 6, 1950 that the Kashag's mission intended to "explain to Chinese Communist Party that Tibet wants to stay friendly with all countries and does not want to be an enemy of any of them, so that Mao Zedong may not send armed forces to attack the weakly defended border of their country." But contact between representatives of Tibet and the Central People's Government was the last thing the British and U.S. imperialists would like to see happen, not even a meeting in Hong Kong as proposed by the Tibetan mission for the purpose of keeping the People's Liberation Army out of Tibet. Reported the Kuomintang's Central News Agency from Taipei on June 16, 1950:

Any negotiations between Tibet and the Chinese Communist Party would inevitably end in the former's capitulation, which is something Britain and India would not accept. So Britain is manoeuvring to prevent the Communist Party and Tibet from entering into any direct negotiations, hoping this may delay the Communist attack on Tibet while waiting for changes in the International situation.

In a dispatch from London dated June 14, 1950, UP quoted the British Foreign Secretary as saying that Britain did not accept "the

* Re-translated from the Chinese.

claims of the Chinese Communist Party on Tibet"* and that the delay in granting the Tibetan mission entry visas into Hong Kong had been caused by Britain's suspicion of its intentions.

Because of the existence of serious misunderstandings caused by past events between the Tibetan people and the people of other nationalities of the motherland, notably the Han—a fact that had to be faced—the Central People's Government decided to use peaceful means to help the Tibetan people with their liberation, so that they would not be hurt in their feelings and there would be no danger of increased misunderstanding. In line with this policy the Xinhua News Agency pointed out in a dispatch dated January 20, 1950 that Tibet should send its representatives to Beijing to negotiate a peaceful liberation. But the Tibetan mission was abroad, and the imperialists would do everything they could to prevent it from going to interior China. In order to effect negotiation the Central People's Government sent on July 10, 1950 the Living Buddha Getag to Tibet. A well-known Tibetan patriot and Vice-Chairman of the Xikang Provincial People's Government, the Living Buddha was, by means of persuasion, to clear up all the misunderstandings the Kashag had about the Central People's Government so that talks could materialize at an early date between it and the Central People's Government.

As soon as the Living Buddha Getag arrived in Chamdo on July 24 on his way to Lhasa, he was held up by Tibetan soldiers as instigated by B. Ford, a British secret agent. On August 21, the Living Buddha was poisoned. "After being poisoned," reported Xinhua from Beijing on December 4, 1950, "Getag suffered stomachache and headache, vomited a yellow liquid mass; his nose ran with blood and pus and his limbs went dead. The next day (August 22) when he died, his skin turned black and would come off when touched. To destroy evidence of the murder, Ford had his body cremated and his entourage sent under escort to Lhasa."

Such outrages by the imperialists in Tibet prompted the Central People's Government to order the People's Liberation Army to march to Tibet to clear things up there and drive out the imperialists. In Chamdo the People's Liberation Army ran into the oppo-

* Re-translated from the Chinese.

sition of the Tibetan army commanded by the henchmen of the British and U.S. imperialists—the Tibetan separatist elements. Obviously, a little punishment was needed. On October 19, 1950, the People's Liberation Army liberated Chamdo, a strategically important town in central Xikang Province, and wiped out more than five thousand men of the Tibetan main force, crushing the attempt of the British and U.S. imperialists and the Tibetan separatist forces to obstruct the entry of the People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people.

With the liberation of Chamdo, the British and U.S. imperialists became even more frenzied in their clamouring. The *London Times* in an October 31, 1950 editorial entitled "Tibet" had the impudence to allege that China's sovereign rights in Tibet had no historical support. An AP London dispatch of November 3 reported that Britain was trying to determine whether the liberation of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army was "lawful." A spokesman of the British Foreign Office said that Britain did not know yet if the People's Liberation Army had crossed "the indisputable border of Tibet." AFP in a November 1 dispatch from London reported that Butler, leader of the Conservative Party, said that day that he hoped the "attack" on Tibet would wake the government of India and Pakistan to the necessity of adopting a more realistic approach. According to a Reuters story of October 30 from London, the liberal *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial warned Nehru that if China acted rashly in response to India's protests, Pakistan would do the same.

On October 21, 1950, the Indian government sent a note to the Foreign Ministry of China that read:

The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. The Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round to the admission of China into that organization before the close of the present session. The Government of India feels that military action on the eve of a decision by the Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's

Government to the United Nations and the Security Council.... The Government of India feels that the time factor is extremely important. In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition and any delay in settling the matter will not therefore affect Chinese interests, or a suitable final solution.

What the note said boiled down to two attempts: (1) to halt the advance of the People's Liberation Army to Tibet with the deceptive promise of support for the admission of China into the U.N., and (2) to make China believe that some delay in the solution of the Tibetan problem would "not affect Chinese interests."

On October 28, 1950, the Indian government sent another note to the Foreign Ministry. It said:

We informed the Chinese Government through our Ambassador of the decision of the Tibetan Delegation to proceed to Peking [Beijing] immediately to start negotiations. This Delegation actually left Delhi yesterday [the 25th]. In view of these facts the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable. We realize there has been delay in the Tibetan Delegation proceeding to Peking. This delay was caused in the first instance by the inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong for which the Delegation was in no way responsible.... Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there will naturally be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable....

To these notes the Central People's Government gave the following solemn reply:

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear: Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government. The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations, and it welcomes, therefore, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations. Yet the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure

for Peking. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, and whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated.

In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilize as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory Tibet, and threaten to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations Organization, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries toward China.... Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.

In still another note sent to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on November 1, 1950, the Indian government, in addition to defending its position with regard to what China said in its reply, said darkly that the sending of the People's Liberation Army to Tibet had "greatly added to ... drift towards general war," and asked to keep some of the special privileges that India had inherited from Britain in Tibet. The following are the main points of the note:

(1) The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Government of India's representation to them was affected by foreign influences hostile to China and categorically repudiate it. At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet.... (2) The Government of China are equally mistaken in thinking that the Tibetan Delegation's departure to Peking was delayed by outside instigation.... They are convinced that there has been no possibility of foreign instigation. (3) ... The Government of India's repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations were not, as the Chinese Government seem to suggest, unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly Government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concern-

ing its neighbours by peaceful methods. (4) Because of this the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their Delegation to Peking, and were glad that this advice was accepted.... In the circumstances the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when they learnt that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against a peaceful people. There has been no allegation that there has been any provocation or any resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step involving an attempt to impose a decision by force, could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan Delegation to proceed to Peking, unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations. (5) They cannot help thinking early operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world and to drift towards general war, which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid. (6) ... The presence of an Agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of a post and telegraph office at the trade route up to Gyantse.... For protection of this trade route a small military escort has been stationed at Gyantse for over forty years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet, and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at Lhasa Mission and the Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung have accordingly been instructed to stay at the posts.

To this note, the Central People's Government replied:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory; the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government.... This point has been recognized by the Indian government in its aide-memoire to the Chinese government dated August 26 this year. However, when the Chinese government actually exercised its sovereign rights, and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realize regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian government attempted to influence and obstruct

the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese government. This cannot but make the Chinese government greatly surprised.

After citing many indisputable facts showing how foreign forces had prevented the Tibetan mission from coming to Beijing for talks, the reply went on to say,

Although the Chinese government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully, it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the liberation of Changtu [Chamdo] further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet.

In conclusion the reply pointed out:

What the Chinese government can not but deeply regret is that the Indian government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese government—the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.... We consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is precisely the forces of those imperialist aggressors.... The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world toward war, and to defend world peace.

In all its notes the Indian government tried to score another point. It argued that since the Tibetan problem was to be solved peacefully, there was no justification for the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet. But since the Indian government accepted the fact that Tibet is Chinese territory, there was absolutely no reason for it to oppose the entry of the Chinese army into Tibet, an act that the Chinese army, whose duty it was to defend the country, was expected to perform, whatever the solution to the Tibetan problem. The fallacies of the Indian government were refuted by the *People's Daily* in an editorial on November 17, 1950. Entitled "No Interference With the Liberation of Tibet by the Chinese People Shall Be Tolerated," the editorial said:

The Indian government shows its total disregard of facts when it is trying to say that the advance of the People's Liberation Army to Tibet

conflicts with the desire of the Central People's Government to solve the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. The fact is that the peaceful solution of the Tibetan problem does not exclude the advance of the People's Liberation Army and must be based on the peaceful acceptance of the People's Liberation Army's advance as well.

To drive the imperialist forces out of Tibet, to liberate the Tibetan people, relieving them of their sufferings, and to forestall any suspicion and misunderstanding that the advance of the People's Liberation Army might give rise to among the Tibetan people, "A Policy Proclamation Regarding the Military Advance to Tibet" was issued on November 10, 1950 by the Military and Administrative Committee of the People's Liberation Army for Southwestern China and the Headquarters of the Southwestern Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army. In explicit terms the proclamation declared,

The People's Liberation Army, after entering Tibet, will protect all the lives and property of the entire ecclesiastical and lay population of Tibet. It will guarantee the freedom of religious belief for all the Tibetan people, protect all the lamaseries and help the Tibetan people in developing education, agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce with a view to improving the living condition of the people. The existing administrative and military systems of Tibet will not be changed. Tibetan troops will become a part of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. Clergymen, government officials and headmen of all ranks will carry on with their duties as usual. All the matters concerning reform in Tibet will be settled through consultation between the Tibetan people and the Tibetan leaders in strict accordance with the wishes of the former. Officials with pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang records may continue to hold their positions and will not be punished for that provided that there are facts showing that they have broken ties with the imperialists and the Kuomintang and that they do not engage in sabotage or resistance.

The proclamation went on to say:

The People's Liberation Army is a highly disciplined army.... It respects the religious belief, customs and habits of the Tibetan people.... It does not take anything away from the people, not even a needle or a length of thread.... It pays the full price for the manpower and transportation facilities it hires. Press-ganging and seizing livestock from the people are unknown to the People's Liberation Army.

As the People's Liberation Army units entering Tibet abided by the proclaimed policies to the letter and maintained strict discipline, they were warmly received by the Tibetans of all circles in Xikang upon their arrival in Chamdo.

The U.S. turned frenzied in their clamouring at the liberation of Chamdo. At a press conference in Washington on November 1, U.S. State Secretary Dean Acheson openly slandered China, calling the liberation by the Chinese people of their own territory of Tibet "aggression," saying that "the U.S. would regard as most unfortunate and serious any further Communist aggression in Asia." On November 15 El Salvador, a small South American country, put forward a motion at the U.N. General Assembly, asking it to form a committee to work out "appropriate measures" for the adoption by the General Assembly to deal with the Tibetan question. The Kuomintang's Central News Agency reported from Lake Success that "it is believed in Lake Success that the U.S. is the originator of El Salvador's motion." Meanwhile, the Tibetan separatist elements, at the instigation of the British imperialists, raised the so-called "Tibetan issue" to the U.N. through a "complaint" to the organization. Immediately, Great Britain gave it its support. Reuters reported from London on November 14 that Britain would give its full support to "Tibet's complaints" that had reached the Security Council "against the interference by the Chinese Communists."

Meanwhile, in concert with these intrigues, efforts continued to prevent the Tibetan mission, stranded in India, from going to Beijing for negotiations. The Indian government had said in its notes that the mission had left New Delhi on October 25; but it did not come to Beijing. The *People's Daily* in an editorial on November 17, 1950 made the truth known. The editorial said:

According to various sources, the British High Commissioner in New Delhi and other foreign imperialists made every effort to persuade the Lhasa delegation, during its prolonged stay in India, not to reach any agreement with the Central People's Government. It was not until August 12 that the Indian government, knowing that our government would soon begin the military advance to Tibet, indicated to our government that the British government would no longer withhold its visas from the Tibetan delegation, thus giving the delegation the convenience to depart for Beijing. However, more than two months

have elapsed and there is still no sign of the delegation coming to Beijing. Apparently, the delay is the result of the instigation and obstruction of foreign countries; they should, therefore, be held responsible for sabotaging the peace negotiations.

The liberation of Chamdo came necessarily as a great shock to the ruling circles of Tibet and threw them into chaos. A handful of separatists headed by Regent Taktra abducted the eighteen-year-old fourteenth Dalai Lama to Yadong; from there they planned to take the young Dalai abroad to live in exile as the thirteenth Dalai did, and return to Tibet in the event of a third world war. But the plan was opposed not only by the Tibetan people but also by the three great monasteries, which played a decisive role in Tibetan politics. Many of the *khenpos* and *kaloons* close to the Dalai were also against the Dalai's flight to India, and stood in favour of negotiation with the Central People's Government. Because of that the Dalai halted his journey after he arrived in Yadong. In the meantime, the group in power in Tibet was divided into two opposing camps; one was in favour of flight, and the other, the majority, was against it. Their division was said to be so irreconcilable that at one point it threatened to become an armed conflict.

The struggle ended in the victory of the anti-imperialist and patriotic camp that represented the wishes of the Tibetan people over its separatist opponents. In the spring of 1951, Regent Taktra stepped down, returning temporal power to the fourteenth Dalai. (By Tibetan tradition the Dalai Lama assumes temporal power at the age of eighteen.) In February that year the Dalai sent to Beijing a five-men negotiating team with Kaloön Ngabou Ngawang Jigme as the chief delegate. With this the plot of the British and U.S. imperialists to keep Tibet from entering into direct negotiation with the motherland ended in failure.

In Beijing the Tibetan delegation held talks with the delegation of the Central People's Government headed by Li Wei-han. The negotiations proceeded smoothly; it took the negotiators only one month to reach agreement on all important issues. On May 23, 1951, "The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was signed in the Hall of Industrious Government in Zhongnanhai. The agreement consists of seventeen articles, the

main points of which are:

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland—the People's Republic of China.

2. The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.

3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

4. The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Erdeni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Erdeni are meant the status, functions and powers of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and of the ninth Panchen Erdeni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be re-organized step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the People's Republic of China.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step, in accordance with the actual conditions

in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms on its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government shall have centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work.

Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and various quarters concerned, and shall be submitted to the Central People's Government for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall be provided by the Central People's Government. The local government of Tibet should assist the People's

Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

The peace agreement not only defines clearly the relationship between Tibet and the motherland; it ended the disharmony between the Dalai and the Panchen, a problem that had remained unsolved for the Tibetan nationality for thirty years. The agreement also represents the highly successful effort of the Chinese Communist Party to solve an extremely complicated inter-ethnic problem of a country, and the problem of the unity of an ethnic group itself, problems that no ruling class in Chinese history, the Qing Dynasty and the Kuomintang government included, had the ability or capability to solve.

Following the signing of the peace accord, the fourteenth Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from Yadong on August 17, 1951. On October 26 the People's Liberation Army units arrived in Lhasa to the welcome of the Kashag and the lay and monastic population. By now the abnormal relations that had existed for forty years between the Tibetan region and its people, and the central authorities had come to an end, and Tibet, having shaken free of imperialist control and plunder, had returned to the big family of the motherland.

The Dalai Lama Welcomes the Return of the Panchen

The peaceful liberation of Tibet was followed by another event of great importance in modern Tibetan history: in April 1952 the tenth Panchen Erdeni returned to Tibet honourably and without opposition. Returning with him were the entire staff of the Council of Khenpos and the representatives from the Northwest China Military and Administrative Committee to the Panchen headquarters, who formed the escort.

Following the death of the ninth Panchen in Jyekundo in Qinghai in 1937, the Council of Khenpos, as required by religious

formalities, sent out search parties to look for the reincarnate soul boy of the Panchen. In 1941 a soul boy was found in a Tibetan family in the township of Wendu in Xunhua County, Qinghai Province. The four-year-old boy, Gonpo Tsetan, was then taken to the Kumbum Monastery where he was accommodated. At the same time the Kashag found two other soul boys. It informed the Tashilhunpo of its discoveries, and told it to bring the soul boy in the Kumbum to Tibet for the confirmation formalities. In 1947, Wang Lejie, the Secretary-General of the previous Panchen, was sent to Qinghai to discuss the matter of confirmation with the Council of Khenpos. The Council, while saying that the confirmation formalities would not be necessary because they were positive that the Qinghai boy was the genuine "reincarnation" of the ninth Panchen, was of the opinion that it would be unwise for the prospective Panchen to go to Tibet until the relationship between Tibet and the motherland was normalized. This the Kashag was informed of by Wang Lejie who went to Tibet in 1948.

In the spring of 1949 Ji Jigme was sent to Guangzhou by the Council of Khenpos to ask Li Zongren, the acting president of the Kuomintang government, for official recognition of the Qinghai boy as the prospective Panchen and the permission to omit the confirmation formalities. On June 3, 1949, the Kuomintang government issued a decree that said, "The Qinghai soul boy, Gonpo Tsetan, known for his profound wisdom and intelligence, has been proved as the reincarnation of the ninth Panchen Erdeni and shall succeed as the tenth Panchen Erdeni without the confirmation formalities." On August 10, 1949, Guan Jieyu, Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, acting as special envoy of the Kuomintang government, presided over the enthronement of the Panchen as the legitimate tenth Panchen Erdeni.

In September 1949, following the liberation of Qinghai after the People's Liberation Army put to rout the local counterrevolutionary army of Ma Bufang, representatives of the Panchen came into contact with the People's Liberation Army. In a telegraphic message dated October 1, the day the People's Republic of China was founded, the Panchen paid his respects to Mao Zedong and Zhu De and expressed his support for the Central People's Government and the People's Liberation Army, and his hope for the early

liberation of Tibet. His message read:

For generations, the Panchen has been treated most generously and bestowed with many honours by the country. For more than twenty years [sic], I have never slackened my effort to defend the territorial integrity of Tibet, but nothing has been achieved, of which I feel most guilty. I am now staying in Qinghai, waiting for the order to return to Tibet. Thanks to the leadership of Your Excellencies, Northwest China has been liberated and the Central People's Government has been established—events that all the people who are proud of the country find highly inspiring. These accomplishments will surely bring happiness to the people and make it possible for the nation to stand on its feet again; and with these accomplishment the liberation of Tibet is only a matter of time. On behalf of all the Tibetan people, I am paying Your Excellencies the highest respects and pledge our whole-hearted support.

In a telegram of reply dated November 23, 1949, acknowledging the respects, Mao Zedong and Zhu De said,

The Tibetan people love the motherland and oppose foreign aggression. They disagree with the policy of the reactionary Kuomintang government and desire to be a member of the big family of a united, strong and prosperous new China where all the nationalities are equal. We hope you and the patriotic personages throughout Tibet will make a concerted effort for the liberation of Tibet and the unity of the Han and Tibetan people.

In April 1950, the Tibetan negotiating team sent by the Dalai arrived in Beijing; coming at the same time were the Panchen and the leading members of the Council of Khenpos. Besides paying their respects to Mao Zedong, they offered their opinions, expressed their hopes and made their requests regarding the negotiations then underway between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet. And through the mediating efforts of the representatives of the Central People's Government, rapprochement was achieved between the Dalai and the Panchen. Accordingly, Articles five and six of the peace agreement provide in fair and reasonable terms for the relations between the Dalai and the Panchen. With all that, the internal quarrel of the Tibetan people, a quarrel that had lasted for more than thirty years, was brought to an end.

In December 1951, the Dalai in a telegram he sent to the Panchen from Lhasa, said he was looking forward to the latter's early return to Tibet and to working together with him for a new Tibet, and told him that when he reached the border, the Kashag would send him an armed escort and he would be provided with transport facilities and manpower for the rest of his journey. On December 19, 1951, the Panchen, along with the entire staff of the Council of Khenpos and their families, left Xining for Tibet in the escort of the representatives from the Northwest China Military and Administrative Committee. In Xining the Panchen was seen off by Xi Zhongxun, Vice-Chairman of the Northwest China Military and Administrative Committee, who had come from Xi'an for this purpose.

The Panchen and his entourage arrived in Lhasa safely on April 28, 1952 to the enthusiastic welcome of the representatives of the central government, the People's Liberation Army's units in Tibet, the monastic and lay officials of the Kashag and the residents of Lhasa. On the afternoon of the same day a meeting that made history took place between the Panchen and the Dalai in the Potala.

The Panchen stayed in Lhasa for about a month. During this time officials representing the Dalai and the Panchen negotiated, on the basis of the peace agreement, the restoration of Panchen's status, functions and powers. The negotiations were highly successful.

The Panchen left Lhasa on June 9, 1952, and on June 23, he returned via Gyantse to his residence—the Tashilhunpo Monastery after more than thirty years of absence. A huge welcoming crowd of several ten thousand Tibetans had gathered there; they were Tibetans from the *dzongs*, *shikas*, lamaseries and pastoral areas of Tsang, some of whom had come from distant pastoral areas, and some of whom had been waiting for more than two months for the occasion. On the day the Panchen arrived in Shigatse, the Five-Star national flags made by the residents of the city and the Tashilhunpo monks fluttered atop all the buildings in the city, portraits of Mao Zedong were hung side by side with the images of Sakyamuni in almost all the rooms in the Tashilhunpo Monastery, and many old people wept for joy.

With that the Panchen's faction ended its exile of more than thirty years, and harmony among the Tibetan people was restored.

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